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DISSERTATIONS

MORAL AND CRITICAL.

Literary Society of Bombay

DISSERTATIONS

MORAL AND CRITICAL.

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ON MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.
ON DREAMING.
THE THEORY OF LANGUAGE.
ON FABLE AND ROMANCE.
ON THE ATTACHMENTS OF KINDRED.
ILLUSTRATIONS ON SUBLIMITY.

BY JAMES BEATTIE, LL. D.

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LONDON:

PRINTED FOR W. STRAHAN; AND T. CADELL, IN THE STRAND; AND W. CREECH AT EDINBURGH.

MDCCLXXXIII.

00059986

TO

THE MOST NOBLE

GEORGE

Marquis and Earl of HUNTLY, &c.

MY LORD,

THE DUCHESS OF GORDON having condeſcended to read the greater part of theſe papers; and to ſay, that they may be uſeful to Young Perſons, and that ſome things in them are not unworthy of Your attention; I am encouraged to make them publick, and have taken the liberty to inſcribe them to Your Lordſhip.

To

To regulate the principles, and form the taſte, of Young Men, has been my employment, and favourite ſtudy, for many years. I cannot affirm, that my ſucceſs has been equal to my wiſhes; for then it would have been great indeed: but I have the ſatisfaction to know, that my labour has not been vain. Let me, therefore, indulge the pleaſing hope, that Your Lordſhip, when a little further advanced in life, will one day do me the honour to declare, that the following Diſcourſes have afforded You ſome amuſement, and that You approve of the ſentiments conveyed in them. And, from that quickneſs of parts, gentleneſs of manners, and generoſity of mind, which You inherit from Your Noble Parents, may I not preſume, that the day is not far diſtant?

Of Your Noble Parents, My Lord, it is not eaſy for me to ſpeak, without the warmeſt expreſſions of admiration and gratitude. But their virtues, and the obligations I am under to them, are ſubjects, whereon They do not permit me to expatiate. If They did, Truth would oblige me to declare what might perhaps incur the ſuſpicion of flattery, and certainly

tainly would of oſtentation. Continue, My Lord, to be like Them: and You cannot fail to be a bleſſing to Your country, an ornament to Your high rank, and the delight of all who approach You; the friend of the poor, the comforter of the afflicted, and the patron of honeſt induſtry.

I have the honour to be, with ſincere affection,

My LORD,

Your Lordſhip's moſt humble

And moſt faithful Servant,

JAMES BEATTIE.

PREFACE.

HAVING, for ſome years, by circumſtances of a particular nature, known to my Friends, but of no importance to the Publick, been hindered from executing thoſe more extenſive plans of Moral Speculation, which I once projected; and being averſe and unaccuſtomed to idleneſs; I thought I might amuſe myſelf, in a way not wholly unprofitable to others, by tranſcribing and correcting certain papers, written a good while ago; which ſeveral perſons, who had read them, were pleaſed to approve, and had adviſed me to publiſh. Some of theſe are contained in this volume: others may poſſibly appear hereafter. They were at firſt compoſed in a different form: being part of a Courſe of Prelections, read to thoſe Young Gentlemen, whom it is my buſineſs to initiate in the Elements of Moral Science. This, I hope, will account for the plainneſs of the ſtyle; for the frequent introduction of practical and ſerious obſervations; for a more general uſe of the pronouns I and You than is perhaps quite proper in diſcourſes addreſſed to the Publick; and for a greater variety of illuſtration, than would have been requiſite, if my hearers had been of riper years, or more accuſtomed to abſtract inquiry.

I have been deſired to publiſh the whole ſyſtem of Lectures: but am prevented by many conſiderations; and by this in particular, that ſuch a work would be too voluminous, for my ability to perform, and for the patience of the Publick to endure. I therefore give only a few detached paſſages; and I beg they may be conſidered as ſeparate and diſtinct Eſſays.

The Reader will be diſappointed, if he expect to find in this book any nice metaphyſical theories, or other matters of doubtful diſputation. Such things the Author is not unacquainted with: but they ſuit not his ideas of Moral Teaching; and he has laid them aſide long ago. His aim is, to inure young minds to habits of attentive obſervation; to guard them againſt the influence of bad principles; and to ſet before them ſuch views of nature, and ſuch plain and practical truths, as may at once improve the heart and the underſtanding, and amuſe and elevate the fancy.

In the Diſſertation on Language there are indeed ſome abſtruſe inquiries, that may ſeem to have little of a practical tendency. But the ſubtleties inſeparable from that part of ſcience are not, even in the early part of life, hard to be underſtood, when explained in a ſimple ſtyle, and with a due regard to the gradual expanſion of the human intellect. To which I may add, that a philoſophical examination of the principles of grammar is a moſt profitable exerciſe to the mental powers of young people; and promotes, more perhaps than any other ſtudy within their ſphere, clearneſs of apprehenſion, and correctneſs of language.

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592.	12.	*read*	is the

ON

MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.

INTRODUCTION.

IF we were engroſſed by corporeal things only, and never thought of attending to what paſſes in our minds, we ſhould be in a great meaſure ignorant of the nobler part of our frame, as well as of thoſe principles of morality and ſcience, which are the glory of human nature, and the chief ſource of human happineſs. Reflection, Conſciouſneſs, or Internal Senſation, is that faculty whereby we attend to our own thoughts, and to thoſe various operations, which the mind performs without the aid of bodily organs. In ſeeing, we uſe the eye; in hearing, the ear; in ſmelling and taſting, the noſe and tongue; and every part of our body is an inſtrument of touch: but, when we employ ourſelves in recollection, invention, or inveſtigation; when we exert our conſciouſneſs in regard to the feelings, pleaſant or painful, that accompany our ſeveral paſſions and emotions; or when we meditate upon the morality of human conduct:—in theſe, and the like caſes, the mind does not ſeem to act by the intervention of any bodily part: nay, of theſe, and other in-

tellectual energies, we cannot but think, that a pure ſpirit may be much more capable than we. Accordingly, though mankind have at all times had a perſuaſion of the immortality of the ſoul, the reſurrection of the body is a doctrine peculiar to Chriſtianity, and met with no little oppoſition even in the Apoſtolick age: a proof, that, to mere human reaſon, it is more natural to think of the ſoul exiſting without the body, than to believe, that a re-union of theſe two ſubſtances after death is neceſſary to the happineſs and perfection of the former.

It is true, that the mind and the body do mutually and continually operate upon, and affect, each other. Reaſon is perverted by diſeaſe; nay, by the quantity and quality of what we eat and drink. Wounds on the head have impaired both the memory and the underſtanding. Anger, ſorrow, and other violent emotions of the mind, produce ſenſible and diſagreeable effects on the body: and cheerfulneſs and hope, benevolence and piety, are equally conducive to the welfare of our mental and corporeal frame. Intenſe thinking is apt to diſcompoſe the head and the ſtomach; and, if too long continued, may prove fatal to health, or even to reaſon. Extreme anxiety is ſaid to have changed the colour of the hair from black to white. Nay, it is well known, that, when certain evil humours predominate in the body, certain evil thoughts never fail to infeſt the ſoul; and that melancholy, and other ſorts of madneſs, may ſometimes be cured by phyſical applications. From theſe, and from many other facts of the ſame kind that might be mentioned, we may warrantably conclude, that, in the preſent life at leaſt, the mind, in the exerciſe even of theſe powers of reflection or conſciouſneſs, is not independent on the body. But we know, on what particular organs the ſoul depends for its knowledge of ſound and colour, taſte and ſmell: whereas, with what part of the body, Memory, for example, or Reaſon, or Imagination, is connected, we know not: neither can

we explain theſe faculties, by experiments made upon matter; or in any other way, than by attending to what paſſes in our minds.

This mode of attention ſeems to be one of thoſe peculiarities that diſtinguiſh man from the inferiour animals. Brutes ſee, and hear, and ſmell, and touch, and taſte, no leſs acutely, and ſome of them more acutely, than we. But they are affected, only or chiefly, with outward things; and ſeem incapable of what we call reflection or conſciouſneſs. They ſometimes look, as if they were thinking; but I know not, whether we ever ſee them act in conſequence of having deliberated: their impulſes to action are ſudden, and appear for the moſt part to be the effect of ſome bodily ſenſation. To a certain degree they are docile, and acquire experience; but all is, or ſeems to be, the reſult of habit co-operating with inſtinct. Give a brute his food, the ſociety of his fellows, and the means of ſecurity and reſt; give him, in a word, thoſe external things, which the inborn propenſities of his nature require; and nothing can be wanting to his felicity: memory will not torment him with former evils; nor imagination with thoſe that are to come. But, in the midſt of affluence and peace, and with every thing to gratify corporeal ſenſe, man is often wretched: the reflections of his mind, the conſciouſneſs of what he has done, the remembrance of paſt, and the anticipation of future calamity; to ſay nothing of the evil paſſions of pride, envy, and malevolence; may poiſon all the gifts of fortune, and make him ſenſible, that human happineſs and miſery depend upon the ſoul, and not upon the body; upon what we *think* (if I may ſo expreſs myſelf), rather than upon what we *feel*. I will not ſay, however, that all the inferiour animals are void of reflection. The more ſagacious among them do give ſome faint indications of ſuch a power: but they probably poſſeſs it in no higher degree, than is barely neceſſary to their preſervation. Whereas, if we conſider what ſort of creature man would be, if he had no faculties but the

outward ſenſes, we ſhall be ſatisfied, that from theſe internal powers both his dignity and his happineſs ariſe.

Of theſe, as well as of the outward ſenſes, there is conſiderable variety. Memory, Imagination, Reaſon, Abſtraction, Conſcience, are faculties of the human ſoul, as well as Hearing, Seeing, Touching, Taſting, and Smelling: the latter employed in perceiving, by means of bodily organs, material things and their qualities; the former exerted, with no dependence on the body that we can explain, in perceiving the human mind and its operations, and the ideas or thoughts that paſs in ſucceſſion before it.

Memory and Imagination are the objects of the preſent inquiry. In treating of them, I ſhall avoid all matters of nice curioſity; and confine myſelf to ſuch as ſeem to promiſe amuſement, and practical information.

OF MEMORY.

IN the proſecution of this ſubject, I ſhall, firſt, mark the difference between Memory and Imagination: ſecondly, take notice of ſome of the more conſpicuous laws and appearances of Memory: thirdly, propoſe rules for its improvement: and, fourthly, make ſome obſervations on the memory of brutes: and I ſhall conclude with a few inferences.

CHAP.

CHAP. I.

Difference between Memory and Imagination.

SOME philoſophers refer to Memory all our livelier thoughts, and our fainter ones to Imagination: and ſo will have it, that the former faculty is diſtinguiſhed from the latter by its ſuperiour vivacity. We believe, ſay they, in Memory; we believe not in Imagination: now we never believe any thing, but what we diſtinctly comprehend; and that, of which our comprehenſion is indiſtinct, we diſbelieve.—But this is altogether falſe. The ſuggeſtions of Imagination are often ſo lively, in dreaming, and in ſome intellectual diſorders, as to be miſtaken for real things; and therefore cannot be ſaid to be eſſentially fainter than the informations of Memory. We may be conſcious too of remembering that whereof we have but a faint impreſſion. I remember to have read books, of which I cannot now give any account; and to have ſeen perſons, whoſe features and viſible appearance I have totally forgotten. Nor is it true, that we believe, or diſbelieve, according to the vivacity, or the faintneſs, of our ideas. No man will ſay, that he has a diſtinct idea of eternity; and yet, every rational being muſt believe, that one eternity is paſt, and another to come. I have a livelier idea of Parſon Adams, than of the impoſtor Mahomet; and yet I believe the former to be an imaginary character, and the latter to have been a real man. I read, not long ago, Vertot's Revolutions of Sweden, and the Adventures of Tom Jones: I believe the hiſtory, and I diſbelieve the novel; and yet, of the novel I have a more lively remembrance, than of the hiſtory *.

* See an Eſſay on Truth, Part I. Chap. ii. Sect. 4.

Memory

Memory and Imagination, therefore, are not to be diſtinguiſhed, according to the livelineſs or faintneſs of the ideas ſuggeſted by the one, or by the other. The former may be faint, while the latter is lively: nay, a great Poet has obſerved, that,

> Where beams of warm Imagination play,
> The Memory's ſoft figures melt away *:

A maxim, which, though not always, will ſometimes be found to hold true.—Beſides, belief may be ſaid to imply diſbelief. If I believe the exiſtence of Julius Ceſar, I diſbelieve his non-exiſtence. If I admit the hiſtory of that commander to be true, I reject every ſuſpicion of its being falſe. And yet, of Julius Ceſar, and his actions, my ideas are equally clear, whether I believe or diſbelieve. The faculties in queſtion I would therefore diſtinguiſh in the following manner.

"I *remember* to have ſeen a lion; and I can *imagine* an elephant, "or a centaur, which I have never ſeen:"—he, who pronounces theſe words with underſtanding, *knows* the difference between the two faculties, though perhaps he may not be able to *explain* it. When we remember, we have always a view to real exiſtence, and to our paſt experience; *it occurs to our minds*, in regard to this thing which we now remember, that we formerly heard it, or perceived it, or thought of it †; "I remember to have ſeen a lion:"—When we imagine, we contemplate a certain thought, or idea, ſimply as it is in itſelf, or as we conceive it to be, without referring it to paſt experience, or to real exiſtence; "I can imagine ſuch a figure as that "of the elephant, though I have never ſeen one; or a centaur, with

* Pope's Eſſay on Criticiſm.

† Αει γαὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, ὅτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν, ἢ ἤσθετο, ἢ ἐνόησεν. Ariſtot. de Memoria et Reminiſcentia, cap. 1.

"the

" the head and ſhoulders of a man joined to the body of a horſe, " though I know that there is no ſuch animal on earth." I remember what has actually happened, and what, in conſequence of my remembering, I believe to have happened: I can imagine a ſeries of adventures, which never did, or which never can, happen. He who writes the hiſtory of his own life, or who compiles a narrative from the books he has read, is guided by the informations of Memory: he who compoſes a romance, puts thoſe things in writing, which are ſuggeſted by his Imagination.

A friend deſcribes an adventure, in which he ſays that he and I were engaged twenty years ago, and informs me of what I ſaid and did on the occaſion: I tell him, that I can diſtinctly imagine every thing he relates, but that I remember nothing of it. He mentions a circumſtance, which on a ſudden brings the whole to my memory. You are right, I then ſay; for now I remember it perfectly well. At firſt, I could only imagine the facts he ſpoke of: but, though I might believe his word, I could not recal any experience of mine, by which, in this particular caſe, it might be verified. But now, my memory informs me, that the adventure was real, and that I was an agent in it, and an eye-witneſs. Hence it appears, that in ſome caſes Imagination may become Remembrance. And it may be further obſerved, that Remembrance will ſometimes decay, till it be nothing more than Imagination: as when we retain the appearance of an object, without being able to affirm with certainty, where we perceived, or whether we ever perceived it: a ſtate of mind, which one is conſcious of, when one ſays, " I either ſaw ſuch a thing, or I " dreamed of it."

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Phenomena and Laws of Memory.

SECT. I.

General account of this Faculty.—Whether we have reaſon to think that it is connected with the Brain.

I PROCEED, in the ſecond place, to take notice of ſome of the more remarkable phenomena of Memory.

This is a faculty, which, if it were leſs common, and we equally qualified to judge of it, would ſtrike us with aſtoniſhment. That we ſhould have it in our power to recal paſt ſenſations and thoughts, and make them again preſent, as it were: that a circumſtance of our former life ſhould, in reſpect of us, be no more; and yet occur to us, from time to time, dreſſed out in colours ſo lively, as to enable us to examine it, and judge of it, as if it were ſtill an object of ſenſe:—theſe are facts, whereof we every day have experience, and which, therefore, we overlook as things of courſe. But, ſurely, nothing is more wonderful, or more inexplicable. If thoughts could occupy ſpace, we might be tempted to think, that we had laid them up in certain cells or repoſitories, to remain there till we had occaſion for them. But thoughts cannot occupy ſpace; nor be conceived to have any other exiſtence, than what the mind gives them by meditating upon them. Yet, that which has been long forgotten, nay, that which we have often endeavoured in vain to recollect, will ſometimes, without any effort of ours, occur to us, on a ſudden, and, if I may ſo ſpeak, of its own accord. A tune, for example, which I hear to-day, and am pleaſed with, I perhaps endeavour to

remember to-morrow, and next day, and the day following, without ſucceſs: and yet, that very tune ſhall occur to me, a month after, when my mind is taken up with ſomething elſe. Where, if I may aſk the queſtion, were my ideas of this tune, when I wiſhed to recollect them, and could not? How comes it, that they now preſent themſelves, when I am not thinking of them at all? Theſe queſtions no man can anſwer: but the fact is certain.

Often, when we do not immediately call to mind what we wiſh to remember, we ſet ourſelves, as it were, to ſearch for it; we meditate on other things or perſons, that ſeem to be like it, or contrary to it, or contiguous *, or to bear any other relation to what we are in queſt of; and thus, perhaps, we at laſt remember it. This continued effort of voluntary remembrance is called Recollection. It reſembles the procedure of thoſe, who, miſſing ſomething valuable, look for it in every place where they think they might have been when they dropped it; and thus recover what they had loſt. For the laſt mentioned fact it is eaſy to account. A jewel, or a piece of coin, is a viſible, tangible, and permanent thing, and muſt remain in its place till it be removed: and, if we come to that place, and examine it with attention, we can hardly fail to find what we are in queſt of. But, where a thought ſhould be, when it is forgotten; how it ſhould have any permanency or any exiſtence, when it is no longer in the mind; and what ſhould reſtore it to our memory, after a long interval of forgetfulneſs; are points, whereon human wiſdom can determine nothing.

Is it not wonderful, that old men ſhould remember more accurately what happened fifty years ago, than the affairs of laſt week? And yet that, in many caſes, our remembrance of any fact ſhould

* Διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς ζητεύομεν νοήσαντες ἀπὸ τῶν νῦν, ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς, καὶ ἀφ' ὁμοίου, ἢ ἐναντίου, ἢ τοῦ συνεζυγος. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ ἀναμνησις.

Ariſtot. de Memoria et Reminiſcentia, cap. 2.

be accurate in proportion to its recency? It may be ſaid, indeed, that the more we attend, the better we remember; and that old men are forgetful of thoſe things only, to which they are inattentive; for that not one of them ever forgot the place where he had depoſited his money. All this is true, as Cicero remarks in his book on Old Age: but how we come to remember that beſt, to which we are moſt attentive, we can no otherwiſe explain, than by ſaying, that ſuch is the law of our nature.

To account for this, and other phenomena of Memory, by intermediate cauſes, many authors, both antient and modern, were fain to ſuppoſe, that every thing perceived by us, whether a thought of the mind, or an external object, every thing, in a word, that we remember, makes upon the brain a certain impreſſion, which, remaining for ſome time after, is taken notice of by the mind, and recognized, as the mark of that particular ſenſation or idea; and that this ſenſation or idea, thus obtruded upon us anew, gives riſe to remembrance. They ſuppoſed further, that attention to the thing perceived deepens this impreſſion, and, conſequently, makes it more durable; while that, to which we ſlightly attend, makes but a ſlight impreſſion that ſoon wears out. When the brain itſelf is diſordered, by diſeaſe, by drunkenneſs, or by other accidents, theſe philoſophers are of opinion, that the impreſſions are diſfigured, or inſtantly eraſed, or not at all received; in which caſe, there is either no remembrance, or a confuſed one: and they think, that the brains of old men, grown callous by length of time, are, like hard wax, equally tenacious of old impreſſions, and unſuſceptible of new. Many plauſible things may indeed be ſaid, for ſolving the difficulties above mentioned, if we will only admit this theory. But it muſt, notwithſtanding, be rejected; and that for ſeveral good reaſons.

The human brain is a bodily ſubſtance; and ſenſible and permanent impreſſions made upon it muſt ſo far reſemble thoſe made

on

on ſand by the foot, or on wax by the ſeal, as to have a certain ſhape, length, breadth, and deepneſs. Now ſuch an impreſſion can only be made by that, which has ſolidity, magnitude, and figure. If then we remember thoughts, feelings, and ſounds, as well as things viſible and tangible, which will hardly be denied; thoſe ſounds, thoughts, and feelings, muſt have body, and, conſequently, ſhape, ſize, and weight. What then is the ſize or weight of a ſound? Is it an inch long, or half an inch? Does it weigh an ounce, or a grain? Does the roar of a cannon bear any reſemblance to the ball, or to the powder, in ſhape, in weight, or in magnitude? What figure has the pain of the toothach, and our remembrance of that pain? Is it triangular, or circular, or of a ſquare form? The bare mention of theſe conſequences may prove the abſurdity of the theories that lead to them.

Moreover; ſuppoſing impreſſions to be made on the brain, I would aſk, *how* the mind perceives them, and why at one time more than at another? Does the human ſoul go up to the *pia mater*, as a houſewife does to her garret, only at certain times? Or, if ſhe make it her place of abode, are there any corners of it which ſhe is unacquainted with, or neglects to look into? Nay, admitting this ſuppoſition, we ſhould be apt to conclude, from the facts already ſpecified, that ſome of theſe impreſſions do occaſionally force themſelves into notice, when the ſoul is differently employed; and that ſhe often looks for others, without being able to find them, as if they were loſt, or miſlaid.—To all which we may add, that the theory in queſtion ought not to find a place in philoſophy, becauſe incapable of proof from experience; it being impoſſible, with bodily eyes, to diſcover, in what way the human brain may be affected by thinking and perceiving.—And therefore, without employing more time in vain inquiries after the *cauſe* of remembrance,

let us be ſatisfied, if, from what we certainly know of this faculty, we can propoſe any rules for its improvement.

But, before I proceed to a more particular account of its appearances and laws, it may be proper to remark, that a ſound ſtate of the brain does in fact ſeem to be neceſſary to the right exerciſe of Memory, as well as of our other intellectual powers. Memory is often ſuſpended during ſleep, and is alſo impaired by diſtemper, by old age, and by ſudden and violent accidents. Thucydides, in his account of the plague at Athens, relates, that ſome perſons ſurvived that dreadful diſeaſe, with ſuch a total loſs of memory, that they forgot their friends, themſelves, and every thing elſe. I have read of a perſon, who, falling from the top of a houſe, forgot all his acquaintance, and even the faces of his own family; and of a learned author, who, on receiving a blow on the head by a folio dropping from its ſhelf, loſt all his learning, and was obliged to ſtudy the alphabet a ſecond time. There goes a ſtory of another great ſcholar, who, by a like accident, was deprived, not of all his learning, but only of his Greek.—One may queſtion ſome of theſe facts: but what follows is certainly true. I know a clergyman, who, upon recovering from a fit of apoplexy about ſixteen years ago *, was found to have forgotten all the tranſactions of the four years immediately preceding; but remembered as well as ever what had happened before that period. The newſpapers of the time were then a great amuſement to him; for almoſt every thing he found in them was matter of ſurpriſe: and, during the period I ſpeak of, ſome very important events had taken place, particularly the acceſſion of his preſent Majeſty, and many of the victories of the laſt war. By degrees he recovered what he had loſt; partly by the ſpontaneous revival of his memory, and partly by information. He is ſtill

* It was, I think, in the year 1761,

alive,

alive, though old and infirm; and as intelligent as people of his age commonly are.—I may further mention, that I have ſeveral times in my life been in a ſwoon: twice, as I remember, by falls from a horſe; and once, on going ſuddenly to a great fire, from the damp air of a winter night: and that, on each occaſion, I obſerved, as others in like caſes have done, that, when I recovered, I had utterly forgotten what happened juſt before the deliquium came on, and was not a little ſurpriſed when the perſons preſent told me of the circumſtances. A like failure of Memory I have once and again been conſcious of, when awake and in health, on being ſtartled at ſome alarming incident.—Theſe facts prove, that our ſoul and body are cloſely united, and do mutually affect each other; and that, by diſorders in the brain and other contiguous parts, the intellectual powers may be diſcompoſed. But from theſe facts we are not warranted to infer, either that the brain is the organ of Memory, or that impreſſions are made on it by what we externally or internally perceive; or that, ſuppoſing them to be made, they are at all neceſſary to remembrance.

SECT.

SECT. II.

The Subject continued.—Laws of Memory.—Importance of Attention.

THE moſt lively remembrance is not ſo lively as the ſenſation from which it is derived: and, for the moſt part, Memory becomes more faint, as the original ſenſation becomes more remote in time. What I ſaw laſt year, I remember more diſtinctly than what I did not ſee theſe ſeven years. This, however, is not always the caſe. Old men can give a more exact account of what happened in their youth, than of more recent events. And any man remembers better the face of a dear friend whom he has not ſeen for many days, than that of an indifferent ſtranger whom he chanced to ſee yeſterday. Of the books, too, which we read, and of the narratives which we hear, every one knows, that ſome we forget immediately, and that others we retain long.

That is likely to be long remembered, which at its firſt appearance affects the mind with a lively ſenſation, or with ſome pleaſureable or painful feeling. Thus we remember more exactly what we have ſeen, than what we have only heard of; and that which awakened any powerful emotion, as joy, ſorrow, wonder, ſurpriſe, love, indignation, than that which we beheld with indifference. Here we diſcern the reaſon of a cruel piece of policy, which is ſaid to be practiſed in ſome communities, and was once, I believe, in this; that of going round the lands once a year, and at every landmark ſcourging one or two boys, who were taken along for that purpoſe. For it was preſumed, that thoſe boys could never forget the places where they had ſuffered pain; and would of courſe be able, when grown up, or grown old, to give teſtimony concerning the boundaries,

if any diſpute ſhould ariſe on that ſubject. We all know the difference between a diſcourſe or narrative which we forget as ſoon as we hear, and one that leaves a laſting impreſſion. The former gives no entertainment, and awakens no paſſion: the latter amuſes with a variety of examples and images, or by the force or beauty of the ſtyle; or gives riſe to wonder, hope, fear, pity, laughter, or other lively emotions.

The antient moraliſts were at pains to illuſtrate their precepts by examples, parables, and other alluſions to things external. This made the hearer both underſtand their meaning, and retain it: for in thoſe days, recourſe could ſeldom be had to books; and it was neceſſary for the people to remember what was delivered to them, if they intended to profit by it. Religious, political, and moral doctrines, when enforced by facts and appoſite examples, loſe their abſtract nature, and become, as it were, objects of ſenſe; and ſo engage attention, are eaſily underſtood, make a deep impreſſion upon the mind, and produce a durable remembrance. This ought to be carefully attended to, by thoſe whoſe buſineſs it is to inſtruct mankind by ſpeaking to them. What is written is permanent, and may be reviewed at leiſure; but what is addreſſed to the ear is immediately gone; and, if it take no hold of the Memory, is good for nothing.

The force wherewith any thing ſtrikes the mind, is generally in proportion to the degree of attention we beſtow upon it. And therefore, what we attend to, is better remembered, than what we conſider ſuperficially. Inattentive people have always bad memories. At leaſt, their memory is bad in regard to thoſe things to which they are inattentive:—for there is no perſon of a ſound mind, who has not ſome purſuit, and ſome favourite ſphere of obſervation. If our attention is engaged by matters of importance; by the duties and decorums of life; by hiſtorical facts; by philoſophical reſearches;

by

by the trade, manufactures, and other political concerns of our country; our Memory will be ſtored with matters of importance: but if we are captivated by trifles only, we ſhall remember only trifles. It is therefore of great moment, that the views and attentions of young people be properly directed. Where parents are given to fooliſh talk, or inſipid ſtory-telling, children often acquire the ſame propenſity. For it is certain, that the bent of the genius is partly determined by thoſe early habits of attention or inattention, whereby the memory is either enriched with what is valuable, or encumbered with what is frivolous.

The great art of Memory is attention. Without this, one reads, and hears, to no purpoſe. And we ſhall be more or leſs profited by what we read or hear, as the objects of our attention are more or leſs important. To read in haſte, or without reflecting on what we read, may amuſe a vacant hour, but will never improve the underſtanding. And therefore, while we peruſe a good author, let us, from time to time, lay the book aſide, and propoſe to ourſelves the following queries. What is it this author aims at? What is his general plan? How far has he proceeded in his ſubject? If I were to give without book a ſummary of the laſt chapter, how ſhould I expreſs myſelf? Is the author quite clear and ſatisfactory in what he has hitherto advanced? If he is not, what are his principal defects? How much of his ſubject is ſtill before him? From what I know of his plan, of the parts he has already gone through, of his principles, and of his method of illuſtration, may I not form conjectures in regard to what is to follow?—It is this ſort of intellectual exerciſe, that improves both the Memory and the Judgment, and makes reading equally agreeable and beneficial.—And, in like manner, after hearing a diſcourſe, or bearing a part in converſation, it may be of uſe to recollect the heads of it: taking care to treaſure up thoſe ſentiments that were remarkable for their truth or beauty, or that

came recommended by the piety or benevolence of the ſpeaker; and overlooking every levity, ſophiſtry, and ill-natured obſervation, that ſeemed to betray depravity of principle, or hardneſs of heart. By cheriſhing habits of Attention, and of Recollection, in the various circumſtances of life, the mind is continually improved; but idleneſs, inadvertence, and inaccuracy, extinguiſh genius, and eradicate virtue.

When we are engroſſed by a multiplicity of affairs, new objects command but a ſlight Attention, unleſs they be very ſtriking. And therefore, thoſe things are moſt attended to, and beſt remembered, which occur when the mind is at eaſe, and unemployed; as in the early part of life, or in the morning. Hence, that is well remembered, of which we have had a previous expectation: for this diſengages the mind from other concerns, and prepares us to attend to that which we look for, as ſoon as it ſhall appear. When, therefore, we take up a book, with a view to profit by it, we ought to lay all other buſineſs aſide, and prevent, as much as poſſible, the intruſion of impertinent ideas. This will not only aſſiſt Memory, but alſo give ſuch a variety to our thoughts as may prove very ſalutary to the ſoul. For the ſame train of thinking too long purſued is often detrimental to health, and ſometimes even to reaſon.

The rule here hinted at ſhould never, on any occaſion, be forgotten. It is a matter of no ſmall importance, that we acquire the habit of doing only one thing at one time: by which I mean, that while employed on any one object our thoughts ought not to wander to another. When we go from home in queſt of amuſement, or to the fields for the ſake of exerciſe, we ſhall do well to leave all our ſpeculations behind; if we carry them with us, the exerciſe will fatigue the body without refreſhing it; and the amuſement, inſtead of enlivening, will diſtract, the ſoul: and, both in

the one caſe, and in the other, we ſhall confirm ourſelves in thoſe habits of inattention, which, when long perſiſted in, form what is called an *abſent man*. In converſation too, let us always mind what is ſaying and doing around us, and never give the company ground to ſuſpect, that our thoughts are elſewhere. Attention is a chief part of Politeneſs. An abſent man, provided he is good-natured, may be born with, but never can be agreeable. He may command our eſteem, if we know him to be wiſe and virtuous; but he cannot engage our love. For inattention implies negligence, and neglect often proceeds from contempt: if, therefore, we find that we are not attended to, we ſhall fancy that we are neglected, and to a certain degree deſpiſed: and how is it poſſible to repay contempt with kindneſs! And when unkindneſs and diſſatisfaction prevail in any ſociety, all the comforts of it are at an end.—Beſides, if we are not ſtrictly obſervant of every thing that paſſes in company, we cannot be either amuſed by it, or inſtructed: in other words, we deprive ourſelves of much innocent pleaſure, and uſeful information. For a great deal of our beſt knowledge is obtained by mutual intercourſe: and for the moſt valuable comforts of life we are indebted to the ſocial and benevolent attentions of one another.

But, muſt one mind the inſipid prattle of thoſe who can neither inſtruct, nor entertain?—Provided it be inoffenſive, I anſwer, Yes: particularly, if they are, by their rank, or ſex, or age, or other circumſtances, entituled to more than ordinary regard. Avoid their company, if you pleaſe, and as much as you conveniently can; but, when you are in it, be attentive and civil. If you are, you contribute to their happineſs, which it is your duty to do; and you enſure their good-will, which is better than their hatred: you may, at the ſame time, improve yourſelf in benevolence and patience; you contract no evil habits of inattention; you will find entertainment

entertainment in the diſcovery of their characters, and ſo enlarge your acquaintance with the human heart; and it will be ſtrange indeed, if you do not gather ſomething from them, which may either inform by its novelty, or divert by its ſingularity.

Let it not be objected, that ſome great men, as Newton, have been remarkably abſent in company. Perſons, who are engaged in ſublime ſtudy, and who are known to employ their time and faculties in adorning human nature by the inveſtigation of uſeful truth, may be indulged in ſuch peculiarities of behaviour, as in men of common talents neither are, nor ought to be, tolerated. For, in regard to the former, we are willing to ſuppoſe, that, if they overlook us, it is becauſe they are engroſſed by matters of greater importance: but this is a compliment, which we ſhould not think ourſelves obliged to pay the latter, at leaſt in ordinary caſes. And I ſcruple not to ſay, that it would have been better for Newton *himſelf*, as well as for ſociety, if he had been free from the weakneſs abovementioned. For then, his thoughts, and his amuſements would have been more diverſified, and his health probably better, and his precious life ſtill longer than it was: and a mind like his, fully diſplayed in free and general converſation, would have been, to all who had the happineſs to approach him, an inexhauſtible ſource of inſtruction and delight.

If, therefore, we wiſh to have a due regard for others, or for ourſelves, let us endeavour to acquire a habit of ſtrict Attention at all times, and in all circumſtances; of Attention, I mean, to that, whatever it is, in which we happen to be engaged. It is true, that ſome of our cuſtomary actions may be well enough performed, even when we are thinking of ſomething elſe. We may put on our clothes, or (when alone) eat our victuals, or play an eaſy tune on a muſical inſtrument, and our mind be all the while taken up with other matters. But this we ought not to do often, leſt

we contract a habit of doing it; which will be, as far as it goes, a habit of Inattention, and therefore faulty; and which, though it take its riſe from trivial things, may gain upon us, till it come to affect our behaviour in things of moment.

Great, indeed, and many are the advantages of habitual Attention. Clearneſs of underſtanding, extenſive knowledge, and exact memory, are its natural conſequences. It is even beneficial to health, by varying the ſucceſſion of our ideas and ſenſations; and it gives us the command of our thoughts, and enables us at all times to act readily, and with preſence of mind. As they who live retired are diſconcerted at the ſight of a ſtranger; as he whoſe body has never been made pliant by exerciſe cannot perform new motions either gracefully or eaſily; ſo the man, who has contracted a habit of ruminating upon a few things and overlooking others, is fluttered, and at a loſs, whenever he finds himſelf, as he often does, in unexpected circumſtances. He looks round amazed, like one raiſed ſuddenly from ſleep. Not remembering what happened the laſt moment, he knows nothing of the cauſe of the preſent appearance, nor can form any conjecture with reſpect to its tendency. If you aſk him a queſtion, it is ſome time before he can recollect himſelf ſo far as to attend to you; he heſitates, and you muſt repeat your words before he underſtand them: and when he has with difficulty made himſelf maſter of your meaning, he cannot, without an effort, keep out of his uſual track of thinking, ſo long as is neceſſary for framing an explicit reply. This may look like exaggeration; but nothing is more certain, than that habits of Inattention, contracted early, and long perſiſted in, will in time form ſuch a character.

SECT. III.

The Subject continued.—Artificial Memory.—Of Penmanſhip, as connected with this Subject.

IT is difficult to commit to Memory what we do not underſtand. The effort is unnatural, as well as unprofitable. How cruel then, to compel children to get by heart long ſermons, and metaphyſical ſyſtems of theology, which, even if they were grown up, they would perhaps find to be above their reach! When young perſons have their minds thus loaded with words to which they cannot affix any meaning, they contract either a diſlike to literature, or a habit of reading without any attempt to underſtand: and ſometimes, their tender faculties, being overſtrained, loſe their native vigour; and parents, and teachers, equally aſtoniſhed and diſappointed, diſcover, when it is too late, that the child, inſtead of improving in wiſdom, becomes every day more and more an idiot. The Memory of children ought no doubt to be exerciſed from the beginning, that it may grow in ſtrength, and be ſtored with knowledge ſuited to their years. But let their taſks be proportioned to their ability, and their attention directed to ſuch things as they may eaſily comprehend; to the principles of grammar, the elements of natural and civil hiſtory, the plaineſt doctrines of morality and religion, to elegant pronunciation, and correctneſs of ſpeech and writing. By this management, their faculties will ripen, and their love of knowledge increaſe, and, as their fancy will be continually amuſed, their ſtudies can never prove detrimental to health. For children are by nature inquiſitive, and paſſionately fond of what is new. So that, if ſome degree of literary

literary ardour is not raiſed within them, there is, in all ordinary caſes, more reaſon to blame the teacher for want of ſkill, than the ſcholar for want of capacity.

Senſations, that bring pleaſure or pain, or give riſe to any paſſion, do eaſily imprint themſelves on the mind; as was already obſerved. To which we may add, that ſuch as are indifferent may be long remembered, if they are often repeated. Children ſoon make this diſcovery for themſelves; and, when preparing their leſſon, repeat over and over thoſe parts of it, which they wiſh to commit to Memory. Theſe repetitions fix the attention, keep other thoughts at a diſtance, produce a habit of arranging the words in a certain order, and make the ſenſe familiar to the underſtanding.

Every one muſt have obſerved, that the thoughts of his mind are apt to follow each other in a train; and that between thoſe which are contiguous there is for the moſt part ſome connection, either natural, or eſtabliſhed by cuſtom. They often ariſe in the mind in the order in which the original perceptions were received. Any part of a tune occurring to the Memory will naturally introduce the following notes in their order. The beginning of a ſentence with which we are acquainted puts us in mind of the ſequel: and teachers prompt the Memory of the ſcholar, by pronouncing the firſt letter or ſyllable of the word, on which he heſitates. If we have at any time conſidered two or more things as connected, that very circumſtance will eſtabliſh a connection between them; ſo as that the remembrance, or the view, of the one, will make us think of the other. Thus we may have ſeen a child put a thread about his finger, to keep him in mind of a commiſſion; and Quintilian tells us, that, for the ſame purpoſe, a Roman would turn the ſtone of his ring inward to the palm of his hand. If we think of a place which we know, in the town or country, we ſhall be

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apt at the ſame time, or immediately after, to remember the adjacent places, the perſons who live there, and any remarkable events that may have happened in that neighbourhood.

On this law of our nature was founded a curious invention, frequently ſpoken of by the old rhetoricians, under the name of the Artificial Memory; whereof both Quintilian and Cicero have given an account, but neither of them ſo diſtinctly as could be wiſhed. In thoſe days, publick orations were either extemporary, or recited from Memory: and as ſome of theſe laſt were very long, orators found it requiſite to deviſe a method of ordering the ſeveral parts in ſuch a manner, as that they might all be remembered in their proper connection and place. For the art I ſpeak of ſeems to have been intended to facilitate the remembrance, not ſo much of the words of an harangue, as of its heads, or topicks, or other ſubordinate diviſions.

For this purpoſe, they arranged in their Memory a number of contiguous places wherewith they were well acquainted; the apartments of a houſe, for example, or the buildings in a ſtreet: and, by long meditating on this ſet of places in a certain order, they came at laſt, on thinking of the firſt, to remember all the reſt ſucceſſively, each in its own ſituation. And it was neceſſary, that this habit of recollecting the places, readily, and without omiſſion or confuſion, ſhould be ſo thoroughly eſtabliſhed, as that there might be no riſque of its ever being loſt or impaired: for, as Quintilian obſerves, that Remembrance muſt be ſomething more than firm, which is to ſerve as a ſupport or baſis to another Remembrance. The orator then formed a kind of imaginary connection between theſe ſeveral places, and the ſeveral heads of the diſcourſe which he intended to deliver; between the firſt place, and the firſt head; the ſecond place, and the ſecond head; and ſo forward: and he revolved this imaginary connection in his mind, till

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the idea of each place ſuggeſted that of the head aſſociated with it; and, as the order of the places was fixed in the Memory, the order of the topicks was by this contrivance made equally permanent, and was with equal eaſe and certainty recollected. And hence, the ſeveral heads of a diſcourſe were called Places or Topicks: and, in alluſion to the ſame practice, we ſtill ſay, In the firſt place, In the ſecond place, In the third place.

In the places thus appropriated to the artificial Memory (ſuppoſing them the apartments of a houſe) there would be moveables; as ſtatues and pictures in one, warlike weapons in another, tables and couches in a third: or, if they did not admit of ſuch furniture, it would be eaſy for the orator to allot to each place (whatever it was) a certain number of ſymbols, or figures, or names, ranged in a certain manner. And thus, the ſubdiviſions of the ſeveral heads of his harangue, and even particular ſentiments in each ſubdiviſion, might be imprinted on his mind by a ſimilar mode of arrangement; the moveables, figures, or ſymbols, being diſpoſed in a certain order, that order fixed in the Memory, and particular ſubdiviſions and ſentiments aſſociated with them.

This ſeems to have been the nature of the Artificial Memory.—But, as was already obſerved, the accounts we have of it from the rhetoricians are not clear; and I am in doubt whether I underſtand them. If what is here ſaid be juſt, I cannot but think, with Quintilian, that the art was too complex, and that Memory may be improved by eaſier methods.

What is agreeable to our own ſentiments, inclinations, way of life, or courſe of ſtudy, we remember more eaſily than what is not ſo; becauſe we underſtand it better, and enter into it with a keener curioſity. Hence our own compoſitions, and the events that have happened to ourſelves, or our friends, or to perſons of our profeſſion, take faſter hold of our Memory, than thoſe in which

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we are not ſo particularly intereſted. A fact relating to agriculture makes a deep impreſſion upon the huſbandman; but is immediately forgotten by the mariner, or by the ſoldier, whoſe memory, however, is not leſs tenacious of maritime or military affairs. Moſt defects in Memory are owing to inattention. Could we attend to, and take a concern in, all topicks that occur in books, and in converſation, we ſhould poſſeſs what might be called an univerſal Memory. If our attentions are confined to a few things, the ſphere of our Remembrance will be narrow.

And here, I muſt blame ſome well-meaning parents and teachers, for deſiring children, when they go to church, or hear the ſcripture read, to be careful to remember a *note*, that is, a ſentence or ſhort paſſage. The conſequence is, that the child directs his whole attention to ſome one phraſe, and diſregards all the reſt. And ſo, in order to make him retain a ſingle aphoriſm, which perhaps he does not underſtand, and which he will probably forget before next morning, he is in a manner required by authority to be inattentive to what he hears; notwithſtanding that he is told it is of the utmoſt importance. Would it not be better, to recommend to him a general and uniform attention; and, when he is to give an account of what he has heard, rather to exerciſe his judgment, and aſſiſt his Memory, by appoſite queſtions in the Socratick method, than to inſiſt on his repeating a number of words in the exact form in which he heard them?

The more relations, or likeneſſes, that we find, or can eſtabliſh, between objects, the more eaſily will the view of one lead us to recollect the reſt. Verſe we remember better than proſe, becauſe of the relation in meaſure, as well as in ſenſe, that the words of the former bear to one another; and rhime better than blank verſe, becauſe lines in rhime bear to one another a relation in ſound, as well as in ſenſe and meaſure. Horace tells us, that in ſome coun-

tries laws were antiently written in verſe; in order, no doubt, that they might be the more eaſily remembered. And it is obſervable, that many of thoſe common proverbs, which every body remembers, have meaſure; that ſeveral of them have rhime; and that, in ſome, there is a ſameneſs of ſound in the initial letters of the words that compoſe them. Every coincidence of this kind is favourable to Memory *.

The more ſenſes we employ in perceiving things, the more eaſily will thoſe things be remembered. Thus, to read aloud, and with propriety, if we are accuſtomed to it, facilitates the remembrance of what we read, conveying it to the mind by the ear, as well as by the eye: but, if we are not accuſtomed to it, the ſound of our voice, and the fear of going wrong, will withdraw our attention, and prevent remembrance. Tranſcription is alſo, in many caſes, favourable to Memory. And if we tranſcribe ſlowly, in good order, in diſtinct paragraphs, without contractions, with a ſcrupulous nicety in punctuation and ſpelling, and with a reaſonable diſtance between the lines, we ſhall have a better chance to remember what we write, than if we were to throw it together confuſedly, and in haſte. For by all theſe means attention is quickened, and the original impreſſion made more lively.

And here, though faſhion ſhould determine againſt me, I will endeavour, on rational principles, to lay down ſome rules, in regard to that mode of penmanſhip, which I conceive to be moſt expedient for thoſe, who write with a view to aſcertain their knowledge, and improve their minds.

I take it for granted, that thoſe handwritings are the beſt, which are moſt durable and diſtinct, which do not occupy too much room, and may be performed with expedition: and that one is

* See Biſhop Lowth's learned Diſſertation prefixed to his Iſaiah.

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better, or worſe, as it partakes more, or leſs, of theſe qualities. Upon this principle, I muſt blame, in the faſhionable hands, all thoſe flouriſhes, that either require time, or mix with any other part of the writing; all thoſe heads and tails of letters, which are ſo long as to interfere with one another; and all thoſe hair-ſtrokes (as they are called) which are ſo fine as to be hardly viſible, or which require too great nicety in cutting the pen. Letters, that riſe and fall obliquely are not ſo diſtinct as thoſe of an erect form: and all individual letters I would conſider as blameable, which are known from their ſituation, but would not be known if they ſtood alone. What we call the body of the letter, by which I mean that part of it, which neither riſes above, nor falls below the line, ought in my opinion to be erect, or nearly ſo; of a ſquare figure, only a little narrower from right to left, than from top to bottom; and of a ſize equal, at leaſt, to that of large print. Thoſe parts of the letter, which riſe above, or fall below the line, ſhould be no longer than the body of the letter, that is, no longer than the line is broad: and ſomething more than the breadth of two lines ſhould be the ſpace between the lines, that the heads or tails of one row of letters may not touch thoſe of another; and that a little room may be left for interlineation, if that ſhould be neceſſary. Let the lines be perfectly ſtraight, and of an uniform breadth; let the points be accurately marked, and the words properly ſeparated: and though ſome ſtrokes of the pen may, and indeed muſt, be finer than others, there ſhould be no greater diſproportion, than is commonly ſeen in elegant printing. In a word, I would make the Roman printed letter the archetype, or pattern, of the written one: that being the moſt diſtinct, and one of the moſt beautiful characters I know; and withal ſo ſimple in the form as to have nothing ſuperfluous; and yet ſo diverſified, as that one letter can never be miſtaken for another. I do not mean, that the writer

ſhould imitate this character exactly. There muſt be more roundneſs in his ſtrokes, and more frequent joinings of one letter with another: and ſome of the Roman characters, as a and g, are not eaſily made with the pen, and therefore ſhould not be attempted. But I would have the penman conſider the Roman alphabet as the ſtandard: and if, between that and the preſent faſhionable hand-writing, he can hit the juſt medium, he will come near to realiſe my idea; and his work will have the diſtinctneſs and durability of print, and will at the ſame time admit of all neceſſary ſpeed in the execution. Nay, of the correctneſs of the compoſition, when thus written, he will be a more competent judge, than of that of ordinary manuſcripts, becauſe he will more clearly perceive what is written: and his Memory will be aſſiſted by the vivacity of the ſenſation it conveys to the eye, as well as by the diſtinct ideas it imparts to the underſtanding.

SECT. IV.

Different Appearances of Memory—in different Perſons,—and in the ſame Perſon at different Times.

THE appearances of Memory are not the ſame in all men, nor in the ſame man at all times. Inſtances are recorded of extraordinary Memory. Themiſtocles made himſelf maſter of the Perſian language in one year; and could call by their names all the citizens of Athens, whoſe number was twenty thouſand. Cyrus knew the name of every ſoldier in his army; Craſſus ſpoke every dialect of the Greek tongue; and Julius Ceſar could dictate to three ſecretaries at once, on three different ſubjects. Portius Latro, as we learn from Seneca, his intimate friend, remembered every thing that he committed to writing, though he wrote with the greateſt rapidity; and never forgot a word of what he had once remembered. The ſame author relates, that Cineas, who had gone to Rome as ambaſſador from king Pyrrhus, did, on the day after his arrival, though he had never been there before, ſalute every ſenator, and a great number of the Roman people, by their names: that another perſon, whoſe name is not recorded, on hearing a poet read a new poem, claimed it as his own, and, for a proof, rehearſed it from beginning to end, which the real author could not do: and that Hortenſius, after ſitting a whole day at a publick ſale, gave an account from Memory, in the evening, of all the things ſold, with the prices, and the names of the purchaſers; and that this account, when compared with what had been taken in writing by a notary, was found to be exact in every particular. I might alſo mention the noted ſtory of the mathematician Wallis, who,

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in bed, and with his eyes ſhut, extracted the cube root from a number conſiſting of thirty figures. Such force of Memory is wonderful: but, as an ingenious author obſerves *, we have no more reaſon to repine at the want of it, than at our not having the ſtrength of Samſon, or the ſwiftneſs of Achilles. If, in the diſtribution of good, our ſhare be equal to that of moſt other men, it becomes us to be content and thankful. In fact, though ſome men have no great capacity for that ſort of learning which is found in books; there are few, whoſe Memory is not equal to all the common affairs of life; and there is not, perhaps, one rational being, whoſe Memory is unſuſceptible of improvement.

Some men of good underſtanding complain of the weakneſs of their Memory: perhaps, becauſe they forget many things they wiſh to remember; or find themſelves deficient in the knowledge of that to which in the early part of life they were inattentive. And ſometimes, no doubt, this may be affectation: for there are people in the world, who would have us believe, that their knowledge is derived rather from their own ſagacity, than from the information of other men. But in fact, no perſon of good ſenſe can with reaſon complain of any great natural defect in this way. For, without experience and knowledge, it is impoſſible, in the common affairs of life, either to act, or to think aright; and, where Memory is preternaturally defective, experience and knowledge will be deficient in proportion; and imprudent conduct and abſurd opinion are the neceſſary conſequence.

But, though to ſoundneſs of judgment Memory be eſſential, it does not follow, that they who have great Memory have always ſound judgment. Extraordinary powers of Remembrance are ſometimes coupled with a childiſh underſtanding. I have heard a

* Idler. Numb. 74.—Other examples of extraordinary Memory, ſee Plin. Hiſt. vii. 24.

boy, whoſe faculties were in other reſpects rather below the ordinary pitch, repeat the greateſt part of a ſermon after once hearing it. In the early part of youth, and long before judgment is mature, the Memory is often very tenacious, even when no pains has been taken to improve it: and there are inſtances of men, who, by reading too much, and overloading their Memories, have fallen into a ſtate of weakneſs, little ſhort of inſanity. That too much learning *may* make one mad, is an old opinion; and examples are not wanting to juſtify it, even at this day.

Yet neither, on the other hand, is extraordinary Memory any proof of a defective underſtanding. Themiſtocles, Ceſar, Cicero, Seneca, and many others that might be mentioned, were men of the greateſt abilities, as well as of very great Memory. Perhaps it will be found, that without extraordinary Memory there is ſeldom or never extraordinary genius; but that great genius does not always accompany great Memory.

Ariſtotle is careful to aſcertain the difference between Remembrance and Recollection; or (what may be called) Paſſive and Active Memory. He maintains, that all animals, who are conſcious of time, have the former; but that, of the latter, man is the only known animal who is capable; for that Recollection implies inveſtigation, and ſeveral other efforts of rationality. And he remarks, I believe juſtly, that men, who excel in Paſſive Remembrance only, are for the moſt part of ſlow capacity; but that they, who have in a great degree the talent of Recollection, are of quick parts, and docile *.

Some men have a talent for remembering names, dates, genealogies, and the like: while others, not inferior in underſtanding, remember ſuch things imperfectly, though they retain with ſuffi-

* Ariſtotle, on Remembrance and Recollection, chap. 1. and 2.

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cient exactneſs the general ſenſe of what they read and hear. Some Memories are moſt tenacious of narrative, and others of moral reflections; ſome of verſe, and others of proſe; ſome of aphoriſms, and ſome of reaſonings. Among ſtory-tellers too, there are many varieties: ſome being captivated chiefly by little tales of wit and humour; ſome by the publick buſineſs of the nation; and ſome by paſſages of hiſtory: ſome give you anecdotes of authors, and ſome of ſtateſmen and kings; ſome expatiate on the riſe and procedure of lawſuits, and ſome upon the tranſactions of private families. There are perſons expert enough in the common affairs of life, who could never have made a figure in the literary world; there are ſtudents of profound erudition, who know little or nothing of the affairs of life: and ſome are equally diſtinguiſhed as men of learning, and men of buſineſs. Memory is in ſome men tenacious from their infancy; and ſome there have been, who found much difficulty in learning to read, but afterwards made good progreſs in literature. There are, who ſoon commit a thing to memory, and ſoon forget it; and ſome acquire ſlowly, but remember long. Some readily recal their knowledge, whenever they have occaſion for it; others with a retentive Memory have a tardy Recollection.—Of theſe varieties, ſome may no doubt be accounted for, as hinted already, from habits of attention, or of inattention, contracted in the beginning of life; from the prudence, or indiſcretion, of our firſt teachers; and from the company and converſation, the amuſements, and employments, that have been moſt familiar to us: but of others, one can hardly give any better account, than that they are conſtitutional.

But, whatever we determine concerning their efficient cauſes, it may, in regard to their final cauſe, be confidently affirmed, that they are of the greateſt utility: as they give different turns to human genius, and ſo diſpoſe men to different purſuits; and as they

promote variety of converſation, and make men more amuſing and more inſtructive to one another, than we could have been, if all had attended to, and remembered, the ſame things. Scholars, who aſſociate with none but ſcholars, may improve in learning: but, if they would acquire a general knowledge of human affairs, they muſt frequent promiſcuous company, in which are men of all capacities and callings. Hence let us learn to undervalue that narrow-mindedneſs, which inclines ſome people to avoid the ſociety of thoſe, who cannot talk to them in their own profeſſion. A man of ſenſe and virtue is in every condition reſpectable, and may contribute to the improvement of the greateſt philoſopher. He, who diſlikes another for peculiarity of genius, ſets an example, according to which he himſelf becomes the object of diſlike; and betrays his inſenſibility to a moſt wiſe inſtitution of Providence, from which human ſociety derives many of its beſt comforts and ornaments. As well might he, on obſerving the varieties of animal nature, expreſs diſſatisfaction, that ſome creatures ſhould have been endued with ſtrength, and others with ſwiftneſs; ſome enabled to feed us with their milk, and others to cloath us with their wool; ſome fitted for domeſtick uſe, and others for the buſineſs of the field; and inſiſt, that it would have been better, for us and for them, if they had all been of the ſame kind, and poſſeſſed the ſame faculties.

In the beginning of life, both ſenſe and intellect are imperfect; and therefore Memory muſt be weak. Nay, it is probable, that in early infancy there is no laſting remembrance even of the moſt lively ſenſations. I know a blind gentleman, of very acute parts, who retains no idea of light or colour, though he did not loſe his eyes till he was three years old: and yet, light is one of the firſt things that attract the notice of an infant, and ſeem to give him pleaſure. And there are not many perſons, who remember any

thing that happened previous to their fourth or fifth year. An infant, however, ſoon comes to know the face of his nurſe; though after weaning he ſoon forgets it: and, when he begins to ſpeak plain, he acquires, with little attention, a vaſt multitude of words in a very ſhort time. At the age of ſix years, he will learn the common words of a language in leſs than twelve months, if he hear it continually ſpoken; which, as he acquires the pronunciation, and accent, as well as the meaning, is a proof, not only of quick Memory, but alſo of an exact ear, and of great flexibility in the organs of articulation. Yet, while his Memory is ſo very ſuſceptible, it is for the moſt part equally deficient in the retentive power, unleſs conſtantly exerciſed: for a child of ſix years, going abroad, loſes his mother-tongue, as faſt as he gets the foreign language.

As we advance in life, the acquiſition of languages becomes more and more difficult; the talent of remembering new words decays gradually; nor is the ear ſo quick in catching a foreign accent, or the organs of ſpeech ſo pliable in articulating unuſual ſounds. Hence we ſee the propriety of ſtudying languages in our early years. And ſome think, that after forty we ſeldom make new attainments in this way: an opinion, which, though it may hold good in moſt caſes, will however in many be found erroneous. The elder Cato is a memorable exception; who did not ſtudy Greek till he was very old, and yet made great progreſs in it. And Ogilvie, who tranſlated Homer and Virgil, and, though no extraordinary poet, was a man of conſiderable learning, is ſaid to have known little of either Greek or Latin, till he was paſt fifty. Study the languages, therefore, while ye are young; and ye will eaſily acquire them: but let not thoſe *men*, whoſe youth has been without culture, ever deſpair of making a competent proficiency, while they are willing to beſtow the neceſſary pains.

In youth, Memory is ſtrong: for, then, our ſenſations are keen; the mind is not pre-occupied, nor diſtracted by buſineſs or care; curioſity raiſes expectation; novelty breeds wonder, ſurpriſe, and other lively paſſions; and almoſt every object gives either pleaſure or pain, few or none being indifferent. In youth, however, Memory may be confounded by too great variety, or by want of method; may be deprived of its native vigour by habits of ſuperficial obſervation; or may be perverted by fixing on trifles. To prevent theſe evils, it was already ſuggeſted, that the minds of young perſons ſhould be employed on thoſe things only or chiefly, which are uſeful, which are level to their underſtanding, which they may be brought to reliſh, and which they are willing to ſtudy till they thoroughly comprehend. And ſpecial care ſhould be taken, to render their ſtudies agreeable, to raiſe in them a love of knowledge; and, by hints and queſtions occaſionally thrown out, to make them wiſh for, and in ſome degree anticipate, the information that is to be laid before them. For, by all theſe means, attention is engaged, and the Memory prepared for receiving a deep, and a durable impreſſion.

In mature age, there is leſs curioſity, and leſs enthuſiaſm; the mind is fatigued by a multiplicity of concerns, and begins to languiſh under the preſſure of anxiety and the pain of diſappointment. But then, the underſtanding is in its moſt perfect ſtate, experience has taught the uſe and the method of ſtrict attention, and Memory is improved by long exerciſe. In mature age, therefore, though Memory may be weaker, than in youth, in regard to the things that only affect the fancy, there is for the moſt part a more laſting remembrance of what we judge to be important.—The antients divided human life into three periods; the *growing age*, *ætas creſcens*, which continues till thirty; the *ſettled or middle age*, *ætas conſtans*, between thirty and fifty; and the *declining age*, *ætas de-*

clivis, from fifty till death: and ſuppoſed, that, till the end of the middle age, we are, or we may be, continually improving in knowledge; and that, beyond that period, we are daily loſing ſomewhat of our former attainments. This may be true in general; but there are inſtances of men retaining all their faculties, and all their knowledge, even to the cloſe of a long life.

In old age, however, ſenſation for the moſt part becomes languid; the affections decay, or are ſwallowed up in ſome one paſſion; the mind is leſs ſuſceptible both of pain, and of pleaſure; curioſity and ambition are extinguiſhed, either by gratification, or by diſappointment; preſent things give little ſurpriſe, and the future awaken no ſanguine hope: but former perceptions remain in the mind, accompanied (as the remembrance of our early days never fails to be) with ideas of delight, mellowed, like colours in a picture, by length of time. Hence we ſee old men forgetful of recent tranſactions; which they affectedly, or perhaps ſeriouſly, undervalue, becauſe they do not bring along with them thoſe pleaſing emotions wherewith their youthful adventures were attended. Hence they delight to recapitulate the affairs of former times; beſtowing unbounded applauſe on the events and perſons that were then the objects of their admiration. This is the character of Neſtor in Homer; and this is part of that admired deſcription of old age, which Ariſtotle and Horace have delineated, the one in his Rhetorick, and the other in his Art of Poetry.

That certain diſeaſes are hurtful to Memory, was already obſerved. What phyſicians call a weakneſs of the nervous ſyſtem often occaſions a decay of this faculty. Dreaming, while it laſts, and every ſort of delirium, whether continued or temporary, have a ſimilar effect. Drunkenneſs impairs Memory; and, repeated often, terminates in early dotage. Even after a full meal, when preceded, as it always ought to be, by exerciſe, the intellectual

powers remain for an hour or two in a torpid ſtate; and then, nothing is more pernicious than ſtudy, which, during this interval, prevents digeſtion, inflames the eyes, ſtupefies the head, and after all is attended with no ſucceſs. This at leaſt is a common caſe: but there are exceptions. Mr. Hume, as I have been aſſured by thoſe who knew him, could immediately after dinner engage in profound ſpeculation, without being the worſe for it.—The morning has oft been celebrated as a friend to the Muſes, and conſequently, to Memory their mother; and, when their votary is in perfect health, perhaps it may be ſo: but many are incapable of mental application, till the day be pretty far advanced. Midnight, by its ſilence and coolneſs, is favourable to thought; but they who value health, which is more precious than learning, will never ſtudy after ſupper, if it can by any means be avoided. Night is the ſeaſon of repoſe, both to man and beaſt, both to the mind and the body. Such is the law of nature; which he who violates will ſooner or later repent the violation. Midnight ſtudies occaſion headachs, watchfulneſs, weak eyes, and broken ſleep: they oblige one to lie in bed till late in the morning, which relaxes the human frame; and, by expoſing the lungs, for ſo many hours, to an atmoſphere loaded with the ſteam of candles, they are apt to bring on aſthma, conſumption, and other dreadful maladies. The morning after breakfaſt, and the evening before ſupper, are generally found to be the beſt ſeaſons for exerciſing both Invention and Memory. But different rules may ſuit different conſtitutions.

CHAP. III.

Methods of improving Memory.—Attention.—Recollection.—Writing.—Converſation, &c.—Directions for committing Diſcourſes to Memory.—Whether Sermons ſhould be recited from Memory, or read.

HAVING touched upon the more remarkable phenomena of Memory, I ſhall now propoſe ſome rules for its improvement. This head will not take up much room, as I have anticipated ſome things which I meant to reſerve for it.

To a well-improved Memory belong theſe three talents or faculties; firſt, That of retaining eaſily, and with little trouble of attention or repetition; ſecondly, That of retaining for a long time; and thirdly, That of a ready recollection.—Or, to give it in the words of Roger Aſcham, "A good Memory is well known "by three properties: that is, if it be quicke in receyving, ſure in "keping, and redie in delivering furthe again." *

For improving Memory in the firſt particular, I can propoſe nothing more effectual, than frequent exerciſe, and a habit of ſtrict Attention. He, who is ambitious to acquire this talent, will ſet apart certain portions of his time, for the purpoſe of exerciſing his Memory, either by recollecting what was formerly imprinted on it, or by making new attainments. And, that this exerciſe may be the more amuſing, as well as uſeful, he will be careful not to load his Memory with frivolous things, or inelegant compoſitions, or with what he does not perfectly underſtand. Nor is it

* Aſcham's Scholemaſter.

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my advice, that he ſhould, on theſe occaſions, confine himſelf to ſerious matters, though they no doubt claim his firſt regard: humourous writing, and jocular converſation, when friendly to virtue and good-manners, are a great relief to the mind; and I once knew a boy, who having been, by the indiſcreet zeal of his mother, kept continually poring on ſermons, and obliged to commit them to Memory, loſt his other faculties, and became ſtupid. Hiſtorical narrative, and poetical deſcription, are alſo very proper for exerciſing Remembrance, and at the ſame time for amuſing the fancy. I have already recommended habits of Attention; and pointed out the method of recollecting from time to time what we are reading, or have been hearing.

What we have been doing, is alſo a matter, on which we cannot too often exerciſe our Memory. Seaſons of ſelf-examination, at which our paſt actions, thoughts, and purpoſes, paſs in review before us, to be approved if we find them right, and condemned and rectified where they appear to have been wrong, are recommended by the divine and the philoſopher, as indiſpenſably requiſite to moral improvement. They are not leſs ſo to intellectual proficiency. They ſerve to give us clear ideas of ourſelves and of other men; to methodize our experience, and fix it in the mind; to enlarge and correct our knowledge of human affairs; and ſo to prepare us both for buſineſs, and for converſation. They are particularly neceſſary, when we are engaged in very active ſcenes; for then ideas paſs through the mind ſo rapidly, that, without habitual Recollection, we muſt forget a great deal of what it is our intereſt to remember. Some men keep a record of the more remarkable occurrences of their life. They who fill ſtations of importance ought certainly to do ſo; after the example of Ceſar, and Cicero, and moſt of the great men of antient times. And, though I will not affirm that this is equally the duty of others, I beg leave to ſay, that

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of ſeveral perſons in the middle and lower ranks of life, whom I have known to be punctual in this reſpect, I never heard one regret the time which he had employed on his journal.

Facility of Remembrance is further promoted by a regular order and diſtribution of things. A confuſed diſcourſe makes no impreſſion: and, of a number of unconnected ſentences if we remember two or three, we generally forget all the reſt. But a methodical compoſition, rightly divided into its ſeveral heads or members, which do all naturally illuſtrate each other, and whereof none can be miſplaced or wanting without injury to the whole, is readily underſtood and quickly remembered; becauſe, all the topicks being connected, the idea of one ſuggeſts that of another. It reſembles a machine, whoſe parts are put together and adjuſted by the artiſt, and which by a perſon ſkilled in mechanicks is underſtood, and remembered, upon being once examined; while a confuſed diſcourſe is like a parcel of wheels and pegs and fragments, lying together in a heap, which, after repeated examinations, we can make nothing of, and which leaves no diſtinct impreſſion in the Memory.

To talk upon a ſubject, makes the mind attentive to it, and promotes facility of Remembrance. And, in this way, we may improve ourſelves by inſtructing the ignorant, as well as by converſing with thoſe who are ſuperiour to us in wiſdom, or equal. Every man, who can ſpeak, thinks in ſome one language or other: but, if our words only paſs internally through the mind, we ſhall not ſo well remember them, as if we had given them vocal utterance. Converſation, too, makes Recollection, and ſomething of arrangement, neceſſary; and obliges the ſpeaker to expreſs himſelf ſo as to be underſtood by others; which is ſometimes not eaſily done, even by thoſe who think they very well underſtand their own meaning. By all theſe exerciſes, Attention is fixed, and our

thoughts

thoughts are ſet in a variety of lights; and, therefore, we become more thoroughly acquainted with them, and more exactly retain them. For, in ſilent meditation, the mind is apt to be indolent; to quit a ſubject before it has obtained a clear view of it; to eſcape from thoughts that ſeem to be attended with any perplexity; and to follow every amuſing idea that may preſent itſelf, without caring how far it may lead from the preſent purpoſe. Of ſuch meditations the Memory retains little or nothing. But when we ſpeak aloud, or converſe, our thoughts become more ſtationary, and are better connected, and more perfectly underſtood; and impreſſions are made on the ear, as well as on the mind.

Memory may be made both ſuſceptible and tenacious, and the underſtanding greatly improved, by writing. I do not mean, by writing out common-places from books,—of which I have ſpoken in another place*; but by putting what we think upon paper, and expreſſing it in our own words. Our thoughts are fleeting, and the greater part of our words are forgotten as ſoon as uttered: but, by writing, we may give permanency to both; and keep them in view, till, by comparing one with another, we make all conſiſtent, and ſupply what is wanting, and amend what is erroneous. Thus attention is fixed; judgment is exerciſed; clear ideas are conveyed to the underſtanding; and the Memory is prepared for receiving a deep impreſſion. Let us, therefore, often write down, not only the ſentiments we learn from books, and teachers, and converſation; but alſo thoſe that are peculiarly our own, of which a conſiderable number may ariſe in the minds of moſt men every day. And, though many of theſe might, no doubt, be forgotten without loſs, yet ſome may be found worthy of a laſting remembrance.

* See, On the Uſefulneſs of Claſſical Learning, page 479, 480; third edition.

And here let me caution my young reader againſt the practice of writing confuſedly, inaccurately, or on looſe papers. It is as eaſy, and far more advantageous, to write correctly, and legibly, with durable ink, and in note-books provided for the purpoſe, and carefully preſerved. And, when a volume is finiſhed, it will be an amuſement, and a profitable one too, to read it over; to make an index to it; and to write upon the cover ſuch a title, or ſummary of contents, as may ſerve for a direction, when afterwards you want to reviſe any particular paſſage.

And be not deterred, as ſome are, from writing down a remark, by the apprehenſion that you may afterwards find it erroneous. I am not adviſing you to publiſh your thoughts to the world, or even to all your acquaintance; but only to record them, for your own benefit, or for the inſpection of an intimate friend, in whoſe judgment, good-nature, and fidelity, you can truſt. And what, though many of them be erroneous? When you correct the error, be comforted with this conſideration, that you are wiſer now, than you were before. No man is aſhamed of having been once an infant; that being a ſtate of imperfection, which is common and neceſſary. Nor is it leſs neceſſary, or leſs common, to acquire knowledge gradually, and to grow in wiſdom as we grow in years.

This practice of writing is much recommended by Cicero and Quintilian. The advantages of it are manifold. It not only makes us think, and remember, with accuracy; but alſo tends to form the ſtyle, and to give us a command of words, and a pure and eaſy elocution; which in every ſtate of life is a moſt uſeful talent, and highly ornamental; and which, when accompanied with a ſound judgment and good addreſs, ſeldom fails to advance a man in the world. This practice alſo gives ſtability to our thoughts, and puts it in our power to review and rectify them, as we grow wiſer, and to mark our progreſs in ſtyle and literature. In this way, too, we

learn

learn to think for ourſelves, and acquire in time a ſtock of knowledge that is properly of our own growth: which is a proof, that our minds are really cultivated, and ſerves as an encouragement to perſiſt in making further acquiſitions.—To a perſon grown old in the purſuits of learning, and in the ſtudy of human nature, ſuch a record, as is here propoſed, of the progreſs of the underſtanding in his early years, would be inexpreſſibly amuſing, and very profitable. And, though one ſhould not devote one's ſelf to letters, nor live to be old, ſuch a record would be of great uſe in the improvement of one's mind and Memory, and would amply compenſate the labour of carrying it on.

Frequent recapitulations of what we learn, often to converſe about it, (where that can be done conveniently), and as often as we can to reduce it to practice, are almoſt the only further means that can be propoſed, for rendering Memory tenacious.

As to quickneſs of Recollection; it depends chiefly on exerciſe, and on our being often in circumſtances, in which it may be neceſſary for us to call to mind, and make uſe of, our learning. When theſe opportunities are wanting, let us however habitually reviſe, and meditate upon, ſuch parts of knowledge as we wiſh to have always at command. Perſons, who frequently join in general converſation, or whoſe profeſſion obliges them to ſpeak in publick, have for the moſt part a facility of Recollection, that ſurpriſes the recluſe ſtudent; who perhaps knows more than they; but who, for want of practice, cannot call to mind the thoughts he is in queſt of till the opportunity of applying them be loſt. This is a great misfortune. Remembrance, with tardy Recollection, is little better than forgetfulneſs. It is like thoſe weapons, mentioned in the proverb, which are never at hand in the hour of danger; or like thoſe friends, who are always ready to help you, except when you have occaſion for them. To thoſe who labour under this infirmity,

it is, therefore, of great importance, to exerciſe themſelves frequently in Recollection; to cultivate a ſocial and communicative temper; to engage in the active ſcenes of life; and ſometimes, when alone, to make ſpeeches extempore, on any occaſional ſubject. Thus they will acquire that ſelf-command in ſpeaking, and that preſence of mind in company, without which one is rather encumbered, than aſſiſted, by one's learning.

A methodical courſe of ſtudy, a love of order, and a habit of diſtributing our knowledge into claſſes, and referring every new acquiſition to its proper head, will alſo be of uſe in promoting a ready Recollection. A merchant, who keeps regular books, can inſtantly turn to the record of any tranſaction, if he know the date, or the ſubject of it, or the name of the perſon concerned in it: but they, who put every thing in writing as it occurs, without any ſubſequent arrangement; or, in other words, who keep only a day-book, muſt be often at a loſs, when they want to re-examine any article, and may employ an hour to no purpoſe in ſearching for that, which the other would have found in a moment. In Recollection, the caſe is nearly the ſame, with thoſe who are accuſtomed to arrange their ſtudies according to a plan, as contraſted with others, whoſe thoughts and whoſe affairs are all in confuſion.—Traders often reviſe their books; to ſee whether every thing be neat, and accurate, and in its proper place. Students, in like manner, ſhould often reviſe their knowlege, or at leaſt the more uſeful branches of it; renew thoſe impreſſions on the Memory, which had begun to decay through length of time; and be particularly careful to retain the plan, or general arrangement, of every part of erudition.

But, while I recommend method, I would warn you againſt the oſtentation of it. This is called Formality; and has often given an awkward and finical air to perſons of a very worthy character.

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In every work of art, which requires labour, and admits of elegance, the chief point of ſkill is, to conceal the art as much as poſſible. The rule is antient; and has been found indiſpenſable, not only in poetry, oratory, and ſtyle, but alſo in manners, and in much of the buſineſs of common life.

Converſation was recommended, as a means of improving Memory, both in the retentive power, and in the talent of ready Recollection. But, for the benefit of ſome young perſons, it may be neceſſary to ſubjoin a caution or two, in regard to this matter. For, at ſo great an expence as that of delicacy, we muſt not ſeek, either to acquire learning, or to improve Remembrance.

Now, in company, it is our duty, to adapt ourſelves to the innocent humours and ways of thinking of thoſe with whom we converſe; and it is indelicate to obtrude our concerns upon them, or give ſcope to any of thoſe peculiarities of behaviour, that diſtinguiſh our own profeſſion, or the ſmall ſocieties to which we are accuſtomed. The violation of this rule is called Pedantry. It is offenſive to perſons of polite manners, and conveys a mean idea of the man in whom it has become habitual. And for this there is good reaſon. The Converſation of ſuch a man ſhows, that he does not deſerve the attention of others, becauſe he is always thinking of himſelf; that he has not enlargement of mind for conceiving the circumſtances and ſentiments of his company, nor tenderneſs and generoſity of nature to take part in them, or ſympathiſe with them; and that his cuſtomary aſſociates, among whom he has contracted or confirmed theſe evil habits, muſt be equally narrow-minded with himſelf.—Therefore, unleſs called upon to do ſo, by the company, or by thoſe who have a right to preſide in it, the ſoldier ought not to expatiate on military affairs, nor the traveller on his adventures, nor the hunter on hounds and foxes, nor the farmer on his improvements, nor the ſcholar on his authors.

thors. Soldiers with ſoldiers, farmers with farmers, and learned men with learned men, may talk in their reſpective trades; becauſe in this way they may pleaſe and inſtruct one another: but, where people are of different purſuits and characters, the Converſation ought to be general, and ſuch as all preſent, eſpecially thoſe to whom particular reſpect is due, may be ſuppoſed to underſtand, and to reliſh. And, how much ſoever we may be impreſſed with what we have been reading or meditating, and however deſirous we may be to digeſt and remember it, we are not entitled to make it an object of general attention, unleſs we have reaſon to believe it will be generally agreeable.

At this rate, you will perhaps imagine, that General Converſation cannot be very edifying. And true it is, that people do not join in it, with a view to inſtruct, or to be inſtructed, in the arts and ſciences. Theſe are to be acquired by ſtudy and contemplation, by frequenting ſchools of learning, or by attending thoſe private ſocieties or clubs, which men ſometimes form for the ſake of mutual improvement. But people reſort to general company, to relieve themſelves for a while from the anxieties of life, to refreſh the mind after the fatigues of ſtudy or of labour, and to improve and pleaſe one another by a mutual interchange of kind words, and benevolent attentions.

Nor think, becauſe idle words are prohibited in Scripture, that therefore every thing we ſay in company ought to tend to the illuſtration of truth. Idle words ought ſurely to be prohibited, and avoided. And all thoſe words may be ſo called, which produce either no effect, or a bad one; or which proceed from motives that are either not good, or poſitively evil. But that Converſation, which promotes the innocent amuſement of our friends, and ſo contributes to their health and happineſs; or which, by expreſſing our benevolence towards them, cheriſhes that temper in us, and

gives an example for the encouragement of it in others;—Converſation, I ſay, of this character is not idle, becauſe it is favourable to virtue, and friendly to mankind.

Nor is Converſation, even in general company, uninſtructive. From it we may derive much material information, in regard to the characters and paſſions of men, the cuſtoms of the world, the tranſactions of paſt and of preſent times, and many other particulars of no leſs moment. Illiterate men, by frequenting polite circles, often acquire ſuch a fund of intelligence, as makes them equally inſtructive and entertaining. Books are certainly very uſeful. But the time was, when they were not common. Yet, at that time, men had ſenſe, and knowlege too; and there were great ſtateſmen, great poets, and great philoſophers; and greater commanders, and orators, than have appeared in the world ever ſince. Whence, then, did they derive their greatneſs? From genius, from experience, from thought; partly no doubt from books; and alſo, from that grand vehicle of neceſſary knowlege, Converſation.

Sermons are almoſt the only ſort of continued diſcourſes, which it is in this country the cuſtom to get by heart. To ſuch readers, as may at any time think fit to comply with this cuſtom, the following directions will be uſeful. They are intended for the benefit of thoſe, whoſe Memory, is neither very bad nor very good. Extraordinary Memories have no need of them.

1. As a general preparative both to the remembrance, and to the compoſition of Sermons, let it be your care to acquire a competence of theological learning, and to be intimately acquainted with the ſentiments and phraſeology of Scripture. For that is well remembered, which is well underſtood: and paſſages of Holy Writ form a conſiderable, and, when judiciouſly ſelected, the moſt valuable, part, of the preacher's diſcourſe. If, therefore, you are well inſtructed in theology, the argument of every Sermon will be

familiar

familiar to you; on every ſuch argument your mind will be ſtored with a great variety of expreſſion; you can never be at a loſs for topicks; and your quotations will be no burden to your Memory.

2. The diſcourſe we are to get by heart we muſt ourſelves compoſe; otherwiſe, the labour of committing it to Memory will be ſuch as to moſt minds would be inſurmountable. And it muſt be accurately compoſed, and have in it nothing obſcure or ſuperfluous. For whatever puzzles the underſtanding is an incumbrance to Memory; and what Horace obſerves of words is equally true of thoughts,

Omne ſupervacuum pleno de pectore manat;

"every ſuperfluity is loſt, like water poured into a veſſel already full."

Beſides, let it be obſerved, that a Sermon is deſigned for the good of thoſe who hear it; and ought therefore to be attended to, and remembered by them. But, if you mix it up with words, phraſes, or doctrines, which they do not underſtand, they will not attend, and they cannot remember; ſo that, inſtead of good, it will do harm, by inuring them to habits of inattention in regard to religious truth. It muſt alſo be a regular diſcourſe, tending to the illuſtration of ſome one important topick; and properly divided into diſtinct heads, whereof each is connected with, and ſerves to explain, the reſt, and none can be miſplaced or omitted, without injury to the whole. For regularity and unity of deſign make men attentive, and, as formerly remarked, produce clearneſs of perception and diſtinct remembrance. But let the heads of the diſcourſe be few, and affect not too great ſubtlety of diviſion and ſubdiviſion: for this would diſtract the Attention, and overpower the Memory of the audience; and never can be requiſite in a practical diſſertation, that is addreſſed to the people, and, as many wiſe men think, ought not to be very long.

3. Let

3. Let the diſcourſe be written out, not in haſte, but deliberately, with your own hand, in bright-coloured ink, and in characters that are diſtinct and legible, and moderately and uniformly large; without contractions, without long ſtrokes or flouriſhes of the pen, and as much as may be without blots or interlineations; with reaſonable and equal ſpaces between the lines; and accurately pointed, and divided into paragraphs, as the ſubject requires. To ſome, who have not ſtudied the laws of Memory, this may ſeem a frivolous rule: but I have formerly accounted for it; and am confident, that whoever makes the trial will ſoon have experience of its propriety.

4. Let the ſubject of the diſcourſe be intereſting to us, and the doctrine ſuch, as we ſeriouſly believe, and are anxious that others ſhould believe and remember. This may look more like a precept of common honeſty, than a rule for the aſſiſtance of Memory. And a precept of common honeſty it is, no doubt; for that man muſt be a moſt audacious hypocrite, who can ſolemnly deliver, as conformable to the Divine Will, and recommend to the belief of others, what he himſelf diſbelieves. But neither is this rule foreign from the preſent purpoſe. For it was mentioned, as a law of Memory, that what is agreeable to our own inclinations, and way of thinking, has a chance to be better remembered, than what we conſider as a matter of indifference.

5. The taſk of committing to Memory ſhould be entered upon, when the mind is diſengaged from buſineſs, and the body in health. If the mind is not vacant, Attention will be painful, and interrupted, and the Memory ſlow to receive any durable impreſſion. And if the health be diſordered, intellectual exertion, without conveying any improvement to the mind, will only do harm to the body. There are certain hours of the day, during which one is better qualified, than at any other time, for invention, remem-

brance, and other mental exerciſes. But the ſame hours will not ſuit all conſtitutions, as already was obſerved; and therefore no general rule can be given in regard to the time that may be moſt ſucceſsfully employed in the work we now ſpeak of. I think it is Lord Verulam who ſays, that, in exerting any faculty with a view to form a habit, two ſeaſons are chiefly to be laid hold on; the one, when we are beſt diſpoſed to act; the other, when we are worſt diſpoſed: that, by improving the former, we act eaſily, and make great progreſs; and that, by a frequent uſe of the latter, we overcome reluctance, and at laſt acquire a habit of doing the action with eaſe, whenever it is neceſſary. This may be an excellent method of cheriſhing moral habits; as virtue is at all times friendly to happineſs, and never can be unſeaſonable. But, in bodily or intellectual exerciſes, I apprehend that this rule is not quite ſo proper; at leaſt for perſons of a delicate conſtitution. In attempting, for example, to acquire a habit of running, or even of walking, when the ſtomach is full, a valetudinarian might ſoon deſtroy himſelf; and in the ſame circumſtances it may be equally detrimental to engage in any fatiguing ſtudy. To force the mind to exert itſelf in remembrance, invention, or profound inquiry, at a time when both mind and body are inclinable to reſt, is likely to be attended with bad conſequences; and therefore, unleſs when neceſſary, ought not to be attempted. After dinner, a ſtudious man may converſe, or ſaunter in the fields, or read an amuſing book, or entertain himſelf (as Milton is ſaid to have done) with muſick; but he will do well to refrain from every laborious exerciſe, both mental and corporeal, till digeſtion be pretty far advanced, and his ſpirits begin to regain their wonted alacrity.

6. While we are committing any thing to Memory, it may be profitable to ſpeak ſlowly, and with propriety, and to ſpeak aloud. For thus, Attention will be fixed; an appeal made to

two

two ſenſes at the ſame time, and no habits contracted of faulty pronunciation.

7. It has been doubted, whether the Memory ſhould be charged with each particular word of what we get by heart; or whether it may not be ſufficient, if we remember the whole meaning, and the greater part of the expreſſion. The former may perhaps be thought unneceſſary; and yet I believe it is the beſt method, for thoſe who would acquire the talent of exact remembrance. Yet I do not propoſe this as a rule without exception: for there is reaſon to fear, that ſome Memories are by no means equal to ſuch a taſk. But, on the other hand, let us bear this in mind, that the more we indulge Memory, or any other faculty, in habits of indolence, the more difficult it will be for us to improve it to that pitch of vigour, whereof nature may have made it capable.

8. Let us never, by ſtudy of any kind, overload Memory, or overſtrain our faculties; for this would bring diſcouragement, incapacity, and bad health. We ought to begin with eaſy taſks, and advance by degrees to ſuch as are more difficult. A clergyman, a particular friend of mine, has often told me, that, when he commenced preacher, it was the labour of many days to get his ſermon by heart; but that, by long practice, he has now improved his Memory to ſuch a pitch, that he can, by two hours application, fix one in his mind ſo effectually, as to be able to recite it in publick, without the change, omiſſion, or tranſpoſition, of the ſmalleſt word. To me this fact ſeems extraordinary; for I am certain of its truth: but I learn from it, that, by patience and long practice, much may be done for the improvement of our nature, and that none of our faculties are more improveable than Memory. What toil and perſeverance, in cultivating the bodily powers, muſt it require, to qualify the tumbler for thoſe feats of activity, with which he aſtoniſhes mankind! When we firſt ſee them, we can hardly

believe our eyes: he ſeems to perform what till now we thought impoſſible. Were we to take equal pains in the improvement of our intellectual and moral nature, which are ſurely not leſs ſuſceptible of cultivation, who can tell to what heights of excellence, and of happineſs, we might at length ariſe!

9. The diſcourſe which we would get by heart we muſt underſtand, not only in general (for that we cannot fail to do, if we compoſe it) but in every ſentence, and in every word. And if there be in it any word, or ſentence, which is not ſufficiently clear, let us either make it clear, or expunge it. There are certain quotations from Scripture, and other theological phraſes, which in compoſing ſermons almoſt every preacher makes uſe of, though every one is not at pains to aſcertain their ſignification: and it often happens, eſpecially in our firſt attempts at writing, that we think ourſelves perfectly ſkilled both in expreſſions, and in doctrines, which yet we underſtand very little. It is therefore incumbent on us, for the benefit of our readers and hearers, as well as ourſelves, and in order to improve our underſtanding, as well as to facilitate remembrance, that we examine our own meaning with the moſt critical exactneſs. If a diſcourſe, or any part of it, be ſuch as we ſhould find it impoſſible to give a ſummary of; if any ſentence appear to be inſerted, rather for the purpoſe of lengthening the paragraph, than of illuſtrating the thought, or rather to improve the ſound, than to clear up the ſubject; if any word or paſſage can be ſpared, without taking away from the emphaſis, or the connection:—theſe are all ſymptoms of inaccuracy; and ought to put us upon re-conſidering what we have written, and making the neceſſary amendments, before we begin to commit it to Memory. For we may be aſſured, that this exerciſe will be more or leſs difficult, according as the diſcourſe is leſs or more free from inaccuracy, obſcurity, and redundance.

Laſtly,

Laſtly, while engaged in this work, let us encourage agreeable paſſions, as hope of ſucceſs and improvement, and a ſenſe of the value of a cultivated Memory, and of the importance of that which it is our ambition to remember. Light ſpirits are favourable to every ſort of exertion; but a deſponding mind is generally unſucceſsful.

And here, it may not, perhaps, be improper to make a few remarks on the expediency of pronouncing Sermons from Memory: and I make them the more willingly, becauſe what I have to ſay on this head may be comfortable to thoſe young men, whoſe Memory, like my own, inclines rather to weakneſs, than to ſtrength.

Firſt, then, it can admit of no doubt, that every publick ſpeaker and teacher ought to be able to ſpeak from Memory, or even without premeditation, as the circumſtances may require; and ſhould, therefore, now and then practiſe extemporary ſpeaking, and ſtudy to acquire a readineſs of apprehenſion and a command of words, and take every prudent method he can think of, for improving Remembrance.

Secondly, They whoſe faculties are uncommonly ſuſceptible; who can retain a Sermon after once or twice reading it; or who, like the gentleman above-mentioned, can commit one to Memory in two or three hours, may, at all times, or as often as they chooſe, preach without notes; eſpecially, if they have confidence in their Recollection, and can diveſt themſelves of anxiety. But many men there are, of good parts, who, from natural baſhfulneſs, or from bodily weakneſs, or from having been in danger of expoſing themſelves through a ſudden failure of Memory, cannot depend on their preſence of mind, or quickneſs of Recollection, when they appear in publick; though in the ordinary affairs of life they have no reaſon to complain of this faculty. Such perſons ought not to preach without papers. If they do, it will be injurious both to themſelves, and to their hearers. To themſelves; by tormenting

tormenting them with ſolicitude, to the great prejudice of their health. And to their hearers: becauſe the fear of forgetting will take off their attention from the management of their voice; the conſequence whereof is, that they will ſpeak without that energy which impreſſes the meaning on the audience; and may, moreover, contract bad habits of drawling, canting, heſitating, or quick ſpeaking; which are all diſagreeable to rational hearers, and make every hearer inattentive; and the moſt eloquent Sermon inſipid.

Thirdly, Thoſe preachers who, after much practice, cannot commit a diſcourſe to Memory in leſs than two days, (and this, I believe, is a common caſe) ſhould never in my opinion attempt it; except, perhaps, on extraordinary occaſions, when they may be obliged to ſpeak with eaſe and elegance, and yet have no opportunity of reading. Two days every week are almoſt a third part of human life. And when one conſiders, that the ſermons thus committed to Memory are forgotten as ſoon as delivered, which is alſo a common caſe, who would not regret ſuch a waſte of time? At this rate, of thirty years employed in the miniſtry, there are almoſt ten conſumed,—in what? in drudgery more laborious, and far more unprofitable, than that of a ſchoolboy;—in loading the Memory with words, which are not remembered for three days together. Would not the preacher have laid out thoſe years to better purpoſe, in giving correctneſs to his publick diſcourſes, or in other improving ſtudies; or in viſiting and inſtructing the neighbours; or in agriculture, and the like liberal amuſements?—Beſides, in theſe circumſtances, a clergyman can never preach without long preparation; nor, if at any time his health ſhould fail, without a degree of anxiety that may be detrimental to both his mind and his body.

Indeed, were Sermons that are pronounced from Memory found to have a more powerful effect upon the hearer, than ſuch as are read, I ſhould not think this time altogether loſt. But, if the preacher

preacher have learned to read well, (which he may, and ought to do), and if he write what he has to ſay with that diſtinctneſs which is here recommended, and prepare himſelf for the publick exhibition by ſeveral private rehearſals at home, I am inclined to think, that he will pronounce with more compoſure and ſelf-command, and with an energy more becoming the pulpit, than if he were to ſpeak from Recollection. For, in the one caſe, his mind is at eaſe, and he has nothing to do, but to pronounce: in the other, he pronounces and recollects at the ſame time; and is, beſides, liable to miſtakes and failures of Memory, and, if his nerves are not uncommonly ſtrong, to occaſional fits of ſolicitude.—Why does a muſician chooſe to play by book even the muſick that he remembers? It is, becauſe, by taking in, with one glance of his eye, a number of contiguous notes, his mind is always diſengaged, and he is every where the better prepared for introducing the expreſſive touches, and other neceſſary ornaments. In like manner, a good reader will, if I miſtake not, read more emphatically and with greater elegance, what he ſees before him, and is well acquainted with, than he can pronounce what is ſuggeſted by continual Recollection; eſpecially, if the diſcourſe he has to deliver be of conſiderable length.

As to the effect upon the hearers:—if I am to judge by my own feelings, and truſt to the declaration of many perſons of candour and ſenſibility, I muſt ſay, that Sermons in the mouth of a good reader have a more powerful energy, than thoſe that are ſpoken without book. The pathos may be leſs vehement, perhaps, but it is more ſolemn, and ſeems better adapted to the place, and to the ſubject. Preachers, indeed, there are, who lay claim to extraordinary gifts, and pretend to ſpeak from ſupernatural impulſe: and there are hearers, who give them credit for this; and think, that what is written, and read to them, has too much the air of mere

human doctrine. But ſuch a conceit is of no account in rational inquiry; for it only proves, that the preacher is vain, and the people ignorant.

But the orators of Greece and Rome ſpoke from Memory; and ſtage-players do the ſame; and ſenators, in debate, and lawyers, in their pleadings, would make a deſpicable figure, if they were to read what they have to ſay. This plea has been urged by men of ſenſe, and deſerves to be conſidered.

1. The orators of Greece and Rome, in the forum, in the ſenate, and before the judges, ſpoke, with a view to determine their hearers to ſome immediate reſolution; and, if they gained this end, were not ſolicitous, whether it was by means of fair reaſoning, or of ſophiſtry; by ſwaying the judgment, or inflaming the paſſions; by giving uſeful information, that might be followed with laſting advantage, or by throwing out what had only plauſibility enough to produce momentary conſequences. It was, therefore, neceſſary, that, by the promptneſs of their eloquence, they ſhould impreſs the hearers with a high opinion of their wiſdom; ſhould deliver their harangues with that vehemence, and thoſe varieties of geſture, which command attention and applauſe; and ſhould have their eye continually upon their audience, to obſerve the effects of what was ſaid, that they might know how to change their topicks and manner of addreſs, according to the circumſtances.

How different are the views; and, therefore, how different ought the eloquence to be, of the Chriſtian Divine! He ſpeaks the truth, and that only; in order to inſtruct his people in matters, which they and he know to be of everlaſting concern, and to eſtabliſh in them not momentary, but permanent principles, of piety and benevolence. His doctrines are all ſuppoſed to be collected with caution from the unerring word of God. He is required, not only to ſpeak with modeſty and ſoberneſs, but alſo to

be ſober and modeſt; not to overpower with vehemence, far leſs to dazzle with ſophiſtry, but to prevail by motives urged in meekneſs, and to perſuade by arguments founded in right reaſon. His aim is, to direct their attention, not to himſelf, but to God and their duty; not to court applauſe as an orator, but to do good to the ſouls of men, and ſet them an example of that humility, contrition, and pious hope, which become a man, a ſinner, and a chriſtian. In a word, if he have a right ſenſe of the importance of his function, and of what it is incumbent on him to ſay, and to do, a peculiar ſerioufneſs, ſimplicity, and unaſpiring dignity, will purify his ſtyle, modulate his voice, and characteriſe his whole deportment. To read his diſcourſe may, therefore, be graceful in him; though in the Greek or Roman orator, it muſt have been abſurd, and even impoſſible.

I hope it will not be thought preſumptuous in a layman, to have ſaid ſo much on the elocution of the pulpit. It is a matter in which I am intereſted, as well as others: and I have not affirmed any thing concerning it, but what I know to be warranted by reaſon and Scripture. Let me confeſs, however, that the ſketch here offered is not the effect of inveſtigation merely: it is a copy taken from the life. And they who have had the happineſs to obſerve, and to feel, that ſublime and apoſtolick ſimplicity, and that mild, though commanding energy, which diſtinguiſh both the compoſition, and the pronunciation, of a Hurd and a Porteus *, will be at no loſs to diſcover the originals.

2. The buſineſs of the player is, not to inſtruct the audience, or even to ſpeak what he thinks; but to perform a part which is avowedly fictitious, and to pleaſe by imitating nature. He muſt aſſume a variety of paſſions, joy, ſorrow, love, hatred, contempt, admiration, anger, jealouſy, deſpair; and ſpeak and act accordingly.

* Now Biſhops of Worceſter and Cheſter.

ingly. It is his intereſt, to be admired, for his voice, motion, ſhape, eyes, and features, for his power of ſuppreſſing the emotions he feels, and of counterfeiting thoſe he does not feel. Nay, I am ſorry to ſay, but it is true, that, upon the modern ſtage, one player muſt ſometimes put on airs of debauchery, irreligion, and impudence, which his ſoul abhors; and another muſt utter ſentiments of innocence and honour, which in him all the world knows to be groſs hypocriſy. Indeed, no two profeſſions on earth differ more widely, than thoſe of a chriſtian miniſter and a player: and as the compoſure and humility of the pulpit would be intolerable on the ſtage, theatrical vociferation and geſture muſt be equally ſo in the pulpit. In regard, therefore, to modes of pronunciation and publick behaviour, nothing can be more abſurd, than to propoſe the one as a pattern to the other.

Beſides, let it be remembered, that the player's Memory is not burdened with a long continued oration; and is, moreover, aſſiſted from time to time by a prompter; who is always ready to ſuggeſt what he is to ſay or do, if he himſelf ſhould be at a loſs: that the part which others bear in the dialogue ſerves to remind him of his own: and that, during the performance, there are intervals of reſt, in which he may have recourſe to his papers, and refreſh his Memory. To ſay, therefore, that a preacher muſt ſpeak without book, becauſe a player does ſo, is ſurely unreaſonable; unleſs you are willing to allow prompters, and pauſes, and intervals of recollection, to the former, as well as to the latter; which, as the one cannot diſpenſe with, the other will never demand.

3. The caſe of ſenators in debate, and of lawyers in their pleadings, is equally foreign from the preſent purpoſe. It is their ambition, not only to vindicate their own ſentiments or party, but alſo to confute whatever may be urged on the other ſide. To commit a diſcourſe to Memory, is not the preparation that will fit them for ſuch a taſk; becauſe it muſt often be impoſſible for them to foreſee with

with certainty, what topicks it may be requiſite to inſiſt upon. It is by a perfect knowledge of the ſubject in queſtion, and of the laws of his country, and by talents for extemporary ſpeaking, derived from nature and improved by habit, that the lawyer, and the ſenator, is enabled to acquit himſelf with honour in his publick appearances. And, of multitudes whoſe intereſt it would be to excel in this way, how few are ever able to riſe to diſtinction! In our two houſes of Parliament, there are about ſeven hundred and eighty members; who, from their rank and education, muſt be conſidered as men of the higheſt accompliſhments; and yet the good ſpeakers in this aſſembly, the moſt auguſt in the world, are not very numerous: a proof, that the mode of ſpeaking, which there commands attention, is a talent not often met with, even among the moſt enlightened of mankind. Now clergymen muſt appear in publick every Sunday, prepared to inſtruct the people in their duty, and to advance nothing but what they are ſuppoſed to have ſeriouſly examined beforehand, and found to be agreeable to reaſon and revelation. They have no oppoſition to combat by extemporary arguments; and they are, and ought to be, accountable to the church, if they aſſert any thing repugnant to ſound doctrine. But ſenators and lawyers are allowed the greateſt freedom of ſpeech; and, if they keep within the bounds of decency, are not reſponſible for what they may urge in behalf of their cauſe, or party.

In Italy and France, ſermons are generally pronounced without notes. But they are at the ſame time accompanied with much theatrical geſture; and the conſequence is, that the people conſider them rather as an amuſement, than as a part of the church-ſervice. In England, the eſtabliſhed clergy do for the moſt part read their ſermons: and England has produced a greater number of good preachers, than any other country in Europe.

CHAP. IV.

Remarks on the Memory of Brutes.—Inferences.

I SHALL now make a few remarks on the Memory of Brutes. That many of them have this faculty, is undeniable. We find, that whelps, as well as children, once burned, avoid the fire; and that horſes, oxen, and dogs, and many other animals, not only have their knowledge of nature enlarged by experience, but alſo derive from man various arts and habits, whereby they become uſeful to him, in war, hunting, agriculture, and other employments. Moſt of theſe creatures know their fellows, and keepers: nay dogs and horſes learn to do certain things, on hearing certain words articulated. Beagles obey the voice of the hunter, and purſue, or deſiſt from purſuit, as he commands; and the war-horſe is acquainted, not only with the voice of his rider, but alſo with the ſummons of the drum and trumpet; as hunting-courſers are, with the opening of the hounds, and the ſound of the horn. Goats, ſheep, and oxen, and even poultry, of their own accord, repair in the evening to their homes: parrots acquire the habit of uttering words; and ſinging birds, of modulating tunes: and bees, after an excurſion of ſeveral miles (as naturaliſts affirm) return, each to her hive; nor does it appear that they miſtake another for their own, even where many are ſtanding contiguous. Lions ſpare him who attends them, when they would tear in pieces every thing elſe: doves fly to the window where they have been fed; and the elephant is ſaid to poſſeſs a degree of remembrance not many removes from rationality. I might mention too the dog of Ulyſſes, who knew his maſter after twenty years abſence *; for the ſtory is

* Hom. Odyſſ. xvii. 300.

probable,

probable, though it may not be true: as well as what is recorded in Aulus Gellius, of Androclus and his lion †, who, having received mutual civilities from each other in the deſarts of Africa, renewed their acquaintance when they met in the circus at Rome, and were inſeparable companions ever after. That the inhabitants of the water have Memory, we cannot doubt, if we believe, what Pliny, in his Natural Hiſtory, Bernier, in his account of Indoſtan, and Martial, in ſome of his epigrams ‡, have mentioned, of fiſhes kept in ponds, that had learned to appear in order to be fed, when called by their reſpective names. Whether ſhellfiſhes, and ſnails, and worms, and other torpid animals, have at any time given ſigns of Memory, I am not able to determine.

In ſome particulars requiſite to the preſervation of brutes, inſtinct ſeems to ſuperſede the neceſſity of Remembrance. Young bees, on the firſt trial, extract honey from flowers, and faſhion their combs, as ſkilfully as the oldeſt; and the ſame thing may be remarked of birds building their neſts; and of brute animals, in general, adopting, when full grown, the voice and the manner of life, which nature has appropriated to the ſpecies. Some late authors pretend, that birds learn to ſing from their parents; and that a lark, for example, which had never heard the lark's ſong, would never ſing it. But this I cannot admit, becauſe my experience leads to a different concluſion; though I allow, that many animals have the power of imitating, by their voice, thoſe of another ſpecies. If this theory be juſt; then a bird gets its note, as a man does his mother-tongue, by hearing it; and, therefore, the ſongs of individual birds will be as various nearly, as the languages of individual men; ſo that the larks of France would have one ſort of note, thoſe of Italy another, and thoſe of England a third.

† A. Gellius, v. 14. ‡ Plin. Hiſt. x. 89. Martial. iv. 30. x. 30.

I would

I would as ſoon believe, that a dog, which had never heard any other voice, than that of a man, or of a ſwine, would not bark, but ſpeak, or grunt.—Man is taught by experience, what is fit to be eaten, or to be drank. But brutes ſeem to know this by inſtinct. The mariner, who lands in a deſert iſland, is cautious of eating ſuch unknown fruits, as are not marked by the pecking of birds. Dogs, and other animals, may be poiſoned by the ſuperiour craft of men; but leave them to themſelves, and they are ſeldom in danger of taking what is hurtful, though they ſometimes ſuffer from ſwallowing too much of what is good. And ſome of theſe creatures, when their health is diſordered, are directed by inſtinct to the proper medicine.

Without Memory, brutes would be incapable of diſcipline; and ſo, their ſtrength, ſagacity, and ſwiftneſs, would be in a great meaſure unſerviceable to man. Nor would their natural inſtincts guard them ſufficiently againſt the dangers they are expoſed to, from one another, and from things inanimate. Memory is alſo to them, as to us, a ſource of pleaſure. For to this in part muſt be owing the ſatisfaction that many of them take, in the company of their fellows, in the friendſhip of man, and in the care of their offspring; of which laſt, however, their love and remembrance laſt no longer, than is neceſſary to the preſervation of the young.—But ſuch joys, as we derive, from the idea of danger eſcaped, of oppoſition vanquiſhed, or of pleaſure formerly poſſeſſed, ſeem peculiar to rational nature, and not within the ſphere of the inferiour creation: for to produce them, not only Memory, but alſo conſciouſneſs and recollection are neceſſary. Brutes are engroſſed, chiefly or only, with what is preſent: their Memory being rather a neceſſary and inſtantaneous ſuggeſtion, than a continued or voluntary act. For the ſorrow, that a dog feels for the loſs of his maſter, a cow for that of her calf, and a horſe for that of his companion,

companion, is nothing more perhaps, though it may continue for ſome time, than an uneaſineſs ariſing from the ſenſe of a preſent want. We can hardly ſuppoſe, that any thing then paſſes in the animal, ſimilar to what we experience, when we revolve the idea of a departed friend. In a word, I do not find ſufficient ground to believe, that they are capable of Recollection, or active Remembrance; for this implies the faculty of attending to, and arranging, the thoughts of one's own mind; a power, which, as was formerly remarked, the brutes have either not at all, or very imperfectly.

Yet, let me not be quite poſitive in this affirmation. Some of the more ſagacious animals, as horſes, dogs, foxes, and elephants, have occaſionally diſplayed a power of contrivance, which *would ſeem* to require reflection, and a more perfect uſe of Memory, than I have hitherto allowed that they poſſeſs. When a rider has fallen from his horſe in a deep river, there have been inſtances of that noble creature taking hold with his teeth, and dragging him alive to land by the ſkirts of the coat. And let me here, for the honour of another noble creature, mention a fact, which was never before recorded, and which happened not many years ago within a few miles of Aberdeen.—As a gentleman was walking acroſs the Dee, when it was frozen, the ice gave way in the middle of the river, and down he ſunk; but kept himſelf from being carried away in the current, by graſping his gun, which had fallen athwart the opening. A dog, who attended him, after many fruitleſs attempts to reſcue his maſter, ran to a neighbouring village, and took hold of the coat of the firſt perſon he met. The man was alarmed, and would have diſengaged himſelf: but the dog regarded him with a look ſo kind and ſo ſignificant, and endeavoured to pull him along with ſo gentle a violence, that he began to think there might be ſomething extraordinary in the caſe, and ſuffered himſelf to be conducted by the animal; who brought

him to his maſter, in time to ſave his life *.—Was there not here, both Memory and Recollection, guided by experience, and by what in a human creature we ſhould not ſcruple to call good ſenſe? No: rather let us ſay, that here was an interpoſition of heaven; who, having thought fit to employ the animal as an inſtrument of this deliverance, was pleaſed to qualify him for it by a ſupernatural impulſe. Here, certainly, was an event ſo uncommon, that from the known qualities of a dog no perſon would have expected it; and I know not, whether this animal ever gave proof of extraordinary ſagacity in any other inſtance.

It is ſaid by Ariſtotle, and generally believed, that brute animals dream. Lucretius deſcribes thoſe imperfect attempts at barking and running, which dogs are obſerved to make in their ſleep; and ſuppoſes, agreeably to the common opinion, that they are the effects of dreaming; and that the animal then imagines himſelf to be purſuing his prey, or attacking an enemy. But, whether this be really the caſe; or whether thoſe appearances may not be owing to ſome mechanical twitches of the nerves or muſcles, rendered by long exerciſe habitual, is a point on which nothing can be affirmed with certainty.—Infants a month old ſmile in their ſleep: and I have heard good women remark, that the innocent babe is then favoured with ſome glorious viſion. But that a babe ſhould have viſions or dreams, before it has ideas, can hardly be imagined. This is probably the effect, not of thought, but of ſome bodily feeling, or merely of ſome tranſient contraction or expanſion of the muſcles. Certain it is, that no ſmiles are more

* The perſon thus preſerved, whoſe name was Irvine, died about the year 1778. His ſtory has been much talked of in the neighbourhood. I give it, as it was told by himſelf to a relation of his, a gentleman of honour and learning, and my particular friend; from whom I had it, and who read and approved of this account, before it went to preſs.

captivating. And Providence no doubt intended them as a ſort of ſilent language to engage our love; even as, by its cries, the infant is enabled to awaken our pity, and command our protection.

Memory is in ſome brutes accompanied with unaccountable circumſtances. When a horſe, an ox, or a goat, returns home of his own accord from the paſture, it is not wonderful; being an effect of Memory ſimilar in all reſpects to what we experience in ourſelves. But when a bee, whoſe eyes from their extreme convexity cannot ſee a foot before them, returns to her hive from a wide excurſion; or when a dog, that has been carried in a baſket thirty miles through a country which he never ſaw, finds his way a week after to his former dwelling, (of which I have known an inſtance)—what can we ſay, but that the ſmell of theſe animals, or ſome other faculty unknown to us, recals to their Memory paſt perceptions, in a way that we cannot conceive! Indeed, where there are perceptive powers different from, or more exquiſite than, any we enjoy, it is reaſonable to think, that there muſt be modes of remembrance equally ſurpaſſing our comprehenſion. And in bees, and dogs, and ſome other animals, there ſeem to be faculties, of the nature of ſmell, as far beyond ours in accuracy, as the informations conveyed by the fineſt microſcope are ſuperiour to thoſe we receive by the naked eye.

Yet, with all the helps he derives from inſtinct, or from more acute organs of ſenſe, how inferiour is the Memory of the moſt intelligent brute to that of reaſonable beings! The diſproportion is almoſt infinite. Many of the irrational tribes are unſuſceptible of diſcipline:—how narrow muſt the ſphere be of their remembrance! Even the moſt docile ſoon reach the ſummit of improvement; and the arts, or rather the habits, attainable by them, and within the power of human induſtry to impreſs upon them, are very few. Wholly deſtitute of ſcience, and of the powers of contemplation,

they are alſo deficient in the recollective faculty; without which we know how little our Memory would avail us: and all ſeem unable to follow even the ſhorteſt train of thought, or attend to any thing that does not affect the ſenſes.

But of a human Memory, improved to no extraordinary pitch, how vaſt is the comprehenſion! With what an endleſs multitude of thoughts is it ſupplied, by reflection, reading, and converſation, inlets of ideas denied to the inferiour animals; and by an experience incomparably more diverſified than theirs, and withal ſo modelled by our powers of arrangement and invention (which are alſo peculiar to man) as to be far more uſeful in itſelf, and much more diſtinctly remembered! Things natural; as animals, vegetables, minerals, foſſils, mountains and vallies; land and water; earth and heaven; the ſun, moon, and ſtars, with their ſeveral appearances, motions, and periods; the atmoſphere and meteors, with all the viciſſitudes of weather:—things artificial; as towns, ſtreets, houſes, highways, and machines, with their various appendages:—abſtract notions in regard to truth and falſehood, beauty and deformity, virtue and vice, proportions in quantity and number, religion, commerce, and policy, whereof the brutes know nothing, and which are the chief materials of human converſation:—theſe are ſome of the general heads, under which may be arranged the manifold treaſures of human Memory. And under each of theſe heads, what an infinity of individual things are comprehended!—Let a perſon, who has been as much in the world, as men of enterpriſe commonly are, revolve in his mind, how many human creatures he has been, and is, acquainted with; how much he remembers of their features, ſhape, voice, ſize, character, and ſentiments, of their relations, connections, and hiſtory: let him then think of thoſe men and women, whom he never ſaw, but has heard and read of; and of the characters he may have ſeen exemplified in

in plays, poems, and other fabulous writings: and will he not be amazed, that his Memory ſhould retain ſo many particulars relating to human creatures only; who yet, in the general diſtribution of human knowledge, do not perhaps form the moſt copious claſs of things? How numerous are the words even of one language! He, who is maſter of four, muſt be ſuppoſed to retain two hundred thouſand words at leaſt, with all the different ways of applying them according to rule, and innumerable paſſages in books to illuſtrate their meaning. And that four languages do not exceed the capacity of an ordinary man, will not be denied by thoſe, who believe, with Pliny and Quintilian, that Mithridates underſtood two and twenty.

But who can reckon up, or even give a general arrangement of, all the objects, notions, and ideas, that one human mind may remember! And, is it not remarkable, and truly wonderful, that, the more an improved Memory retains, the greater is its capacity? Was it ever ſaid, by any perſon of a ſound mind; My Memory has received all it can receive, and I never from this hour deſire to hear any new thing?—Let us hence learn to ſet a proper value on the dignity of the human ſoul; and to think of its intellectual faculties as inexpreſſibly ſuperiour, both in kind and in degree, to thoſe of the animal world. If we be capable of endleſs improvement, (and what reaſon is there to believe that we are not?) ſurely our deſtination muſt be different from theirs; for the Author of nature does nothing in vain: and an underſtanding, far more limited than that of man, would be ſufficient for all the purpoſes of a creature, whoſe duration is circumſcribed by the term of an hundred years. Our minds, therefore, muſt have been deſtined for ſcenes of improvement more extenſive and glorious, than theſe below; and our being to comprehend periods more durable, than thoſe which are meaſured out by the ſun. This ſpeculation forms

a proof, by which the wiſer heathens were led to believe in the immortality of the ſoul. Thus reaſoned Tully, in the perſon of the elder Cato: "Why ſhould I enlarge?" ſays he, "ſince the "activity of the mind is ſo great; ſince it remembers ſo much of "what is paſt, anticipates ſo wiſely what is to come, and is capable "of ſo many arts, ſciences, and inventions; of this I am per-"ſuaded, and thus I believe, that the being poſſeſſed of ſuch en-"dowments cannot be mortal." *

Theſe reflections lead me to animadvert a little on two ſtrange conceits of the modern philoſophy. The firſt is, that human faculties are ſo like thoſe of other animals, that, if the form of their bodies were but a little more ſimilar, we might characteriſe men, by calling them ſagacious brutes; and brutes, by ſaying, that they are imperfect men. For the writers I allude to will hardly admit, that there is one original faculty in the former, which is not in ſome degree in the latter; inſinuating, that the difference, where there is any, is owing rather to habits and experiences obtained by means of a more or leſs exquiſite formation of bodily organs, than to any thing eſſential in the frame of the mind. Nay, ſome have gone ſo far as to ſay, or at leaſt to make us ſuppoſe it is their belief, that man's primitive ſtate was a ſtate of brutality; that in it he enjoyed more health and happineſs than he does now; that he becomes the more imperfect, the more he deviates from the brutal character; and that, if he did as he ought to do, and as nature intended he ſhould, he would go naked, and on all four.—As long as men believe hiſtory and their ſenſes, it will not be neceſſary to combat the latter part of this doctrine. Of the former I ſhall only ſay, Let thoſe acquieſce in it who can. He, who is ambitious to claim conſanguinity with the beaſts, will not be much inclined to

* Cicero de Senectute, cap. 21.

read

read any thing I write; and therefore I may leave him to himſelf.—Brutes, no doubt, as well as men, have the power of retaining paſt perceptions: but, after what has been ſaid, I preſume it will appear, that they who compare this power, as it is in man, with what is called Memory in a brute, and diſcern no eſſential difference, may as well find out, that gnats and whales are the ſame ſort of animal, and that the hiſſing of a gooſe is an exact imitation of the thunder of a ſea-engagement.

That there is in the univerſe a ſcale riſing, by gradual aſcent, from nothing up to Deity, is another modern conceit, not leſs abſurd than the former; though, on account of certain names who have patronized it, ſomewhat more reſpectable. If brutes come next to men in this imaginary ſcale, ſure it cannot be ſaid to riſe gradually. I allow indeed, that horſes are ſwifter and ſtronger than men; and that many animals have faculties of perception and action that we have not; the ſwallow, for example, which can fly; the dolphin, which can live under water; and the bee, which can extract honey from flowers. But in every reſpect wherein they can be compared, how far is the rational nature above the irrational! We have ſeen, that even in regard to Memory, which is common to both, the diſtance is inconceivably great. What then ſhall we think of this diſtance, when we conſider it with a view to thoſe powers, which form the glory, and indeed the diſtinguiſhing character of man; I mean, our capacities of ſpeech, invention, and ſcience, and thoſe particulars in our frame, that entitle us to the denomination of moral, political, and religious beings? There is indeed a boundleſs variety in nature: and a ſcale gradually aſcending might poſſibly be traced in ſome claſſes of being; as in the degrees of ſagacity which belong to different brutes, and of intelligence as it appears in different men.

But,

But, how abſurd is it to talk of an univerſal ſcale of things, when many of thoſe things or ideas, that are mentioned as contiguous, are known to be ſeparated by intervals of infinite extent! For ſuch we muſt ſuppoſe the interval to be, between exiſtence and nothing, between plants and animals; between a creature unconſcious and irrational, and ſuch a creature as man; and, which is ſtill more apparent, between the higheſt order of created things, and the ſupreme, independent, and infinitely perfect Being, who is the Author of all. In a ſcale of beings, or a ſeries of ideas, ſaid to riſe, one above another, by gradual aſcent, we muſt imagine (if the words have any meaning) the contiguous beings or ideas to have ſome qualities in common, or at leaſt to have ſimilar qualities, differing, not ſo much in kind, as in degree. But in exiſtence, for example, what quality is there, which can be underſtood, in any degree, or in any kind, to belong to non-exiſtence? In what reſpect can that which is not organized be ſaid to approach to that which is; or dry, barren mould to reſemble the *fabrick* of a vegetable? Again, animals have ſenſation; plants have not: how can ſenſation, and the want of it, be conſidered as degrees of the ſame, or of kindred qualities! Moreover, man is capable of ſcience, and endowed with conſciouſneſs, and a moral principle: can he, then, be ſuppoſed, in theſe reſpects, to be elevated, one degree only, above animals, that are deſtitute of a moral principle, and incapable of contemplation? Or does the wealth of him who has no wealth (if I may ſo ſpeak) bear any proportion to that of a rich man?—And, laſtly, is it poſſible to imagine, that any created being, the moſt glorious that can be conceived, ſhould ever, after innumerable ages of improvement, approach within any diſtance leſs than infinite, of the Almighty, Eternal, and Self-exiſtent Creator?

Humble as we ought to be, under a ſenſe of our great and many imperfections, let us however entertain a right idea of human nature; remembering, that it was made in the image of God, and that it is deſtined for immortality. And, in all our inquiries, let it be our care, to guard againſt prejudice and vain theory, and confine our views to matters of fact, and to plain and practical truth.

OF IMAGINATION.

CHAP. I.

General Account of Imagination.

ACCORDING to the common uſe of words, Imagination and Fancy are not perfectly ſynonymous. They are, indeed, names for the ſame faculty; but the former ſeems to be applied to the more ſolemn, and the latter to the more trivial, exertions of it. A witty author is a man of lively Fancy; but a ſublime poet is ſaid to poſſeſs a vaſt Imagination. However, as theſe words are often, and by the beſt writers, uſed indiſcriminately, I ſhall not further diſtinguiſh them.

In what reſpect Imagination and Memory differ, was formerly explained. When we *remember*, we revolve or reviſe paſt perceptions, with a view to our experience of them, and to their reality. When we *imagine*, we conſider the notion or thought now preſent to the mind, ſimply as it is in itſelf, without any view to real exiſtence, or to paſt experience. Thoughts ſuggeſted by Memory may alſo be conſidered in this way: in which caſe they become what, in the ſtyle of modern philoſophy, would be called Ideas of Imagination. Thus the features of a portrait, or of a perſon, whom I ſaw ſome time ago, may occur to my mind, and be for a while contemplated, without my conſidering, whether I ever ſaw ſuch a thing before, or whether the idea be, or be not, a fiction of my own fancy. And ſometimes, there will remain in the mind the idea of a particular event, of which we cannot ſay, whether we learned it from information, or only dreamed of it.

Addiſon, ſpeaking of ſight, in the four hundred and eleventh paper of the Spectator, ſays, "that it is the faculty which furniſhes the Imagination with its ideas;" and, a little after, he adds, "that we cannot have a ſingle image in the fancy, that "did not make its firſt entrance through the ſight."—If by the term *Image* he mean, what he elſewhere calls, and what is commonly underſtood by the word, *idea*, it will follow, from this account, that men born blind, or who retain no Memory of light and colour, can have no Imagination. But this is not agreeable to fact. I am particularly acquainted with a perſon *, who, having at the age of five months loſt his ſight by the ſmall pox, retains not the idea of any thing viſible; and is yet a good poet, philoſopher, and divine, and, in a word, a moſt ingenious, as well as a moſt worthy, man. He dreams too, as frequently as other people; and dreams are univerſally aſcribed to the fancy: and his writings prove, that he poſſeſſes, what every critick will allow to be, and what Addiſon himſelf would have called, a ſublime Imagination.

Invention is by all philoſophers conſidered, as an operation of the ſame faculty. Now one may invent, and conſequently imagine, tunes, or ſentiments, which one never heard or ſaw; and which cannot be perceived by *ſight*, till committed to writing.—It would appear then, that Addiſon's uſe of the word in queſtion is rather too limited, when he ſays, that ideas derived from ſight are the only objects of Imagination: which yet, perhaps, may have been the opinion of thoſe, who firſt diſtinguiſhed this power of the mind by a name derived from the word *image*.

Some authors define Imagination, "The ſimple apprehenſion of "corporeal objects when abſent." But the common uſe of language would warrant a more comprehenſive definition. The

* The Reverend Dr. Blacklock of Edinburgh.

anxiety of a miſer, and the remorſe of a murderer, are not corporeal objects; and yet may be *imagined* by thoſe who never felt them. Shakeſpeare, who was neither a murderer nor a miſer, but on the contrary poſſeſſed a generous and benevolent heart, has expreſſed theſe feelings in ſuch a manner, as will ſatisfy every reader, that his conception of them was equally juſt and lively.

In the language of modern philoſophy, the word *Imagination* ſeems to denote; firſt, the power of apprehending or conceiving ideas, ſimply as they are in themſelves, without any view to their reality: and ſecondly, the power of combining into new forms, or aſſemblages, thoſe thoughts, ideas, or notions, which we have derived from experience, or from information.

Theſe two powers, though diſtinguiſhable, are not eſſentially different. If one can apprehend, or imagine, a thing that one has ſeen, one may alſo imagine two or more ſuch things united ſo as to form what has nothing ſimilar to it in nature. If I, for example, have the idea of a dog's head and a man's body, it is eaſy for me to imagine them united in one and the ſame animal; to which my fancy can add wings, and horns, and cloven feet, and as many odd appendages as you pleaſe. Theſe two faculties, therefore, of *Simple Apprehenſion* and *Combination* (as I ſhall take the liberty to call them) are ſo nearly allied, that there can be no harm in referring both to the Imagination or Fancy.

That the nature of this *Combining Power* may be the better underſtood, I muſt remark, that philoſophers have divided our ideas, and other objects of perception, into Simple and Complex. A ſimple object is that which does not ſeem to conſiſt of parts that can be conceived ſeparate; as heat, cold, hunger, thirſt, &c. A complex object conſiſts of parts or qualities, which are ſeparable, or may at leaſt be conceived as ſuch by the mind. The ſmalleſt grain of ſand, the minuteſt particle of matter that ſenſe can perceive, is a complex

complex object; becauſe it conſiſts of parts that may be ſeparated, and is characterized by qualities, which it is poſſible to think of apart from each other, as figure, colour, ſolidity, weight, &c.

Now all ſimple ideas, that is, all our notions of ſimple objects, are derived from experience; and cannot be deſcribed in words, ſo as to be underſtood by thoſe who never perceived them. A man born deaf has no conception of ſound; nor he who is born blind, of light or colour. And if we were to attempt to convey by deſcription thoſe ſimple ideas, to which nature has not opened an inlet by ſenſation, we ſhould labour as ineffectually, as did that philoſopher, who undertook to give a blind man a notion of ſcarlet. He told him, that it yielded a ſenſation at once lively and agreeable, that it was an emblem of courage, and ornamental to princes and great men; and, after ſpecifying ſome of its other qualities, aſked him, whether he had not now ſome idea of it. Yes, replied the other, Scarlet muſt be, from your account, the likeſt thing in the world to the ſound of a trumpet.—Men born blind do, indeed, talk of things viſible, and often with propriety. But this muſt be, either the effect of Memory, when they ſay of colours and light what they have heard ſaid by others: or it muſt be with ſome figurative alluſion; as when they ſpeak of having *ſeen* ſuch a perſon, or ſuch a book, which, in their mouth, means no more, than their having been in company with the perſon, or heard the book read. For of the peculiar ſenſations conveyed by ſight they muſt remain as ignorant, as we are of the phenomena of a world of ſpirits. Their dreams preſent them with nothing but different arrangements of thoſe ideas which they have acquired by means of the other four ſenſes. Even when they dream of light, which from their unhappy circumſtances it is natural they ſhould often do, as there is nothing they ſo earneſtly deſire, they ſtill

fancy, that it is audible, or tangible; they never can conceive what it really is. For the wildeſt of our dreams are ſo far conformable to nature, as to be wholly made up of thoſe ſimple or complex notions of things, wherewith experience has made us acquainted. Memory ſupplies the materials: all that fancy does in ſleep, or can do, is variouſly to arrange them, ſo as to form new combinations, whereof ſome are leſs, and others more extravagant.

Of the ſimple or complex ideas derived from experience, the mind, when awake as well as in ſleep, frames, as I obſerved already, or may frame, innumerable aſſemblages different from thoſe that really exiſt. He who has ſeen ivory and a mountain, may conceive the colour, ſmoothneſs, and ſubſtance of the former, united with the ſhape and ſize of the latter; and ſo have a notion of an ivory mountain. The monſtrous picture deſcribed by Horace, in the beginning of the *Art of Poetry*, with the head of a man, the neck of a horſe, feathers of different birds, limbs of different beaſts, and the tail of a fiſh, it is eaſy for us to conceive, and, if we know a little of drawing, to make viſible in a picture. In fact, nothing is more eaſy than to form new combinations of this ſort: the great, and the difficult, buſineſs of invention is, to make them agreeable and uſeful, conſiſtent and natural.

This capacity of framing new aſſemblages is referred, as I ſaid before, to the Imagination. Memory preſents nothing to our view, but what we have actually perceived; ſo that a being endowed with Memory, but deſtitute of fancy, whatever knowledge he might acquire, would be incapable of invention. For all invention implies novelty; and that things or ideas are put together, which were never ſo put together before.

And, that the powers of invention and remembrance are different; ſo as that a perſon may poſſeſs the one in a high, and the other in a low degree, is almoſt too obvious to require proof.

Shakeſpeare and Aaron Hill were poets, and men of genius. The latter was a traveller, and wrote the hiſtory of his travels, and had enjoyed, beſides, the advantage of a liberal education: the former had little learning, was never out of England, and paſſed a great part of his life in needy circumſtances. From this account one would think, that Hill muſt have poſſeſſed a greater fund of ideas, than Shakeſpeare: and that he had more knowlege of books, of countries, and of other things which occur in reading, admits of no doubt. But Hill's inventive talent was not extraordinary; we find little new in him; and we ſay, without impropriety, that he had no great powers of Imagination. Whereas Shakeſpeare, with far leſs erudition, was in ſentiments and images incomparably more abundant; and has indeed diſplayed a variety of invention, as well as a knowlege of nature, that is almoſt without example.—We every day meet with perſons of good ſenſe and clear apprehenſion; who can diſtinctly tell a ſtory, or give an account of a book they have read, or of buſineſs they have been engaged in; but whoſe converſation, though it beſpeaks a good Memory, ſhows no inventive talent. And others may be met with, who are witty and humourous, and ſtrike out in their diſcourſe many new ideas, who yet have no great ſtrength of Memory, and little of that clearneſs of head, which is requiſite to form a man of buſineſs.

CHAP. II.

Of the Aſſociation of Ideas.

SECT. I.

Principles of Aſſociation. — Firſt, Reſemblance. — Secondly, Contrariety. — Thirdly, Nearneſs of Situation.

THE human ſoul is eſſentially active; and none of our faculties are more reſtleſs, than this of Imagination, which operates in ſleep, as well as when we are awake. While we liſten to a diſcourſe, or read a book, how often, in ſpite of all our care, does the fancy wander, and preſent thoughts quite different from thoſe we would keep in view! That energy, which lays a reſtraint upon the fancy, by fixing the mind on one particular object, or ſet of objects, is called Attention: and moſt people know, that the continued exerciſe of it is accompanied with difficulty, and ſomething of intellectual wearineſs. Whereas, when, without attending to any one particular idea, we give full ſcope to our thoughts, and permit them to ſhift, as Imagination or accident ſhall determine, a ſtate of mind which is called a Reverie; we are conſcious of ſomething like mental relaxation; while one idea brings in another, which gives way to a third, and that in its turn is ſucceeded by others; the mind ſeeming all along to be paſſive, and to exert as little authority over its thoughts, as the eye does over the perſons who paſs before it in the ſtreet. The ſucceſſion of theſe wandering ideas is often regulated by Memory; as when the particulars of a place we have ſeen, or of a converſation we

have witneſſed, paſs in review before us. At other times, our thoughts have leſs connection with reality, and follow each other in an order, in which, perhaps, they never appeared before.

The ſame thing is obſervable in thoſe miſcellaneous converſations, that are confined to no one particular topick, but in which every perſon ſays what occurs to him, according as it is ſuggeſted by what had been ſaid by others. Here, though a variety of ſubjects, and a multitude of diſſimilar ideas, be introduced, yet we may for the moſt part trace out the relations that unite them. And this is ſo well known, that, if any thing be ſaid which appears to bear no relation to what went before, the audience are apt to take notice of it, and expect to be informed of the train of thinking, which could lead the ſpeaker to an idea apparently ſo incongruous.—I have ſomewhere read or heard, that, in the time of thoſe civil wars which occaſioned the death of Charles the Firſt, when ſome of the King's adherents were diſcourſing of the evils that threatened the royal party, one of them aſked, what was the value of a Roman *denarius*. This queſtion ſeemed to be very remote from the ſubject; and the company expreſſed their ſurpriſe, that a converſation of ſo great moment ſhould be interrupted by ſo unſeaſonable a query. The gentleman aſked pardon; and ſaid, he was led to it by a train of thoughts that had juſt then paſſed through his mind: that the fate of their unfortunate ſovereign ſeemed to him to reſemble that of our Saviour when betrayed into the hands of his enemies; and that this had made him think of Judas the traitor, and of the price paid for his treachery, which was thirty pieces of ſilver, or, as he ſuppoſed, thirty Roman *denarii*.

When our thoughts follow one another in this manner, the tranſitions are often exceedingly quick; ſo that we ſhall be, this moment, thinking of one thing, and, the next, of ſomething totally

totally different. And yet, perhaps, if we could recollect all the intermediate ideas, we ſhould find, that, though the firſt and the laſt be very diſſimilar, thoſe that come next one another are all related. Julius Ceſar, for example, occurs to my mind. Upon him I may, if I pleaſe, fix my attention for a while, without ſuffering fancy to wander to any thing elſe. But, if it is under no reſtraint, a great variety of ideas may immediately preſent themſelves. Ceſar leads me to think of Gaul, perhaps, which he conquered, and of Britain, which he invaded; of the barbarous ſtate in which he found the inhabitants of this iſland; of ſavage life, in general, and the horrid practices that prevail in it, murder, rapine, human ſacrifices, and the eating of human fleſh. How different, I exclaim, is this abominable banquet, from thoſe of the Hippomolgians celebrated by Homer, who lived on milk, and led a life of ſuch purity, that Jupiter took pleaſure in beholding it! Hence there is an eaſy tranſition to the golden age deſcribed by the poets, and to man's ſtate of innocence before the fall.—I ſet out with Julius Ceſar, the moſt accompliſhed perſonage of antiquity; the next moment I was among cannibals, the diſgrace of human nature; and, immediately after, the peace and the pleaſures of paradiſe were before me. Ideas more diſſimilar can hardly be imagined; and yet, the contiguous links in this chain are ſo connected, that one may naturally lead to another. And, if my reverie were to continue, ten thouſand ideas might ariſe, equally diverſified, and yet mutually related.

I do not ſay, that, of any number of ſucceſſive ideas, there is *always* a mutual affinity between thoſe which are next to each other. Fancy *often* is capricious, and preſents combinations, that are unaccountably extravagant. And we may, no doubt, exchange any one thought for almoſt any other; even as, by a ſudden turn, we may direct our eyes this inſtant to the ſouth, and the next to the

the north. But the more natural procedure, and that which requires the leaſt effort, is, in the latter caſe, to look at things as they lie in order and contiguous, and, in the former, to paſs from one thought to others that bear a relation to it.

Since, then, there is, *for the moſt part*, a connection between thoſe ideas that paſs through the mind; it comes to be a matter worthy of curioſity, to inquire into the nature of this connection; and ſee, whether we can trace out any principles, whereby the ſucceſſion, or Aſſociation, of our ideas may appear to be regulated. Theſe principles are, no doubt, many and various: nor will I undertake, as ſome have done, to enumerate them all. Nor am I anxious, as ſome have been, to reduce them to two or three general ones. The more examples of this Aſſociation that we attend to, the greater number of aſſociating principles we ſhall probably diſcover. But I confine myſelf to a few particulars.

1. One event or ſtory leads us to think of another that is *like* it. We are often put in mind of an abſent friend, by ſeeing a ſtranger who *reſembles* him. *Reſemblance*, then, is one of thoſe aſſociating principles, that lead our thoughts from one object to another. In other words, Ideas that are *ſimilar*, or ſuppoſed to be ſuch, are attractive of each other in our minds.

Hence the origin of metaphor, ſimilitude, allegory, and thoſe other figures of rhetorick, that are founded in *likeneſs*; multitudes of which occur, not only in poetry, and all good writing, but alſo in common diſcourſe. We call a cunning perſon, a fox; and one who breeds diſſention, a firebrand; a dull man, an aſs; and an indecent, unmannerly fellow, a brute. The ſame trope is uſed, in the way of commendation, when we call an innocent babe, a lamb; a virtuous and beautiful perſon, an angel: or merely in order to convey a lively idea; as when, of a lean man it is ſaid, that he is nothing but ſkin and bone; or of a tall man, that he

is a ſteeple. Theſe are metaphors. And, in applying them, our fancy is led, from the perſon or thing we ſpeak of, to the other perſon or thing whoſe name we make uſe of; on account of a ſuppoſed reſemblance between them.

To talk metaphorically, and illuſtrate our thoughts in the way of allegory and ſimilitude, is more common than one would imagine, not only with men of learning, but even with children and ſavages: and we are moſt apt to do ſo, when we give vent to any ſtrong emotion. The following ſentence is natural enough, and not too refined for common dialogue; and yet, the firſt clauſe is a metaphor, the ſecond a ſimilitude, and the third an allegory. "I was thunderſtruck at the news; and ſtood for a time motion-"leſs, like a ſtatue; but endeavoured to compoſe myſelf, by re-"flecting, that in the voyage of life calms and ſtorms do generally "ſucceed each other." Unlettered people, and nations whoſe language is in a rude ſtate, have more frequent recourſe to theſe figures, than perſons of a copious elocution. The dialect of the vulgar abounds in proverbs, moſt of which, as they apply them, are allegories or ſimilies. And the harangues of Indian chiefs, whereof ſpecimens appear from time to time in the newſpapers, are full of metaphor from beginning to end. This may ſhow, how natural it is for the human mind, to aſſociate ſimilar ideas; or, to paſs, from one idea or object, to another that is like it.

When the ſoul is occupied by any powerful paſſion, the thoughts that ariſe in it are generally ſimilar to that paſſion, and tend to encourage it. Is a man joyful? his thoughts do all partake of the gaiety of his heart; and melancholy ideas diſappear ſo totally, that he would find it no eaſy matter to recal them. Is he ſad? he then ruminates upon pain and diſappointment, and the uncertainty of human things; upon death, and the grave, and a thouſand other gloomy objects. Anger, in like manner, gives the mind a tendency

dency to aſſociate the congenial ideas of injury, reproach, and retaliation: as piety and benevolence call up the moſt delightful images of felicity and virtue, the rewards of the good, and the reformation of the wicked, ſociety flouriſhing, and the whole univerſe united in harmony and love.—So that, if we know a perſon's character, or the paſſions that habitually prevail in him, we may gueſs, with no little aſſurance, in regard to the thoughts that would ariſe in his mind on any given occaſion, that they would bear a reſemblance to his predominant temper. And thus it is, that poets are enabled to preſerve the decorum of characters; and to aſſign to every perſon, whom they may introduce as an agent in their fable, thoſe ſentiments, and that conduct, which we ſhould expect from ſuch a perſon, if he were to make his appearance in real life.—If, then, we would keep uneaſy thoughts at a diſtance, we muſt repreſs every diſagreeable paſſion, as anger, revenge, envy, ſuſpicion, and diſcontent; and cheriſh piety, humanity, forgiveneſs, patience, and a lowly mind. For the latter bring along with them ſweet and ſoothing ideas; as painful thoughts and miſery are the inſeparable companions of the former.

2. Another aſſociating principle is *Contrariety*. When we feel hunger or cold, we are more apt to think of food, or of heat, than of any thing elſe. The influence of this law is obſervable even in ſleep. Our dreams, when we are hungry or thirſty, are all made up of eating or drinking; or rather, of attempts to eat or drink: for, as the appetite remains unallayed, the idea of complete gratification does not occur; but we fancy, that the drink is impure, or the food beyond our reach, or that ſomething elſe continually interpoſes to diſappoint us.

In ſurveying a great pile of ruins, is it not natural to ſay, How changed is this place from what it once muſt have been! "how "doth the city ſit ſolitary, that was full of people!"—and, while

our eyes dwell on the ſcene of deſolation that is now before them, to revolve in our mind thoſe ideas of feſtivity, ſplendour, and buſy life, which we conceive to have been formerly realized on the ſame ſpot? We are told by Herodotus, that, when Xerxes, from a hill near the Helleſpont, was taking a view of his vaſt army and navy, and beheld the ſea covered with his ſhips, and the ſhores and plains of Abydos full of men, he wept to think that thoſe multitudes would all be dead within a hundred years *. The humanity of the thought is pleaſing; and it pleaſes alſo on account of the contraſt. From the acclamations that now rang in his ears, and the activity diſplayed in thoſe unnumbered varieties of motion that were before his eyes, the mind of the Perſian king was led, by a natural tranſition, to the oppoſite ideas of eternal reſt and ſilence.

If contraſt were not a natural bond of union among ideas, we ſhould not be ſo much pleaſed with it in works of fancy. But in fact we find, that poets and other artiſts, whoſe aim is to give pleaſure, are all ſtudious of it. Homer frequently interrupts the deſcription of a battle, with a ſimilitude taken from ſtill life or from rural affairs: and in this he has been imitated by ſucceeding poets; who have alſo, after his example, in the contrivance of characters, oppoſed the violent to the gentle, the cunning to the generous, and the proud to the humble; and, in the arrangement of their fable, diverſified events by a like artifice; introducing a negotiation after a battle, a night-adventure after a day of buſineſs, a feſtival after a ſtorm, a ſcene of joy after diſtreſs, and a glimpſe of domeſtick tranquillity in the midſt of tumult. On all theſe occaſions we are pleaſed with the variety; and we are alſo pleaſed with the oppoſition, becauſe it makes the variety more obſervable and ſurpriſing, and ſuits that propenſity of the human mind, of

* Herodot. lib. vii. Polymnia.

aſſociating contraries, or paſſing from one extreme to another. Contraſted characters have this further advantage in poetry, that, by counteracting, they mutually exerciſe, one another, and occaſion a full diſplay of the peculiarities of each.

But the propenſity I ſpeak of is not at all times equally ſtrong. When one is happy, one is unwilling to think of miſery. And therefore, it would ſeem, that the influence of Contrariety, as an aſſociating principle, is moſt powerful, when the mind is actuated by ſome *uneaſy* emotion. While we ſuffer no inconvenience, the ſoul is tranquil, and the fancy is not apt to wander beyond the preſent ſcene. But ſolicitude and pain ſtimulate thought, and direct our view to thoſe things that ſeem to promiſe an adequate relief. We think of coolneſs when panting under the heat of a ſummer ſun,

O quis me gelidis in vallibus Hæmi
Siſtat, et ingenti ramorum protegat umbra!

But in extreme heat we ſhould probably think of extreme cold. When King John is tortured with the burning heat of a mortal poiſon, Shakſpeare does not make him think of coolneſs, for that was not the proper contraſt to his feelings, but puts in his mouth the following exclamation.

Poiſon'd, ill fare! dead, and forſook, caſt off,
And none of you will bid the winter come,
To thruſt his icy fingers in my maw;
Nor let my kingdom's rivers take their courſe
Through my burn'd boſom; nor entreat the north
To make his bleak winds kiſs my parched lips,
And comfort me with cold.

Nothing can be more natural than the direction here given to the imagination of the ſufferer: and in the poetical, or pindarick, boldneſs of the ſtyle, there is no more extravagance, than might be

be expected from a perſon betrayed, and poiſoned, frantick with pain, and in the agonies of death.

3. When the idea occurs of any place with which we are acquainted, we are apt to paſs, by an eaſy and quick tranſition, to thoſe of the adjoining places, of the perſons who live there, and of the events that are known to have happened in that neighbourhood. Here the aſſociating principle is neither Reſemblance, nor Contrariety, but *Contiguity*, *Vicinity*, or nearneſs of ſituation *. If there be not only Contiguity, but order, or ſyſtematick arrangement, the Aſſociation will be peculiarly ſtrong. After ſeeing all the human bones ſeparated, and lying ſide by ſide, the idea of one

* Contiguity and Vicinity are not ſtrictly ſynonymous; the former being the higheſt degree of the latter: but it is not neceſſary to be more explicit.—Perhaps, *Vicinity in time* ought alſo to have been mentioned as an aſſociating circumſtance: as our minds are ſometimes led from one event to another that fell out about the ſame time. Yet I think this does not commonly and naturally happen, unleſs where the ſucceſſive ideas are connected by ſome other Principle of Aſſociation. If, after hearing an event and the date of it, one were to ſubjoin, "That puts me in mind of ſomething which "happened at the ſame time," the company, if they were not mere chronologers, would be rather diſappointed, to find, that what was ſaid by the laſt ſpeaker was not in any reſpect, but that of contemporarineſs, related to what had been ſaid by the other. Take an example. *Mr. A.* "So, Sir, as I was ſaying, I fell from my horſe in the "middle of the river; and the weather was very cold; it being the thirtieth of "November." *Mr. B.* "Sir, I have reaſon to remember the thirtieth of that "month; for that was the date of my little daughter Jane's inoculation for the ſmall "pox."—Would not ſuch a connection be ſomewhat ludicrous, from the *want of relation* between the two events? Yet *in time* they might be cloſely related, to a day, or even to an hour. But if *Mr. B.* were to ſpeak thus: "Sir, it is remarkable that, on the very "day you mention, my little daughter narrowly eſcaped drowning;" or, "I was in as "great danger from fire, as you were from water;"—the Aſſociation would be allowed to be natural, from the *reſemblance* of the one event, or from the *contrariety* of the other.—In matters of this kind, *dates* are not apt to take hold of the imagination, becauſe they are ſeldom important. *Places* are viſible things: and the images they leave in the memory (if I may be allowed the expreſſion) are livelier and more accurately defined.

will

will not ſo readily introduce that of another, as if we had examined the entire ſkeleton. To an architect the fragment of a column conveys a notion of the whole pillar; and the outline of the ſhadow of a face which we know, is found to give a lively idea of all the features.

The ſight of a place in which we have been happy or unhappy, renews the thoughts and the feelings that we formerly experienced there. With what rapture, after long abſence, do we reviſit the haunts of our childhood, and early youth! A thouſand ideas, which had been for many years forgotten, now crowd upon the Imagination, and revive within us the gay paſſions of that romantick period. The ſame effect is produced, though perhaps in a fainter degree, when in a foreign land we talk of, or recollect, the place of our nativity. And from theſe, and other Aſſociations of a like nature, ariſes in part that moſt important principle, the love of our country; whereof the chief objects are, our friends, and fellow-citizens, and the government that has ſo long protected us and our fathers; but in which is alſo comprehended a fondneſs for the very fields and mountains, the vales, the rocks, and the rivers, which formed the ſcenery of our firſt amuſements and adventures.

Moſt perſons feel ſomething of this fondneſs: and thoſe who do not, may yet admit the reality of it, when they are told, that the natives of certain countries, when abroad in foreign parts, do ſometimes fall ſick, and even die, of a deſire to reviſit their native land. The Swiſs were formerly ſo liable to this malady, that they diſtinguiſhed it by a particular name. The Scots, too, have ſuffered from it. And in general it has been thought, that the natives of a mountainous region are more ſubject to this infirmity, than thoſe who have been born and bred in level countries. For precipices, rocks, and torrents, are durable things; and, being more ſtriking to the fancy than any natural appearances in the plains, take faſter hold of the memory; and may therefore more frequently recur to

the abſent native, accompanied with an idea of the pleaſures formerly enjoyed in thoſe places, and with regret that he is now removed to ſo great a diſtance from them. To which we may add, that the daily contemplation of the grand phenomena of nature, in a mountainous country, elevates, and continually exerciſes, the Imagination of the ſolitary inhabitant; one effect of which is, to give thoſe ſenſibilities to the nervous ſyſtem, which render the mind in a peculiar degree ſuſceptible of wild thoughts, and warm emotions. *

On entering a place conſecrated to religion, ſerious minds are generally conſcious of devout impreſſions; the ſurrounding ſcene recalling ſome of thoſe habits of thinking, which have been formed in this or in ſimilar places. And, for the ſame reaſon, playhouſes and ball-rooms, and other places of publick diverſion, have a tendency to ſuggeſt thoughts of a different nature. Such is the effect of Cuſtom, and of Contiguity, conſidered as Principles of Aſſociation.

* See Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick. Part i. chap. 6. ſection 3.

SECT. II.

Principles of Aſſociation. — Fourthly, The Relation of Cauſe and Effect. Superſtitions ariſing from this and the preceding Principle.

4. *THINGS related as cauſe and effect* naturally ſuggeſt each other to the mind. When we think of the ſun, we can hardly avoid thinking of the influence of his beams: the notion of ſnow, or of ice, brings along with it that of cold: the ſight of a wound conveys an idea of the weapon that gave it, and of the pain that attends it. All men, and even children, have a propenſity to think of, and inquire into, the *cauſe* of any event that attracts their notice; and are continually forming conjectures in regard to the *conſequences* of their own, and other people's, conduct.

The ſame mutual attraction takes place among thoſe objects and ideas, that *are ſuppoſed* to ſtand in the relation of Effect and Cauſe; even though in fact they have no influence upon each other. The falling of ſalt; the clicking of that little inſect, which we call a death-watch; the twinkling of a glow-worm; the howling of a dog; or the ſhriek of an owl, have nothing to do with impending calamity: but to the ſuperſtitious, who regard them as omens, ſuggeſt that idea as effectually, as if they were known to be the real cauſes, or the certain fore-runners, of misfortune.

It is therefore incumbent on thoſe, who ſuperintend education, to inſtil right notions into the young mind, and guard it againſt theſe, and the like Aſſociations; which, notwithſtanding their abſurdity, have often embittered human life, and even perverted mens ideas of the Divine Providence. Superſtition is one of the worſt diſeaſes of the ſoul. It is equally unfriendly to happineſs, to

rational piety, and to ſound philoſophy. And this peculiar evil attends thoſe forms of it which I now allude to; that one is not always proof againſt their influence, even when one is ſatisfied that they are unreaſonable. At the falling of ſalt, or at finding the number of perſons at table to be exactly thirteen, I have known people of good underſtanding exceedingly diſconcerted: who would yet acknowledge, that they believed it was idle to take notice of ſuch a thing; but that, having once looked upon it as ominous, they could not, on ſeeing it, diveſt themſelves of apprehenſions.

" The ideas of goblins and ſpirits (ſays Locke) have really no " more to do with darkneſs than with light: yet let but a fooliſh " maid inculcate theſe often on the mind of a child, and raiſe " them there together, poſſibly he ſhall never be able to ſeparate " them again ſo long as he lives: but darkneſs ſhall ever afterwards " bring along with it thoſe frightful ideas."—I will not ſay, that children, or that men, either may be, or ought to be, as free from fear by night, as by day: darkneſs and ſolitude create ſome degree of horror in every mind; and, where our eyes give no diſtinct information of ſurrounding objects, we muſt be more expoſed to danger, than where we have the free uſe of all our faculties. But I ſay, with Locke, that the notion of ghoſts or goblins appearing in the dark is wholly artificial; being the effect of certain Aſſociations, formed in infancy, and founded on thoſe idle tales with which children are amuſed and terrified; and which, too often, even when they come to a right uſe of reaſon, continue to haunt them; and ſometimes, eſpecially in bad health, are attended with melancholy conſequences. Certain it is, that children who never hear of ghoſts are never afraid of them. Is it not, then, a matter of importance, to keep them ignorant of what ſuperſtitious people believe in regard to theſe idle tales? Addiſon juſtly remarks, that,

next to a good conſcience and clear judgement, the greateſt bleſſing in life is a ſound Imagination. And he recommends piety, and rational habits of thinking, as the beſt preſervative againſt thoſe impertinent notions, whereby this faculty is liable to be perverted.

To the ſame cauſe, namely, to abſurd Aſſociations formed in early life from falſe opinions concerning Cauſes and Effects, it is owing, that weak minds have annexed to certain places the ideas of ſpirits, demons, and other dreadful beings. Hence churches and church-yards become objects of terror. And where a perſon has died, with circumſtances of peculiar diſtreſs, the place has been ſuppoſed to be haunted by his ghoſt. So prevalent in former times was this folly, that there was hardly a large old houſe to be ſeen, which had not in it two or three apartments that were believed to be infeſted with troubled, or with evil ſpirits. Deſolate houſes, heaps of ruins, deep groves, the ſides of rivers, and monumental mounds of earth, or heaps of ſtones, were avoided in the night by the aſtoniſhed peaſant; as if they had been the abodes of robbers, or beaſts of prey.

A young mind may be argued out of ſuch fancies: and therefore it is worth while to animadvert a little upon them; and ſhow, that, though the ſtories circulated concerning them were not altogether fabulous, it would not follow, that there is any thing ſupernatural in the caſe.

So much are we accuſtomed to the buſtle of active life, that profound ſilence alone ſtartles the Imagination, and, as many accurate obſervers of nature have remarked, is apt to produce fear *. Silence, as well as darkneſs, implies ſome degree of danger; by intimating that we are at a diſtance from the protection and other

* Ipſa ſilentia terrent. *Virgil.* — Terret ſolitudo, et tacentes loci. *Tacitus.*

comforts of ſociety.—Beſides, when the ſenſes have nothing to employ them, the mind is left (if I may ſo ſpeak) a prey to its own thoughts; the Imagination becomes unmanageable; the nerves loſe their wonted vigour; and now, the ſmalleſt ſound is alarming, and the moſt common object appears to the eye diſtorted and diſproportioned; nay we fancy that we ſee, and that we hear, what exiſts only in our own Imagination. When the human frame is thus prepared for the reception of extravagant ideas, the ſenſes are as eaſily impoſed on, as when one raves in a fever: and then, if we be inclined to ſuperſtition, and in circumſtances that favour it, who can tell what may follow!

Now in a large and uninhabited building, like a church, the wind may howl; doors and windows may clap; the creaking of ruſty hinges may be heard; a ſtone, or a bit of plaſter, may drop with ſome noiſe from the mouldering wall; the light of the moon may gleam unexpectedly through a cranny, and, where it falls on the broken pavement, form an appearance not unlike a human face illuminated, or a naked human body, which the peaſant, whoſe chance it is to ſee it, may readily miſtake for a ghoſt, or ſome other tremendous being. In the forſaken apartments of an old caſtle, rats and jack-daws may raiſe an uproar, that ſhall ſeem to ſhake the whole edifice to the foundation. Piles of ruins, eſpecially when ſurrounded with trees and underwood, give ſhelter to owls, and wild cats, and other creatures, whoſe ſcreaming, redoubled by echoes, may to the ſuperſtitious ear ſeem to be, as Shakſpeare ſays, "no mortal buſineſs, nor no ſound That the "earth owns." In deep groves, by twilight, our viſion muſt be ſo indiſtinct, that a buſh may, without enchantment, aſſume the form of a fiend or monſter; and the craſhing of branches, toſſed by the wind, or grated againſt one another, may ſound like groans and lamentations. By the ſide of a river, in a ſtill or in a ſtormy evening,

evening, many noiſes may be heard, ſufficient to alarm thoſe, who would rather tremble at a prodigy, than inveſtigate a natural cauſe: a ſudden change, or increaſe of the wind, by ſwelling the roar of the far-off torrent, or by daſhing the waters in a new direction againſt rocks or hollow banks, may produce hoarſe and uncommon ſounds; and the innocent gambols of a few otters have been known to occaſion thoſe yells, which the vulgar of this country miſtake for laughing or crying, and aſcribe to a certain goblin, who is ſuppoſed to dwell in the waters, and to take delight in drowning the bewildered traveller.

Theſe, and the like conſiderations, if duly attended to, would overcome many of thoſe terrors that haunt the ignorant and the credulous; reſtore ſoundneſs to the Imagination; and, as Perſius ſays, in his uſual rough but expreſſive manner, "pull the old "grandmother out of our entrails." And the habit of encountering ſuch imaginary terrors, and of being often alone in darkneſs, will greatly conduce to the ſame end. The ſpirit of free inquiry, too, is in this, as in all other reſpects, friendly to our nature. By the glimmering of the moon, I have once and again beheld, at midnight, the exact form of a man or woman, ſitting ſilent and motionleſs by my bedſide. Had I hid my head, without daring to look the apparition in the face, I ſhould have paſſed the night in horror, and riſen in the morning with the perſuaſion of having ſeen a ghoſt. But, rouſing myſelf, and reſolving to find out the truth, I diſcovered, that it was nothing more, than the accidental diſpoſition of my clothes upon a chair.—Once I remember to have been alarmed at ſeeing, by the faint light of the dawn, a coffin laid out between my bed and the window. I ſtarted up; and recollecting, that I had heard of ſuch things having been ſeen by others, I ſet myſelf to examine it, and found, that it was only a ſtream of yellowiſh light, falling in a particular manner upon the floor,

floor, from between the window-curtains. And ſo lively was the appearance, that, after I was thoroughly ſatisfied of the cauſe, it continued to impoſe on my ſight as before, till the increaſing light of the morning diſpelled it.—Theſe facts are perhaps too trivial to be recorded: but they ſerve to ſhow, that free inquiry, with a very ſmall degree of fortitude, may ſometimes, when one is willing to be rational, prove a cure to certain diſeaſes of Imagination.

Does, then, all that has been ſaid, and believed, concerning preternatural ſights and ſounds, amount to no more than this, that men have, in every age, been impoſed on, by the dreams of a diſtempered fancy? Have ſuch things no exiſtence, but in the brain of the viſionary?—In anſwer to this, I might quote Plutarch, who, after recounting ſome prodigies, has the following remark. "To be too confident, either in believing, or in diſbelieving, "ſuch things, is unſafe, on account of human weakneſs, which "is confined within no boundary, and has not the command "of itſelf; but ſometimes runs into vain ſuperſtition, and ſome-"times into a neglect and contempt of religion. It is beſt to "be cautious, and to avoid extremes."

That viſions were ſeen, and celeſtial voices heard, in the days of antient prophecy, is undeniable; and that, for effecting purpoſes of importance, the ſame thing *may* have happened, even in latter times, does not wholly exceed belief: but no one, I think, can be blamed for rejecting, as fabulous, the vulgar ſtories of ghoſts and apparitions. As far as my knowledge of nature extends, I ſee no reaſon for admitting them; as far as I have examined their evidence, I find it unſatisfactory: and I do not at preſent recollect one inſtance of the kind, which may not be accounted for, upon one or other of the principles abovementioned.

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Of this we are certain, that neither diſembodied ſpirits, nor good nor evil angels, can become viſible to mortals, without the ſpecial appointment of a wiſe Providence; and, therefore, that none but wicked men can have any reaſon to be afraid of them. And Scripture, in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, plainly intimates, that ſuch extraordinary events are not to be expected, even in caſes that ſeem to us to be of the laſt importance; for that we have already, from reaſon and from revelation, every notice of the economy of unſeen worlds, that could be of any real uſe to us. "Let us endeavour" (as Addiſon has well expreſſed it) "to eſtabliſh to ourſelves an in-"tereſt in him, who holds the reins of the whole creation in "his hand, and moderates them after ſuch a manner, that it "is impoſſible for one being to break looſe upon another, with-"out his knowledge and permiſſion."

SECT. III.

The ſame Subject. — Cuſtom, an aſſociating Principle.

IT was hinted, and ſome of the preceding examples imply, that *Cuſtom* is a principle of Aſſociation. Its influence is powerful and extenſive. Two objects, or ideas, that are not ſimilar, nor contrary, nor contiguous, nor related as cauſe and effect, or in any other way, may, by appearing once or twice in the ſame groupe, acquire an affinity no leſs intimate with reſpect to the Imagination, than if art or nature had combined them in one permanent aſſemblage; and the one ſhall ſuggeſt the other to the mind as readily as the idea of a door or window ſuggeſts that of a houſe.—You may have heard one of the common people, in order to amuſe his companions who were not in the ſecret, offer to lay a wager, that they ſhould never pare their nails on Monday without thinking of the fox. What connection, one would ſay, is there between the nails, or the act of paring them on the ſecond day of the week, and that animal? Truly none. But when you are once led to take notice of theſe ideas thus aſſociated, you may afterwards find, they will ſo adhere, as that, if you attend to the one, the other will immediately preſent itſelf.

Many of our actions do in this way ſuggeſt certain thoughts, from no other diſcernible cauſe, but that their union, which at firſt was accidental, having been once and again repeated or renewed, or once accompanied with ſome ſtriking circumſtance, has ſettled into a permanent Aſſociation. If, for example, while I am performing a certain piece of muſick, or while I am making a viſit at the houſe of a friend, I ſhould receive ſome very agreeable,

or very diſagreeable, intelligence, it is not unlikely, that the ſame muſick, or a repetition of the viſit, will afterwards put me in mind of that intelligence, or at leaſt convey ſome vague idea of good or of bad fortune. Or if, in my walks, I ſhould, for ſeveral days, meet unexpectedly, in one place, with one and the ſame perſon, diſtinguiſhed by ſuch qualities, good or bad, as would make me attend to him, it would not be wondered at, if the ideas of that place and perſon ſhould ever after mutually ſuggeſt each other to my mind. In theſe caſes Contiguity would co-operate with Cuſtom in eſtabliſhing the Aſſociation; which would probably be ſtronger or weaker, in proportion as the coincidence of the objects was accompanied, more or leſs, with ſurpriſe, joy, ſorrow, or any other painful or pleaſurable emotion.

Whence comes it, that, on hearing the ſounds, or ſeeing the characters, of a known language, the mind makes ſo quick a tranſition to the thing ſignified, that it ſeems to overlook the impreſſion made on the eye or ear, and to attend to the meaning only? Is it not, becauſe the articulate ſound, or the written character, has long been aſſociated with the idea ſignified, and has formed in the mind a habit of paſſing inſtantaneouſly from the one to the other? In like manner, and for the ſame reaſon, the thoughts, that occur to us, do inſtantly ſuggeſt the words, by which they are wont to be expreſſed; and that whether we write, or ſpeak, or only meditate. For although words and thoughts are different things (as appears from this, that deaf men think, who know nothing of words) yet words are, as it were, the dreſs, or the guiſe, in which our thoughts preſent themſelves; ſo that we cannot revolve ideas in our minds, without revolving words at the ſame time; even as we cannot think of the character of an abſent friend, without recollecting his viſible appearance.

Men, who were born deaf, and have never been taught to read, do probably, in attending to their thoughts, eſpecially to their abſtract notions, revolve thoſe viſible ſigns by which they are accuſtomed to expreſs them. If, for example, it be their way to ſignify *good*, by holding up their thumb, and *evil*, by ſtretching out the little finger, it is, I think, probable, that, in their minds, the ideas of Good and Evil will be accompanied with thoſe of the thumb and little finger: theſe organs being as really their ſigns for thoſe ideas, as the words *good* and *evil* are ours. If they have acquired the ready uſe of written language, it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that they will aſſociate their abſtract notions with the viſible appearance of the correſponding words, as printed or written. But this is only conjecture. For I have never had any converſation upon this ſubject with men born deaf; and I believe it would not be eaſy to make them comprehend the queſtions that might lead to the illuſtration of it.

In nothing do we make a more rapid tranſition from the ſign to the thing ſignified, than in judging of the diſtance, magnitude, and figure, of things, from their viſible appearance. The eye perceives only light and colour: yet by the eye we eſtimate figure, and magnitude, and conſequently diſtance; becauſe we have been always *accuſtomed* to take certain arrangements of colour and light for the ſigns of thoſe tangible qualities. And this eſtimation is ſo inſtantaneous, that we think we ſee the magnitude, the figure, and the diſtance, when in fact we only ſee colours and light variouſly diſpoſed. Thus we in ſome meaſure miſtake a judgment for a ſenſation; and are led by the ſign to the thing ſignified, almoſt without being conſcious that we perceive the ſign at all. The Aſſociation here is as ſtrong, as between words and ideas; but it begins to be formed at an earlier period. It begins, as ſoon as we

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can uſe our hands for the purpoſe of perception; and is compleated long before we are capable of rational inquiry.

Muſicians expreſs their notes, and the maſters of dancing their motions and attitudes, by ſigns or ſymbols delineated on paper; in

This diſcourſe was addreſſed at firſt to thoſe who were ſuppoſed to be acquainted with opticks. To make the paſſage intelligible to ſome readers, the following illuſtration may be neceſſary.

1. *By Diſtance* I here mean, the ſpace between us and other things. Blind men perceive, and can meaſure it, by Touch; that is, by ſtretching out their hand, or walking forward, till they come in contact with the diſtant object. And, from the inſtance of a young man, who had been born blind, and who was made to ſee at the age of fourteen (his cataracts being then couched by the famous Cheſſelden) it appears, that Sight alone, unaided by touch, would not make diſtance perceptible. This boy, when he firſt opened his eyes, perceived light and colour, which however ſeemed to touch the organ of ſight; and it was by ſtretching out his hand, or walking up to the coloured object, that he found out its diſtance: the very way in which he was wont to eſtimate diſtance, while he was blind. Afterwards, obſerving, that certain changes in the viſible appearance of bodies do always accompany a change of diſtance, he fell upon a method of eſtimating the diſtance by the viſible appearance: and his method was the ſame with ours. For, while a body retires from the eye, its viſible appearance becomes ſmaller, its colours leſs lively, and its outlines leſs diſtinct; and a number of intermediate objects, more or fewer according to the diſtance, appear between us and it. And hence, a certain viſible appearance comes to be the ſign of a certain diſtance. And if a painter can imitate this viſible appearance, the objects he draws in an artificial landſcape will ſeem to be, ſome of them near, and others remote, though all are really at the ſame diſtance from the eye. Thoſe that are to ſeem near muſt be vivid in colour, large in ſize, diſtinct in outline, and ſeparated from the eye of the ſpectator by few or no intermediate objects: thoſe that are intended to appear as if they were more remote, muſt be ſmaller in ſize, more faint in colour, and in outline more indiſtinct, and muſt ſeem to be ſeparated from the ſpectator by a greater number of intermediate objects.

The heavenly bodies are always ſeen at the ſame apparent diſtance; and therefore we know not what change in their viſible appearance a change of diſtance might occaſion. To aſcertain their diſtance by touch, is impoſſible; and between them and us there are no intermediate objects of known magnitude, to enable us to judge of it. Hence to the eye they all ſeem to be indefinitely, and equally, diſtant; and, being ſcattered over the whole ſky, make every part of it ſeem indefinitely, and equally, diſtant;

in the uſe of which, as in reading and writing, their minds inſtantly paſs from the view of the ſign to that meaning which cuſtom has annexed to it: and, if they chooſe to play, or dance, their fingers, or limbs, immediately perform the action, that produces

and, conſequently, give to the whole ſky the appearance of part of the inſide of a ſphere.—Moreover, the horizon ſeems, to the eye, to be further off than the zenith; becauſe between us and the former there lie many things, as fields, hills, waters, which we know to occupy great ſpace, whereas between us and the zenith there are no conſiderable things of known dimenſions. And therefore, the heavens appear like the ſegment of a ſphere, and leſs than a hemiſphere, in the centre of which we ſeem to ſtand. And the wider our proſpect is, the greater will the ſphere appear to be, and the leſs the ſegment.

2. All colour is extended; and, Colour being an object of ſight, *Extenſion* muſt be ſo too. But of that extenſion, whoſe diſtance is unknown, our eye muſt be a very incompetent judge. Now Diſtance, as we have ſeen, is originally perceived by touch; and, therefore, from touch our firſt diſtinct ideas of extenſion muſt be derived. So that if a man, endued with ſight, were to be fixed all his days immoveably in one place, and deprived of the means of gaining experience by touch, that man could never, from the information of his own ſenſes, receive any accurate knowledge of extenſion; though his eyes would no doubt give him ſome confuſed idea of it.

3. The ſame reaſoning holds in regard to *Magnitude*, or limited extenſion. Magnitude is either tangible, or viſible. The former is always the ſame: the latter changes with every change of diſtance. A man of ſix feet is always ſix feet high, whatever be his ſituation in regard to us: change of place making no change in his real or tangible magnitude. But the viſible magnitude of this man may be ſix feet, or not one foot, according as we view him at the diſtance of two feet, or of two miles; for his magnitude appears to our eye greater or leſs, according as the angle, ſubtended by his image in the retina of our eye, is greater or leſs. Decreaſe of apparent magnitude, faintneſs of colour, indiſtinctneſs of outline, and the number of intermediate objects, help us to judge both of the magnitude, and of the diſtance of things: and of two bodies equally diſtant, or ſuppoſed to be equally diſtant, that which has the greateſt viſible magnitude is conceived to have the greateſt tangible magnitude. But, without touch, we ſhould not know diſtance, nor, conſequently, diſtinguiſh the tangible magnitude from the viſible; in which caſe it is evident, that our knowledge of magnitude would be very indefinite.

When by any accident we think an object nearer than it really is, its viſible appearance will ſeem ſmaller than it really is: and if we think its diſtance greater than the reality, its viſible magnitude will appear larger. To a man bewildered in miſt objects ſeem larger than the life, becauſe their faint appearance conveys the idea of great diſtance;

produces the intended effect; juſt as, when we chooſe to expreſs ourſelves by ſpeech or writing, the idea no ſooner appears in the mind, than our fingers direct the pen in tracing out the cuſtomary characters, and our organs of ſpeech aſſume that configuration which

tance: and to ſpectators in the theatre the player on the ſtage appears taller than he really is, when the ſcenery, or any other contrivance, makes him look as if he were more remote than he really is. On the ſame account, the ſun and moon ſeem larger in the horiſon, than in the meridian; for in the former ſituation they appear at the greateſt diſtance; either becauſe the horiſon, for a reaſon already given, ſeems more remote than the zenith, or becauſe the atmoſphere, being more full of vapour towards the horiſon, makes the heavenly bodies appear fainter, and conſequently more diſtant. A man on the top of a ſteeple ſeems ſmaller to thoſe below, than the ſame man would ſeem to the ſame perſons, and at the ſame diſtance, on level ground; which depends on the ſame principle. For on level ground we can judge pretty accurately of diſtance, becauſe we have frequent occaſion to eſtimate diſtance on level ground; but of the diſtance of things above us we cannot judge ſo accurately; firſt, becauſe we are leſs accuſtomed to do it; and ſecondly, becauſe, if the object be very high like a ſteeple, there are no contiguous things with which we may compare it ſo as to aſcertain its magnitude, and the diſtance of its higher parts. And beſides, as the parts near the top, on account of their diſtance, appear leſs than they really are, we think the whole ſteeple leſs and ſhorter than it really is, and conſequently imagine, that the top is not ſo far from us, as it is in reality. And hence, when we go up by ladders, or by ſtairs, we are ſurprized to find the journey longer than we expected.

And here, it is proper to diſtinguiſh the *real* viſible magnitude of things from their *apparent* viſible magnitude. Of the ſame object, ſeen at the ſame diſtance, the *real* viſible magnitude is always the ſame; whence the laws of perſpective, as far as they relate to magnitude, may be aſcertained geometrically. But the *apparent* viſible magnitude of diſtant objects may be conſiderably affected by the imagination of the ſpectator, or rather by his opinion of their diſtance. For this opinion, and the viſible ſenſation, operating upon his mind at the ſame time, do in ſome meaſure interfere with and confound each other. And he thinks, that a certain viſible object *appears* to be of a certain dimenſion, becauſe his idea of its diſtance determines him to believe, that it *is* of that dimenſion.

4. Figure is either plane or ſolid. *Plane figure*, or limited ſuperficies, cannot be diſtinctly perceived without touch; as was proved already. Of every *ſolid figure* ſome parts are more diſtant from us than others: but diſtance is perceived originally by touch: therefore, ſo muſt ſolid figure.

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which fits them for uttering the cuſtomary ſounds. On theſe, and the like occaſions, the power of habit, early begun and long continued, is wonderfully great. To the young muſician how difficult is it, and to the expert performer how eaſy, to expreſs on his inſtrument, or with his voice, the meaning of the muſical characters that are laid before him! All varieties of articulate ſound are quickly acquired by children, even in caſes, in which a very nice adjuſtment of the articulating organs may be neceſſary: but when

A ſolid body preſents to our eye nothing but a certain diſpoſition of colours and light. We think we *ſee* the prominency, or the cavity, when in fact we ſee only the light, or the ſhade, occaſioned by it. This light and ſhade, however, we learn by experience to conſider as the ſign of a certain ſolid figure. And if a painter, by means of colour, can exactly imitate this light and ſhade, his work will appear to the eye to have all the prominencies and cavities of the ſolid body, though it be delineated on a plain and ſmooth ſurface. It is difficult for ordinary eyes to perceive, and attend to, the exact viſible appearance of a ſolid body: our attention being engaged, leſs by the viſible appearance, or ſign, than by the ſolid figure, or thing ſignified. And this habit, of attending more to the latter than to the former, ariſes from our concern for our own welfare; which may be affected by the nearneſs or ſolidity of bodies, but not by their viſible appearance. Nor is it ſtrange, that, in this caſe, we ſhould attend more to the thing ſignified, than to the ſign. For in the uſe of language, as obſerved above, the ſame thing happens. In reading a book, or hearing a diſcourſe, we attend leſs to the ſhape of the letters, or to the ſound of the words, than to the ideas ſignified by thoſe words or letters: the objects of ſight and of hearing are overlooked, and we mind only, or chiefly, the objects of the underſtanding.

It appears then, that Diſtance, Extenſion, Magnitude, and Figure, are originally perceived, not by ſight, but by touch: and that we come to judge of them by ſight, when we have learned from long experience, that certain viſible appearances do always accompany, and ſignify, certain diſtances, extenſions, magnitudes, and figures. But we get this knowledge ſo early in life (for we muſt begin to acquire it, as ſoon as we begin to ſee, and to move) that we loſe all memory of its commencement and progreſs. Yet ſome of us may remember the time, when we thought that the ſky, then conſidered as a tranſparent and ſolid concave, reſted on the tops of the mountains that bounded our proſpect, and that it was impoſſible to go beyond them: a proof, that our powers of eſtimating diſtance by ſight were then confined within a very narrow circle.

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a grown man attempts to ſpeak a foreign language for the firſt time, he finds the difficulty almoſt inſurmountable.

The figures of ſhort hand, and thoſe characters, uſed in China and elſewhere, which ſignify not ſimple ſounds, but entire words, do, like our words and letters, convey ideas to the people who have acquired the *habit* of annexing to them a certain meaning. But when men expreſs themſelves emblematically, *Similitude* is the aſſociating principle that leads to the interpretation. For an emblem is an allegory addreſſed to the eye; and every allegory is founded in likeneſs. Thus the picture, which repreſents two boys, the one in the act of trimming a candle, and the other in that of attempting to blow out the ſun with a pair of bellows, is an emblem, which, on account of the ſimilitude of the two caſes, conveys an idea of the folly of thoſe men, who, truſting to the weak, tranſient, and artificial light of their own prejudices, reject, and even endeavour to extinguiſh, the ſtrong, ſteady, and eternal radiance of the goſpel. In theſe, and the like contrivances, there is a ſtudied obſcurity; they being, like riddles, intended to amuſe the fancy by exerciſing it; which they would not do, if their ſignification were as well aſcertained, as that of words and letters. And therefore all minds are not equally capable of expounding them. One, who is not converſant in figurative language; or who happens to be unacquainted with that part of nature, of hiſtory, or of fable, to which the emblem alludes, may labour in vain to find out its ſignification.

On Aſſociations formed by accident, and eſtabliſhed by *cuſtom*, many of the pains and pleaſures of life depend. That which in itſelf would be indifferent becomes agreeable, or the contrary, according to the nature of the affections, or ideas, to which it may have given riſe on a former occaſion. An inſignificant tune, if we have once heard it in an agreeable place, or ſung by an agree-

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able perſon, or when we were happy, will give us pleaſure when heard again, by recalling thoſe ideas of delight that accompanied the firſt performance *. A preſent, however trifling, preſerved as the memorial of a friend, derives ineſtimable value from its power of enlivening our idea of the giver, and renewing thoſe kind emotions, whereof that perſon is the object. One would think, that the ſports and adventures of children could not be intereſting to men: yet with what ſatisfaction do we talk over ſuch things with an old ſchoolfellow! They bring again to view the ſcenery of our early days, which is an idea particularly ſoothing to the fancy; and revive within us a variety of pleaſing paſſions, wherewith they have long been aſſociated.

Things in themſelves diſagreeable may by aſſociation become pleaſing. Des Cartes ſomewhere mentions, that he had all his life a partiality for perſons who ſquinted; and that, in his endeavours to trace out the cauſe of a taſte ſo ſingular, he at laſt recollected, that when a boy he had been fond of a girl who had that blemiſh. Friends and lovers frequently contract a liking to thoſe peculiarities of each other, that appear rather ungainly to the reſt of the world: which, by the by, is a lucky circumſtance: for if all men had a taſte for the ſame qualities in their own ſpecies, a few might be gratified, but the majority would be diſappointed. We have heard even of proud and abſolute princes, who were the ſlaves of women that had neither virtue nor beauty to recommend them. Not that a bad heart, or uncomely figure, can ever of itſelf inſpire love; but becauſe, when united with other qualities, it may, in conſequence of aſſociations founded in habit, have acquired the power of introducing pleaſurable ideas into the mind of the beſotted admirer.

* See an Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick, as they affect the mind. Part i. Chap. 6.

Further: What in itſelf would be agreeable, may, if it has at any time been accompanied with diſagreeable ideas, awaken emotions of a painful kind. A memorial of a dear friend, which during his life was ſo delightful, will excite the moſt lively ſorrow when he is dead, and oblige us perhaps, for our own eaſe, to keep it concealed in ſome repoſitory, with a reſolution to ſee it no more. There are ſorts of food, neither unpleaſant nor unwholeſome, that ſome people cannot eat; and, as Locke obſerves, there are veſſels both cleanly and convenient, out of which one would not chooſe to drink; on account of ſome diſguſting aſſociation. A platter, for example, in which we had ſeen a ſow guzzling, or food reſembling a medicine that had lately turned our ſtomach, would create abhorrence; eſpecially if our nerves were delicate; whatever reaſon we might have to believe, that the former was now clean, and the latter palatable. Locke mentions a gentleman, who had been cured of a dangerous diſeaſe by a very offenſive operation in ſurgery. He entertained the higheſt regard for the operator, and the warmeſt gratitude for his ſervices; but could never after endure the ſight of him.

Would it be expedient, or decent, to ſing a pſalm to the tune of a common ballad, or a common ballad to the tune of a pſalm? And yet, perhaps, in itſelf, and previouſly to the influence of habit, the ballad-tune might have ſuited the pſalm, or the pſalm-tune the ballad. But when we have once and again heard certain notes accompanied with certain words, the words, or the notes, heard ſeparate, will mutually ſuggeſt each other. So that, if ſuch a tranſpoſition were to be made, it would raiſe in every perſon of ſenſibility a mixture of jarring ideas, which, by blending things profane with things holy, and ſerioufneſs with laughter, would debaſe the imagination, and impair that ſtrength of mind, by which we retain the command of our own thoughts. For how

is it poſſible, that our devotion ſhould be promoted to-day, by the ſame things, which yeſterday, in the hour of relaxation, led us to think of drinking and merriment, and the amours of Strephon and Chloe!—Thoſe ſectaries, therefore, (and ſuch are ſaid to be among us) who either adapt their pſalms to the meaſures, or ſing them with the muſick, of common ſongs, muſt be very ignorant of human nature, or very inattentive to the right performance of this part of worſhip. Nothing connected with levity, or with trivial paſſions, ſhould ever be ſeen or heard in a place appropriated to the ſolemnities of religion: and, in a church, even on a week day, I ſhould think it not leſs unſeemly to play a hornpipe on the organ, than to dance one in the area. No perſon is leſs an enemy, than I am, to wit and humour, to ſinging and dancing. I preſume, that the Deity would not have qualified us for theſe amuſements, or made them profitable to health, and to virtue, if he had not meant that we ſhould enjoy them. But they never can be lawful, when they are indecent. And indecent they muſt be, when unſuitable to times and places; or when they have a tendency to pervert the mind, by irrational or impure aſſociations.

Upon the ſame principle, I muſt condemn all thoſe alluſions to the doctrine and phraſeology of Scripture, that are intended to raiſe laughter. Such may, no doubt, have been ſometimes made, both in writing and in converſation, without any bad meaning. But it is a dangerous, and may be a fatal, amuſement. It gradually leſſens our reverence for holy things: and, if we have ever been accuſtomed to join together, though with no evil purpoſe, ludicrous ideas and religious truths, it will be ſingular indeed, if, one time or other, on ſome ſolemn occaſion, our fancy does not preſent us with ideas, which, though formerly amuſing, may now be the objects of horror, and ſuch as we would give

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the world to have been able to keep at a diſtance.—It is ſhocking to conſider, how frequently theſe profane witticiſms occur in ſome of the moſt popular writers of the laſt age, particularly Dryden, Congreve, and Swift; Pope himſelf is not free from them. Never retail ſuch things in converſation; revolve them not in your mind; paſs them over ſlightly when they come in your way; and forget them as ſoon as poſſible. Such is the weakneſs of our nature, that they may in an unguarded moment make us laugh; but it would have been better for us, if they had provoked our indignation.

To proceed. We are told, that, in the age of Richard the ſecond, about four hundred years ago, the peaks or tops of the ſhoes, worn by people of faſhion, were of ſo enormous a length, that, in order to bear them up, it was neceſſary to tie them to the knee. And we learn from Cowley, that in his days ladies of quality wore gowns as long again as their body; ſo that they could not ſtir to the next room, without a page or two to carry their train. What ridiculous diſproportion! we exclaim: what intolerable inconvenience! Is it poſſible, that the taſte of our forefathers could be ſo perverted, as to endure ſuch a faſhion! But let us not be raſh in condemning our forefathers, leſt we ſhould unwarily paſs ſentence upon ourſelves. Have we never ſeen, in our time, forms of dreſs equally inconvenient, and yet equally faſhionable? Does a ſhoe of four and twenty inches in length diſfigure or encumber the one extremity of the human body more, than a head-dreſs two feet high does the other? Or is it a greater hindrance to the amuſements, or more hurtful to the health, of a fine lady, to drag after her two dozen ſuperfluous yards of ſilk, than to ſit two hours in a morning under the diſcipline of the curling iron, or totter upon a ſharp-pointed ſhoe-heel, which every moment threatens her ancle with diſloca-

tion? In fact, as the world goes, former and latter ages, and the male and the female ſex, may mutually ſay, in regard to abſurdity of dreſs, what the poet ſays, when ſpeaking of that wildneſs of invention which prevails among poets and painters,

——hanc veniam damus, petimuſque viciſſim.
This privilege we grant, and aſk it in return.

Now, how are we to account for the prevalency of fashions ſo uncouth, and ſo inconvenient? It is to be accounted for, in part, from the power of *Cuſtom*, as an aſſociating principle. The faſhion may be improper, and, when firſt brought in, ridiculous: but the mere habit of ſeeing it will gradually overcome our averſion: and, when we have long ſeen it worn by perſons of rank, beauty, virtue, or wiſdom, and on occaſions of the greateſt feſtivity or ſolemnity, it acquires in our fancy a connection with many pleaſing ideas; and whatever is ſo connected muſt itſelf be pleaſing.

An African negro has from his birth lived among people of a black colour, with flat noſes, thick lips, and woolly hair. His father, and mother, and all his relations, his friend, his miſtreſs, and his ſovereign, have all the ſame caſt of features and complexion. He has heard, perhaps, of Europeans, or he may have ſeen ſome of them; of whom he knows little more, than that their colour is white, that they come from a far country, and are remarkable for many ſtrange cuſtoms; that they enſlave and oppreſs black men, becauſe they are black, and buy and ſell them, like cattle, in a market; force them away from their country and friends to remote regions from which they never return; ſcourge them for the ſlighteſt faults, and even put them to death on frivolous pretences. With what a multitude of diſguſting ideas, in the mind of this negro, muſt the European complexion

complexion be aſſociated; and, with how many agreeable ones, his own! Is it not, then, as natural for him, to have that predilection for African features, which we have for thoſe of Europe, —as long, at leaſt, as he remains in his own country? For, if he were to live among us, and to be treated with that humanity, which, as a man, and as a ſtranger, he has a right to demand, and will certainly receive, from every Chriſtian, his diſlike to our lineaments and colour would gradually abate, becauſe they would ſoon come to be aſſociated with many pleaſing images. Cuſtom has, indeed, a very powerful influence, in determining our notions of beauty. The natives of a certain province among the Alps are diſtinguiſhed by an extraordinary ſwelling under the chin; owing, it is ſaid, to the ſnow-water which they are obliged to drink a great part of the year; and there, we are told, that none are accounted handſome, but they whoſe chins hang down upon the breaſt.

SECT. IV.

Origin of our Ideas of Beauty, — in COLOUR, — *in* FIGURE, — *in* ATTITUDE, — *in* MOTION, — *partly accounted for, from the Influence of Cuſtom, as an aſſociating Principle. — Beauty of Countenance — Standard of Beauty.*

I Said, that, in determining our notions of Beauty, Cuſtom has a very powerful influence. It might have been ſaid, more explicitly, that "from aſſociations founded in habit, many, or "perhaps moſt, of thoſe pleaſing emotions are derived, which ac- "company the perception of what in things viſible is called *Beauty*: "thoſe COLOURS, FIGURES, GESTURES, and MOTIONS, being "for the moſt part accounted BEAUTIFUL, which convey to the "mind pleaſurable ideas; and thoſe ugly, or not beautiful, which "impart ſuggeſtions of an oppoſite or different nature." This deſerves a particular inquiry.

FIRST, as to COLOURS: It is true, that ſome give pleaſure, becauſe they affect the mind with a lively ſenſation. Gold, and ſilver, and flowers, and gaudy feathers, are admired by children and ſavages, on account of their brilliancy. The moon is to moſt infants a captivating object: I have ſeen a boy of fifteen months not a little offended, becauſe he could not have it for a plaything. Bright colours naturally draw attention. To look at burning coals is hurtful to ſight: yet few, even of thoſe who know this, can keep from ſtaring on the fire.—It is alſo true, that ſome colours are accounted beautiful, becauſe they cheriſh the organ of ſight, as Green; or becauſe they have that character which we term *delicacy*, and yield a ſenſation at once lively and gentle, as pale red, and

light blue; or becauſe they are ſuppoſed to be emblematical of moral qualities, as ſcarlet, blue, and white, which we ſometimes conſider as the ſymbols of valour, conſtancy, and innocence.—It is further admitted, that colours, which look as if they were ſtained or ſullied, or which are ſo mixed, or ſo indefinite, that we ſcarce know what name to give them, are not generally admired; on account, perhaps, of the dulneſs or ambiguity of the ſenſation wherewith they affect us. Thoſe gradations, however, and ſhades of colour, that appear in flowers, in the plumage of the peacock and other birds, in the rainbow, in the evening and morning ſky, and in many natural objects, are wonderfully beautiful; when they ſo melt away into one another, that, though we diſcern the change, we cannot mark the boundary. But in theſe caſes, it is not ſo much the mere delicacy or ſplendor of the colours that charms the eye, as that inimitable art (if I may ſo expreſs myſelf) with which they are blended, and which inſpires every beholder with pleaſing admiration, as far ſurpaſſing the higheſt efforts of human dexterity. Outward circumſtances, too, muſt have ſome effect. The calmneſs of an evening, and the freſhneſs of a morning ſky, the magnificent concave of heaven, the fragrance of the flowers, and the glorious arch of the rainbow, make us contemplate their colours with particular delight. For where beauty of colour is united with elegance, or dignity of form, or with any other agreeable circumſtance, theſe qualities mutually adorn each other: and we love the beauty more, on account of the greatneſs or goodneſs; and admire the greatneſs and approve the goodneſs more, on account of the beauty. Virtue itſelf, ſays Virgil, appears to advantage in a beautiful perſon *.

* Gratior et pulchro veniens in corpore virtus. Æn. v. 344.

In fact, the beauty of colours depends ſo much on the ideas with which they may happen to have been aſſociated by cuſtom, that the ſame colour ſhall be beautiful in one object, and in another ugly, for no other reaſon, but becauſe in the one it brings along with it ſome pleaſing, and in the other ſome painful, recollection. Greenneſs in the fields is beautiful; becauſe it conveys to the beholder many ſweet ideas of fragrance, and plenty, and happy ſeaſons, as well as becauſe it refreſhes the organ of ſight: but in the human countenance the ſame colour would ſtrike with horror, by ſuggeſting a great variety of diſagreeable thoughts. The liquid vermilion of the lips, and the "purple light of love" that illuminates the cheek of youth, we admire as the ſigns of health, innocence, vivacity, and warm affection; but if the ſame ideas had been ſuggeſted by white cheeks and white lips, we ſhould certainly have given the preference to theſe. The glow of a bluſh is enchanting; as it betokens modeſty and gentleneſs: but the ſame colour, if known to be the effect of violent paſſion, would for a time diveſt the fineſt face in the world of more than half its charms. The rainbow, if believed to be a ſure preſage of plague or hurricane, would be a tremendous phenomenon; and an image, like that which occurs to the frantick Lear,

> To have a thouſand with red burning ſpits
> Come hiſſing in upon them,

would be equally brilliant and horrible.

Female cheeks, flaming with artificial red, cannot ſure have any intrinſick grace; and are far from recommending themſelves by concomitant ideas of delicacy, purity, or ſweetneſs: yet in the eye of a French *petit maitre* they are delightful and divine; becauſe to him they ſuggeſt the moſt tranſporting idea he can conceive, that of being in the faſhion.—To the ſame cauſe may be imputed

the continuance of this, and the like practices in ſavage life. I ſay the *continuance*; for I ſuppoſe, that among barbarians they took their riſe from ſome remote views to publick good, and might have been at firſt intended, partly to defend the ſkin from inſects, and partly to render the human viſage terrible to an enemy. And that the ſame cut and colour of face, which had been found uſeful in keeping flies and foes at a diſtance, ſhould be thought honourable, and become faſhionable, will not appear ſtrange to thoſe, who know the power of habit in forming aſſociations.

The Romans, when they had attained the age of manhood, were much employed in the exerciſes of the field. Their ſummer was very hot, and, unleſs when in arms, they ſeldom wore any covering on the head. Hence we may imagine, that at Rome the complexion of the one ſex would differ exceedingly from that of the other; as the women were ſubject to a ſtrict economy, and did not often appear in publick. Accordingly, Cicero declares, that maſculine grace or dignity conſiſts in that ſort of complexion which betokens habitual exerciſe; and which in that climate we may ſuppoſe to have been a dark brown approaching to the mulatto colour. A fairer hue would no doubt have been offenſive to that manly people; as intimating effeminacy, and idleneſs. Yet, in regard to beauty of complexion in women, the Roman notions did not differ from ours. This might be proved from many paſſages in the antient authors, particularly from Virgil's charming picture of the bluſhing Lavinia; whom he compares to pure ivory tinged with purple, and to white lillies glowing with a ruddy light reflected from roſes *.—Where cuſtoms are uniform, men will differ but little in their ſentiments concerning beauty; becauſe the ſame appearances of the human body will ſuggeſt nearly the ſame ideas.

* Cicero de off. lib. i. § 36. Virg. Æneid. xii. 67.

SECONDLY, Perfection and Skill are always agreeable; and whatever ſuggeſts them to the mind muſt be ſo too; and, if viſible, is entitled to be called Beautiful or Elegant. I know not, whether it is not for this reaſon, that FIGURES ſo compleat as circles, ſquares, ellipſes, equilateral triangles, hexagons, &c. impreſs us with the notion of beauty. Certain it is, that the more accurately they are drawn, the more beautiful they appear.

Were we to conſider any two of ſuch figures, a ſquare, for example, and a circle, or a cube and a globe, ſimply as they are in themſelves, and without regard to their colour, ſubſtance, or uſe, we might be at a loſs to determine, which of the two excelled in beauty. But when we ſee them in furniture, or in architecture, that matter will be decided according to the ideas of wiſdom or folly, of convenience or inconvenience, which they convey to the mind. Make a ſphere the baſe, and a cube the upper end, of a pillar; and we are offended with the impropriety: for ſuch a column cannot ſtand, and the deſigner muſt have been a fool. Reverſe the poſition of the figures; and make the cube a pedeſtal, and put the ſphere on the top; and, if the other parts be in due proportion, we acknowledge the whole to be beautiful, becauſe it is convenient, and does ſome honour to the architect. Even a prepoſterous combination, like what is here ſuppoſed, will pleaſe, when it is contrived ſo as to convey, in the way of allegory, a good moral meaning. Fortune, repreſented as a female ſtanding on a ſphere, is an expreſſive emblem to denote mutability; and this we allow to be an elegant invention in Cebes, who I think is the firſt author that ſpeaks of it.

Beauty of form is ſaid to depend in part on variety and proportion. An equilateral triangle is more beautiful, becauſe more regular, than a figure of three unequal ſides: and a hexagon than a pentagon; becauſe it has more variety; and becauſe the

proportion of the angles and bounding lines is more immediately diſcernible in the former, than in the latter. But variety, without proportion, or ſome other quality connected with agreeable ideas, it not beautiful; for what beauty can there be in a figure of twenty unequal ſides? And what is it, that renders Proportion beautiful, but the pleaſing ideas of ſkill, contrivance, and convenience, which it conveys to the mind of the beholder?

This proportion in things viſible, which is eſtimated by the eye only, and cannot be aſcertained by meaſure or calculation, is not eaſily defined in words. It implies *convenience*; for no proportion is good, that makes a thing inconvenient. It implies *good contrivance*; for what is ill-proportioned can hardly be ſaid to be *well-contrived*. And it implies ſuch a coincidence, of the part to which it belongs, with the intended effect of the whole, as not to hurt the general deſign: for, in an elegant work, as the front of a building, no part or member will be allowed to be in exact proportion, which withdraws our attention from the whole, or which we cannot contemplate without overlooking the reſt of the piece. This laſt character, of the component members of any beautiful ſyſtem, is commonly called harmony, *ſymmetry*, or a right adjuſtment of parts. Now *ſymmetry*, *good contrivance*, and *convenience*, are all pleaſing; and therefore, that which comprehends them all muſt be pleaſing; and, conſequently, if an object of ſight, beautiful. Diſproportion, and too much ornament, convey the idea of inconvenience and bad taſte; and are, therefore, not beautiful, becauſe to a conſiderate mind diſagreeable.

In beautiful things, Utility is eſſential: for all beauty gives pleaſure; and that cannot pleaſe, which is plainly uſeleſs, or repugnant to uſe. With perfect beauty of form, and of colour, the greateſt utility is often united, in the works of nature. In them too, it has been remarked by an elegant writer, that what we con-

ſider as ſtrikingly beautiful is for the moſt part ſmooth in the ſurface, and rather below the ordinary ſize, than above it. A craggy mountain is a ſublime object, and its crags may add to its ſublimity; but a beautiful hill is, or appears to be, ſmooth. The ſtatue of Minerva muſt be tall, dignity being her character; but a gigantick Venus would be abſurd; that of Medici is little more than five feet.*

Now, whence comes it, that ſmoothneſs, and moderate ſmalneſs, ſhould enter into our idea of beauty? Is it not, becauſe the effect of beauty is, to compoſe, as that of ſublimity is, to elevate the ſoul; and becauſe what is ſmooth, and what is not large, conveys a notion of eaſe, and manageableneſs, and ſoftneſs, which tend as effectually to ſettle the mind, as the idea of vaſtneſs and difficulty tends to rouſe it?

Beſides, moderate ſize, and an even ſurface, are favourable to ſimplicity; which is ſoothing to our nature, becauſe it promotes an eaſy and perfect comprehenſion of things. We are pleaſed, when we readily and thoroughly underſtand; for this makes us think well of our own faculties; but to be perplexed and puzzled, is tireſome, and mortifying. In elegance of almoſt every ſort, of manners, of language, of muſick, of architecture, of attitude, and of drapery,

* In the following paſſage,

Talia jactabam, et furiata mente ferebar;
Cum mihi ſe, non ante oculis tam clara, videndam
Obtulit, et pura per noctem in luce refulſit,
Alma Parens, confeſſa Deam, qualiſque videri
Cælicolis, et QUANTA ſolet — Æneid. ii. 588.

Æneas, or Virgil inſinuates, that Venus, when ſhe condeſcended to become viſible to mortals, aſſumed a ſmaller form, than when ſhe appeared among the Gods. And for this there was good reaſon. Her etherial kindred were much mightier, and conſequently taller, than her friends in the lower world; and a Venus, adapted to the terreſtrial taſte, would have been thought too diminutive by the lofty inhabitants of Olympus.

Simplicity

Simplicity is indiſpenſable *. It is perhaps of all graces the moſt difficult to acquire by art, (for ſome have it from nature); and it is that, which to an uncorrupted taſte yields the moſt durable ſatisfaction. In feminine attire, *neat ſimplicity* is juſtly conſidered by Horace †, as a moſt captivating circumſtance.

Of beautiful animals, and of the moſt beautiful parts of animals, the figure is generally bounded by curves, rather than by ſtraight lines; except where theſe laſt may be neceſſary to ſtrength or convenience. Were the human body, or were the breaſt and back of a horſe, a dove, or any other well-ſhaped animal, to terminate on all ſides in right lines and angles, inſtead of that flowing curve which winds ſo gracefully around them, every one muſt be ſenſible, that the beauty of ſhape would be entirely deſtroyed. The peculiar curvature of this winding line is not eaſily deſcribed in words. Hogarth, in the figures that illuſtrate his *Analyſis of Beauty*, has made it obvious to the eye, by many ingenious contrivances.

Suppoſe a ſeries of curves;—the firſt bent like the letter S in the Roman printed character, or like two ſemicircles of the ſame radius running into one another with oppoſite convexities;—to proceed gradually, with a leſs and leſs degree of flexure, till the curve almoſt diſappear in a right line:—it ſeems to be in the middle between the firſt and this laſt, that the waving line I ſpeak of is to be found.

Now I am inclined to think, that, on the principles here adopted, a good reaſon may be given for our preferring this curve in animals, and eſpecially in the human frame; and, conſequently, for our being pleaſed with it in ſuch other things, as may aſſume it without inconvenience. It is the medium, between a defect and an exceſs; between too much plumpneſs and too little; between

* Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick. † Part i. chap. 6. ſect. 2. § 4. † Od. i. 5.

that luxuriancy of ſubſtance, which conveys the idea of unwieldineſs or weakneſs, and that ſcantineſs which is generally known to accompany decay. In infants, theſe curves are too much bent, on account of the redundancy of fleſh compared with the ſmalneſs of the ſize; in old-age, they are bent too little, and approach to right lines, on account of the defect of moiſture; in the prime of life, they are neither the one nor the other, but a middle between both.—This ſhape, therefore, is by cuſtom aſſociated in our minds with the idea of that period, when the bodily powers are moſt compleat, and equally remote from infirmity on the one hand, and imperfection on the other. Surely it is not wonderful, that a form, which conveys the notion of youth, and conſequently of joy and hope, of health, ſtrength, and activity, and of generous and warm affections, ſhould pleaſe more, and for that reaſon be accounted more beautiful, than thoſe other forms, that convey ideas of inſufficiency, and feebleneſs, or of decay, deſpondence, and melancholy.

I mean not to inſinuate, that the body of an infant, and that of an old man, are *equally* remote from the ſtandard of perfect beauty. Infancy has its peculiar charms; and every feeling heart knows them to be irreſiſtable. Innocence, helpleſneſs, playfulneſs, freſhneſs of conſtitution and of colour, with the conſideration that it is advancing to maturity, all conſpire to recommend infancy to our love, by ſuggeſting a thouſand delightful ideas:—whereas a human body, emaciated with age, can boaſt of none of thoſe charms; and, inſtead of complacency and hope, calls forth the painful paſſions of regret and ſorrow.

But let me correct myſelf. This is an idea of decrepitude, rather than of old age. The laſt period of life, like the evening ſky, is often diſtinguiſhed by a luſtre, not dazzling indeed, nor ardent, like the ſplendour of noon, but no leſs pleaſing to a contemplative mind.

mind. A freſh old age, with chearfulneſs, good ſenſe, and a good conſcience, though it cannot be called the loveliеſt, is however the moſt venerable, of all terreſtrial things.

The curve of beauty is not in every caſe beautiful. Nothing indeed is ſo, that neceſſarily brings diſagreeable thoughts. If the horſe were as ſlow as the ſnail, we ſhould be leſs inclined to admire his ſhape, than to nauſeate his unwieldy magnitude. If pillars twiſted into this winding form were ſo ſlender as to raiſe a ſuſpicion of weakneſs, their fine outlines would not prevent our diſapprobation. — Hogarth's admiration of this curve ſeems to have been exceſſive. He takes every opportunity to introduce it: and hence it has been remarked of his pictures, that they want that firmneſs and ſtability, which is produced by right lines, and which, when neceſſary or convenient, is always to be ſeen in the works of nature.

Few appearances in the animal world are more pleaſing, than a horſe of high mettle running at full ſpeed, his mane and tail ſtreaming in the wind, with none of thoſe trappings that betoken ſervitude, and not diſfigured by the prunings of barbarous art: we admire the ſhape and the motion; we ſympathiſe (if I may ſo ſpeak) with the animal's conſciouſneſs of freedom and independence; and, if we have any thing of a painter's eye, we are ſtruck with the waving lines that predominate ſo remarkably in his figure. All this we call beautiful, becauſe we are pleaſed with it: and it pleaſes, chiefly becauſe it intimates many agreeable conſiderations of youth, ſtrength, ſwiftneſs, and other qualities, which are valuable in themſelves, and particularly uſeful in this noble creature. What we call beauty in a cow, is a different thing. That ſort of beaſt, if ſhaped like a horſe, would not pleaſe; firſt, becauſe it would appear unnatural, which is an offenſive idea; and, ſecondly, becauſe it would give us no reaſon

to

to expect thoſe good qualities, for which a cow is valued. In different ſpecies of viſible things, therefore, beauty is not the ſame. But, in every ſpecies, that form will be accounted beautiful, which raiſes in the beholder ideas of perfection, uſefulneſs, and other endearing qualities.

May not, then, our approbation and our diſapprobation, of particular animal ſhapes and figures, be accounted for, upon this principle; that, by long habit, we have learned, that ſome are connected with agreeable, and others with diſagreeable circumſtances? Previouſly to ſome knowledge of the nature of any animal, or ſome conjectures in regard to it, we ſhould not probably determine any thing concerning the beauty of its *figure*. *

In

* A great artiſt and excellent writer accounts for the pleaſure we take in beautiful *forms* or *figures*, upon this principle, that our minds are more accuſtomed to them than to any other. His theory is as follows. "We could not perceive the "beauty of any animal till we were acquainted with ſeveral animals of the ſame "kind. Had we never ſeen more than one human face, we ſhould not have "been in a condition to ſay, whether in reſpect of the *ſhape* of the features it "were beautiful or otherwiſe: and the more we are accuſtomed to view a variety "of forms of any particular ſort, horſes, ſtatues, houſes, &c. the better judges "we become of that ſort of beauty. Now, ſays our Author, Beauty is that, which "nature ſeems always to intend, and which is actually produced oftener than "any *one form* of uglineſs. A ſtraight noſe, for example, is more frequently "ſeen, than any one curvature of that part; and more frequently occurs to our "fancy, becauſe every deviation from it puts us in mind of it. That ſhape, "therefore, of the noſe we account the moſt beautiful; or, in other words, that "ſhape gives us the greateſt pleaſure, becauſe it is moſt familiar to our eyes and "imagination." See the eighty-ſecond paper of *The Idler*.

This ingenious theory is not inconſiſtent with mine, though it reſolves the philoſophy of *beauty in form or ſhape* into a ſimpler and more general principle. It is, no doubt, natural for us to contract a liking to what we have been accuſtomed to, even when in itſelf indifferent. Many of the brutes do ſo. An apartment in which I had lived without uneaſineſs for a few weeks, I could never leave without ſome degree of concern. That for this reaſon merely, and independently on agreeable aſſociations, we ſhould prefer thoſe forms that are moſt familiar to the mind,

In the article of dreſs, our notions of beauty, as elſewhere obſerved, depend much upon cuſtom. What is moſt faſhionable appears to common eyes moſt beautiful *. But are there no fixed principles of beauty in dreſs? Are not the Greek and the Roman draperies allowed to be more graceful than our modern French garb?

They are ſo. For they abound more in the flowing curve above-mentioned: and for this reaſon, and becauſe they are more ſimple and manageable than our attire, they comply more eaſily with the natural bendings and outlines of, the fineſt animal form we know, the human body; and of courſe ſhow it to greater advantage. Our dreſſes diſguiſe, and often disfigure, the body; confound the proportion which one part bears to another; and preſent to the eye a multitude of ſharp angles and right lines, ſuch as we know are not to be ſeen in any elegant animal figure. We are however reconciled to them on ordinary occaſions: but in ſtatues they appear ridiculous; and therefore a good ſtatue muſt be either naked, or dreſſed in the Greek or Roman, or ſome other graceful faſhion †. The ſame thing holds true of thoſe painted portraits, in which permanent elegance is more ſtudied than exact likeneſs.—We are ſure, that the figure of the human body will always pleaſe, on account of the many agreeable thoughts it muſt ever preſent to the human mind. Thoſe dreſſes that diſguiſe it leaſt will, therefore, have a chance to be moſt frequently, and longeſt, in faſhion; and muſt, by conſequence,

mind, I ſee no reaſon to deny. Thus far I acquieſce in the author's theory. And I preſume it will be granted, in favour of mine, that a ſlight liking thus contracted at firſt would by ſubſequent aſſociations of a pleaſing nature be improved into a ſtronger attachment, and ſo beſtow additional charms on the captivating form.

* See the preceding Section. † Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick. Part i. chap. 3.

in ſtatues, and other imitations, that are intended for the publick eye, and to laſt many years, be preferable to ſuch forms of attire as are likely to have only a tranſient vogue, and to derive that more from cuſtom and prejudice, than from any intrinſick excellence, or natural propriety.

As far as the beauty of attire depends upon its ſuitableneſs to perſons and characters, the cuſtom of the country muſt paſs for the ſtandard. Different dreſſes belong to different ſexes, ranks, and profeſſions. In all countries, where variety of dreſs was attainable, this notion has ever prevailed. A man in a woman's garb is an uncouth figure: clergymen and ſoldiers are known by the cut, as well as by the colour, of their cloaths: and the ſame apparel, which is becoming in a country maid, would be unſeemly in a lady of rank appearing in her own character. In all theſe matters, we are offended, when the common rules are not obſerved.

And for this there is good reaſon. He who endeavours to introduce a change in the garb that cuſtom has appropriated to his profeſſion, ſex, and age, muſt have his mind very much ſet upon trifles; and think, either that he is wiſer than other men, or that his eminence entitles him to diſtinguiſh himſelf in this way. Alterations in the faſhion of dreſs muſt indeed happen, as the world is now conſtituted; but that man is a fop, who would wiſh them to happen by his means. Nay, he is worſe than a fop, if, by attempting an unneceſſary change, he give offence to thoſe whom it is his duty to pleaſe; and ſo make himſelf leſs uſeful in ſociety than he ought to be. I wiſh this hint may be of uſe to ſome young clergymen whom I have heard of.

THIRDLY. Beauty of GESTURE is not confined to any one ſtate of the body. The erectneſs of the Apollo Belvidere; the leaning attitude of the Antinous; and the bending, ſhrinking form

form of the Venus of Medici, are all very beautiful. The firſt conveys the ideas of majeſty, activity, and ſtrength; the ſecond of compoſure, acquieſcence, and eaſe; and the third, of conſcious beauty united with modeſty. It is our knowlédge of the influence of human thoughts upon the human body, that enables us to diſcern theſe meanings in thoſe attitudes: and as all theſe ideas are extremely pleaſing, the ſtatues that ſuggeſt them muſt be equally ſo. To which I may add, that, in theſe figures, perfect beauty of form is united with gracefulneſs of attitude; and the one heightens the other: we admire the ſhape on account of the attitude, and the attitude on account of the ſhape; and both the one and the other we admire on account of thoſe delightful ideas, with which they are aſſociated in our imagination. Beſides, each of the attitudes in queſtion is natural, and ſuch as a well-formed human body may continue in, without pain, for a conſiderable time.

For it may in general be remarked, that no human geſture can be beautiful, which conveys any diſagreeable idea of infirmity, unwieldineſs, reſtraint, or affectation. Many of thoſe ſteps in the minuet, and other dances, which one cannot at firſt perform without ſome danger of falling, ſeem to me rather to ſurpriſe, becauſe they are difficult, than to pleaſe, becauſe they are graceful. Figures finically contraſted, in which the eyes ſeem to point one way, and the reſt of the body another, and the left leg is an exact counterpart to the right arm, and the left arm to the right leg, and the very fingers appear to be at variance each with its neighbour, are too artificial, and have too much the air of reſtraint, to pleaſe thoſe who love nature and ſimplicity. They were however much affected by the French painters of the laſt age: but we do not find this affectation in the pictures of Reynolds; and in his Diſcourſes he has particularly cautioned the ſtudent againſt it.

Nor can that be a beautiful attitude, which is incongruous to the action, or ſentiment, by which it is ſuppoſed to be produced. A human figure, leaning againſt a pillar, and yet perfectly upright, would not pleaſe; becauſe we know that ſuch a thing cannot be, without conſtraint and pain. Archers ſtooping, while they draw the bow to ſhoot their arrows to a great diſtance, would ſuggeſt the idea of infirmity, or want of ſkill; but, if they were taking a near aim, that poſture would not be unſeemly. An erect carriage of the body is often convenient, and generally profitable to health; but is graceful only when it is ſuited to the emotion that is ſuppoſed to be in the mind. It becomes a ſoldier in arms, becauſe it accompanies, and betokens, elevation of mind; it becomes a perſon, whoſe rank and abilities entitle him to have a ſenſe of his own dignity; it becomes any man, or any woman, who is provoked to exert a laudable indignation; and it is becoming in thoſe motions and dances, that are intended to ſhow the human ſtature and ſhape to advantage; but, as the concomitant of modeſty, humility, reſpect, intreaty, compaſſion, or ſorrow, or even of indolence, compoſure, or the deſire of reſt after fatigue, it would be offenſive, becauſe unnatural.

I diſtinguiſh here between Expreſſion and Beauty. Conſtrained, and even painful attitudes, may be very expreſſive; and as ſuch are approved of: but, though we call them well-imagined, well-executed, and natural, we cannot in ſtrict language call them beautiful. Such are thoſe of Laocoon and his ſons, ſtruggling with ſerpents, and with the pangs of death. Such is that of the wounded gladiator; which ſo emphatically marks the laſt effort of nature, and the laſt moment of life. And ſuch is the poſture of the ſlave, who is ſuppoſed to liſten to the ſecret talk of conſpirators: he cannot continue in it without pain; and yet the eagerneſs

eagerneſs of his attention, and the fear of loſing one ſingle whiſper, or of being overheard, will not permit him to change it.

FOURTHLY: Beauty and Awkwardneſs of MOTION are not eaſily deſcribed in words: but will, I believe, be found, the one to pleaſe, the other to diſpleaſe, on account chiefly of certain agreeable ideas ſuggeſted by the former, and of certain diſagreeable ones aſſociated with the latter.

Motions, that imply eaſe, with ſuch an arrangement and proportion of parts in the moving object, as give reaſon to think, they may continue for ſome time without injury to it, are generally pleaſing; at leaſt in animals; eſpecially when they betoken a ſort of perfection ſuited to the nature of the animal. But motions, that betray infirmity, unwieldineſs, imperfection, or the appearance of danger, cannot be called beautiful, becauſe they convey unpleaſing ideas. A ſtrong and ſlender young man in the race, or a high-mettled horſe or greyhound at full ſpeed, preſents an image of the former kind: and the jumping and capering of an ox or cow; the flouncing of a large fiſh thrown on the land; the waddling ſteps of an infant that alarms us every moment with the fear of its falling, and the walk of a man crippled by labour, gout, or old-age, or rendered ſluggiſh by corpulency, are examples of the latter.

I think it is Rouſſeau, who obſerves, that, in running, a woman has nothing of that grace, which attends her on other occaſions. Perhaps the jutting out of her elbows, the natural effect of her endeavouring with lifted hands to ſecure the moſt delicate part of the female frame, may give to her motion the appearance of timidity and conſtraint. Or perhaps ſhe may ſeem to fail in this exerciſe, merely becauſe, according to our manners, ſhe cannot be much accuſtomed to it. Ovid ſays, that Daphne's beauty was heightened by her running; but he accounts for it, without any contradiction

to this philoſophy *. Virgil, in celebrating the ſpeed of Camilla, ſays not a word of the gracefulneſs of her motion. †

The former poet affirms, in his Art of Love ‡, that Venus was ſtill graceful, even when, for the amuſement of a friend, ſhe uſed to *take off* the limping gait of poor old Vulcan. Perhaps it might be ſo. Such mimickry in ſo lovely a lady would convey an idea, not of infirmity, but of playfulneſs. Yet in mere mortal beauties I apprehend that mimickry is not very becoming; becauſe there is ſomething vulgar in it. For no power of outward charms will reconcile a diſcerning eye to any motion, or any ſort of behaviour, though known to be aſſumed, which betrays indelicacy, or want of taſte. So that, without ſenſe and virtue, even a beautiful woman, who aſpires to general admiration, has a very difficult part to act. But where theſe are united in an elegant form, we ſay, with the poet,

Illam, quicquid agit, quoquo veſtigia flectit,
Componit furtim, ſubſequiturque decor. ‖

which, though not eaſily tranſlated, may be thus paraphraſed: "Wherever ſhe moves, Grace attends her; whatever ſhe does, "Grace, without the appearance of art or deſign, adjuſts her form, "and regulates all her motions."

The heaving of unbroken waves in the ſea is beautiful; perhaps on account of their ſmoothneſs, uniformity, and eaſy curvature, ſuggeſting the idea of vaſt agitation without difficulty; which for many obvious reaſons muſt be more agreeable, than a ſluggiſh or weak exertion with turbulence. A ſhip's progreſs through a ſwelling, but not tempeſtuous ocean, is alſo extremely beautiful: for it fills the mind with many pleaſing images; the boldneſs, the ſkill, and the ſecurity of the mariner; the perfection of that mechaniſm, which is not endangered by ſo mighty an effort; and the

* Metam. i. 527. † Æneid. vii. 810. ‡ Lib. ii. 570.
‖ Tibullus. Eleg. iv. 7.

advantages of navigation and commerce. And in both caſes, the ſublimity conſpires with the beauty of the objects to heighten the pleaſure of the beholder. The enraged Atlantick, riſing in mountains, is ſublime in the higheſt degree, and would yield a pleaſing aſtoniſhment to one who could ſee it without fear *; but convey's too many ideas of danger and difficulty, to produce that ſoothing and chearful delight, which attends the contemplation of what is beautiful.

A flag or ſtreamer hanging without motion, being emblematical of inactivity, is not beautiful; except ſo far as it may pleaſe by the glare of the colours, or by ſuggeſting the idea of calmneſs and reſt. But flags and ſtreamers, flying in the wind, gratify the eye by the varying ſhades of colour, and by their eaſy volubility; and affect the imagination with many agreeable ideas of buſy life, and military ſplendor. Dryden has expreſſed this with a pleaſing and pictureſque extravagance.

> The flag aloft ſpread ruffling to the wind,
> And ſanguine ſtreamers ſeem the flood to fire:
> The weaver, charm'd with what his loom deſign'd,
> Goes on to ſea, and knows not to retire. †

He ſeems to have been fond of the image; for, in another place, deſcribing a banner, in which the god of war was painted, he ſays, with his wonted energy,

> Red was his ſword, and ſhield, and whole attire,
> And all the Godhead ſeem'd to glow with fire;
> Even the ground glitter'd where the ſtreamer flew,
> And the green graſs was died with ſanguine hue. ‡

It is not eaſy to determine, whether the ſublime or the beautiful predominates in this paſſage.

* See Illuſtrations on Sublimity. † Annus Mirabilis. ‡ Knight's Tale.

The

The plodding pace of a plowman is awkward: for it leads us to think of bodily powers impaired by toil, or not exerciſed to advantage; of manners uncultivated; and of other evils attending, or ſuppoſed to attend, a life of labour and penury. But the plowman himſelf is not ſenſible of any thing ungraceful in his walk; becauſe all his friends and neighbours have it, and he knows of none better. In fact we ſee, that peaſants imitate one another in this reſpect; and that the young and the nimble aſſume of choice thoſe motions, which are naturally expreſſive of age, infirmity, and wearineſs.

But far more unſeemly are the ſtrut of the ſolemn, and the wriggle of the pert, coxcomb: whoſe every motion ſhows vanity and affectation, with a nauſeous degree of ſelf-attention and ſelf-ſufficiency.

Cicero, in name of the Stoicks (with whom Grace or Dignity conſiſted in a perfect ſameneſs of look and of geſture on all occaſions) blames every motion, that alters the countenance, quickens the breath, or betrays any diſcompoſure *. But I believe the moſt eager motion would appear graceful, if it were underſtood to expreſs a good affection: as that of a child, after long abſence, ſpringing to the embrace of a parent. Nothing will offend the eye, which either warms the heart with pleaſing paſſions, or conveys agreeable images to the fancy.

That air, and thoſe motions, which in common life we call graceful, comprehend many particulars, every one of which will on examination be found, to be aſſociated with, and to convey, agreeable ideas of moral, intellectual, or corporeal excellence. A graceful air implies preſence of mind, and a perfect command of the body; with a gentle, chearful, and free demeanour, neither encumbered by timidity, nor fluttering into petulance; but pre-

* Cicero de Off. lib. i. § 36.

ſerving,

ſerving, between what is rude and what is finical, between pride and abjectneſs, between modeſty and aſſurance, that due medium which betokens mildneſs, generoſity, and ſpirit, a kind attention to others, and a forgetfulneſs of one's ſelf; with ſuch other points of decorum, as put us in mind of the pleaſing ideas connected with elegant converſation, and polite manners. And all this muſt appear unſtudied and habitual; that it may not convey any diſagreeable notion of conſtraint or hypocriſy. What is taught in ſchools of exerciſe is chiefly intended to correct, or to prevent, evil habits, and to give one the command of one's body; but muſt no more be practiſed on the ordinary occaſions of life, than the formal ſtyle of declamation is to be introduced into familiar dialogue.

It is probable, that the antient Greeks and Romans excelled us in elegance of motion and attitude. For their bodies were kept active by continual exerciſe, and were not clogged, as we are, with cumberſome apparel: and, beſides, they were taught (at leaſt the men were) to ſit, to ſtand, to walk, and to run gracefully. Yet Cicero complains, and we too have cauſe to complain, that many of the motions practiſed in the theatre, and by the maſters of exerciſe, are offenſive, becauſe too remote from nature and ſimplicity, and unbeſeeming the decorum of the manly character. *

In the days of heroiſm and fable, goddeſſes were known by their air, and eſpecially by their motion. Juno piqued herſelf on her auguſt demeanour.

Aſt ego, quæ Divum INCEDO regina—Joviſque
Et ſoror, et conjux—

But I, who move in majeſty on high,
Conſort of Jove, and Empreſs of the ſky—

One ſees the lofty air, and the ſtately ſtep, with which the proud queen of Olympus pronounced theſe words. Venus, though not

* Cicero de Off. lib. i. 36.

ſo majeſtic a perſonage, had however a certain natural walk, which ſhe could not fall into, without diſcovering her rank. When ſhe put off the aſſumed character of the Tyrian huntreſs, it was not the act of turning away, and diſcloſing the bloom of a roſy neck; nor the divine odour breathed from her hair; nor her robe flowing down to the ground, that made her known even to her own ſon: but when he ſaw her in motion, then

—— Vera INCESSU patuit Dea.
The Goddeſs by her graceful walk is known.

This may ſhow, how highly an elegant air in walking was eſteemed by the antients. Indeed it is hardly poſſible for the moſt ordinary beholder to ſee it without emotion. He who cannot diſcern a mind in it, muſt however derive pleaſure from the harmony of bodily parts, and from the eaſe and freedom, the energy and compoſure, with which they exert themſelves.

Dancing is connected with ſo many delightful ideas, of youth, health, activity, chearfulneſs, and beauty, that the motions commonly practiſed in it cannot fail to pleaſe, unleſs accompanied with ſome peculiarity that conveys a diſagreeable ſuggeſtion of deformity, want of ſkill, affectation, impudence, or any other incongruity. But I need not remark, becauſe it is obvious, that the motions of different dancers differ exceedingly in reſpect of grace. Much will depend on the comelineſs, good ſhape, and agility of the perſon; on the eaſe wherewith the ſeveral movements and evolutions are performed, and on their perfect coincidence with the expreſſion and rhythm of the muſick, and with the rules of the dance.

That all dances are not equally graceful, is no leſs obvious. Thoſe that ſhow to advantage the motion, ſhape, and activity of the human body, are always approved of. But ſome ſteps, as already obſerved, particularly in the hornpipe and minuet, ſeem to derive

derive a charm rather from their difficulty, than from their elegance. The latter dance, if I can truſt my own judgment, is not ſo graceful in men, as in women; whoſe full and flowing attire not only gives dignity to their mien, and an eaſy winding curvature to their motion, but alſo conceals the inconvenient, and (I had almoſt ſaid) diſtorted poſition of the feet.

Leſt I ſhould get beyond my depth (being no great connoiſſeur in this elegant art) I ſhall only obſerve further, that ſome dances pleaſe, by uniting regularity with apparent diſorder; which yields the gratification of ſurpriſe, and conveys a favourable idea of the ſkill, with which they are planned and conducted. Some pieces of muſick are contrived with a like purpoſe, and pleaſe from the ſame principle: as Fugues, in which different voices or inſtruments take up the ſame air, but not all at the ſame time; ſo that one is, as it were, the echo, or an imitation, of another. And yet the general reſult is, not diſſonance or confuſion, which one would be apt to expect, but perfect harmony. This gives an agreeable ſurpriſe; and heightens our admiration of the compoſer's ſkill, and of the dexterity of the performers.

I know not, whether any other poet has in ſo few words conveyed ſo many charming ideas of Beauty, in its ſeveral varieties of *colour*, *ſhape*, *attitude*, and *motion*, as Gray has combined in the following image.

> Slow melting ſtrains their Queen's approach declare;
> Where'er ſhe turns the Graces *homage pay*:
> With *arms ſublime* that *float upon* the air,
> In *gliding ſtate* ſhe wins her *eaſy way*;
> O'er her *warm cheek*, and *riſing boſom*, move
> The *bloom* of *young deſire*, and *purple light of love*.

As the human voice is that ſound, which more directly than any other makes its way, through the ear, to the heart of man; ſo that, which to his eye diſplays the greateſt variety of beauty in the narroweſt compaſs, is the human countenance. So ſtrong is our predilection for this maſterpiece of nature, that, if the higheſt created being were to preſent himſelf to our view, we cannot but think he would bear a reſemblance to "the human face divine." And hence we approve of thoſe fictions in painting and poetry, that deſcribe angels and perſonified virtues in the form of beautiful men and women.

I do not ſay, that the pleaſure we take in beholding this wonderful aſſemblage of viſible charms is *altogether* the effect of aſſociations, founded in experience, and eſtabliſhed by habit. But that it may be *partly* accounted for, from this cauſe, I have no ſcruple to affirm.

It will, I think, be allowed, that regular features, illuminated by fine colours, would not be very beautiful, if they were void of expreſſion, nor beautiful at all, if they had a bad expreſſion. Or, if ſuch a face could be ſuppoſed capable of gaining admirers, it muſt only be among thoſe (and many ſuch, indeed, there are) who, not having ſagacity to read the ſoul in the countenance, are no competent judges of human beauty. On the other hand, homely features that expreſs good underſtanding, and a kind, a gentle, and a chearful temper, are never diſagreeable to thoſe who can diſcern their meaning, but may on the contrary be very agreeable, or even truly amiable.

Now, previouſly to experience, we ſhould not know, what looks are ſignificant of good, or what of bad mental qualities; nor, conſequently, would the former convey to us any pleaſing, or the latter any unpleaſing ideas. Nay, previous to experience, we ſhould not know, what colour of face accompanies health and youth, or what betokens

betokens the contrary; nor, of courſe, could we have any reaſon for preferring any one complexion to any other. But having learned, that certain forms, and colours, of features do commonly intimate certain agreeable qualities of mind and body; they become as cloſely aſſociated in our imagination or memory, as the words of a known language are with the thoughts they ſtand for; ſo that the outward ſign is no ſooner perceived, than the idea ſignified preſents itſelf.

In proof of this reaſoning, it might be remarked, that perſons, who, from want of years, or of natural ſagacity, are not quick-ſighted in what relates to the mind, are moſt liable to be captivated by regular features, and a glowing complexion; while more experienced or more penetrating obſervers are not thoroughly pleaſed, unleſs where they diſcern thoſe nicer, and more ſignificant graces, that ſeem to betoken intellectual accompliſhments, and moral virtues.

The moſt ſtriking feature of the face, and that to which we moſt frequently direct our view, is the eye. This, with the eyelids, the eyelaſhes, and the eyebrow, is the chief ſeat of expreſſion. At this window (as the wiſe man calls it) the ſoul is often ſeen in her genuine character, even when the porter below (I mean the tongue) is endeavouring to perſuade us, that ſhe is not within, that ſhe is otherwiſe employed, or that ſhe is quite a different perſon. Smiles and ſadneſs diſplay themſelves partly at the mouth; the former by raiſing, the latter by depreſſing, the corners of it; and yet we might in many caſes miſtake a laughing for a weeping countenance, if we did not ſee the eye. Indeed this little organ, whether ſparkling with joy, or melting in ſorrow; whether gleaming with indignation, or languiſhing in tenderneſs; whether glowing with the ſteady light of deliberate valour, or ſending forth emanations of goodwill and gratitude, is one of the moſt intereſting

objects in the whole viſible univerſe. There is more in it, than ſhape, motion, and colour; there is thought and paſſion; there is life and ſoul; there is reaſon and ſpeech.—Now, what is it, that conſtitutes the beauty of this feature? And why are we more pleaſed with ſome appearances of it, than with others?

Venus ſays, in Shakſpeare,

Mine eyes are gray, and bright, and quick in turning: *

that is, are of a dark colour, of a fine water, (to take an alluſion from diamonds) and of a diverſified expreſſion.

A dark-coloured iris may perhaps be *naturally* more pleaſing, than a fainter one; becauſe it forms a more ſtriking contraſt with the whiteneſs of the ball, and occaſions a more brilliant reflexion of the light: and bright colours are, as I remarked already, preferred even by children to ſuch as are obſcure. And the motions, and conſequently the expreſſion, of a blue or a hazel eye, are diſcernible more immediately, more accurately, and at a greater diſtance, than thoſe of light-coloured eyes. Thus far I may allow the beauty of this organ to be intrinſick and abſolute; and not to depend on aſſociated ideas of moral, intellectual, or bodily excellence.

But an eye may be dark-coloured, and yet not beautiful. If in its motion there be ſuch languor, unſteadineſs, or uniformity, as we know by experience to accompany a liſtleſs temper, a wandering or bewildered attention, or an unvaried ſameneſs or a want of thought, it will ſuggeſt unpleaſing ideas, and rather diſſatisfy, than intereſt us. Dark eyes, that ſeem to imply mental deficiency, are even more diſagreeable, becauſe more obſervable, than ſuch as with the ſame expreſſion have a fainter colour.

An eye, that is bright, or of a fine water, is generally beautiful, if there be nothing offenſive in the expreſſion. For it conveys the

* Shakſpeare's Venus and Adonis.

agreeable

agreeable ideas of perfection, health, and ſoundneſs. And as lively thoughts and paſſions are obſerved to give brilliancy to this organ; ſo that brilliancy, wherever it appears, is apt to raiſe in the beholder ideas of vivacity, acuteneſs, chearfulneſs, generoſity, and other pleaſing qualities. No wonder then, that it ſhould be accounted beautiful.

That "quickneſs in turning," which the poet juſtly imagines to be eſſential to fine eyes, betokens in the mind a capacity of paſſing readily from one thought to another; an agreeable talent, when accompanied with good ſenſe; and juſt the reverſe of ſullenneſs, inattention, and ſtupidity. The fixed and unvaried glare of an inexpreſſive eye is frightful. It puts one in mind of death, and is ſuch a look as we ſhould expect in a ghoſt. So our great poet underſtands it:

Thou haſt no ſpeculation in thoſe eyes
Which thou doſt glare with —

ſays Macbeth to the murdered Banquo. So Spenſer, in a paſſage equal to any thing that ever was written in deſcriptive poetry:

On every ſide them ſtood
The trembling ghoſts, with ſad amazed mood,
Chattering their iron teeth, and ſtaring wide
With ſtony eyes. *

In fact, the beauty of the eye depends chiefly upon its expreſſion. If it convey a favourable idea of the mind that gives it animation, we muſt be pleaſed with it in the ſame proportion, in which we approve the good qualities that ſeem to be expreſſed by it. And as eyes may intimate good mental qualities, whatever be their colour, ſo eyes of any colour, at leaſt of any common colour, may be

* Fairy Queen. Book i. canto 5. ſtanza 32.

beautiful.

beautiful. The expreſſion of ſuch as are dark-coloured is no doubt keener, and more emphatical, than that of others; but *an agreeable expreſſion* is not confined to any colour, nor excluded from any. And the ſame thing is true of a diſagreeable expreſſion. Eyes of the cleareſt water, and beſt colour, will be viewed with diſlike, if they be thought to ſpeak the language of envy, pride, ſuſpicion, cruelty, or folly.

The beauty of the other features may be accounted for in the ſame way. White and red are, no doubt, beautiful in themſelves; and marvellous is the delicacy, with which they are blended in a blooming countenance. But, although, without ſuch a compoſition of white and red, human beauty, according to our notions of it, cannot be perfect; yet the pleaſure we take in a fine complexion ariſes chiefly (as already obſerved) from the ideas of youth, health, modeſty, and gentleneſs, which are its natural aſſociates. If it were to ſuggeſt to us (as it probably does to a grown up negro, when he firſt ſees it) the idea of imperfection or diſeaſe, or of any thing unnatural in the human frame, we ſhould turn away from it in diſguſt.

Of the features conſidered abſtractedly, and without regard to the complexion, it may be remarked in general, that what we call *regularity* is accounted beautiful. But why is it ſo? Is it not, becauſe it betokens an even temper, and the abſence of thoſe paſſions whereby the features are made irregular; and becauſe that proportion, which we moſt approve in the ſeveral parts of the face, is found to be the moſt convenient, and conſequently the moſt perfect? Every evil paſſion mars in a greater or leſs degree the regularity of the features: and if a very large noſe were more uſeful than one of a moderate ſize, we ſhould certainly prefer the former. A feature greatly raiſed above, or diminiſhed below, its due proportion; that is, above or below that proportion, which is moſt common,

common, and known to be moſt convenient, diſpleaſes, by ſuggeſting painful ideas of exceſs, or deficiency, diſeaſe, or imperfection.

A ſmiling countenance is a lovelier object, than one agitated with laughter; partly, no doubt, becauſe the former is leſs disfigured, and the latter cannot continue long without pain; but chiefly, becauſe the one diſplays the virtues of good-humour and ſerenity; whereas the other is at beſt only the ſign of merriment, which is no virtue at all, and may happen occaſionally to the peeviſh and paſſionate, as well as to the goodnatured and chearful. Some of our Engliſh poets call Venus the *laughter-loving dame*; but Homer with better judgment calls her "the lady who delights in "ſmiles." *

Every turn of countenance it is pleaſing to behold, which betokens good mental qualities. But had the laws of nature relating to the human phyſiognomy been the contrary of what they are, I am inclined to think, that our ideas of beauty would have been ſo too.

I ſhall conclude this ſubject with two obſervations.—The firſt is, that human beauty is ſo far from being (what it is ſaid in the Scotch proverb to be) only *Skin-deep*, that it derives its origin, and moſt eſſential characters, from the ſoul. Moſt people, therefore, may in ſome degree acquire it, who are willing to cultivate their intellectual powers, and to cheriſh good affections. And without a ſound underſtanding, and a chearful, benevolent, and gentle diſpoſition, no fineneſs of ſhape, delicacy of complexion, or regularity of feature, will ever form that genuine beauty, which at once pleaſes a diſcerning eye, and captivates and ſecures an intelligent mind. What ideas do we affix to the terms, a pretty idiot, or a handſome termagant? Surely they are not agreeable, but very much

* See an Eſſay on Laughter. Introduction.

the contrary. "Beauty," according to Plutarch, "is the flower "and bloſſom of virtue." It is outwardly ornamental; becauſe it is the effect of a generous nature operating within.

I remark, in the ſecond place, that it is not ſo indeterminate a thing as many modern philoſophers imagine. Men may differ in their notions of beauty, as the object of *love*, or of *liking*; and certainly will do ſo, as long as they differ in their cuſtoms, prejudices, paſſions, and capacities. Yet a ſtandard of beauty there is, notwithſtanding. Elſe why ſhould thoſe very ſtatues be admired as beautiful by us, which were the admiration of the antients? And why ſhould thoſe ideas of beauty, which Homer, Virgil, and Ovid deſcribe with ſo much rapture, be ſo exactly conformable to our ideas? Andromache ſmiling in tears * would be as intereſting an object now, as ſhe was three thouſand years ago: and the Venus, and the Lavinia, of the Mantuan poet †, if copied by Reynolds, would ſtill be the perfection of feminine grace, and feminine tenderneſs.

That this may be the more apparent, let us diſtinguiſh between that ſort of beauty, which is adapted to the general taſte; and thoſe forms of it, which gratify the various humours and fancies of individuals.

Individual men and women frequently contract likings in this way, at which their acquaintance wonder: but nobody wonders, that the Apollo Belvidere, the Antinous, and the Venus of Medici, ſhould be regarded with admiration. Juſt ſo, one may prefer the village where one was born to every other; and yet be ſenſible, that in real beauty it falls ſhort of a thouſand others. The taſte may appear ſingular to thoſe who know not the cauſe of the preference: but in being charmed with the

* Δακρυοεν γελασασα. Hom. Il. vi. 484. † Virg. Æneid. i. 402. xii. 64.

ſcenery

ſcenery of Richmond or Shooters-hill, of Canewood or Taymouth, of Loch-lomond or the lakes of Keſwick, there is nothing ſingular or ſurpriſing at all.

Des Cartes records his partiality for ſquinting perſons, and has very well accounted for it *. And moſt other examples of a *particular* taſte in features, complexion, and ſhape, may be explained from ſimilar principles. If in other reſpects we be greatly pleaſed with any perſon, ſuch of his, or of her peculiarities, as would appear indifferent, or even ungainly, to others, may become lovely in our eyes, on account of the many agreeable ideas with which in our imagination they may be aſſociated. For ſome ſuch reaſon I ſuppoſe it was, that Anacreon ſpoke favourably of joined eyebrows; a circumſtance, which has puzzled the criticks; who forgetting that this poet was a man, and conſidering him only as an author, ſeem to have thought that he would not avow any partialities of his own, which were not warranted by the general taſte of his age. It is no doubt owing to the power of ſimilar aſſociations, that ſome men prefer a tall, and ſome a ſhorter ſize; ſome, a plump, and ſome, a ſlender make; ſome a high, and ſome a low forehead; ſome one colour of hair, or of eyes, and ſome another. And it is but too common for one's taſte to change in theſe and the like particulars; according as one's affection happens to ſhift from one to another object.

That which I underſtand by beauty adapted *to the general taſte*, is to be diſtinguiſhed from thoſe forms that gratify theſe, and the like, particular fancies or partialities. There may indeed be a coincidence; as when one is enamoured of a perſon, whom all the world allow to be beautiful: but often they

* See above, page 104.

do not coincide; for one may be captivated with qualities that ſeem amiable or admirable to one's ſelf, but not ſo, or not equally ſo, to others. Certain forms there are, and attitudes, and motions, of the human body, which give delight to every beholder; and which, though they may not raiſe that *tender affection* which one bears to a *favourite*, would however be acknowledged by all to be worthy of admiration. None, I think, will controvert this, who has at any time contemplated a good copy of the Venus, or the Apollo ſo often mentioned.

All this it is eaſy to explain upon the principles of aſſociation. What is, or appears to be perfect, in the human body, muſt pleaſe, as long as bodily perfection is more uſeful and more agreeable, than the want of it. And, while virtue and a good underſtanding are held in any eſteem among men, every look of the eye, and turn of the countenance, muſt give delight, which conveys the idea of acuteneſs, good humour, modeſty, gentleneſs, affability, generoſity, and good nature.

But has each individual of mankind the ſame ideas of bodily and mental excellence? And, if not, is it poſſible, that any forms of human beauty ſhould be pleaſing to each individual?

I anſwer, that perceptions may be natural, and opinions right, which are not to be found in each individual of the human race. To hear, and to ſee, are natural; but ſome men have the misfortune to be deaf, and ſome to be blind. The beſt melodies of Handel are inſipid to one who has no muſical ear; but Handel's beſt melodies are charming for all that. Cleanlineſs, as it promotes both health of body and delicacy of mind, is undoubtedly preferable to its oppoſite; and yet the Hottentot may chooſe rather to wallow like a beaſt, than to live like a man. Nothing brings fuller conviction, than the demonſtrations of Euclid; yet reaſon muſt be cultivated a little, before it can comprehend

comprehend them. Without faculties to perceive a thing, we cannot judge of it at all; and, before we can judge rightly of any thing, the faculties by which we perceive it muſt be conſiderably improved.

Beauty, like other things, cannot without percipient faculties be perceived; nor accurately perceived, without improved faculties. Till we have ſeen a variety of human figures, and learned to diſtinguiſh by the eye thoſe bodily proportions that are beſt adapted to the ſeveral bodily functions, we cannot be competent judges of the human *ſhape*: nor of the human *face*, unleſs we have ſeen many faces, compared them together, obſerved how the features and the mind operate on each other, traced the connection between certain appearances in the countenance and certain ſtates of the ſoul and body; nor, perhaps, unleſs we have alſo received from nature, (what all have not) that peculiar ſort of penetration, which enables one to judge of the thoughts and temper, from the looks and behaviour.

As one is leſs or more penetrating, leſs or more obſervant, and worſe or better informed, in theſe reſpects, one will be leſs or more, what Terence calls, Elegans formarum ſpectator, a nice critick in beauty. And among perſons, who in theſe reſpects are all equally accompliſhed, we may venture to affirm, that in regard to human beauty there will be no material difference of opinion.

Nor, indeed, in regard to any ſort of beauty. Two perſons equally, and well ſkilled in the nature of the horſe, will not differ in their judgment of the beauty of that ſort of animal. In every ſpecies of viſible things, that are liable to diſorder, or capable of improvement, thoſe forms will convey the moſt pleaſing ideas, and conſequently be accounted the moſt beautiful, which ſeem to be moſt perfect, or to come

neareſt

neareſt perfection. But perfection, or the degrees of imperfection, in any individual, can be perceived by thoſe only, who underſtand the nature of the ſpecies to which it belongs; and of many a ſpecies the nature cannot be underſtood, except by thoſe, whom inborn diſcernment, and extenſive and accurate obſervation, have enabled to ſtudy it ſucceſsfully.

So much for the origin of our ideas of Beauty. In all caſes, it ſeems poſſible to account for them upon the principles of aſſociation, except, perhaps, in that ſingle one, of colours giving pleaſure, and being called beautiful, merely becauſe they are bright, or becauſe they are delicate. For with bright and delicate colours, eſpecially the former, children are delighted, long before they know any thing of elegance in ſhape, motion, or attitude, or can form any judgment of the uſefulneſs, perfection, or imperfection, of things viſible. Yet ſo far ſeems our taſte, even for this ſort of beauty, to depend upon aſſociation, that no degree of ſplendor, or of ſoftneſs, will ever reconcile us to any colour, which we know to be the effect, or the neceſſary concomitant, of diſagreeable qualities.

If this enquiry ſhall be thought too long, as an example, let it be conſidered as a digreſſion. It is now finiſhed; and I return to my ſubject.

SECT. V.

External Aſſociations. — Recapitulation.

SOME people contract ſtrange habits of, what may be called, External Aſſociation. I call it ſo; becauſe the body is more concerned in it than the mind, and external things than ideas. They connect a certain action with a certain object ſo, that without the one they cannot eaſily perform the other; although, independently on habit, there is no connection between them. I have heard of a clergyman, who could not compoſe his ſermon, except when he held a foot-rule in his hand; and of one, who, while he was employed in ſtudy, would always be rolling between his fingers a parcel of peas, whereof he conſtantly kept a trencher full, within reach of his arm. I knew a gentleman who would talk a great deal in company, by the help of a large pin, which he held between his thumb and fore-finger; but, when he loſt his pin, his tongue ſeemed at the ſame inſtant to loſe its volubility; and he never was at eaſe, till he had provided himſelf with another implement of the ſame kind. Locke ſpeaks of a young man, who in one particular room where an old trunk ſtood could dance very well; but in any other room, if it wanted ſuch a piece of furniture, could not dance at all. The Tatler mentions a more probable inſtance, of a lawyer, who in his pleadings uſed always to be twiſting about his finger a piece of packthread, which the punſters of that time called, with ſome reaſon, the thread of his diſcourſe. One day, a client of his had a mind to ſee, how he would acquit himſelf without it; and ſtole it from him. The

conſequence was, that the orator became ſilent in the middle of his harangue, and the client loſt his cauſe.

Such examples may be uncommon; but many perſons are to be met with, who have contracted ſimilar habits. You may ſee a boy, while repeating his catechiſm, button and unbutton his coat a dozen times; and, when learning to write, ſcrew his features unknowingly into a variety of forms, as if he meant by the motion of thoſe parts to imitate that of his pen. Some men there are, who no ſooner bid you good morrow, than they thruſt a ſnuff-box into your hand; and ſome can hardly either ſpeak or think, without gnawing their nails, ſcratching their head, or fumbling in their pockets.

It ſhould be our care to guard againſt awkward habits, and ſuch as make us unneceſſarily dependent on things and places: and we ought to be very thankful to thoſe, who by friendly admonition would reform ſuch improprieties in our behaviour. For peculiarities, which we cannot diſcern in ourſelves, may be very glaring, as well as ungraceful, in the eyes of others: and, therefore, if we will not liſten to advice on theſe points, we may in time, and without any bad meaning, make ourſelves ridiculous. It has been recommended to muſicians, and others who have occaſion to act, or to ſpeak, in publick, to practiſe frequently before a looking-glaſs; that they may correct evil habits by their own judgment. The rule is not a bad one; but in all ordinary caſes, I would rather truſt to the opinion of a judicious friend. For to our own infirmities it is to be feared that we are often partial, and ſometimes blind: and the frequent uſe of the mirror has been found, at leaſt in the male ſex, rather to encourage grimace, than to promote a taſte for elegance.

So much for that operation of the human mind, which by modern philoſophers has been called THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.

It is commonly referred to the imagination; for which reaſon I have ſpoken of it in this place: but, from the examples given, it will appear to be owing in part to habits affecting the memory, and the outward ſenſes.

The doctrine is not peculiar to modern philoſophy. Ariſtotle, ſpeaking of Recollection, or active remembrance, inſinuates, with his uſual brevity, that the relations, by which we are led from one thought to another, in tracing out, or *hunting after* (as he calls it) any particular thought which does not immediately occur, are chiefly three, *Reſemblance*, *Contrariety*, and *Contiguity* *. And this enumeration of the aſſociating principles does not differ, in any thing material, from what is here given. I reduced them to five, *Reſemblance*, *Contrariety*, *Nearneſs of Situation*, *the relation of Cauſe and Effect*, and *Cuſtom* or *Habit*. Now the three laſt may very well be referred to that one which Ariſtotle calls *Contiguity*. *Nearneſs of Situation* is nothing elſe. In its influence a *Cauſe* may be ſaid to be, becauſe it really is, *contiguous* to its *Effect*. And two things or ideas cannot be aſſociated by *Cuſtom*, ſo as that the one ſhall introduce the other into the mind; unleſs they have, once and again, or once at leaſt, been *in company together*, or thought of *at the ſame time*.

* The paſſage is quoted above, Eſſay on Memory. Chap. II.

CHAP. III.

Remarks on Genius.

BY Memory, we acquire knowledge. By Imagination, we *invent*; that is, produce arrangements of ideas and objects that were never ſo arranged before.

By Imagination, alſo, in certain caſes, we are enabled to *judge*, becauſe qualified to form diſtinct ideas of thoſe things in nature, art, and ſcience, which exerciſe our reaſon, or call forth our affections.

For, in conformity with modern language, I aſcribed to imagination two diſtinct, though congenial, faculties: "firſt, "the power of apprehending or conceiving ideas, ſimply as "they are in themſelves, without any view to their reality: "and ſecondly, the power of combining into new forms, or "aſſemblages, thoſe thoughts, ideas, or notions, which we may "have derived from experience or from information."

The talent of invention, applied to uſeful purpoſes, is called *Genius*. Imagination, united with ſome other mental powers, and operating merely as a percipient faculty, in conveying ſuitable impreſſions of what is elegant, ſublime, or beautiful in art and nature, is called *Taſte*.

I mean not to enter, with any degree of minuteneſs, into the *analyſis* of Taſte and Genius. Nor is it neceſſary that I ſhould. That matter has been fully and accurately diſcuſſed by an abler hand; I mean, by the learned Dr. Gerard: to whoſe writings and converſation, (for he was my maſter in philoſophy) and to whoſe friendſhip on many occaſions in life,

I am

I am happy in this opportunity of declaring, that I am deeply indebted.

The remarks I have to offer, on Genius and Taſte (which in a diſcourſe on Imagination cannot be entirely overlooked) ſhall be brief, and few, and chiefly of a practical nature.

To qualify the human mind for invention, that is, for forming new and uſeful arrangements, of things or of ideas, experience, and good ſenſe, as well as imagination, are neceſſary. In dreams, and in diſeaſe, imagination often operates with aſtoniſhing vivacity: but that is not Genius, becauſe it is not regulated by knowledge or judgment, and tends to no uſeful purpoſe *.

I mention this, with a view to combat an opinion, as old at leaſt as the age of Horace, and not uncommon in modern times; — that Genius, eſpecially poetical genius, is nothing more than a certain warmth of fancy, or enthuſiaſm of mind, which is all-ſufficient in itſelf, and ſtands in no need of judgment, or good ſenſe, to give it direction and regularity. Under the influence of this idle conceit, Horace tells us, that ſome of the poets of his time ſhut themſelves up in cells, avoiding the ſcenes of obſervation and buſineſs, and when they ſhowed themſelves in publick, affected a total diſregard to the cuſtoms of the world: as if ignorance, ruſticity, and madneſs could qualify them for inſtructing or entertaining mankind. But Horace teaches a different doctrine. He declares Good Senſe to be the ſource of all good writing: and recommends it to the man of genius, to ſtudy nature, to mingle in ſociety, and to make himſelf acquainted with the manners and characters of men, and with the various ways in which they expreſs their paſſions and ſentiments †.

* This phraſe muſt be taken with ſome grains of allowance. See *An Eſſay on Dreaming.*

† Hor. Ar. Poet. 295—318.

And indeed, if we were to recollect particulars, the hiſtory of literature, as well as the nature of the thing, would bear teſtimony to the poet's determination. Arts and ſciences owe their improvement, and genius its moſt illuſtrious diſplays, not to monks, and hermits, and half-witted enthuſiaſts, but to ſuch men as Homer, Socrates, Xenophon, Sophocles, Demoſthenes, Cicero, Ceſar, Bacon, Shakeſpeare, Milton, Clarendon, Addiſon, Lyttelton: men, who ſtudied life and manners, as well as books; who took part in the buſineſs of ſociety; and gave proof of the ſoundeſt judgment, as well as of a moſt comprehenſive mind.

Two things may be remarked concerning Genius: firſt, that it is not a common, but rather a rare accompliſhment; and ſecondly, that it appears in different degrees, and under a great variety of forms.

1. It is not a common, but rather a rare endowment. All men are teachable; but few poſſeſs the power of uſeful invention. Such is the will of our Creator. And it is right that it ſhould be ſo. Life has oft been likened to a warfare: and civil ſociety may in this reſpect be compared to an army; that in it there muſt be ſome to contrive and command, but that far the greater number have nothing to do but to obey. If every man were an inventor and a projector, there would be ſuch a multiplicity of rivalſhips and jarring intereſts, and ſuch a ſpirit would predominate of independence and of pride, as could not fail to introduce confuſion into human affairs; and many of the lower employments of life, which are eſſential to the general welfare, would be totally abandoned. For if all men were equal in abilities, they would all aſpire to an equality of condition; a ſtate of things, which is proved by the experience of every age to be unattainable; and of which, if we conſider how neceſſary

neceſſary ſubordination is to publick good, we ſhall be ſatisfied, that, if it could be attained, it would not be expedient. As Providence has made us differ in the form of our bodies; and ſome are ſwift, and others unwieldy, ſome weak, and others ſtrong; it would ſeem to be no leſs the intention of Providence, that we ſhould differ in the capacity of our minds: for thus we are the better qualified to diſcharge, with pleaſure to ourſelves, and with benefit to the publick, the duties belonging to the different profeſſions that take place in ſociety.

2. Genius appears in various degrees, and in a great variety of forms. As to its degrees: — how vaſt the difference between the author of the Iliad, and him who compoſed the odes that bear the name of Anacreon! To thoſe who invent arts and ſciences, or make a diſcovery of new truths by inveſtigation (for many important truths are diſcovered by accident) the higheſt honours are undoubtedly due. And yet great genius may be exerted in improving the inventions of another; or in ſetting truths that are already known to ſome, in ſuch convenient lights as may make them known to many. None of Newton's Commentators lay claim to an equality of genius with that incomparable philoſopher. But he who explains the Newtonian ſyſtem ſo, as to make it intelligible to ordinary underſtandings, will be allowed to poſſeſs Genius, and to deſerve well of mankind. For this cannot be done, without a talent (which is by no means common) for contriving ſuch arguments, and modes of illuſtration, as are moſt likely to be heard with pleaſure, and to convey diſtinct ideas and full conviction.

The varieties of human genius are innumerable. One man has a genius in mechanicks, another in architecture; or in painting, muſick, poetry, geometry, medicine, eloquence; and one may make progreſs, and deviſe improvements, in one of theſe arts, who

who could not in another, or at leaſt not without more laborious application. And ſome men have appeared, who gave proof of an univerſal genius, and that they were capable of making diſcoveries in any art or ſcience, to which they thought fit to apply themſelves. Theſe varieties are certainly owing to adequate cauſes; but what thoſe are, it may be as difficult to aſcertain, as why ſome men are tall, and others ſhort, ſome made for ſwiftneſs, and ſome for ſtrength.

Arts there are, and ſciences, wherein any man of ſenſe, who is willing to be induſtrious, may make ſuch proficiency as will enable him to perform in them with reputation. And ſuch are moſt of the neceſſary arts. For that which it may be any man's buſineſs to underſtand, Providence has kindly placed within the reach of every capacity. We do not often hear of a man, whom want of genius renders unfit for huſbandry, navigation, law, commerce, war, or any of the common employments of life. But to command a fleet, or an army, to preſide in a court of juſtice, or lay down rules for improving commerce or agriculture, are offices, which can fall to the ſhare of very few, and for which not one, perhaps, in a thouſand is fully qualified, even though he were to receive a ſuitable education. Genius is indiſpenſable in the fine arts, particularly, in architecture, painting, and poetry: for theſe, being not neceſſary to life, but only ornamental, are valued, rather in proportion to the degree of pleaſure with which they affect the beholder, than according to their intrinſick uſefulneſs: and a good critick is pleaſed with thoſe poems, pictures, or buildings only, which have more than ordinary excellence, and evince more than common abilities in the poet, painter, or architect. Thus reaſons, and thus determines Horace, in regard to Poetry. "In ſome things, ſays he, there is a mediocrity, which "may be, and ought to be endured. A pleader is held in eſtima-

" tion, though perhaps leſs eloquent than Meſſala; and a lawyer,
" though not ſo learned as Aulus. * But mediocrity in poets is not
" permitted, or pardoned, by gods, by men, or by bookſellers.
" For as, at an entertainment, bad muſick, and ſweetmeats ill-
" ſeaſoned or ill-prepared, are offenſive; becauſe an entertain-
" ment might very well be without them; ſo poetry, which
" was invented and made for the expreſs purpoſe of giving plea-
" ſure, muſt, when it falls ſhort of excellence, *fail to pleaſe*, and
" come near to be thought contemptible *."

This doom has been called ſevere; but will hardly be thought ſo, if we ſuppoſe, that Horace is ſpeaking of poetry, as addreſſed to thoſe who are judges of it. To ſuch perſons, whatever ſeems in any degree faulty muſt be in the ſame degree unpleaſing: and therefore poetry cannot anſwer its end, if it is not ſo far faultleſs, as to give no offence; which will not be the caſe, if it is not thought perfect in its kind, or ſomething at leaſt above mediocrity. So in the other fine arts. Bad muſick may gratify an unſkilful ear, and bad painting an inexperienced eye; but he, who is a true critick in theſe arts, would rather hear no muſick, and ſee no pictures, than be obliged to attend to ſuch as he cannot approve.

It has been diſputed, whether the ſame force of mind, that makes a man ingenious in any one art, would not, with a proper education, make him ſo in any other. The diſpute, like many others, may be preſumed to have ariſen from words not well underſtood. If by Ingeniouſneſs be meant nothing more than what is commonly called Capacity, or Docility, we might determine the queſtion in the affirmative; in regard to thoſe arts, at leaſt, which are common, or congenial. An expert joiner might, no doubt, have proved equally expert, as a ſhip-

* Hor. Ar. Poet. 368—378.

wright,

wright, blackſmith, or watchmaker, if his education had been anſwerable: and he, who is eloquent as a preacher, might have been no leſs eloquent as a lawyer or ſenator. The ſame talents may, I believe, be applied, with the ſame ſucceſs, to moral and to natural philoſophy: and they, who are maſters of an elegant proſe-ſtile, may, with a competence of the neceſſary learning, acquit themſelves creditably in various kinds of proſe compoſition; in philoſophy, hiſtory, theology, or politicks. Geometry, too, and mechanicks, and aſtronomy, are ſo nearly allied, and ſo level to the human underſtanding, that thoſe who are capable of the one can hardly be ſuppoſed incapable of the other. To a right comprehenſion of the principles of theſe, and the like arts and ſciences, few perſons properly educated, and tolerably induſtrious, will be found unequal, if they labour under no intellectual weakneſs.

But, if we take Genius to mean, what is frequently underſtood by that term, a bias of the mind towards ſome particular arts, joined with ſuch powers of invention as make one remarkable, we ſhall probably ſee cauſe to decide the queſtion in the negative: with a reſerve, however, in favour of thoſe univerſal geniuſes, who are ſaid to have now and then appeared in the world. Homer in Epick poetry, Newton in geometry and philoſophy, Livy in hiſtory, Handel in muſick, and Raphael in painting, were extraordinary geniuſes. But I cannot think, that any of them would have been ſo eminent in any other walk of invention, as in that which he made choice of: that Newton, for example, could have rivalled Homer in poetry, or Handel in muſick; or that Raphael in hiſtory could have vied with Livy, or Livy as a painter equalled Raphael. For, how many poets, painters, muſicians, philoſophers, and hiſtorians, and thoſe too of conſiderable ingenuity, have endeavoured to reach the merit of theſe great maſters, and found after all, that

they were in purſuit of what they could never attain! How many commanders of armies have propoſed for their pattern Ceſar and Annibal! And how very few are to be compared with Annibal or Ceſar in military genius! Orators have been in requeſt in all ages: and yet, to this day, Demoſthenes and Cicero are at the head of the profeſſion.

A man of moderate talents may learn to perform with applauſe in ſeveral arts. To write ſmooth verſes, to draw a tolerable picture of a human face, to play and even to make an agreeable tune, to compoſe a hiſtory or philoſophical diſcourſe that ſhall be read with pleaſure, requires no more capacity, than thouſands in every age and nation are poſſeſſed of. But, to be a great poet, painter, muſician, hiſtorian, or philoſopher, one muſt have not only that capacity which is common to all men of ſenſe, but alſo a particular and diſtinguiſhing Genius, which learning may improve, but cannot beſtow. It is no preſumption, to ſuppoſe, that Heaven ſhould endow with extraordinary talents thoſe who are intended for extraordinary purpoſes. And therefore, I do not think, that Cicero expreſſes himſelf too ſtrongly, when he ſays, that "without ſomething "of divine inſpiration no man was ever great."

Genius is not confined to particular profeſſions, or to any one rank of life. In the cottage it may be met with, and in the palace; in the city, and in the hamlet; in the ſhop of the meaneſt mechanick, as well as in the moſt famous ſchools of learning. For, as every art is improveable, Providence has ſo ordered human affairs, that in every claſs of artiſts a genius may be found, who is capable of making improvements. But let not thoſe be diſcouraged, who diſcern not in themſelves any extraordinary abilities. It is not requiſite, that every ſeaman ſhould be an aſtronomer, or that every private ſoldier ſhould underſtand the

theory of war. Genius and greatneſs are almoſt equally expoſed to the aſſaults of envy: both muſt encounter mortifications, that are not known to the majority of mankind: and both are liable to the influence of a reſtleſs ambition, which is often fatal to happineſs, and not always friendly to one's worldly intereſt. Mediocrity of talents, as well as of fortune, ſeems indeed to be the moſt deſirable ſtate, to thoſe who have no other wiſh, than to be happy and uſeful: and he who is diligent and ſober-minded, in any honeſt calling, may perform his part with comfort to himſelf, and with advantage to ſociety.

Nor let the man of genius imagine, that nature has done every thing for him, and that he has nothing to do for himſelf. In one or two inſtances, uncultivated genius may have riſen to diſtinction: but who will ſay, that equal genius, with culture, is not more likely to be diſtinguiſhed? We have heard of Dramatick writers, who, truſting to their natural powers, whereof, it ſeems, they had a higher idea, than any body elſe ever had, thought learning below their ambition, becauſe Shakſpeare was not learned: a conceit, which, far from being a proof of genius, was only an indication of folly, and an apology for idleneſs. Shakſpeare, it is true, had little ſchool-learning; but we muſt not thence infer, that he was either ignorant or idle. In obſerving the characters of men, and the appearances of the inanimate and irrational world, as well as in the ſtudy of his native tongue, of which he was a compleat maſter, he muſt have been indefatigable: and he ſeems to have poſſeſſed, in a moſt uncommon degree, the talent of ſelecting, from the books that came in his way, ſuch knowledge as might be of uſe to him in his poetical capacity.

Homer, Plutarch, Pythagoras, Thales, Herodotus, and other antients, ſpent many years in travelling from place to place, and collecting all the knowledge of the time, for the improvement

of their genius. Plato, at the age of fourſcore, did not deſiſt from reviſing and poliſhing the ſtyle of his Dialogues; that ſtyle, which had already been poliſhed to a degree of perfection, whereof before his time the world had ſeen no example. Cicero was all his life aſſiduous in ſtudy: and Ceſar, the moſt aſtoniſhing genius that hiſtory has recorded, wrote an account of his own wars in the midſt of danger and buſineſs, and did not think the hours loſt, which he employed on a treatiſe of Latin grammar. What a vaſt idea ſhould we have formed of Livy's induſtry, as well as eloquence, if he had compoſed no more than the thirty five books now remaining of his Roman hiſtory; which, however, are hardly one fourth of the whole! — I may add, that Milton was one of the moſt learned men, as well as the ſubliméſt genius, of modern times: that Bacon and Newton were profoundly ſkilled in hiſtory and claſſical erudition, as well as in every part of philoſophy: that Swift for ſeveral years ſtudied at the rate of ten hours a day: and that Addiſon, before he left the univerſity, was ſo great a maſter in antient literature, as to have publiſhed ſome of the fineſt Latin verſes that had appeared in the world ſince the Auguſtan age. — But there is no end of the examples, that might be brought, to prove, that the moſt famous men of every nation were equally ingenious and induſtrious. Great talents, unaided by induſtry, evaporate in vain wiſhes that produce no effort; or exhauſt themſelves in momentary and undirected efforts, that end in diſappointment.

I will not undertake to trace out the efficient cauſes of thoſe varieties of genius, which are obſervable among mankind. Genius being the talent of uſeful invention, and invention the work of imagination, it may ſeem to follow, that whatever diverſifies imagination, muſt give variety to genius. If the fancy have acquired, by nature or by habit, a tendency to paſs from cauſes to effects,

and from effects to cauſes, it may be preſumed, that the genius, aided by accurate obſervation, will be philoſophical. If there be a propenſity to trace out reſemblances, and to bring thoſe ideas together which are *like* one another, the genius may poſſibly exert itſelf in ſome imitative art, as painting, or poetry; eſpecially, if there be ſuperadded a taſte for the beauties of nature, with great ſenſibility of temper, and a contemplative mind: but, in perſons leſs romantic, and much engaged in the buſineſs of ſociety, or who have not in early life been accuſtomed to ſurvey the grand phenomena of creation, if the ſame aſſociating principle of reſemblance predominate, it may perhaps give riſe to Wit; which conſiſts, for the moſt part, in the unexpected diſcovery of ſimilitude between things apparently unlike. A tenacious memory, with a diſpoſition to aſſociate thoſe ideas that are related in time and place, ſeems likely to produce a genius for hiſtorical narrative.

All this may be ſaid, and is probable enough; but not ſufficient to ſolve the difficulty. For ſtill it may be aſked, Whence comes it, that one imagination ſhould be more, and another leſs, ſubject to the influence of any one aſſociating principle? Why ſhould Reſemblance attract the chief notice of one mind; contiguity of place and time, that of another; and the relation of cauſe and effect, that of a third? Is this the conſequence of habits contracted in the beginning of life? Then why have not all children the ſame turn of genius, who have had the ſame education?—Or is it merely conſtitutional?

In fact, I believe, it is owing partly to conſtitution, and partly to habit: but that theſe two cauſes are ſo blended in forming and varying human genius, that one can hardly ſay, in any particular caſe, how far the one, or the other, may have been predominant. In the moſt diſcouraging circumſtances we have ſeen genius unexpectedly

unexpectedly ariſe; and a peculiar turn of temper, and of capacity prevail, in oppoſition to all the power both of precept and of example.

The paſſions, no doubt, have ſome influence in forming the genius. You cannot expect to find the ſame talents in a chearful and a melancholy man; in an arrogant and an humble ſpirit; in one who loves retirement, and in one who is fond of the buſtle and glitter of publick life. Wit and humour, when united, as in Swift, with miſanthropy, pride and indignation, will vent itſelf in ſuch virulent ridicule, as makes men deſpiſe and hate one another: but, if accompanied with mildneſs and benevolence, may give riſe to that good-natured jocularity, which we admire in Addiſon, and which ſweetens the temper, while it enlivens the fancy.

Habits contracted in our younger years may alſo give a bias to the inventive powers. When children are much in the company of ſeamen, of ſoldiers, of mechanicks, we ſee them acquire habits of attending, with more than ordinary pleaſure, to the converſation of ſuch people. Hence they come to underſtand ſomething of naval affairs, military tranſactions, mechanical curioſities; to be intereſted in them, and take a liking to them: and this liking, if ſtrong, and accompanied with good parts, will no doubt go a great way in forming a peculiarity of genius. Thoſe who reliſh harmony of language, and read the works of poets, eſpecially of good poets, very early in life, acquire in time a poetical taſte, which, if other circumſtances be favourable, will produce ſomething like a genius for poetry.

Among contemporary poets, we may ſometimes obſerve a ſimilarity of genius; which is probably occaſioned by their imitating one another. When Donne and Cowley had introduced, about the middle of the laſt century, a taſte for irregular meaſures of

verſe, and for interlarding every ſpecies of poem with childiſh witticiſm, Sprat, and Otway, and many others, fell into the faſhion; and one would almoſt think that the ſame ſpirit had animated them all.

But it ſeems to me, that they are minds of an inferiour order, which are thus formed, or enſlaved, by early habits; true, original, and diſtinguiſhing genius being the gift of nature, though improvable by good education, and liable to be in ſome degree perverted by bad. At the time when Cowley had infected the whole nation with witticiſm, Milton aroſe; and gave his country a ſpecimen of the trueſt, and moſt ſublime poetry: in framing which he was directed, partly by his exquiſite taſte in antient learning, but chiefly by his own incomparable genius.

Yet Milton himſelf, though not enſlaved, was ſwayed a little, by the prejudices of his age, and the habits of his early youth. And I obſerve, that the faſhion of the time is by all criticks admitted as an apology for an Author's more trivial faults: whence we may infer, that, in the general opinion of mankind, the moſt elevated minds cannot wholly reſiſt the force of example, and that the bent of the genius is partly determined by outward circumſtances. The very learned writer of an Inquiry into the life and writings of Homer has proved, or at leaſt made it highly probable, that the great father of poetry himſelf was in ſome degree indebted, for the tranſcendency of his genius, to the manners of his age, and to the political and military eſtabliſhments wherewith it was his fortune to be acquainted.

When I ſaid, that thoſe are geniuſes of an inferiour order, which are formed or enſlaved by early habits, I did not mean to inſinuate, that no great genius ever became an imitator. Virgil imitates many poets, and particularly Homer, from whom he has borrowed the plan, and many of the ſentiments, images, and phraſes, of the Eneid;

Eneid: but Virgil's ſtyle, and manner, and the numbers of his verſe, are altogether his own; and are characteriſed by a peculiar dignity, correctneſs, and delicacy, not to be met with in Homer, nor indeed in any other poet. Taſſo imitates Homer in his plan, and Virgil in his ſtyle. Pope imitates Boileau and Dryden: but his own genius is apparent in every part of his works; he has more fire, and fancy, than the French author; and he is more ſublime, and more uniformly harmonious, than his Engliſh maſter.—In fact all good poets imitate one another more or leſs: and I am not ſure, whether Homer himſelf has not in ſome things condeſcended to imitate Heſiod *. But in the writings of a great genius, even when he imitates, nay when he is only a tranſlator, there is always ſomething peculiar and extraordinary.

* Homer is generally ſuppoſed to have been before Heſiod. I incline to a different opinion, but am not poſitive in it. For in the latter I think I find not only the poetical art, but even the Greek tongue, leſs cultivated, than in the former. And if Heſiod had known Homer, I preſume he would have mentioned him, and been ſomewhat more particular in what he ſays of the Trojan war. His plan would not have hindered it; whereas Homer's could hardly admit the mention of Heſiod. The Aſcrean bard laments his having had the misfortune to live in the fifth age of the world; wiſhing, that he had died in an earlier, or been reſerved to a later period: now this fifth age, according to his own account, immediately followed thoſe heroick times, in which happened the war of Thebes and of Troy: ſo that Homer, if he had flouriſhed (as Cicero and Dr. Clarke conjecture he did) many ages before Heſiod, muſt have been born before the Trojan war; which is altogether incredible. Dr. Clarke's ingenious argument, drawn from the proſody of the Greek word καλον; the firſt ſyllable of which, he obſerves, that Homer uniformly pronounces long; while Heſiod and the latter poets have it ſometimes long, and ſometimes ſhort: — this argument, I ſay, does not ſeem very material; ſuch changes of pronunciation being common in all languages. Herodotus and Varro make theſe venerable bards contemporaries. There ſeems indeed to have been no great interval of time between them. And it is evident, from the general colour of their ſtyle, either that the one imitates the other, or that both have imitated ſome poet more antient than either. See Heſiod. Opera et Dies. verſ. 172. — Cicero de Senectute. cap. 15. — Clark. Annot. ad Hom. Iliad. Lib. 2. verſ. 43.

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But, however we may be puzzled in reſolving the varieties of human genius into their proximate cauſes, we can be at no loſs to comprehend their final cauſe, or the intention of Providence in eſtabliſhing them. By theſe diverſities of capacity and character, men are led to different employments; which not only prevent oppoſitions of intereſt; but alſo ſupply a profuſion of conveniencies; adorn human life with an endleſs variety of arts; and enlarge the ſphere of ſocial virtue, by opening ſources innumerable of friendly communication between the various individuals and nations that compoſe the great ſociety of mankind.

When, together with the multitude of arts that ſupport life, we conſider the tribes of artiſts by whom they are cultivated, and that in the choice of a profeſſion many are determined by their own free-will; we muſt be filled with admiration, at the complexneſs of human ſociety, and the pliableneſs of the human mind, as well as at the wiſdom of the Creator, in thus providing a genius for every art, and a gratification for every natural deſire. How many artiſts are employed in furniſhing what is neceſſary to the compoſition of that common article, Bread! The baker muſt purchaſe his flour from the miller, and his yeſt from the brewer; and neither flour nor yeſt can be had without agriculture. The huſbandman depends, for the implements of his trade, on thoſe who make for him the plough, the harrow, the ſickle, the ſcythe, and the waggon; and theſe cannot be made without iron and wood. In many places, where they are neceſſary, wood and iron cannot be had, without the care of the merchant, and the labours of the mariner. Mariners traverſe the ocean in ſhips; and neither can they guide their veſſel, nor the merchant conduct his commerce, without that ſort of knowledge, to which ink and paper are neceſſary. The manufacture of paper reminds us of him, who weaves the cloth whereof it is made; of the ſpinner,

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who draws and twiſts the threads for the weaver; of the labourer, who prepares the flax for the ſpinning-wheel; and of the tiller of the ground, who ſows the flax, and gathers, and cures it. Few or none of theſe people can work without tools of iron: and that moſt uſeful metal, before it can be forged into inſtruments, muſt paſs ſucceſſively through the hands of the miner, the ſmelter, and the ſmith. To all this we may add, that no artificer can live without a houſe, and food, and cloaths, and other conveniencies, which are ſupplied by the induſtry of the ſhoemaker, taylor, tallow-chandler, joiner, currier, houſe-carpenter, ſlater, ſtone-cutter, bricklayer, glazier, maſon, and architect.

From this one example, thus ſlightly proſecuted, we may form an idea of the mutual ſubſerviency of man to man, and of one art to another. And hence let us learn to ſet a proper value on induſtry and manufacture. The meaneſt artificer in ſociety, if honeſt and diligent, is worthy of honour: not only, as he ſupports himſelf and his dependents without any charge to the publick, and thus gives the means of life and of comfort to ſeveral human creatures; but alſo, becauſe he adds to the fund of national wealth and ſplendour, and is inſtrumental in providing neceſſaries to all, and convenience and ornament to thoſe of higher condition.

To purſue this ſpeculation a little further. Of the multitude of trades eſtabliſhed in ſociety, how few are there, which *we* would chooſe to make the buſineſs of our lives! how many, which we ſhould think it a miſery to be compelled to follow! Nay, ſome there are no doubt, which we may think it ſtrange, that any human being could ever be tempted to engage in. Yet we do not find, that any uſeful art periſhes; or that artiſts of any denomination are wanting, while there is a chance, that they ſhall meet with encouragement. This at leaſt is not often the caſe, where regular ſociety has been of long ſtanding.

And is not this a proof of three things? Firſt, that a wiſe and good Providence governs the world? Secondly, that human genius is ſuſceptible of boundleſs variety? And thirdly, that happineſs is not confined to, nor excluded from, any ſtation?—For is it not Providence, that gives this pliableneſs to human nature? And, if it were not for this, would ſociety be ſo happy, or arts ſo flouriſhing? And if happineſs were not to be found even in the loweſt ranks of life, would men ever make choice of thoſe callings, that oblige them to paſs their days in a mean condition, and in narrow circumſtances?

I grant, that many are forced into a way of life, which they do not reliſh. But every trade can boaſt of volunteers. And, in ordinary caſes, both the one and the other are found to live not uncomfortably. The impreſſed ſeaman becomes in a little time as brave and as chearful as any of his companions. And the labourer, who lives and dies in the hamlet where he was born, and never had the means of changing his condition for a better, often enjoys a degree of health and happineſs, whereof the rich and the great have no experience, and could not eaſily form an idea.

There is hardly any occupation, in this free country at leaſt, that to us appears more forlorn, than that of thoſe who, in the hyperbolical language of the poet,

Deep plunged in mines, forget a ſun was made.

And yet I have been aſſured, by a man of humanity and obſervation, the ſuperintendant of an Engliſh colliery, that his people would rather work in their pits, three hundred feet under ground, than labour in a field of hay in the fineſt ſunſhine.—To us, who are educated with high notions of liberty, it may ſeem wonderful, that men could live at all, or with any degree of comfort, under a deſpotical ſovereign. And yet the ſubjects of deſpotiſm are not always miſerable. In Ruſſia, as well as in more moderate governments, you may meet with merry peaſants, chearful aſſemblies, and happy families. So great is the power of habit, and ſo various the inclinations

nations of the human mind, that honeſty and humble induſtry, with contentment, may enjoy the means both of peace, and of pleaſure, under any form of government.

What! it may be anſwered, Are all forms of policy, and all human occupations, equally friendly to happineſs? Then, why contend for liberty? Or why complain, when by the ſeverity of parents and guardians, or by the lowneſs of our fortune, we are compelled to engage for life in a diſagreeable employment?

I admit not the inference. I ſpeak of the goodneſs of God, in giving that verſatility to man's nature, which makes it ſuſceptible of comfort in every ſtate in which it can learn to be content. And wretched indeed would our condition be, if our felicity depended more upon outward circumſtances, than upon the frame of the mind: for, in that caſe, good and evil would be no more in our power, than riches and high ſtation are now; and the miſerable would as far exceed the happy in number, as the common people do their rulers.

But far be it from me to inſinuate, that all governments are equally good; or that there is no material diſtinction between competence and want, moderate and exceſſive labour, a healthy and an unhealthy, or a creditable and a mean employment. The human body *may* live, and enjoy health, in the polar circle and torrid zone, as well as in the temperate climates; yet who, on equal terms, would not prefer the laſt? In adverſity, and in ſickneſs, the mind of a good man *may* be happy: yet, who will ſay, that health and proſperity are not deſireable; or that to crave protection againſt the oppreſſor, or to reſiſt, even unto blood, the aſſaſſin who would maim our bodies, is not worth our while? Self-preſervation, the avoidance of pain, a deſire to riſe from lower to higher degrees of happineſs, to gain the eſteem of thoſe with whom we live, and to promote our worldly intereſt, where it can be done by innocent means, are principles of action, to which nature has given all men

an unqueſtionable right; and which, as they are ſprings of virtue and publick ſpirit, muſt be allowed to be productive of the beſt conſequences.

Nothing is more friendly to the ſoul of man, than Liberty; which is the birthright of every rational being, and which none can without cruelty deprive us of, unleſs by our crimes we have proved ourſelves unworthy of it. Deſpotick governments are therefore unjuſt, as far as they deprive the innocent of this prime bleſſing: and it never can be for the good of mankind, that injuſtice ſhould triumph, or that innocence ſhould be born down. Beſides, activity and genius flouriſh in free governments, but in the abodes of tyranny diſappear: and however it may fare with ſome individuals, ſociety will always decay or proſper, as genius and induſtry are diſcountenanced or promoted.

Freedom of choice in regard to an employment is a part of man's natural liberty, which parents and guardians ought not to violate. For though it may be poſſible to be happy in any ſtate, it is alſo poſſible, that, by having an employment forced upon us, we may be made miſerable for life. And much it is to be regretted, that in this country it ſhould at any time be neceſſary to compel ſeamen into the ſervice of the publick; and that, from lowneſs of circumſtances, a man of ſpirit ſhould ever be left to languiſh in obſcurity, without any hope of emerging into that tract of buſineſs, for which his genius qualifies him, and to which he naturally aſpires. But this laſt is only one of thoſe many evils, which, in order to raiſe our views to a better life, Providence has annexed to the preſent ſtate of imperfection; and a remedy may be ſaid to be in ſome meaſure provided for it, in the natural pliableneſs of the human mind. And the other evil is a conſequence, unavoidable as many think, of our living under a free government, in the neighbourhood of an ambitious and powerful enemy, and depending on our naval power for the preſervation of our liberties.

CHAP. IV.

Of Taſte, and its Improvement.

SOME ideas are too complex, to admit of logical definition. When this is the caſe, we muſt have recourſe to deſcription; and give a detail of the more important, if we ſhould not be able to aſcertain the eſſential qualities. And, if we can illuſtrate a ſubject, I believe it is not material, whether that be done by definition and ſyllogiſm, or by any other method equally brief, convincing, and intelligible.

It was ſaid, that "Imagination, united with ſome other mental "powers, and operating as a percipient faculty, in conveying "ſuitable impreſſions of what is elegant, ſublime, or beautiful, "in art or nature, is called TASTE." This account may be right as far as it goes; but is not ſufficiently comprehenſive. By pointing out its defects, we make amends for them. They may be reduced to two.

Firſt; Sublimity, Beauty, and Elegance, are not the only things in art and nature, which gratify Taſte. There is alſo a taſte in imitation, in harmony, and in ridicule. He who takes delight in truth, in virtue, in ſimplicity, may be ſaid to have a taſte for it. And, not to be charmed with ſuch qualities; or to approve their oppoſites; to be inſenſible of harmony; to reliſh groſs buffoonery; to prefer bad pictures to good, and finical ornament to manly ſimplicity, are proofs of bad taſte; as diſregard to truth, and indifference to virtue, are, of both a bad taſte, and a bad heart.

Secondly; As Elegance, Sublimity, Beauty, and the other qualities here mentioned as objects of taſte, are all good and agree-

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able; we might, by truſting to the definition, be led to ſuppoſe, that Taſte, being an inlet to pleaſure only, is not connected with painful emotions. But, in the works of human art, it is the office of Taſte, to diſcern, not only what is excellent, but alſo what is faulty; and to be delighted with the one, and diſſatisfied with the other, according as that approaches to perfection, and this deviates from it. To read Blackmore and Milton with the ſame reliſh, or the ſame indifference; or, while we admire the latter, not to be diſguſted with the former, would be a ſign of bad taſte, or of total inſenſibility. A goodnatured critick may confine his *remarks* to the beauties of his author: but, if he have true diſcernment, it is impoſſible for him not to perceive, and be offended with, the blemiſhes.

Since, then, that ſort of mental ſagacity, which we call Taſte, is too complex to be characterized in a ſhort definition; I proceed to enumerate thoſe faculties or talents, which muſt be united in the perſon who poſſeſſes it.

To be a perſon of taſte, it ſeems neceſſary, that one have, firſt, a lively and correct imagination; ſecondly, the power of diſtinct apprehenſion; thirdly, the capacity of being eaſily, ſtrongly, and agreeably affected, with ſublimity, beauty, harmony, exact imitation, &c.; fourthly, Sympathy, or Senſibility of heart; and, fifthly, Judgment, or Good Senſe, which is the principal thing, and may not very improperly be ſaid to comprehend all the reſt.

I. Good taſte implies Lively Imagination. This talent qualifies one, for readily underſtanding an author's purpoſe; tracing the connection of his thoughts; forming the ſame views of things which he had formed; and clearly conceiving the ſeveral images or ideas that the artiſt deſcribes or delineates.

In this reſpect, the minds of different men are differently conſtituted. Some can enter into a deſcription of what they have ſeen,

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or of what is familiar; and follow an author's train of thought, when he lays down a plan, and proceeds accordingly: but are not able to comprehend ſuch thoughts or images as are uncommon; or to mark thoſe delicacies of connection, which give ſurpriſe, or which imitate the deſultory operations of enthuſiaſm, or any other ardent paſſion. Yet theſe delicate tranſitions are among the chief beauties of poetry. The philoſopher lays down a plan, and follows it; his buſineſs being only, to inſtruct. But the orator ſometimes, and the poet frequently, conceals his plan, and makes you expect ſomething different from what he intends; becauſe his aim is, to pleaſe, by working upon your paſſions, and fancy: which is never more effectually done, than when he exhibits what is at once natural and ſurpriſing.—In the end of Virgil's ſecond Georgick, the praiſes of a country life are, by the poet's management, cloſely connected with the former part of the book, which treats of trees and vines: but the connection is not obvious to every eye; and they, who do not ſee it, blame the author for his want of method. The ſame delicate contrivance appears in the end of the firſt Georgick: where, from the precepts of agriculture, he makes a nice though natural tranſition to the prodigies that attended the death of Julius Ceſar, and thence to the calamities of civil war; after which, he reſumes with equal art the ſubject of agriculture, and ſo concludes the book.

The language of enthuſiaſm, and of all thoſe paſſions that ſtrongly agitate the ſoul, is naturally incoherent; and may appear even extravagant to thoſe, who cannot enter into the views of the ſpeaker, or form an idea of what is paſſing in his mind. Hence, in the odes of Pindar, and in ſome of the odes of Gray, which imitate the language of enthuſiaſm, many readers complain, that they are often at a loſs to diſcover connection between the contiguous ſentiments; while others, not more learned perhaps, find

no difficulty in conceiving the progreſs of ideas, that lead theſe authors from one thought or image to another. The latter, ſurely, are the only perſons qualified to judge of thoſe odes: and this qualification they ſeem to derive from their ſuperiour livelineſs of fancy. In a word, the imagination of a critick muſt, in reſpect of vivacity, be able to keep pace with that of the authors, whom he aſſumes the privilege of judging, or wiſhes to read with the true reliſh. Their powers of invention it is not neceſſary that he poſſeſs: but, in readily apprehending or imagining every thing they are pleaſed to ſet before him he cannot be in any degree inferiour, without being in the ſame degree an incompetent judge. If we are unable to conceive a poet's imagery, or enter into his ſentiments, we underſtand him as little, as if we were ignorant of his language.

The greateſt livelineſs of imagination will, however, avail but little, if it is not *corrected* and regulated by the knowledge of nature, both external or material, and internal or moral. Without this, there cannot be Taſte; becauſe one cannot diſcern, whether the productions of art be natural or unnatural; that is, whether they be good or bad. In acquiring that knowledge of nature, which is neceſſary to taſte, a man needs not deſcend to the *minutiæ* of natural hiſtory; but he muſt contemplate all the ſtriking appearances of the world around him, ſurveying them in thoſe pictureſque attitudes, in which they moſt powerfully captivate the mind, and awaken the paſſions.

As means of promoting in young perſons a taſte for the beauties of external nature, I have in another place * recommended frequent peruſals of the beſt deſcriptive poets, particularly Virgil, Spenſer, and Thomſon; together with ſome practice in drawing.

* Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick, Part i. chap. 2.

I may now add, that Homer, Milton, and Shakeſpeare will improve that taſte, and at the ſame time make them acquainted with Moral nature, that is, with human paſſions and characters; which however, as Horace intimates *, cannot be thoroughly underſtood, but by careful obſervation of men and manners, as they appear in the active ſcenes of real life.

Livelineſs of imagination, though a natural gift, is not unſuſceptible of improvement. By ſtudying the works of nature and art; by travelling into foreign countries, and converſing with people of different profeſſions, capacities, and manners; by exploring new ſcenes of the inanimate world, mountains, vallies, and plains, whether diſtinguiſhed by their wildneſs or regularity, by their beauty or grandeur; the memory may be ſtored with new ideas, which, if properly arranged and aſcertained, will give vigour to all the mental powers, and to imagination among the reſt. Milton is ſaid to have quickened his fancy, by reading the old romances. And Leonardo da Vinci recommends it to the painter, to go into decayed buildings, and obſerve the ſtains on the broken and mouldy walls; where an eye accuſtomed to look at ſuch things will frequently diſcern figures reſembling clouds, battles, uncommon attitudes, draperies, ludicrous faces, and the like: agreeably to which idea, a pamphlet has been publiſhed †, to ſhow, how, from a few random ſtrokes of a pencil dipped in Indian ink, hints may be obtained for the invention of landſcapes. Every thing, indeed, that puts us in the way of meeting with novelties, may be conſidered as a help to the fancy: but care muſt be taken to methodiſe thoſe new ideas, leſt they ſeduce from the love of nature, and give a taſte for extravagant combinations. Livelineſs and correct-

* Ar. Poet. verſ. 317.

† An Eſſay to facilitate the inventing of Landſcapes. London 1759.

neſs of imagination are eminently and equally conſpicuous in Homer: Spenſer and Arioſto are not inferiour in the firſt quality, but extremely defective in the ſecond.

II. Sometimes, when one's imagination is lively, and regulated too by an acquaintance with nature, one may, notwithſtanding, contract habits of indolence and irregularity in one's ſtudies; which produce a ſuperficial medley of knowledge very detrimental to the native vigour of the mind. And therefore I mentioned Diſtinct Apprehenſion, as the ſecond thing neceſſary to good taſte. There are men, who think with preciſion on every ſubject: and there are others, whoſe ideas are always inaccurate and obſcure. The former make you underſtand their meaning at once, and may be known by their clearneſs of method and of ſtyle: the latter uſe indefinite and ſuperfluous words, confuſedly put together; which, though, on familiar topicks, they may give a tolerable idea of what is intended, will often leave you at a loſs, and perhaps, when any thing uncommon is to be expreſſed, make it impoſſible for you to find out what is in the mind of the ſpeaker.

The former, it is obvious, are the only competent judges of what they read; becauſe they are the only perſons who perfectly underſtand it. How comes it, that, on every peruſal of Homer, Virgil, or Milton, beauties are diſcovered, which never ſtruck us before? Is it not, becauſe, the more we are acquainted with theſe authors, we underſtand them the better? Elegant writing is diſtinguiſhed by a thouſand little graces, that eſcape the ſuperficial reader, and are not immediately apparent even to the attentive. And therefore, habits of accurate ſtudy are indiſpenſably requiſite to form a true critick.

Beſides, moſt performances in the fine arts are intended to raiſe, in the reader or beholder, certain emotions and ſympathies. And it is generally true, that an emotion is lively in proportion to the clearneſs,

clearneſs wherewith its object is perceived or apprehended by the mind. A man of obſcure apprehenſion muſt, therefore, be a man of dull feeling, and ſo cannot poſſeſs true taſte; becauſe he is not ſuſceptible of thoſe ardent emotions, which the artiſt intended to raiſe, and which in ſounder minds his work does actually raiſe.

It is remarkable, that in every language the moſt elegant authors are the moſt perſpicuous. Such are Homer and Xenophon in Greek, and Ceſar, Cicero, and Virgil, in Latin. A proof, that good taſte and clearneſs of apprehenſion are inſeparable: this laſt quality being the immediate cauſe of perſpicuity in writing.

For attaining the faculty of diſtinct apprehenſion, the beſt rule that can be given is, to ſtudy with accuracy, and with method, every thing we apply to, whether books, or buſineſs.—But having already enlarged on this topick, I ſhall not now purſue it any further.

III. A board may be ſo ſhaped and painted, as that a dog ſhall miſtake it for a man; but it does not appear, that he has any pleaſure in it, as an *imitation*. Brutes no doubt perceive ſome of thoſe things which we term ludicrous; but brutes never laugh, nor ſeem to have any notion of *incongruity*. All animals that ſee diſcern light, and probably colours; but man alone perceives, in colours and in figures, that pleaſurable quality, which we term *beauty*. The *magnificence* of the ſtarry firmament, of a lofty and craggy mountain, of a thundering cataract, of a tempeſtuous ocean, has no charms for any terreſtrial creature, but man. *Novelty* yields pleaſure to rational minds; but the inferiour tribes ſeem rather to diſlike it. Many brutes hear more acutely than we; and ſome of them may be ſoothed or alarmed by ſound; but brutes have no ſenſe of *harmony*: nay of thoſe men, who hear with equal acuteneſs, ſome have a muſical ear, and others have not.

In theſe and the like caſes, there ſeems to be in the human mind a ſort of double ſenſation: one conveyed immediately by the exter-

nal organ; and the other depending, partly on that, and partly on ſome other faculty.

That there is in our conſtitution ſuch a thing as a muſical ear, a ſenſe of beauty, a taſte for ſublimity and imitation, a love of novelty, and a tendency to ſmiles and laughter, will not be denied. And that theſe ſenſes, or ſenſibilities, depend partly on the eye and the ear, and yet are to be diſtinguiſhed from the outward ſenſes of ſight and hearing, (for theſe may exiſt without the others) is evident from what has been ſaid. They may therefore be called *Secondary Senſes*. Some philoſophers call them *Reflex*, and ſome *Internal*. And the pleaſures derived from them are termed, by Addiſon, and Akenſide, Pleaſures of Imagination *.

Others have named them *Emotions*, as if they were a ſort of weaker paſſions. And the name is not improper. For all paſſions are attended with pleaſure or pain, and produce ſenſible appearances both in the ſoul and in the body. And the feelings I ſpeak of are all of the agreeable kind; and, where they operate without reſtraint, do all diſplay themſelves externally. The contemplation of beauty, for example, ſoftens the features into a ſmile. Sublimity raiſes admiration and aſtoniſhment, and novelty often gives ſurpriſe; and theſe paſſions operate very ſenſibly on the countenance. Ludicrous objects call forth laughter, which is ſtill more obvious to the eye, as well as to the ear. And the various pleaſures that reſult from imitation do variouſly affect the face; according to the nature of the object imitated, and the ſkill diſplayed by the imitator.

But the name we aſſign to theſe modes of perception is not a matter of great moment. When I call them Secondary Senſes, I

* See Hucheſon's *Moral Philoſophy*; Gerard's *Eſſay on Taſte*; the ſixth volume of the *Spectator*; Akenſide's *Pleaſures of Imagination*; and Lord Kames's *Elements of Criticiſm*.

would

would not be underſtood to find fault with the language of thoſe authors, who in ſpeaking of them have adopted a different phraſeology.

Now the third thing neceſſary to good taſte is, Acuteneſs of (what is here called) Secondary Senſation; or, to expreſs it in other words, "a capacity of being eaſily, ſtrongly, and agreeably "affected, with ſublimity, beauty, harmony, exact imitation," &c.

In this reſpect alſo the capacities of different men are very different. Some have no ſenſe of harmony or modulation, either in language, or in muſick. Some, who are exceedingly delighted with the Sublime and the Beautiful, have little taſte or genius in the way of Ridicule:—Milton is an inſtance; who excels in grand and elegant deſcription, but whoſe attempts at humour are nothing but quibble. Others have an exquiſite reliſh for every ſort of ludicrous combination, who ſeem to be little affected with beauty, or with greatneſs:—Swift is one inſtance, and the author of *Hudibras* another. To excel equally in the Sublime and in the Ludicrous, is a rare talent: Shakeſpeare, however, poſſeſſed it in a very high degree; and Pope, in a lower: Homer, too, is ſaid to have been eminent in the comick, as well as in the ſolemn ſtyle; though that does not appear from any part of his works now extant. Some authors, of whom Homer is the moſt illuſtrious, give no delineations of moral or of material nature, but what bear an exact reſemblance to reality; others, like Arioſto, abound in extravagant and unnatural fiction: the former, ſurely, have a better taſte in imitation, as well as a better judgment, than the latter. The ſenſe of harmony aſſumes various appearances. Pope, for all the ſmoothneſs of his numbers, had no muſical ear; Milton, though his poetry is moſt harmonious, writes rugged proſe: and Addiſon, whoſe proſe is the ſweeteſt that can be, is not diſtinguiſhed as a melodious verſifier.

Some

Some of theſe varieties may be accounted for, from the power of habit. Of thoſe, who have from nature a muſical ear, many perhaps may never have thought of improving that talent, and many have never had the means of improving it: and we ſeldom acquire any true reliſh for muſick, unleſs we have been accuſtomed to it in our younger years. Beſides, that ſweetneſs of ſound in proſe, which is called harmony, is very different from muſical harmony or melody: eaſy articulation belongs to the former; for we never call thoſe words harmonious, which we find it hard to pronounce: but the latter has nothing to do with articulation: and therefore, one may have a taſte for the one, who has none for the other. Nor is it to be wondered at, that a harmonious verſifier ſhould write in proſe without harmony; for this may be the effect of haſte or careleſneſs, or want of practice.

Further; the more we are accuſtomed, from our early years, to attend to what is great and beautiful; to read ſublime poetry, or to aſſociate with perſons of a ſolemn deportment, the leſs we ſhall be inclined to give way to the levities of wit and humour. And from him, who is better pleaſed with the wildneſs of romance, than with the ſimplicity of nature and the antients, a taſte for correct imitation is not to be expected. Theſe various habits may be owing to various cauſes, too minute to be ſpecified. Our way of life, our courſe of ſtudy, the company we keep, the taſte of the age or of the ſociety to which we belong, have great influence in perverting or improving all our intellectual faculties, and thoſe of taſte and genius in particular. I here join taſte and genius together. They are kindred powers; and of ſo near affinity, that the firſt, perhaps, might be called *paſſive genius*, and the ſecond *active taſte*.

The human mind is always the ſame: but in one age one ſet of faculties are cultivated, and another in another; and the purſuits

of men, the ſtates of literature, the modes of taſte, and the characters of nations, are varied accordingly. About the middle of the laſt century, the greater part of Engliſh authors were learned and ſerious, but not very attentive to elegant expreſſion. Under Charles the ſecond, they ran into the oppoſite extreme, and became giddy, ſuperficial, and indelicate; and none but wits and epigrammatiſts were accounted men of taſte: ſo that, if the revolution had not taken place, our literature would probably have periſhed, as well as our laws and liberties. In the reign of Queen Anne, and George the firſt, wit, learning, and elegance, were happily united. Of late the publick taſte ſeems to have been moſt effectually gratified by correct expreſſion, and hiſtorical and philoſophical inquiry.

But whatever influence habit may have in forming the taſte and the genius, it muſt be repeated, that in minds, as well as in bodies, there are conſtitutional differences. There are men, who can never bring themſelves to reliſh muſick; and ſome are equally diſinclined to poetry. And of poets and muſicians, as well as of painters, ſome excel in the grand ſtyle, and ſome in the ludicrous; nor will either claſs of artiſts admit, that the other is qualified to preſcribe rules for both. And therefore, we are not to expect, that in different men taſte ſhould be preciſely uniform, or that it ſhould be abſolutely perfect in any individual.

Any one of theſe Secondary ſenſes will form a ſort of taſte; but to the perfection of this talent the concurrence of them all is neceſſary. In a man thus accompliſhed, every object of his contemplation, whether fit to allure by its novelty, aſtoniſh by its grandeur, charm by its beauty, pleaſe by imitative elegance, or amuſe by unexpected incongruity, will awaken that kind, and that degree, of internal ſatisfaction, which the moſt enlightened part of mankind would acknowlege to be adequate to the pleaſurable

ſurable qualities of the object. But ſuch perfection of taſte is imaginary: as there is not on earth a perſon, who is not a greater admirer, a more accurate obſerver, and of courſe a more competent judge, of ſome objects of taſte, than of others. Rarely have we heard of one man completely ſkilled in muſick, painting, and poetry, or even in any two of thoſe arts. The epick poet undervalues the epigrammatiſt, who in his turn pronounces all ſublime writing to be affected or inſipid; the architect is perhaps indifferent to both; and the compoſer of inſtrumental ſymphonies to all the three. There may be exceptions: but it is in general true, that

> One ſcience only will one genius fit,
> So vaſt is art, ſo narrow human wit;
> Not only bounded to peculiar arts,
> But oft in thoſe confin'd to ſingle parts.

It is eaſy to know, how far an author's taſte may be deficient in this reſpect. If, while he aims at elevation, he diſappoint the reader by mean language, or groveling ideas, (which is generally the caſe with Blackmore) it is a ſign, that he has no taſte in Sublimity. If he appear fond of deſcribing what is unamiable or ungraceful, and diſguſt you with vile alluſions and filthy images, (which is too often the caſe with Swift and Juvenal) he gives proof of an indelicate mind, that either has no ſenſe or love of beauty, or, which is worſe, does not chooſe to indulge it. If his views of nature be indefinite or inaccurate; if they be overcharged with unneceſſary ornaments, or ſeem to be drawn not from his own obſervation, but from the works of other men, (which are faults common to all bad poets and bad painters) it is evident, that he has no diſtinct knowlege of nature, or, at leaſt, that he has no talent or taſte in imitation. If the ſound of his verſes offend, as in

Donne and Hobbes, by its harſhneſs; or, as in Waller and Lanſdowne, proceed in one uniform tenor of ſmoothneſs, without changing according to the ſubject, or amuſing the ear with thoſe varieties of rhythm and cadence, which the moſt regular verſification admits; it will be ſuppoſed, that he writes careleſly, or that he has no true reliſh for harmonious compoſition. If, in his comick ſcenes, he attempt to raiſe laughter by unnatural exaggeration; which is ſometimes done by Sterne and Smollett: if, inſtead of humour, he obtrude upon you indecent buffoonery; which is frequent in Ariſtophanes and Rabelais: if, where he intends wit, he can only bring forth common-place jokes, or verbal quibbles; of which I am ſorry to ſay that there is an example or two in Milton: or if, with Congreve and Vanburgh, he endeavour to make crimes and misfortunes matter of merriment; we muſt believe, either that he has no true ſenſe of ridicule, or that he wilfully debaſes it, to gratify the taſte of the times, or the ſingularity of his own temper.

But let it be remembered, that the work of an artiſt is not to be characteriſed by incidental faults. Theſe may be owing to the weakneſs of human nature; which in the beſt men is liable to tranſgreſſion, in the wiſeſt to error, and in the moſt attentive to inadvertence. Who can paint nature with the energy of Shakſpeare? who ſo ſublime as Homer and Milton? who more elegant than Horace? Yet Shakſpeare is not always natural: Homer and Milton may, each of them, furniſh more than one example of meanneſs: and Horace has written ſome verſes that are equally unworthy of a good man and a good poet. If an author abound in beauties, let his blemiſhes be forgotten. If he give proof of good intention, and diſcover genius in any department of art or of ſcience, he is entitled to honour. But when he falls continually

into the ſame ſort of fault, and perſiſts in an undertaking which he is unable to execute, he juſtly incurs the cenſure of criticiſm *.

It muſt alſo be remarked, that we ought not to expect, from any performance, a higher degree, or more varieties, of pleaſure, than the author intended. Poets, who never attempt great things, may yet excel in elegy and paſtoral, and other inferiour branches of the art; and nobody blames Theocritus or Tibullus, becauſe they poſſeſs not the ſublimity of Homer: nay, they would have been really blameable, if they had endeavoured to introduce ſublimity into poems that do not admit of it. Every work ſhould be good in its kind; but every kind of work has a ſort of goodneſs peculiar to itſelf.

Beſides: though it is the aim of all the fine arts to give pleaſure, by gratifying theſe Secondary Senſes, it ought no leſs to be the aim of the artiſt, to promote the love of virtue; which may be done, by diſplaying the deformity of moral evil, as well as by painting the charms of moral goodneſs. And therefore, in Satire, and in ſuch other writings, as are intended to move our indignation at vice, offenſive images may be allowable. For though in themſelves they could not give pleaſure, they may yet be approved of, as evidences of good meaning in the author, and as tending to cheriſh good affections in the reader: even as harſh potions may warrantably be adminiſtered, and painful operations of ſurgery performed, in order to expel diſeaſe from the body. Yet, as we blame the phyſician, who gives more pain to his patient than is neceſſary; we muſt alſo blame the ſatiriſt, who, without obſerving any rule of moderation in this matter, introduces ideas, that are either too indelicate to be uſed on any occaſion, or leſs delicate than the occaſion requires. Flattery and witticiſm, bandied about from

* Hor. Ar. Poet. verſ. 347—360.

one

one courtier to another, are objects of ſatire, no doubt; but, ſurely, do not amount to a crime ſo very atrocious, as Pope would inſinuate, when he vents his abhorrence of them in the filthieſt alluſion that ever was written: an alluſion, which decency forbids me to tranſcribe, and of which the author himſelf ſuppoſes his friend to ſay—

This filthy ſimilie, this beaſtly line,
Quite turns my ſtomach.—

Moſt of our powers of perception are capable of improvement. The ſmell of a perfumer; the touch of a poliſher; the ſight of a painter, who ſtudies the exact viſible appearances of things; and the hearing of a blind man, who muſt often truſt to his ear for his preſervation; are generally more acute, than the ſame ſenſes in other men: becauſe they are more exerciſed, and the informations received by them more carefully attended to. A deviation from the ſquare or the perpendicular is ſooner perceived by the architect, or joiner, than by an ordinary eye. Painters, in like manner, improve their ideas of ſublimity, beauty, and elegant imitation, by ſtudying the moſt admired pictures, and the beſt monuments of antient art. And every muſician knows, that, by the practice of muſick, our ſenſe of harmony may be improved to a degree, which can hardly be conceived by thoſe, who never cultivated that faculty. Delicacy of taſte, in regard to wit and humour, is acquired by the ſame means. The vulgar are delighted with homely jokes, becauſe they know no better: but one, who is accuſtomed to elegant converſation, and to the ſtyle of polite authors, will ſoon learn to diſtinguiſh between urbanity and ruſticity, and undervalue that coarſe buffoonery, to which, with leſs experience, he would perhaps have had no diſlike *.

* Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick. Part i. chap. 3. Eſſay on Laughter, chap. 4.

The Secondary Senſes are therefore to be improved by the ſtudy of nature, and of the beſt performances in art; and by keeping at a diſtance from every thing, in art, or in manners, that is inelegant, or indecent.

IV. A fourth requiſite to good taſte is Sympathy; or that Senſibility of heart, by which, on ſuppoſing ourſelves in the condition of another, we are conſcious in ſome degree of thoſe very emotions, pleaſant or painful, which in a more intenſe degree would ariſe within us, if we were really in that condition.

Human pleaſures may be divided into thoſe of the body, and thoſe of the ſoul: the former common to us with the brutes; the latter peculiar to rational beings. Thoſe are of ſhort duration; theſe more permanent. By the firſt, an appetite may be gratified; but it is by the laſt only that we can be made happy.

The fine arts are intended to give pleaſure rather to the mind, than to the bodily ſenſes. For though ſounds in muſick pleaſe the ear, and colours in painting the eye, they are little valued, if the ſoul receive no gratification. Now the human ſoul cannot be gratified, except by thoſe things that raiſe in it certain paſſions or emotions: for a man unſuſceptible of paſſion, who could neither hope nor fear, rejoice nor be ſorry, deſire nor diſlike, would be incapable of happineſs. And therefore, it muſt be the aim of all the fine arts, and of poetry in particular, to convey into the mind ſuch paſſions, or affections, as bring pleaſure along with them.

Tragedy gives pleaſure, by infuſing pity and imaginary terror, and other elevated emotions: and Comedy, by diſplaying the follies of mankind in ſuch a light as to provoke contempt and laughter. The Epick poem, like Tragedy, operates upon our ſublimer affections; and inſpires admiration of what is great, joy in the proſperity of the good, a tender ſorrow for the unfortunate; and an agreeable agitation of mind, produced by the viciſſitudes of hope

and

and fear, as they are called forth by the circumſtances of the ſtory. True Satire pleaſes, while it promotes the love of virtue and wiſdom; and this it may do, by expoſing the crimes of mankind to our indignation, or their follies to ridicule. Lyrick poetry is applicable to a variety of matters, and gives ſcope to many paſſions: and theſe, by a pleaſing extravagance in the choice of words and figures, and a peculiar wildneſs in the compoſition and harmony, it endeavours to work up to enthuſiaſm. Even when it paints inanimate nature, Poetry is little eſteemed, unleſs it touch the heart: and an author of ſenſibility knows, how to ſelect thoſe appearances that are moſt likely to captivate a reader's fancy, and lead his mind to ſuch thoughts, as may awaken benevolence, piety, contentment, tenderneſs, admiration, ſurpriſe, and other pleaſurable emotions *.

In a word, every thing in poetry ought to be pathetick; that is, capable of moving the paſſions; not merely ſuch as are melancholy and tender, but our affections in general. So that, if the reader want that gentleneſs of mind, which I have elſewhere deſcribed under the name of Sympathy †, it will be impoſſible for him to receive any true pleaſure from a good poem; however ſkilled he may be in language and verſification, and however well acquainted with the ordinary appearances of nature.

And yet, a defect of this ſenſibility is not uncommon among the readers of poetry. One is wholly engroſſed with the contrivance of the fable; another values nothing but the moral ſentiments; a third attends chiefly to the ſtyle, and the numbers: I have heard of one, whoſe ſole pleaſure in reading Virgil aroſe from comparing Eneas's voyage with the map; and of another, who could find nothing worth notice in the Georgick, but ſome precepts of agriculture. But the true poet touches the heart, whatever be his

* Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick. Part i. chap. 3. † Ibid. chap. 7.

ſubject:

ſubject: and the true critick has a heart capable of being touched, with admiration, tenderneſs, joy, benevolence, piety, patriotiſm, or any other emotion that the author means to inſpire; and of feeling the full effect of his harmony, and of thoſe beautiful or ſublime ideas that may adorn his compoſition.

V. The laſt thing mentioned as neceſſary to form good taſte, is Judgment, or Good Senſe; which is indeed the principal thing; and which ſome would conſider, as comprehending moſt of the foregoing particulars. By Judgment, I here underſtand ſuch a conſtitution of mind, as diſpoſes a man to attend to the reality of things, and qualifies him for knowing and diſcovering the truth. It is by means of this faculty, as applied in criticiſm, that we compare poetical imitations with natural objects, ſo as to perceive in what they reſemble, and in what they differ; that we eſtimate the rectitude of ſentiments, the probability of incidents, and whether fictitious characters be ſimilar to thoſe of real life and conſiſtent with themſelves, and whether any *part* of a compoſition be unſuitable to the tendency of the whole. Hence too we diſcern, with reſpect to the plan of a work, whether it be ſimple and natural, or confuſed and unnatural; and whether the author have been careful to make it, both in the general arrangement, and in the ſtructure of each part, conformable to rule.

Leſt this ſhould be miſunderſtood, I muſt repeat an obſervation, which I have elſewhere had occaſion to make; that, in almoſt every art, two ſorts of rules have obtained authority; the Eſſential, and the Ornamental. The former reſult from the very nature of the work, and are neceſſary to the accompliſhment of the end propoſed by the artiſt. The latter depend rather upon eſtabliſhed cuſtom, than upon nature; and claim no higher origin, than the practice of ſome great performer, whom it has become the faſhion to imitate. To violate an *eſſential* rule, diſcovers want of ſenſe

in an author, and conſequently want of taſte: for where ſenſe is not, taſte cannot be. To depart from an *ornamental* or mechanical rule, may be conſiſtent with the ſoundeſt judgment, and is ſometimes a proof both of good taſte and of great genius.

Great wits ſometimes may glorioufly offend,
And riſe to faults true criticks dare not mend:—
—From vulgar bounds with brave diſorder part,
And ſnatch a grace beyond the reach of art.

I am the more anxious to mark, and to dwell on this diſtinction, becauſe the French criticks * in general ſeem to have no notion of it. What is contrary to eſtabliſhed rule, or to faſhion, they condemn as contrary to taſte, without enquiring further. The conſequence is, that, according to them, French authors only can write in taſte, becauſe no other authors write in the French faſhion: and Shakeſpeare's plays muſt be abſurd farces, and their author a barbarian, becauſe they happen to be framed, upon a plan, and in a ſtyle, which the criticks of Paris have never acknowleged to be good. Criticiſm has been thought an entertaining, and uſeful part, of the philoſophy of mind: but, upon this principle, is as much beyond the reach, or below the notice, of rational inquiry, as modes of hair-dreſſing, or patterns of ſhoe-buckles.

The following are ſome of the eſſential rules of compoſition, which muſt not be violated on any account.

1. In Philoſophy and Hiſtory, the ſtricteſt regard is to be had to truth, in the detail of facts; and the inferences are to be made according to common ſenſe, and the rules of ſound reaſoning.

* I ſhould have ſaid, the French Criticks of the preſent age. Few nations have produced more learned men than France. I ſpeak here, not of the Stevens, the Daciers, the Rollins, the Fenelons; but of thoſe writers, who have learned from Voltaire to cenſure becauſe they envy, and ſo criticize what they do not underſtand.

2. In

2. In works of fiction, a like regard is to be had to probability; and no events are to be introduced, but ſuch as, according to the general opinion of the people to whom they are addreſſed, may be ſuppoſed to happen.

3. Fictitious characters ought to ſpeak and act ſuitably to their ſuppoſed condition, age, rank, and other circumſtances; and to the paſſions, and ſentiments, that are ſaid to occupy their minds.

4. External objects are to be deſcribed, both in hiſtory, and in poetry, as they are found to be in nature. The poet, however, is not obliged to enumerate all their qualities, but thoſe only that are neceſſary for his purpoſe.

5. An author's ſtyle muſt always be perſpicuous, and fit to convey a full view of his meaning to an attentive reader; and ſo contrived, as not to hurt, but to pleaſe the ear, when it is pronounced. But in every ſort of ſtyle, the ſame degree of perſpicuity, or of harmony, is not to be expected.

6. Every compoſition, whether long or ſhort, from an Epick poem or Tragedy, down to a ſermon or ſhort eſſay, ought to have ſome one end in view; and all its parts muſt be ſo diſpoſed, as to promote that end. If it have no end, it has no meaning; if more ends than one, it may confound the attention by its multiplicity: if any of its parts be unſerviceable, or repugnant to its final purpoſe, they are ſuperfluous or irregular, and ought to have been lopped off, or corrected. Of this unity of deſign, Homer's two poems are perfect models. Each contains a great variety of action, converſation, and adventure: but every thing, in the one, tends to the re-eſtabliſhment of Ulyſſes in his kingdom, and, in the other, to diſplay the anger of Achilles, and its lamentable conſequences.

7. Every compoſition ought to have a moral tendency, or at leaſt to be innocent. That mind is perverted, which can either

produce an immoral book, or be pleaſed with one. Virtue and good taſte are ſo nearly allied, that what offends the former can never gratify the latter.

8. As, in every nation, certain cuſtoms of long ſtanding acquire in time the authority of law; ſo, in every art, there are rules, which, though one might have called them diſcretionary or indifferent at their firſt introduction, come at length, after having been invariably obſerved by the beſt authors, to be conſidered as eſſential. One example will explain this. Homer, who invented, or at leaſt who perfected, Epick poetry, adopted in both his poems that meaſure of verſe which is called Hexameter. That *he* might without blame have adopted another, will hardly be queſtioned. His choice therefore was arbitrary. But, as it was a lucky choice; and as the practice of Homer became, in this reſpect, a law to the poets of antiquity; the hexameter is now, and was in the time of Horace *, and probably long before, held to be indiſpenſable in all Greek and Latin poems of the Epick kind.—For the ſame reaſon, partly; and partly, as Ariſtotle obſerves, becauſe it is too elaborate, and unlike the cadence of converſation, Hexameter verſe would not be tolerated in the Greek or Latin drama; the Iambick, Trochaick, and Anapeſtick meaſures, having been adopted, by the beſt authors, in the antient tragedy and comedy. And, in like manner, if an Engliſh author, in an Epick or Dramatick poem, were to attempt any other form of verſe, than our Iambick of five feet, he would be thought to tranſgreſs a rule, which, though at firſt a matter of indifference, is now, after having been eſtabliſhed by the practice of Chaucer, Spencer, Shakeſpeare, Milton, and all our great poets, become eſſential and unalterable.

I ſhall now give an inſtance or two, of the ornamental or mechanical laws of compoſition.

* Hor. Ar. Poet. verſ. 73.

1. That a regular tragedy, or comedy, ſhould conſiſt of five acts, and neither more nor fewer, is a rule, for which it would be difficult to aſſign any better reaſon than this, that it has been followed by good authors, and is recommended by Horace. Nor has this rule been invariably followed. The Italian Opera, which, as reformed by Metaſtaſio, is a moſt beautiful ſpecies of Dramatick poem, conſiſts of but three acts: and we have, in Engliſh, many good plays, both ſerious and comical, divided in the ſame manner; and ſome of only two acts, and ſome even of one. It is true, that a dramatick piece ought not to be too long, becauſe it would fatigue the ſpectator as well as the actor; nor too ſhort, becauſe it would not be ſufficiently intereſting: it is reaſonable too, that ſome intervals ſhould be allowed in the repreſentation, for the relief both of the players, and of the audience: but that this purpoſe could not be anſwered by five intervals, or three, as well as by four, is a point, which I apprehend it would be difficult to prove.

2. Moſt of the French and Greek tragedians obſerve *the unities of time and place:* that is, they ſuppoſe every part of the action to have happened in the ſame place, becauſe it is all repreſented on the ſame ſtage; and they limit the time of it to a few hours, becauſe the repreſentation is of no longer continuance. Unity of place is violated, when the ſcene changes from one place to another, from a houſe to the ſtreet, from the town to the country, or from one town or country to another. Unity of time is broken through, when the incidents of the fable are ſuch, as could not have fallen out within a few hours, or at leaſt within the ſpace of one day and one night.

The obſervance of theſe unities may in ſome caſes, no doubt, heighten the probability of the action: but they lay a mighty reſtraint upon an author's genius; and they may give riſe to improbabilities as great as any of thoſe that can be occaſioned by the

neglect of them. If the ſubject of the play be a conſpiracy, for example, and the ſcene of action the ſtreet; then, if unity of place be held eſſential, the conſpirators muſt conduct their affairs in the ſtreet, ſo as to be ſeen and heard by every body: a very unlikely circumſtance, and what, one may venture to ſay, can never happen. Surely, moſt audiences would be better pleaſed, and think the whole more natural, if, on ſuch an emergency, the ſcene were to change from the ſtreet to a private apartment.

The improbabilities, occaſioned by diſregarding theſe unities, are not ſo great as ſome people imagine. While we ſit in the theatre, it is as eaſy for us to reconcile our minds to the ſhifting of the ſcene, from the town to the country, or from one country to another; as it is, at our entrance, to ſuppoſe the ſtage a certain place in Rome or Egypt. And, if we can perſuade ourſelves, that the player, whom we ſee, and whoſe name and perſon we know, has on a ſudden become Cato, or Ceſar, or any other antient hero; we may as well believe, that the evening which we paſs in the playhouſe comprehends the ſpace of ſeveral days or years.

But in fact, there is not, in dramatical repreſentation, that ſtrict probability which the criticks talk of. We never miſtake the actor for the perſon whoſe character he bears; we never imagine ourſelves in a foreign country, or carried back into the ages of antiquity: our pleaſure is derived from other ſources; and from this chiefly, that we know the whole to be a fiction.—The unities of time and place are violated by Shakeſpeare, in every one of his plays. He often ſhifts the ſcene from one country to another: and the time of his action is not always limited to days or weeks, but extends frequently to months, and even to years. Yet theſe irregularities are not offenſive to thoſe who underſtand him. And hence, I think, we may infer, that the rule, which enjoins the

dramatick poet to a rigid obſervance of the unities of time and place, is not an eſſential, but a mechanical rule of compoſition. *

As to the improvement of taſte in this particular;—I ſhall only remark, that whatever tends to correct, and methodiſe, our knowledge, either of men, or of things, is to be conſidered as a means of improving the judgment. Hiſtory, geometry, and grammar; and thoſe parts of philoſophy, which convey clear ideas, and are attended with ſatisfactory proof, are eminently uſeful in this reſpect;—to which muſt be added ſuch an acquaintance with life and manners, as fits a man for buſineſs and converſation. Idleneſs, and habits of ſuperficial ſtudy, are ruinous to the underſtanding; as I have often remarked already, but can hardly repeat too often. And nothing is more detrimental to taſte, and to judgment, than thoſe ſubtleties of antient and modern metaphyſicks, that encourage verbal controverſy, and lead to nothing but doubt and darkneſs. They exhauſt the vigour of the mind to no purpoſe; they extinguiſh the love of good learning; they withdraw the attention from the concerns of human life, and from thoſe things in art and nature, that warm the heart, and elevate the fancy: they pervert the rational powers, they corrupt good principles, and they poiſon the ſources of human happineſs.

Taſte, as far as it depends on the knowledge of rules, may be further improved, by reading good books of criticiſm, and comparing them with the authors whom they illuſtrate. Sound judgement, however, we muſt acknowledge to be in a great meaſure conſtitutional: and no perſon will ever acquire true taſte, unleſs nature has made him a man of ſenſe.

So much for *taſte in general*, and its improvement. It is ſcarce neceſſary to add, becauſe the thing is obvious, that, in order to be

* See Johnſon's Preface to Shakſpeare; and Calſabigi's *Diſſertazione ſu le Poeſie Drammatiche del S. A. P. Metaſtaſio.*

completely ſkilled in any of thoſe *particular* branches of art, which are ſubject to the cognizance of this faculty, one muſt unite theory with practice. None but a painter is a competent judge of painting: no perſon who has never compoſed in proſe or verſe, can be an unexceptionable critick in language and verſification: and he who is truly a muſical connoiſſeur muſt have practiſed as a muſician, and ſtudied the laws of harmony. In every art, certain materials and inſtruments are employed; and they only, who have handled them, are entitled to decide upon the dexterity of the artiſt.

Yet, without having been a practitioner, one may acquire ſuch taſte in the fine arts, as ſhall yield a high degree, and a great variety, of entertainment. The pleaſures of taſte are worthy of our ambition: they are innocent and profitable. He, who employs his leiſure in the ſtudy of nature and art, is eſteemed on that very account; and has many ſorts of liberal recreation in his power, which are unknown to thoſe who devote themſelves to ſenſuality, or the purſuit of riches.

But Taſte has a further uſe: it is friendly to virtue *. Nay, I might, and perhaps I ought to have mentioned the love of virtue as

* An artiſt of the higheſt eminence, has ſet this matter in a light ſo ſtriking and ſo beautiful, that I ſhall be excuſed for tranſcribing the paſſage entire. The reader would not thank me, if I were to attempt an abridgement of it.

" Every eſtabliſhment that tends to the cultivation of the pleaſures of the mind, as " diſtinct from thoſe of ſenſe, may be conſidered as an inferiour ſchool of morality, " where the mind is poliſhed and prepared for higher attainments.

" Let us for a moment take a ſhort ſurvey of the progreſs of the mind towards what " is, or ought to be, its true object of attention. Man, in his loweſt ſtate, has no " pleaſures but thoſe of ſenſe, and no wants but thoſe of appetite. Afterwards, when " ſociety is divided into different ranks, and ſome are appointed to labour for the " ſupport of others, thoſe whom their ſuperiority ſets free from labour begin to look for " intellectual entertainments. Thus, whilſt the ſhepherds were attending their flocks, " their maſters made the firſt obſervations on aſtronomy: ſo muſick is ſaid to have had " its origin from a man at leiſure liſtening to the ſtrokes of a hammer.

" As

as eſſential to it. Men of genius have too often employed their talents in corrupting and deſtroying mankind; but it may be queſtioned, whether a wicked heart be at all compatible with delicate taſte. This will at leaſt ſerve as a ſecurity againſt thoſe vices that debaſe

" As the ſenſes, in the loweſt ſtate of nature, are neceſſary to direct us to our ſup-
" port, when that ſupport is once ſecure, there is danger in following them further.
" To him who has no rule of action but the gratification of the ſenſes, plenty is always
" dangerous. It is therefore neceſſary to the happineſs of individuals, and ſtill more
" neceſſary to the ſecurity of ſociety, that the mind ſhould be elevated to the idea of
" general beauty, and the contemplation of general truth. By this purſuit the mind is
" always carried forward in ſearch of ſomething more excellent than it finds, and
" obtains its proper ſuperiority over the common ſenſes of life; by learning to feel
" itſelf capable of higher aims, and of nobler enjoyments. In this gradual exaltation
" of human nature, every art contributes its contingent towards the general ſupply of
" mental pleaſure. Whatever abſtracts the thoughts from ſenſual gratifications; what-
" ever teaches us to look for happineſs within ourſelves, muſt advance in ſome meaſure
" the dignity of our nature.

" Perhaps there is no higher proof of the excellency of man than this, that to a mind
" properly cultivated whatever is bounded is little. The mind is continually labouring
" to advance, ſtep by ſtep, through ſucceſſive gradations of excellence, towards perfec-
" tion; which is dimly ſeen, at a great, though not hopeleſs, diſtance; and which we
" muſt always follow, becauſe we never can attain: but the purſuit rewards itſelf; one
" truth teaches another; and our ſtore is always increaſing, though nature can never
" be exhauſted. Our art, like all arts which addreſs the imagination, is applied to
" ſomewhat a lower faculty of the mind, which approaches nearer to ſenſuality: but
" through ſenſe and fancy it muſt make its way to reaſon; for ſuch is the progreſs of
" thought, that we perceive by ſenſe, we combine by fancy, and diſtinguiſh by reaſon;
" and, without carrying our art out of its natural and true character, the more we
" purify it from every thing that is groſs in ſenſe, in that proportion we advance its uſe
" and dignity; and, in proportion as we lower it to mere ſenſuality, we pervert its
" nature, and degrade it from the rank of a liberal art: and this is what every artiſt
" ought well to remember. Let him remember alſo, that he deſerves juſt ſo much
" encouragement in the ſtate, as he makes himſelf a member of it virtuouſly uſeful,
" and contributes in his ſphere to the general purpoſe and perfection of ſociety.

" The art which we profeſs has Beauty for its object. This it is our buſineſs to
" diſcover and to expreſs. But the Beauty of which we are in queſt is general and
" intellectual. It is an idea that ſubſiſts only in the mind: the ſight never beheld it,

" nor

debaſe the ſoul; and, by directing our views to the obſervation of nature, muſt frequently lead us to contemplate that Great Being, who is the ſource of happineſs, and the ſtandard of perfection.

It has been ſaid by ſome, that Taſte is wholly capricious; depending, not upon nature or reaſon, but upon faſhion, and the fancies of men. And it is true, that the likings men contract to certain modes of dreſs and furniture are partly determined by cuſtom, are different in different countries, and in one and the ſame country are perpetually changing. And that there ſhould be diverſities of taſte in regard to Beauty, has been ſhown to be natural: ſince in our own ſpecies, as well as in other things, that will always be the moſt agreeable, which brings along with it the moſt agreeable ideas; and ſupplies, or is connected with, the greateſt variety of comforts and pleaſures.

Yet in beauty we have ſeen that there is, and, in all things that admit the diſtinction of Better and Worſe, we may affirm that there is, a ſtandard of excellence; and Taſte, as oppoſed to Caprice, has a real foundation in nature. To be pleaſed with novelty and imitation; to prefer good pictures to bad, harmony to harſhneſs, and regular ſhape to diſtortion: to be gratified with accurate repreſen-

" nor has the hand expreſſed it. It is an idea reſiding in the breaſt of the artiſt, which " he is always labouring to impart, and which he dies at laſt without imparting: but " which he is yet ſo far able to communicate, as to raiſe the thoughts and extend the " views of the ſpectator; and which, by a ſucceſſion of art, may be ſo far diffuſed, " that its effects may extend themſelves imperceptibly into publick benefits, and be " among the means of beſtowing on whole nations refinement of taſte: which, if it " does not lead directly to purity of manners, obviates at leaſt their greateſt deprava- " tion, by diſentangling the mind from appetite, and conducting the thoughts " through ſucceſſive ſtages of excellence, till that contemplation of univerſal rectitude " and harmony, which began by Taſte, may, as it is exalted and refined, conclude " in Virtue."

Sir Joſhua Reynolds. Diſcourſe at the Opening of the Royal Academy, October 16, 1780.

tations

tations of human manners, eſpecially in that ſtate of primitive ſimplicity, in which they give a full diſplay of the character: to be intereſted in a detail of human adventures: to look with delight on the ſun, moon, and ſtars, the expanſe of heaven, grand and regular buildings, huge rocks and cataracts, the ſcenery of groves and rivers, mountains and the ocean, the flowers and verdure of ſummer, and the pure ſplendour of winter ſnow:—is ſurely natural to every reaſonable being, who has leiſure to attend to theſe things, and is in any degree enlightened by learning or by contemplation. For this laſt clauſe muſt never be omitted; becauſe, as I formerly obſerved, we cannot perceive at all without percipient faculties, nor accurately without improved faculties. *

If it be denied, that theſe, and the like appearances in art and nature, have any intrinſick charm; for that other habits of education might have made us look upon them with indifference, or with diſguſt: I ſhall only aſk, whence it comes, that the poems of every age and nation, which were certainly made for the purpoſe of pleaſing, ſhould abound in deſcriptions of theſe and the like objects; and why the fine arts have always been a matter of general attention in all civilized countries.

Truth is allowed to be uniform and unchangeable: yet what can be more abſurd, than many of thoſe opinions are, which have paſſed in the world for true! Was not the philoſophy of Des Cartes admired, long after that of Newton was made publick? nay, in ſome parts of Europe, is not the former ſtill conſidered as the true ſyſtem? The exiſtence of matter has been denied by one ſet of philoſophers; that of motion, by another; that of ſpirit by a third; and that of every thing, by a fourth. How many theories of human nature have appeared, and diſappeared, within

* See above, page 141.

theſe

theſe hundred years! What endleſs varieties of opinion among lawyers, and divines, phyſicians, and moraliſts! Nay, have we not ſeen, even in our days, the greateſt of all intellectual depravities, a depravity whereof the devil himſelf is not capable, I mean atheiſm, patroniſed by ſome vain and worthleſs beings of the human form! Yet it will not be ſaid, by any intelligent creature, that theological, philoſophical, and moral truths are all deſtitute of foundation, or depend wholly upon faſhion, and the fancies of men.

If, then, in regard to matters that admit of clear proof, ignorance, affectation, and error may prevail for a time among thoſe, from whom better things might be expected; need we wonder, that bad taſte ſhould ſometimes prevail; and Blackmore be preferred to Milton, Lucan to Virgil, and Pliny to Cicero?—But, whatever temporary infatuations may take place in the world of literature; ſimplicity and true taſte ſooner or later gain the aſcendant, and prove their rectitude by their permanency. To the general ſuffrage of mankind if we were to oppoſe the cavils of Zoilus, Bavius, and Mevius, would Homer and Virgil loſe any of their reputation? No. They were thought the greateſt of poets two thouſand years ago: they are thought ſo ſtill, by all who underſtand them: nor can we conceive it poſſible, while nature remains unaltered, that the time will ever come, when they ſhall be conſidered as bad, or even as indifferent writers.

CHAP. V.

The ſubject of Imagination reſumed. Some directions for the Regulation of it.

IT was formerly remarked, that upon aſſociations formed by accident, and eſtabliſhed by cuſtom, many of the pains and pleaſures of life depend. It may now be affirmed, in more comprehenſive terms, that our happineſs is peculiarly affected by whatever affects Imagination; and that, therefore, the right government of this faculty muſt be a matter of the greateſt importance to all men. Some rules were propoſed, for preventing thoſe perverſe aſſociations, that diſturb the tranquillity of mankind, by making them ſuperſtitious in regard to dreams, omens, ghoſts, and the like. I ſhall now offer a few directions of a more general nature, which may be of uſe for the further regulation of this capricious faculty.

The Imagination ſtands moſt in need of reſtraint, when it runs into one or other of the oppoſite extremes of *Levity* and *Melancholy*. The firſt is incident to youth; the ſecond, to manhood and old age. The latter is more fatal to happineſs than the former; but both are attended with much evil.

I. Thoſe minds, which are moſt in danger from Levity of imagination, are of a joyous or ſanguine temperature, with a great ſhare of vanity, and apt on all occaſions to amuſe themſelves with the hope of ſucceſs, and of higher felicity, than men have reaſon to look for in this world. They are the dupes of the flatterer; and miſinterpret common civilities for compliments paid to their

ſuperiour merit. Hiſtory, philoſophy, and ſimple nature ſuit not their taſte: but thoſe romances they greedily devour, which contain deluſive pictures of happineſs, or incredible exaggerations of calamity. They form a thouſand ſchemes of conduct, few of which can be reduced to practice; and look down with contempt on thoſe plodding mortals, who, having only good ſenſe to guide them, and diſclaiming all extravagant hopes, aim at nothing beyond the common purſuits of life.

As a perſon of this character is generally happy, at leaſt for a time, in his own folly, it may ſeem impertinent to endeavour to lay before him leſſons of wiſdom. For theſe, if they have any good effect at all, muſt depreciate him in his own eyes, and ſo deprive him of many an exquiſite gratification. Yet, when it is conſidered, that ſuch levity ſeldom fails, ſooner or later, to make him contemptible; expoſes him to diſappointments, the more ſevere, becauſe unforeſeen; diſſipates, in an endleſs variety of idle ſchemes, thoſe talents which, if properly directed, might have been of uſe; and often, by cheriſhing pride, betrays him into ſuch behaviour towards others, as may juſtly provoke their diſlike:—when, I ſay, we conſider, that theſe and other evils may flow from this levity, it will be thought, not cruelty, but kindneſs, to propoſe a cure for it.

The cure may be preſumed to be in ſome forwardneſs, when you have inſtilled into the patient a love of nature, and of truth. With this view, let him ſtudy geometry, and hiſtory, and thoſe parts and ſyſtems of philoſophy, which recommend benevolence, and a lowly mind, and lead to the obſervation of life and manners. Flatterers and romances muſt be baniſhed for ever; or, if any of the laſt are to be tolerated, let them be ſuch, as paint the purſuits and fortunes of mankind with ſimplicity and truth, and have no tendency to inflame appetite, or encourage wild expectation. The

importance of mechanick arts to the publick weal; and how reſpectable even in the loweſt rank are honeſty and induſtry; and what wretchedneſs muſt ever attend the efforts of fantaſtick ambition; are topicks, that cannot be too earneſtly inculcated.

It will be a lucky circumſtance, if he often fall into the company of thoſe, who are wiſer than himſelf: for, in this caſe, if he be not entirely blinded by ſelf-conceit, he muſt form compariſons, which will at once mortify his vanity, and teach him to have a due reſpect for other men. But, if he keep aloof from ſuch companions, and prefer the ſociety of his inferiours and admirers, (which is a common ſymptom of that mental diſeaſe whereof I ſpeak) there is ſcarce any hope of his amendment; his admiration of himſelf, and contempt for the reſt of the world, will harden into ſuch a habit, as adverſity itſelf will ſcarce have power to unſettle. Adverſity is indeed a ſevere monitor: but no other is ſo effectual in promoting that knowledge of one's ſelf, which is the parent of humility; or that fellow-feeling of the infirmities of other men, which melts the heart into forbearance and goodwill, and reſtrains the ſallies of intemperate paſſion, and the flights of unruly fancy.

The habit of turning every thing into joke and ridicule, is another dangerous levity of imagination. It is ſo far allied to the former, as to derive its origin from vanity; for no man will perſiſt in it, who has not a very high opinion of his own talents.

Cicero well obſerves, that "man ſeems to have been deſtined "rather for ſerious than for ludicrous purpoſes. Sport, ſays he, "and jocularity are indeed allowable, like ſleep, and other relaxa-"tions; but it is only after we have diſcharged our duty in matters "of importance." * Wit and humour, when natural, are entertaining and uſeful: they enliven converſation, and endear human

* De Off. lib. i. cap. 29.

creatures

creatures to one another; and are often of ſingular advantage in diſcountenancing vice and folly: and he who has a genius in this way needs not take pains to ſhow it, for it will break out of its own accord. But they, who are continually aiming at wit, and think by ſo doing to render themſelves acceptable to every company, little know, how often their pleaſantry gives offence; and that the ſmile, which they look for, and perhaps obtain, is more frequently owing to complaiſance, than to approbation. In fact, nothing is more teaſing than impertinent jocularity: and few artifices are ſooner detected, or more heartily deſpiſed, than theirs are, who endeavour to paſs upon us for natural, that wit, which is the effect of recollection and ſtudy.

A parody of a ſhort poem is often amuſing: but one's mind muſt be in ſome degree perverted, before one can, without general diſſatisfaction, and frequent fits of diſguſt, go through the whole of Scarron's, or even the two books of Cotton's, *Virgil Traveſti*. And the impreſſion that ſuch things, when long continued, leave on the mind, is by no means deſirable. To ſee wit miſemployed, and what is ſublime, or inſtructive, degraded and miſrepreſented, not in a ſlight effort of gaiety, but with perſeverance and toil, ſuggeſts the idea, rather of malice, than of playfulneſs. It might raiſe a good-humoured ſmile, to clap a hat and wig, for a moment, on the buſt of Socrates or Cicero: but if a ſtatuary were to labour a year, in preparing ſuch implements of marble, with a view to fix them on thoſe venerable brows, we ſhould hardly pay any compliment either to his heart, or to his fancy.—Beſides, parodies, when far proſecuted, are never free from indecency: and if he, who at any time aſſumes the character of a buffoon, does not ſpeedily lay it aſide, his conduct is in danger of becoming immoral, as well as incongruous.

Another

Another evil, reſulting, as a natural conſequence, from this levity of mind, is the profanation of things ſacred. The habitual joker ſpares nothing. The phraſeology of Scripture, and the doctrines of religion, ſerve him occaſionally as funds of merriment: which not only depraves his own mind, and both intoxicates and poiſons imagination; but alſo makes his pleaſantry a nuiſance to the wiſe, and a ſnare to the ſimple.—But of the danger of connecting ludicrous ideas with ſolemn truths, I have already ſpoken more than once.

He who underſtood, better than any other writer, the nature and province of true humour, is Addiſon. Let thoſe, therefore, who wiſh to be fully inſtructed in this matter, ſtudy him; and learn the theory from his practice. In his mirth, there is nothing profane or impertinent. He is perfectly ſerious, where he ought to be ſo: and his ſmiles, like thoſe of innocence, though irreſiſtably captivating, are ever inoffenſive. He is not, ſome think, a profound philoſopher; for he is always clear and harmonious, rational, manly, and intereſting. But if writing be good, in proportion as it is uſeful; and if its nobleſt uſe be, to improve the heart, refine the taſte, and ſweeten the temper, Addiſon is of all uninſpired authors, at leaſt in proſe, the beſt, and the moſt delightful.

II. A *gloomy* Imagination, when it grows unmanageable, is a dreadful calamity indeed. In this forlorn condition, a man not only feels the extremes of anxiety and fear, but is apt to fancy, that his conſcience, and every power of heaven and earth, are combined againſt him. Folly is a weakneſs of underſtanding: but this kind of phrenſy, which miſtakes its own ideas for realities, has oft been the lamentable portion of thoſe, who, in the common affairs of life, and indeed on every topick, except that which diſcompoſed them, could ſpeak and think with propriety.

Rational

Rational remonſtrance, oppoſed to this malady, has rarely any good effect. The diſordered fancy of the unhappy ſufferer makes him adopt abſurd principles; which, however, as he thinks them warranted by the evidence of ſenſe or memory, it is not in the power of argument to remove:—while his reaſoning faculties are often wonderfully acute. Beſides, his nervous ſyſtem, too ſenſible already, is by ſuch oppoſition irritated more and more: and any ſuperiority, which he may think he has gained in the diſpute, ſerves only to confirm his notions, and perpetuate his diſeaſe.

This calamity is then the moſt deplorable, when it is connected with religious terror. If the patient apprehend injury, or think he has received any, from his fellow-creatures, indignation will give vigour to his mind; and he may now and then derive a gloomy pleaſure from the contemplation of his own innocence, and of that ſagacity, wherewith he fondly imagines that he ſhall diſappoint, and avenge himſelf of, the adverſary. But if the ſtate of his mind be ſuch, as leads him to fear the worſt evils both here and hereafter, all conſolation is at an end; and the night of deſpair cloſes round him on every ſide.

The cure of this diſtemper, as it affects both ſoul and body, belongs equally to the phyſician and to the moraliſt; who preſcribe medicine and exerciſe, to remove obſtructions and evil humours from the corporeal part; and a hurry of buſineſs or amuſement, to force the mind to exert itſelf in a new direction. But this, like many other maladies, it is more eaſy to prevent, than to cure. Let me, therefore, recommend the following preventives, for regulating, not our fancy only, but our paſſions, and moral nature in general. For the paſſions and imagination mutually affect each other; and the ſame rules will ſerve for the government of both.

First,

First. Let our general courſe of life be active, ſocial, and temperate. Indolence and ſolitude ſound prettily in paſtoral poems; but we were made for fellowſhip, and labour: and if we give ourſelves up to idleneſs, or abandon the ſociety of our fellow-creatures, our lives will be unnatural, and therefore unhappy. Nothing gives ſo pleaſing a variety to life, as Action; and nothing ſo effectually diſſipates painful thoughts, as the countenance and converſation of a friend. Nor with our friends only ſhould we aſſociate: the company of ſtrangers may be of ſingular uſe, in ſweetening our tempers, and refining our manners. For this requires a more than ordinary attention to all the civilities of ſocial intercourſe; it forces the mind into new exertions, which prevent that ſtagnation of the faculties, whereby the fancy is corrupted; it amuſes, by offering to our notice a variety of new characters and incidents; and, if we ſtudy to make ourſelves agreeable, which is nothing more than our duty, it is beneficial to our worldly intereſt, by extending our acquaintance and influence. — The fruits of Sobriety are health, gladneſs, governable paſſions, clear diſcernment, rectitude of opinion, the eſteem of others, and long life; which, with an approving conſcience, are the greateſt bleſſings here below, and, in all common caſes, an effectual ſecurity againſt a diſeaſed imagination.

Secondly. Let us cheriſh every benevolent and chearful affection; good-nature, good-humour, forgiveneſs, candour, and a diſpoſition to think favourably, or charitably at leaſt, of every body; declining law-ſuits, controverſy, and contention of every kind, which give much preſent uneaſineſs, and, by wearing out the ſpirits, promote melancholy and diſſatisfaction. Repreſs immoderate anxiety, reſentment, and ſorrow, which enfeeble the mind, and diſqualify it for happineſs: when any one thought recurs too often, eſpecially if it be accompanied with diſagreeable emotions, endeavour

vour with all your might to get rid of it: and avoid, as you would the peſtilence, thoſe unnatural paſſions of envy, ſuſpicion, and jealouſy, which often bring phrenſy along with them, and preſent nothing to the imagination, but blood, darkneſs, and furies.

Miſanthropy is itſelf a ſort of madneſs: reject with horror every thought, and every book, that tends to encourage it. If generous motives will not prevail, let the fate of Swift deter us from this infernal diſpoſition. Swift had learning, genius, wit, humour, renown, and the friendſhip of many diſtinguiſhed perſons: but his miſanthropy was unbounded, and grew more and more virulent, as he advanced in years; till at laſt it plunged him into a ſtate of wretchedneſs, than which there is nothing on record more deplorable.

Pride, too, is the bane of happineſs, as well as of virtue, and is very apt to diſorder the imagination. Indeed it has been obſerved, that phrenſy is more frequently owing to pride, and to vanity, than to any other moral cauſe; and that a lowly and contented mind is not often in danger from that terrible diſeaſe. As it is from pride and vanity that ſelf-conceit takes its riſe, we ought to be particularly jealous of ourſelves, and to conſider it as a dangerous ſymptom, when we are unwilling to hear advice, and differ in opinion from the rational part of mankind. This ſhows, that all is not right in the underſtanding: and when that is depraved in any degree, it is no wonder, that the fancy ſhould be in the ſame degree unmanageable.

Thirdly. To prevent that melancholy, which is the effect of a diſtempered imagination, it will be further neceſſary, eſpecially for literary men who are liable to be haunted with this diſeaſe, to purſue thoſe ſtudies only, which are amuſing, practical, and uſeful; whereof there is a ſufficiency to fill up every leiſure hour of life: And let all thoſe be avoided, that cheriſh evil paſſions.—Such is

metaphyſical controverſy; which for the moſt part ends in diſſatisfaction and diſappointment.—Such are the miſanthropical writings of Hobbes, Rochefoucault, and Mandevil; wherein human nature is moſt injuriouſly repreſented as a vile compoſition of ſelfiſhneſs, malignity, and pride.—Such are many of the ſatires of Swift; which appear to have little elſe in view, than to create a mutual abhorrence between the two ſexes; and to diſunite ſociety, by making every man ſuſpicious of his neighbour.—Such are the dreams of our modern Epicureans; who deſcribe man as a ſort of beaſt by nature, and inſinuate, that he is in nothing ſuperiour to other animals, unleſs in being more docile, and more prone to miſchief.—And ſuch, without exception, are all thoſe writings, that favour infidelity and atheiſm; whereof, to the diſgrace of the times, more have appeared in this, than in any former age: a circumſtance, that we ſhall be at no loſs to account for, if we conſider the diſſipation, the petulant wit, the falſe refinements, and the total neglect of good learning, by which ſome parts of Europe are now ſo infamouſly diſtinguiſhed. To a man educated in Chriſtian principles, and not corrupted by affectation or debauchery, nothing can give keener anguiſh, or overwhelm the mind with a deeper gloom, than to be perplexed with doubts concerning that futurity which is the foundation of his deareſt hopes.

There is another ſort of books, of a very different character, abounding in good ſentiments, and written by perſons of the greateſt worth, from which, notwithſtanding, it will be prudent for him to abſtain, whoſe imagination is apt to dwell upon melancholy ideas. Such are ſome of thoſe tragedies, and tragical novels (whereof I mention only the *Revenge*, by Young, and The hiſtory of *Clariſſa*, by Richardſon) that wear out the ſpirits with a ſucceſſion of horrors and ſorrows: and ſuch, though a work that does honour

honour to literature, is a great part of The *Night-thoughts*. Theſe gloomy compoſitions are captivating to young people: for, in youth, the ſpirits are high, and misfortune and ſorrow are novelties. But they may ſtore the mind with mournful ideas, which afterwards, in certain diſorders of the human frame, one would fain get rid of: and therefore I think they ſhould be but ſparingly indulged in, by perſons of a delicate conſtitution and great ſenſibility. To the vain, however, and the giddy, they may be of great benefit; for their ſenſibility is not eaſily wounded; and to them we may preſume it is, and not to thoſe who are already broken-hearted, that the wiſe man addreſſes himſelf, when he ſays, "It is "better to go to the houſe of mourning, than to the houſe of "feaſting;—for by the ſadneſs of the countenance the heart is "made better."

It may ſeem, in theſe days, an unneceſſary advice; and yet I ſhould not do juſtice to my ſubject, if I did not recommend moderate application to the ſtudious in general, and to thoſe of them chiefly whoſe fancy has become ungovernable from a depreſſion of mind. I will not, however, enter upon a detail of the miſeries that take their riſe from exceſſive ſtudy. Tiſſot has written an elegant book on the ſubject; but let it not be recommended to every one's peruſal; for the caſes recorded by that author are ſo many, and ſo dreadful, as would go near to frighten the valetudinary ſtudent out of his wits. I ſhall only remark, that too much ſtudy will in time ſhatter the ſtrongeſt nerves, and make the ſoul a prey to melancholy. The want of air and exerciſe, with interrupted digeſtion, unhinges the bodily frame: and the mind, long and violently exerted in one direction, like a bow long bent, loſes its elaſticity, and, unable to recover itſelf, remains ſtupidly fixed in the ſame diſtorted poſture. One ſet of ideas are then continually before it; which, being always of the diſagreeable kind,

bring along with them an unvaried interchange of horror and ſorrow. When it is thus far advanced, the diſorder is alarming. Study muſt be altogether relinquiſhed; or at leaſt all thoſe ſtudies, that are either ſevere, or in any way related, in their objects, or method of procedure, to thoſe that occaſioned the malady: and new employments muſt be contrived to force the mind out of its old gloomy tract, into a path more chearful and leſs difficult.

If therefore perſons of a delicate frame ſhould at any time think it their duty to engage in laborious ſpeculation, they will do well to make their daily taſk ſhort; and, from the moment they lay aſide their papers to-day, till they reſume them to-morrow, not once to think of the matter: employing the interval in chearful company, or in exerciſe, or in reading poetry, hiſtory, books of travels, and ſuch like writings, that gratify the mind with a variety of images, and yet require no intellectual exertion. In theſe circumſtances, muſick is very ſalutary; and ſome of the beſt romances of the comick kind may be read with advantage. Botany, too, is an uſeful recreation to the ſtudious; as it leads them to the fields, and ſo gives them at once freſh air, gentle exerciſe, and liberal amuſement. But, of all occupations, agriculture is the moſt natural; the moſt friendly to the ſoul and to the body of man; and the moſt beneficial to ſociety.

In ſome countries, every young man is obliged to learn a mechanick art. It is recorded of one Achmet, a Turkiſh emperor, that he was a maker of thoſe ivory rings, which the Turks wear on their thumbs when they ſhoot their arrows. We find in Homer, that Ulyſſes, though a king and a hero, was an expert joiner, and a tolerable ſhipwright. I have often wiſhed, that this practice were more general. It would at leaſt be of great advantage to thoſe who follow a learned profeſſion, and would prevent many of the evils incident to a thoughtful and ſedentary life. Let us not be aſhamed

aſhamed or averſe, to ply the ax or chiſſel, or the hammer, and the anvil. If we acquire a dexterity in any healthy mechanick exerciſe, which one may do in a perfect conſiſtency with literary ambition, we ſhall poſſeſs an inexhauſtible fund of recreation; and, in order to unbend the mind after the fatigue of ſtudy, ſhall not be obliged to join in thoſe dangerous amuſements, that give ſcope to malevolent or inflammatory paſſions.

Laſtly, let thoſe, who wiſh to preſerve their imagination in a chearful and healthy ſtate, cultivate piety, and guard againſt ſuperſtition; by forming right notions of God's adorable being and providence, and cheriſhing the correſpondent affections of love, veneration, and gratitude. Superſtition is fierce and gloomy: but true Chriſtianity gives glory to the Divine nature, and is moſt comfortable to the human. It teaches, that nothing happens, but by the permiſſion of Him, who is greateſt, wiſeſt, and beſt; that the adverſities which befal us may all be improved into bleſſings; that man is indeed a ſinful creature, but that God has graciouſly provided for him the means both of pardon, and of happineſs; that, if we obey the Goſpel, than which no ſyſtem of doctrine can be more excellent in itſelf, or ſupported by better evidence, "our light "afflictions, which are but for a moment, ſhall work out for us "an eternal weight of glory;" for that, when theſe tranſitory ſcenes diſappear, an endleſs ſtate of things will commence, wherein Virtue ſhall triumph, and all her tears be wiped away for ever; wherein there will be as much felicity, as the moſt exalted benevolence can deſire, and no more puniſhment, than the moſt perfect juſtice will approve.—He who believes all this, and endeavours to act accordingly, muſt look upon the calamities of life as not very material; and, while he retains the command of his faculties, may have continually preſent to his imagination the moſt ſublime, and

moſt

moſt tranſporting views, that it is poſſible for a human being either to wiſh for, or to comprehend.

The Divine Omnipotence ought at all times to inſpire us with veneration and holy fear. By the ſimpleſt means, or without any means, it can accompliſh the moſt important purpoſes. This very faculty of Imagination, the Deity can make, to each of us, even in this world, the inſtrument of exquiſite happineſs, or conſummate miſery; by ſetting before it the moſt glorious objects of hope, or the moſt tremendous images of deſpair. What a bleſſing are chearful thoughts, and a ſound imagination! and what man can ſay, that his imagination and thoughts are always, or indeed at any time, in his own power! Let us, therefore, learn humility; and ſeek the Divine favour above all things. And, while we endeavour to make a right uſe of the rules he has preſcribed, or given us grace to diſcover, for purifying and improving our nature, let us look up for aid to Him, whoſe influence alone can render them ſucceſsful.

OF DREAMING.

NATURE does nothing in vain. But, from the imperfection of our knowlege, we often miſtake final cauſes, and are too apt to pronounce that uſeleſs, of which we do not perceive the uſe: which is not leſs abſurd in many caſes, than if a man born blind were to deny the utility of light, or the beauty of colour. In the ſhop of a watchmaker, or of any artiſt who employs himſelf in complex mechaniſm, how many wheels are there, and pegs, and utenſils, whereof a clown cannot conceive to what purpoſe they are to be applied! How many parts are there of the human body, which anatomiſts only can explain! and how many, which the moſt learned of that profeſſion cannot fully account for! Shall we therefore imagine, that any of thoſe parts are ſuperfluous, or uſeleſs?

A king in Spain is ſaid to have cenſured the arrangement of the planetary ſyſtem; impiouſly aſſerting, that he could have made a more regular world himſelf. His preſumption, we know, was the effect of ignorance: he took upon him to find fault with that which he did not underſtand. Had he known the true aſtronomy, he muſt have been overwhelmed with aſtoniſhment, at the regularity, with which the heavenly bodies perform their revolutions.

In fact, the more we underſtand nature, the more we admire it. And when, among the works of God, any thing occurs, of which we perceive not the neceſſity, or the propriety, it becomes us humbly to confeſs our ignorance. For what are we, that we ſhould preſume to cavil at the diſpenſations of infinite wiſdom!

* Extracts from this diſcourſe were printed in a periodical paper called *The Mirror*. The whole is here given, as it was at firſt compoſed.

Man's knowlege is progreſſive. How many things are known to us, which were unknown to the antients! What at preſent ſeems of little value may hereafter be found to be of the greateſt. Many countries are uninhabited now, which before the end of the world may ſupport millions of human creatures, and give riſe to new arts and ſciences, and other wonderful inventions.

Theſe remarks we ought never to loſe ſight of, in philoſophical inquiry; eſpecially, when we are at a loſs to explain final cauſes. Our knowlege of theſe will always be in proportion to our knowlege of nature. For, if we be in any degree ignorant of the form and ſtructure of a thing, we muſt in the ſame degree be ignorant of the end for which it was made, and the uſes to which it may be applied. Were it required of us, to find out the uſe of a machine, which we had never before ſeen or heard of; the firſt thing we ſhould do would be, to examine its nature, that is, the form, connections, and tendency of its ſeveral parts. If we will not take the trouble to do this, or if we have not mechanical ſkill to qualify us for it, what title have we to affirm, that the machine is uſeleſs, or imperfect? As well may a blind man find fault with my complexion, or a deaf man condemn a ſymphony of muſical inſtruments.

Though there are not many natural appearances more familiar to us than DREAMING, there are few which we leſs underſtand. It is a faculty, or an operation of our minds, of which we can hardly ſay, whether or not it be ſubſervient, either to action, or to knowlege. But we may be aſſured, it is not without its uſes, though we ſhould never be able to diſcover them.

I ſhall not trouble the reader with the opinions of the antients, in regard to the immediate cauſe of Dreaming. Epicurus fancied, that an infinite multitude of ſubtle images; ſome flowing from bodies, ſome formed in the air of their own accord, and others made up of

different things variouſly combined, are always moving up and down around us: and that theſe images, being of extreme fineneſs, penetrate our bodies, and, ſtriking upon the mind, give riſe to that mode of perception which we call Imagination, and to which he refers the origin both of our dreams, and of our thoughts when we are awake. Ariſtotle ſeems to think, that every object of ſenſe makes, upon the human ſoul, or upon ſome other part of our frame, a certain impreſſion; which remains for ſome time after the object that made it is gone; and which, being afterwards recognized by the mind in ſleep, gives riſe to thoſe viſionary images that then preſent themſelves.—Theſe opinions, if one were to examine them, would be found, either to amount to nothing that can be underſtood; or to aſcribe to human thought a ſort of material or bodily nature, which to me is perfectly inconceivable. *

Neither ſhall I take up time, with enumerating five different ſpecies of Dreams, acknowleged by ſome antient philoſophers, and particularly deſcribed by Macrobius †. Dreams are indeed of different ſorts and characters; but I ſee no reaſon, why they may not be divided into fifty claſſes, as well as into five.

Without attempting to explore the *efficient* cauſe of this phenomenon, which it is probable we ſhall never come to the knowlege of; I ſhall content myſelf with making a few unconnected remarks upon it, chiefly with a view to point out its *final* cauſe; and to obviate thoſe ſuperſtitions in regard to it, which have ſometimes troubled weak minds. I mean not to be poſitive in what I ſuggeſt; for, on a ſubject like this, in which our experience can never be accurate, becauſe the phenomena never occur, but when we are almoſt incapable of obſervation, our knowlege can hardly be ſuppoſed to riſe higher than conjecture.

* See Eſſay on Memory, chapter ii. ſection 1. † Som. Scip. lib. i. cap. 3.

1. My firſt remark is, that Dreaming, though common, is not univerſal among mankind. Locke tells us of a perſon of his acquaintance, who never dreamed till the twenty-ſixth year of his age, when he happened to have a fever, and then dreamed for the firſt time. Agreeably to which, Ariſtotle obſerves, that thoſe, who never dream till they be grown up, are generally liable, ſoon after their firſt experience in this kind, to ſome change in the bodily conſtitution, tending either to death, or to ſickneſs *. Plutarch mentions one Cleon, his friend, who lived to be old, and never dreamed once in his life; and ſays, he had heard the ſame thing reported of Thraſymedes †. I myſelf know a gentleman, who never dreams, but when his health is diſordered. And it is generally acknowledged, that ſome people are not often conſcious of dreaming, and that there are many who always dream when they ſleep.

Thoſe philoſophers, who maintain that the ſoul thinks always, will have it, that in ſleep we dream always; and that, if we ever imagine otherwiſe, it is only becauſe we forget our dreams. This is juſt ſaying, in order to ſupport a theory, that a thing may have happened whereof we have no evidence, and that may not have happened of which we have evidence. That all men ſhould dream equally, notwithſtanding that ſome are always conſcious of it, and ſome never; notwithſtanding that we dream, ſometimes a great deal, and at other times very little; is a poſition that cannot be admitted, if experience is a rational ground of knowledge. I may therefore repeat, that Dreaming, though common, is not univerſal.

* Ariſt. Hiſt. anim. lib. iv. cap. 10.

† De Orac. ſub fin.—Pliny ſpeaks of a whole nation in the remote parts of Africa (he calls them Atlantes) who never dream: but it is in the ſame chapter in which he mentions the Troglodytes, who dwell in caves, and live on the fleſh of ſerpents; the Egipanes, whoſe form is the ſame with that of the God Pan; and the Blemmyes, whoſe eyes and mouth (for they have no head) are in the breaſt. Nat. Hiſt. v. 8.

But I only mention the fact, without pretending to account for it. And I have nothing elſe to ſay about it, but this, that probably Dreaming is not equally neceſſary to all conſtitutions. Dreams give to human thoughts a variety, which (as will be obſerved by and by) may be uſeful to ſome minds as an amuſement, but not to all, or at leaſt not to all in an equal degree. As ſome bodies require leſs food, and leſs ſleep, than others; ſo ſome minds may have more, and others leſs, need of dreams, as a recreation.

2. In dreams, we miſtake our thoughts for real things. While the dream laſts, it appears a reality; at leaſt it generally does: but the moment we awake, we are conſcious, that the whole was imaginary, and that our waking perceptions, and they only, are real, and ſuch as may be depended on.

Some writers, who affect to diſbelieve the exiſtence of body, and maintain that we never perceive any thing but the ideas of our own minds, have urged this as an argument in favour of their theory. "If we be impoſed on by our dreams," ſay they, "why "not by our ſenſations, when awake? If ideas in ſleep affect us in "the ſame way as bodily objects, may not thoſe things which we "now take for bodily objects be really ideas, and nothing more?" This reaſoning, if it could prove any thing, would prove too much. If we be ſo far impoſed on by our ſenſations, when awake, as to miſtake an idea for a body, that is, one ſort of object for another which is totally different and unlike; we may be ſo far impoſed on, by our faculties in general, as to miſtake black for white, vice for virtue, and truth for falſehood. And, if this be allowed, it follows, that our ſenſes and underſtanding are fallacious faculties; that by the law of our nature we are compelled to believe what is not true; that the Almighty Being, who made us, meant to deceive us, and yet that we have ſagacity to ſee through the deception; and, therefore, that we ought not, and rationally cannot, believe any

thing whatever, nor even admit any one propoſition to be more probable than any other: which is Pyrrhoniſm in the extreme, and at once puts an end to all ſcience, and overturns every human principle.

But in fact, the deluſions of dreaming, notwithſtanding their frequency, never affect the aſſurance of our conviction, or the certainty of our knowledge. While ſleep laſts, we may miſtake a dream for a reality; but no waking man in his ſenſes ever miſtook a reality for a dream. The law of our nature determines us, whether we will or not, to believe, that what we perceive, when awake, is real; and that what we remember to have dreamed, when aſleep, is not real, but imaginary. There is no need of arguments to enforce conviction. That I at this moment am awake, and not aſleep, is ſelf-evident. I cannot prove it; becauſe I know nothing more evident, to prove it by: neither can I diſbelieve it. Such is the law of rational, or at leaſt of human, nature. Nor is my belief in this caſe leſs neceſſary, than the effect of thoſe phyſical laws that operate upon my body. I could no more bring myſelf to believe, that I am now aſleep, and that what I ſee around me is a dream, than I could by an effort of my will ſuſpend my body in the air, or make it gravitate upwards to the clouds *.

Ariſtotle remarks †, and every perſon muſt have obſerved, that in ſleep we ſometimes fancy, among other things, that our dream is only a dream. But this is not ſo common. It holds true for the moſt part, that in dreams we miſtake ideas, or thoughts, for real external objects, and are affected by them in nearly the ſame manner. Only, when we look back upon a dream, we ſeem to remember a particular confuſedneſs of perception, which has no place in our feelings, when we are awake. But this we are not

* See an Eſſay on Truth. Part ii. chap. 2. ſect. 2.

† Ariſt. de Inſom. cap. 3.

always

always ſenſible of, while the dream continues. It is a circumſtance that attends the recollection of our dreams.

3. Though ſome of our dreams are very extravagant, others are more regular, and not unlike real life. When the mind is at eaſe, and the body in health, we often dream of our ordinary buſineſs *. The paſſions, too, that occupy the mind when awake, and the objects and cauſes of thoſe paſſions, are apt to recur in ſleep, though for the moſt part under ſome diſguiſe; accompanied with painful circumſtances, when we are in trouble, and with more pleaſing ideas when we are happy.

The poets attend to this; and, in deſcribing the dreams of their heroes and heroines, are careful to give them a reſemblance to their real fortune. Dido, when forſaken by Eneas, dreams, that ſhe is going a long journey alone, and ſeeking her Tyrians in a deſert land:

—— longum, incomitata, videtur,
Ire viam, Tyrioſque deſerta quærere terra.

thus uniting, in one image of melancholy diſtreſs, the two paſſions that engroſſed her through the day, love to her people, and a ſenſe of her forlorn condition.—Eloiſa, ſeparated for ever from her friend, dreams of being again happy in his company: but the next moment, ſays ſhe,

* Et quoi quiſque fere ſtudio devinctus adhæret,
Aut quibus in rebus multum ſumus ante morati,
Atque in qua ratione fuit contenta magis mens,
In ſomnis eadem plerumque videmur obire:
Cauſidici, cauſas agere, et componere leges;
Induperatores, pugnare, ac prælia obire;
Nautæ, contractum cum ventis cernere bellum:
Nos agere hoc autem, et naturam quærere rerum
Semper, et inventam patriis exponere chartis. Lucretius. iv. 959.

Methinks,

Methinks, we wandering go
Through dreary waſtes, and weep each others woe;
Where round ſome mouldering tower pale ivy creeps,
And low-brow'd rocks hang nodding o'er the deeps.
Sudden you mount; you beckon from the ſkies:
Clouds interpoſe, waves roar, and winds ariſe.

On theſe occaſions, the poet will not deſcribe a dream exactly like the real circumſtances of the dreamer: he makes it only a ſort of dark allegorical ſimilitude. And this we approve of; becauſe we know it is according to nature.

For a reaſon to be given in the ſequel, it will appear to be mercifully ordered by Providence, that our dreams ſhould thus *differ* from our waking thoughts. And, from what we know of the influence of our paſſions upon the general tenor of our thinking, we need not wonder, that there ſhould be, notwithſtanding, ſome *analogy* between them. It is this mixture of reſemblance and diverſity, that makes many of our dreams *allegorical*. But, when that happens, an attentive obſerver, who is free from ſuperſtition, will find, that they allude, not to what is future, but to what is preſent, or paſt; unleſs we have been anticipating ſome future event; in which caſe, our dreams may poſſibly reſemble our conjectures. Now if our conjectures were right, and if our dreams be like them, it may happen, that there ſhall be a reſemblance between a dream and a future occurrence. But in this, there is nothing more ſupernatural, than that I ſhould dream to-night of what I have been employed in to-day. For this is nothing more, than a particular train of thought, impreſſed upon us in ſleep, by a certain *previous* train of thought, into which reaſon and experience had led us when awake.

For

For example: When I ſee a man diſſipating his fortune, I may, with reaſon, apprehend, that poverty will ſoon overtake him. If this conjecture trouble me in the day-time, it may alſo recur in ſleep, accompanied with ſome viſionary circumſtances; and I ſhall dream, perhaps, that I ſee him in rags and miſery. Suppoſe this to happen ſoon after, what opinion am I to entertain concerning my dream? Surely, I have no more reaſon to conſider it as prophetical, than to look upon the conjecture which gave riſe to it as the effect of inſpiration.

Some of our dreams bear little or no reſemblance to any thing that ever before occurred to our ſenſes or fancy. But this is not common, except in bad health. It holds true in general, that dreams are an imitation, though often a very extravagant one, of reality.

There are people, who obſerve, that one particular dream frequently returns upon them. Socrates, in the Phedo of Plato, ſays, that he had all his life been haunted with a viſion of this kind, in which one ſeemed to exhort him to ſtudy muſick. If this repetition of dreams be, as is likely enough, the effect of habit: if I dream the ſame thing a ſecond, and a third, time, in conſequence of having thought or ſpoken of it, after I firſt dreamed it: we may hence learn the expediency of concealing diſagreeable dreams, and baniſhing them from our thoughts as ſoon as we can. Indeed, it is a vulgar obſervation, that they who never ſpeak of dreams are not often troubled with them.

Intemperance of every kind, in eating or drinking, in ſleep or watching, in reſt or exerciſe, tends to make dreams diſagreeable: and therefore, one end of dreaming may be, to recommend temperance and moderation. For the time we employ in ſleep bears a great proportion to the whole of human life; and, if there be any expedient for rendering that part of time agreeable, it is ſurely worth

worth while to put it in practice. Habits of virtue and ſoberneſs; the repreſſion of turbulent deſires; and the indulgence of pious, ſocial, and chearful diſpoſitions, are, for the moſt part, effectual in giving that lightneſs to the animal ſpirits, and that calm temperature to the blood, which promote pleaſurable thoughts through the day, and ſweet ſlumber and eaſy dreams by night.

The antients thought, that morning dreams come neareſt the truth. In the morning, no doubt, the perſpiration and digeſtion continued through the night will make the ſtomach, and the whole frame of the body, more compoſed and cool, than when we go to ſleep: and hence, perhaps, it is not abſurd to ſay, that dreams may be more regular then, and more like real life. But, if we have paſſed the earlier hours of the morning without ſleep, and fall a dozing about the time we uſually riſe, our dreams are ſeldom agreeable, and our ſlumber is rather ſtupefying than ſalutary: whence we may reaſonably ſuppoſe it to be the intention of nature, that we ſhould riſe early, and at a ſtated hour.

4. As agreeable thoughts accompany good health; as violent paſſions, and even phrenſy, are the effect of certain diſeaſes; as dulneſs, and confuſion of thought, may be occaſioned by a loaded ſtomach; and as the ſwallowing of much ſtrong liquor produces a temporary madneſs:—as our thoughts, I ſay, when we are awake, are ſo much determined by our bodily habit, it is no wonder, that they ſhould be ſtill more liable to ſuch influence when we are aſleep. Accordingly, certain dreams do, for the moſt part, accompany certain poſitions and ſtates of the body. When our breathing is in any degree interrupted, by the head falling awry, by the bed-clothes preſſing on the mouth and noſtrils, or by any internal diſorder, we are apt to dream of going, with great uneaſineſs, through narrow paſſages, where we are in danger of ſuffocation. When the ſtate of the ſtomach and bowels occaſions any convulſive motion

in the jaws, a thing not uncommon in ſleep, and which frequently produces a ſtrong compreſſion and grinding of the teeth, we are apt to dream, that our teeth are looſe, or falling out, or that our mouth is full of pins, or of ſomething very diſagreeable. In cold weather too, when by any accident we throw aſide the bed-cloaths, we dream perhaps of going naked. Ariſtotle obſerves, that in ſleep a weak impreſſion made on an organ of ſenſe may make us dream of a ſtrong impreſſion; and that a ſtrong impreſſion may make us dream of a weak one *. A ſlight warmth in the feet, he ſays, if in any degree greater than ordinary, will ſometimes cauſe us to dream of walking on burning coals; and the crowing of a cock heard in ſleep will ſeem fainter, than if we had heard it at the ſame diſtance when awake.

Of all theſe facts I have had experience. And here we diſcover one ſource of the great variety of dreams. And, if the thing could be accurately attended to, I make no doubt, but many particular dreams might be accounted for in the ſame manner; that is, from impreſſions made in ſleep upon our organs of ſenſe, particularly thoſe of touch and hearing. A very ſlight hint, ſuggeſted from without, or in any way ſuggeſted, is ſufficient for fancy to work upon, in producing multitudes of viſionary exhibitions.

In confirmation of this remark, I beg leave to mention what, from good authority, I have heard of a gentleman in the army; whoſe imagination was ſo eaſily affected in ſleep with impreſſions made on the outward ſenſes, that his companions, by ſpeaking ſoftly in his ear, could cauſe him to dream of what they pleaſed. Once, in particular, they made him go through the whole procedure of a duel, from the beginning of the quarrel to the firing of a piſtol, which they put in his hand for that purpoſe, and which by the exploſion awaked him.

* Ariſt. de Inſomn.

When therefore we have an uncommon dream, we ought to look,—not forward with apprehenſion, as if it were to be the fore-runner of calamity; but rather backward, to ſee if we can trace out its cauſe, and whether we may not, from ſuch a diſcovery, learn ſomething that may be profitable to us.—I dream, for example, that ſome of my teeth drop out. That, ſay the vulgar, betokens the loſs of friends. No doubt, if I have any friends, and ſhould happen to outlive them, the time muſt come, when I ſhall loſe them. But the dream has nothing to do, with either the loſs, or the acquiſition of friends: nor does it direct my thoughts to futurity at all. I wiſh, rather, to know, to what ſtate of my body this dream may have been owing: which if I can find out, who knows, but I may draw advantage from my dream? My teeth ſeemed to drop out. Perhaps at that time my gums were affected with ſome painful ſenſation, or convulſive motion. Might not this be occaſioned by too heavy a ſupper, or by an ill-digeſted dinner? Let me eat lighter food, and in leſs quantity, for ſome time, and obſerve, whether the ſame viſion makes a ſecond appearance. I make the trial; and I find that my ſleep is ſounder, and my dreams more agreeable. This is making a right uſe of dreams. And in this way, I am perſuaded, that perſons, who diveſt themſelves of ſuperſtition and prejudice, might make important diſcoveries in regard to their health. So Plutarch thought long ago. See his dialogue called *Moſchion and Zeuxippus*.

In ſome conſtitutions, certain dreams go before, or accompany, the beginnings of certain diſeaſes. When, for example, there is any tendency to fever, we are apt to dream of performing, with great labour, ſome work, we know not preciſely what, in which we never make any progreſs. This imagination will occur in ſleep, even while one has no means of obſerving, when awake, any ſymptom that could lead one to ſuſpect one's health to be in danger: and,

when

when it does occur, may it not ſerve as a warning to make ſome change in the ordinary regimen, to eat or drink leſs than uſual, or have recourſe to ſome of thoſe other methods, whereby acute diſtempers are prevented? In general, when one is haunted with diſagreeable dreams, it may, I think, be taken as a ſign, that ſomething is wrong in the conſtitution; and, therefore, that temperance, faſting, or exerciſe, may be requiſite, to avert the impending evil. And theſe are remedies, which one may have recourſe to; and in regard to which one may venture to make a few experiments, in almoſt any circumſtances. Agreeable dreams I would take for the ſigns of health; and conſider them accordingly as good, and not evil.

This theory, which I have reaſon to think is not without foundation, may, to ſuch as acquieſce in it, prove a good antidote to thoſe idle ſuperſtitions in the affair of Dreaming, which have been too prevalent in all ages.

5. After hinting, that dreams may be of uſe in the way of phyſical admonition; what if I ſhould go a ſtep further, and ſay, that they may be ſerviceable, as means of moral improvement? I will not affirm, however, as ſome have done, that, by them, we may make a more accurate diſcovery of our temper and prevailing paſſions, than by obſerving what paſſes in our minds when awake. For in ſleep we are very incompetent judges of ourſelves, and of every thing elſe: and one will dream of committing crimes with little remorſe, which, if awake, one could not think of without horror. But, as many of our paſſions are inflamed or allayed by the temperature of the body, this, I think, may be affirmed with truth, that, by attending to what paſſes in ſleep, we may ſometimes diſcern what paſſions are predominant, and ſo receive good hints for the regulation of them.

A man dreams, for example, that he is in violent anger, and that he ſtrikes a blow, which knocks a perſon down, and kills him. He awakes in horror at the thought of what he has done, and of the puniſhment he thinks he has reaſon to apprehend: and while, after a moment's recollection, he rejoices to find, that it is but a dream, he will alſo be inclinable to form reſolutions againſt violent anger, leſt it ſhould one time or other hurry him on to a real perpetration of a like nature. If we ever derive this advantage from dreams, we cannot pronounce them uſeleſs. And why may we not in this way reap improvement from a fiction of our own fancy, as well as from a novel, or a fable of Eſop?

One of the fineſt moral tales I ever read, is an account of a dream in *The Tatler*, which, though it has every appearance of a real dream, comprehends a moral ſo ſublime and ſo intereſting, that I queſtion, whether any man who attends to it can ever forget it; and, if he remembers, whether he can ever ceaſe to be the better for it. Addiſon is the author of the paper; and I give the ſtory in his own elegant words.

"I was once, ſays the Tatler, in agonies of grief that are unutterable, and in ſo great a diſtraction of mind, that I thought myſelf even out of the poſſibility of receiving comfort. The occaſion was as follows. When I was a youth, in a part of the army which was then quartered at Dover, I fell in love with an agreeable young woman, of a good family in thoſe parts, and had the ſatisfaction of ſeeing my addreſſes kindly received; which occaſioned the perplexity I am going to relate. We were, in a calm evening, diverting ourſelves on the top of the cliff with the proſpect of the ſea; and trifling away the time in ſuch little fondneſſes as are moſt ridiculous to people in buſineſs, and moſt agreeable to thoſe in love. In the midſt of theſe our

" innocent endearments, ſhe ſnatched a paper of verſes out of " my hand, and ran away with them. I was following her, when, " on a ſudden, the ground, though at a conſiderable diſtance from " the verge of the precipice, ſunk under her, and threw her down, " from ſo prodigious an height, upon ſuch a range of rocks, as " would have daſhed her into ten thouſand pieces, had her body " been made of adamant. It is much eaſier for my reader to " imagine my ſtate of mind upon ſuch an occaſion, than for me " to expreſs it. I ſaid to myſelf, It is not in the power of heaven to " relieve me :—when I awaked; equally tranſported and aſtoniſhed, " to ſee myſelf drawn out of an affliction, which the very moment " before appeared to be altogether inextricable."

I might enlarge on the beauty of this narrative; but I mean only to recommend, to the ſerious conſideration of the reader, the important leſſon implied in it. What fable of Eſop, nay of Homer, or of Virgil, conveys ſo fine a moral! Yet moſt people have, I am ſure I have, met with ſuch deliverances by means of a dream. And ſuch a deliverance will every good man meet with at laſt, when he is taken away from the evils of life, and awakes in the regions of everlaſting light and peace; looking back upon the world and its troubles, with a ſurpriſe and a ſatisfaction, ſimilar in kind (though far higher in degree) to that which we now feel, when we eſcape from a terrifying dream, and open our eyes upon the ſweet ſerenity of a ſummer morning. Let us not deſpiſe inſtruction, how mean ſoever the vehicle may be that brings it. Even if it be a dream, we may learn to profit by it. For, whether aſleep or awake, we are equally the care of Providence: and neither a dream, nor a waking thought, can occur to us, without the permiſſion of him, " in whom we live, and move, and have our " being."

6. The

6. The Imagination, or Fancy, ſeems to be almoſt the only one of our mental powers, which is never ſuſpended in its operations, by ſleep. Of the other faculties, ſome are more and others leſs affected, and ſome appear to be for a time wholly extinguiſhed. That memory is often impaired in ſleep, is evident from this, that a perſon ſhall dream of converſing with his deceaſed friends, without remembering any thing of their death, though that event is ſeldom out of his thoughts when awake. Sometimes we ſeem to be carried back into the ages of antiquity, without being ſenſible, of what in our waking moments we can never forget, that thoſe ages were paſt before we had an exiſtence: as I remember once to have dreamed, that I was paſſing the Alps with Hannibal and his army. Sometimes our memory ſeems to be more vigorous than our judgment: as when we dream of converſing with a dead friend, and yet are not ſurpriſed at the circumſtance of ſeeing, and talking with, ſuch a perſon *. At other times, judgment is more active. Thus, as already obſerved, men ſometimes conclude (and I have reaſon to believe that the ſame thing happens to children) from the abſurdity of the ſcenes that preſent themſelves in ſleep, that they are not real, but viſionary. I dreamed once, that I was walking on the parapet of a high bridge. How I came there, I did not know: but, recollecting that I had never been given to pranks of that nature, I began to think it might be a dream: and, finding my ſituation uneaſy, and deſirous to get rid of ſo troubleſome an idea, I threw myſelf headlong, in the belief, that the ſhock of the fall would reſtore my ſenſes; which happened accordingly. In a word, there are none of our powers, over which ſleep does not ſeem, at one time or other, to have great influence, fancy alone excepted: and even this faculty appears to be extinguiſhed, when we ſleep without

* Eſſay on Truth. Part ii. chap. 2. ſect. 2.

dreaming,

dreaming, (if that is ever the caſe) and ſometimes acquires a vivacity and a wildneſs that are quite unaccountable.

Who can tell, but the temporary ſuſpenſion of theſe powers may be uſeful, by enabling them to act more regularly, and with greater vigour, at other times? Or, to expreſs it in different words, Who can tell, but the ſoul, when it has long acted in one direction, may be relieved and ſtrengthened, by quitting the old track entirely for a while, and exerting itſelf in a new one? For, when we think too long on any one ſubject, we find that our intellectual energies become languid and unſucceſsful, and that a little reſt is neceſſary to the ſoul, as well as to the body. Nay, on theſe occaſions, the mind may regain her vigour, not only by reſt, but alſo, and more effectually perhaps, by exerting herſelf in another way. Thus converſation makes us forget the labour of invention: reading is a relief after the fatigue of company: muſick is frequently more ſoothing than ſilence: and they, who are haraſſed with metaphyſical uncertainty, may find a cure in the demonſtrations of Euclid.

7. It was remarked, that ſome men dream more, and others leſs; and ſome perhaps, though theſe are few, not at all. This cannot be fully accounted for, from the different degrees of health which different men enjoy, nor from their different ways of life; although theſe, and the like peculiarities, may no doubt have influence. Perſons, who think much, and take little bodily exerciſe, will perhaps be found to be the greateſt dreamers; eſpecially, if their imagination be active, and their nervous ſyſtem very delicate: which laſt is too common an infirmity among men of learning. The ſleep of the labouring man is ſweet and ſound; and his dreams he ſeldom remembers. For his mental faculties are not much employed, his nerves are firm, and the ſphere of his imagination is narrow.

As nature does nothing in vain, is it not probable, that to the conſtitutions of ſome people Dreaming may be more neceſſary, as a mental recreation, than to thoſe of others? To meditate continually on the ſame ſet of diſagreeable objects, is hurtful to health, and may be fatal to reaſon: and when one is afflicted with low ſpirits, which often proceed from this very cauſe, the phyſician never fails to recommend amuſements, company, travelling, ſea-voyages, and other expedients, for leading the mind out of its old gloomy track, refreſhing it with new ideas, and forcing it to exert itſelf in a new direction, and with unuſual energy.

Go, ſoft enthuſiaſt, quit the cypreſs groves,
Nor to the rivulet's lonely moanings tune
Thy ſad complaint. Go, ſeek the chearful haunts
Of men, and mingle with the buſtling croud.
Lay ſchemes for wealth, or power, or fame, the wiſh
Of nobler minds, and puſh them night and day.
Or join the caravan, in queſt of ſcenes
New to the eye, and ſhifting every hour,
Beyond the Alps, beyond the Appenines.
Or, more adventurous, ruſh into the field
Where war grows hot, and raging through the ſky
The lofty trumpet ſwells the maddening ſoul;
And in the hardy camp, and toilſome march
Forget all ſofter, and leſs manly cares. *

They, therefore, who think more than others, may have more need than others have, of that amuſement and variety which is produced by dreaming.

Certain it is, that dreams are often a relief to thoſe, who are in perplexity, or who have long been ruminating upon diſagreeable

* Armſtrong.

things,

things, or upon any one ſet of ideas which they cannot eaſily get rid of. Nor is it neceſſary, in order to effect this, that a dream ſhould in itſelf be pleaſing. Scenes of difficulty, and even of danger, are, as we have ſeen, recommended to the patient oppreſſed with melancholy: and if a dream ſhall only give a new impulſe, even for a ſhort time, to the mind of ſuch a perſon, it may do him an important ſervice, however diſagreeable in itſelf. Rarely, indeed, are they happy in their dreams, whoſe faculties are worn out with much thinking.

8. We are warranted by authentick hiſtory to believe, that dreams have given information of future events. Hence weak people infer, that they always were, or ſtill may be, prophetical. But nothing is more abſurd. Becauſe in antient times there were prophets, and holy men, ſhall I therefore conclude, that I am a ſaint, or a prophet? Becauſe the Deity has been pleaſed to reveal himſelf, in an extraordinary manner, to ſome perſons ſet apart by him for extraordinary purpoſes, ſhall I therefore imagine, that he will reveal to me the trifling occurrences of my life, a few days before they happen? He has in great mercy concealed from us the knowlege of what is to come; except ſo far as it was neceſſary to us, and could not be made out by human reaſon. For man, acquainted with futurity, would be both uſeleſs and miſerable. To him all curioſity and enterpriſe would be at an end, and all hope extinguiſhed; future evils would torment him before they came; and future good, by being anticipated, would loſe every charm that ſurpriſe and novelty confer upon it. And he would ſit down, motionleſs and ſtupid, in expectation of evil, which he knew he could not avoid, and of good, which would give riſe neither to activity, nor to deſire. An oiſter, endowed with ſight and hearing, conſciouſneſs and reaſon, would not be a more wretched creature. Even

when God has foretold future events by his prophets, he has generally delivered the prophecy in terms that could not be fully underſtood, till after it was accompliſhed: for otherwiſe it muſt have interfered with the principles of human action, and with the ordinary courſe of human affairs.

Is it not ſtrange, if dreams are prophetical, that, after the experience of ſo many ages, we ſhould never have found out any rational way of expounding them? And if ſome are prophetical, but not all, is it not ſtrange, that every ſpecies of dream ſhould be equally familiar to good men, and to bad? For of each character, there are ſome ſuperſtitious people who believe in dreams, and ſome more rational who do not. To ſay, that dreams are of divine original, implies (as Ariſtotle has well obſerved) many abſurdities, and this among others, that it is not to the wiſeſt and beſt men they are ſent, but to all indiſcriminately. *

The rules, by which the vulgar pretend to interpret dreams, are too ridiculous to be mentioned. They are indeed ſuch, as may make almoſt any dream prophetical of any event. If a dream and a ſubſequent occurrence be the ſame or ſimilar, then they believe that the dream foretold it; if totally different, and even contrary, they ſtill believe that the dream foretold it.

That there may occaſionally be a coincidence of a dream with a future event, is nothing more than one has reaſon to expect from the revolution of chances. It would indeed be wonderful, conſidering the variety of our thoughts in ſleep, and that they all bear ſome analogy to the affairs of life, if this did never happen. But there is nothing more extraordinary in it, than that an idiot ſhould ſometimes ſpeak to the purpoſe, or an irregular clock once or twice a year point to the right hour. The ſame coincidence of a reality

* Ariſtot. de Divinatione per ſomnum. cap. 1.

with a previous imagination is obſervable when we are awake; as when a friend, whom we did not expect, happens to come in view the very moment we were thinking or ſpeaking of him: a thing ſo common, that both in Latin, and in Engliſh, it may be expreſſed by a proverb.

9. My next remark is, that dreams depend in part on the ſtate of the air. That, which has power over the paſſions, may reaſonably be preſumed to have power over the thoughts of men. For the thoughts, that occur to a mind actuated by any paſſion, are always congenial to that paſſion, and tend to encourage it. Now, moſt people experimentally know, how effectual, in producing joy and hope, are pure ſkies and ſunſhine; and that a long continuance of dark weather brings on ſolicitude and melancholy. This is particularly the caſe with thoſe perſons, whoſe nervous ſyſtem has been weakened by a ſedentary life, and much thinking; and they, as I hinted formerly, are moſt ſubject to troubleſome dreams. If the external air can affect the motions of ſo heavy a ſubſtance as mercury, in the tube of the barometer; we need not wonder, that it ſhould affect thoſe finer fluids, that circulate through the human body. And if our paſſions and thoughts, when we are awake, may be variouſly modified by the conſiſtency, defect, or redundance of theſe fluids, and by the ſtate of the tubes through which they circulate; need we wonder, that the ſame thing ſhould happen in ſleep, when our ideas, diſengaged from the controul of reaſon, may be ſuppoſed to be more obſequious to material impulſe? When the air is loaded with groſs vapour, dreams are generally diſagreeable to perſons of a delicate conſtitution.

If then our thoughts in ſleep may receive form and colour from ſo many circumſtances; from the general ſtate of our health, from the preſent ſtate of the ſtomach and fluids, from the

temperature of the air, from the tenor of our thoughts through the day, and from the poſition of outward objects operating upon our organs of ſenſe; need we be ſurpriſed at the variety of our dreams? And when any uncommon or diſagreeable one occurs, is it not more rational to refer it to one or other of theſe cauſes, than to terrify ourſelves with a fooliſh conceit, that it is ſupernatural, and betokens calamity? How often, during the day, do thoughts ariſe, that we cannot account for, as uncommon perhaps, and incongruous, as thoſe which make up our dreams!

Once, after riding thirty miles in a high wind, I remember to have paſſed part of a night in dreams, that were beyond deſcription terrible: inſomuch that I at laſt found it expedient to keep myſelf awake, that I might no more be tormented with them. Had I been ſuperſtitious, I ſhould have thought that ſome diſaſter was impending. But it occurred to me, that the ſtormy weather I had encountered the preceding day might be the occaſion of thoſe horrors: and I have ſince, in ſome medical book, met with a remark to juſtify the conjecture. A very ſlight cauſe may check that inſenſible perſpiration, which is ſo needful to health: and when this happens, we cannot expect that our dreams ſhould be ſo eaſy, as at other times. Let no one, then, be alarmed at an uncommon dream. It is probably nothing more than a ſymptom of a trifling bodily diſorder: and, if ſo, it has no more to do with futurity, nor is one whit more ſupernatural, than a cut finger, or a pang of the toothach.

10. Concerning the opinion, which ſome have entertained, that our dreams are ſuggeſted by inviſible beings; I ſhall only ſay, that I think it very improbable. For, firſt, I ſee no reaſon for believing, that the Deity would employ "millions of ſpiri-

"tual

"tual creatures" in ſuch an office, as that of prompting our ordinary dreams. Secondly, I cannot conceive, how thoſe creatures ſhould be affected, in ſuch an operation, by the external air, or by the ſtate of our health, which are known to have great influence on our thoughts, both in ſleep, and when we are awake. And, thirdly, from what we know of the rapidity of fancy when awake, we need not ſuppoſe any foreign impulſe requiſite to produce the various phenomena of dreaming; as the ſoul ſeems to poſſeſs in herſelf powers ſufficient for that purpoſe. Fever, melancholy, and many other diſeaſes, give a wildneſs to the thoughts of waking men, equal, or even ſuperiour, to what happens in ſleep. If the agency of unſeen beings is not ſuppoſed to produce the firſt; why ſhould we have recourſe to it, in order to account for the laſt? — But it is urged, that in ſleep, the ſoul is paſſive, and haunted by viſions, which ſhe would gladly get rid of if ſhe could. And it may be urged in anſwer, for it is not leſs true, that perſons afflicted with anxiety and melancholy too often find, to their ſad experience, that their ſoul is almoſt equally paſſive, when they are awake; for that they are, even then, haunted with tormenting thoughts, from which all their powers of reaſon, all the exertions of their will, and all the exhortations of their friends, cannot effectually relieve them.

To conclude: Providence certainly ſuperintends the affairs of men; and often, we know not how often, interpoſes for our preſervation. It would, therefore, be preſumptuous to affirm, that ſupernatural cautions, in regard to futurity, are never communicated in dreams. It is the deſign of theſe remarks, not to contradict any authentick experience, or hiſtorical fact; but only to ſhow, that dreams may proceed from a variety of cauſes,

which

which have nothing ſupernatural in them: and that, though we are not much acquainted with the nature of this wonderful mode of perception, we know enough of it to ſee, that it is not uſeleſs or ſuperfluous, but may, on the contrary, anſwer ſome purpoſes of great importance to our welfare, both in ſoul and in body.

THE

THEORY

OF

LANGUAGE.

IN TWO PARTS.

Part I. Of the Origin and General Nature of Speech.

Part II. Of Univerſal Grammar.

Ex elementis conſtant, ex principiis oriuntur, omnia: Et ex judicii conſuetudine in rebus MINUTIS adhibita pendet ſæpiſſime in maximis vera atque accurata ſcientia. S. CLARKE. Pref. ad Homer.

The Theory of Language.

PART I.

Of the Origin and General Nature of Speech.

CHAP. I.

Man, the only Animal capable of Speech. — Speech, an Art, acquired by Imitation. — Natural Signs of human Thought. — Artificial Signs of Thought: — firſt, Viſible; — ſecondly, Audible.

THE faculties of the human mind have long ago been divided into thoſe of Perception and thoſe of Volition; the former being ſuppoſed to be the inlets to knowlege; the latter, the inſtruments of action. But, in many caſes, we cannot perceive without an exertion of the will; nor act, without adding to our ſtock of knowlege: and therefore, the diviſion, though ſufficiently accurate perhaps, is not perfectly ſo. The faculty of Speech is Active, becauſe we act, while we make uſe of it; and may alſo be called Perceptive, becauſe by means of it we perceive what paſſes in the minds of one another.

But whether we call it Active, or Perceptive, or to what claſs of human powers we refer it, is a matter of no conſequence. It is one of the diſtinguiſhing characters of our nature; none of the inferiour animals being in any degree poſſeſſed of it.

For we muſt not call by the name of *Speech* that imitation of human articulate voice, which parrots and ſome other birds are

capable of; Speech implying thought, and conſciouſneſs, and the power of ſeparating and arranging our ideas, which are faculties peculiar to rational minds. In Greek, the ſame word *Logos* denotes both Speech and Reaſon; and in Latin, Reaſon is *Ratio*, and Speech *Oratio*, which, I preſume, may be reſolved into *oris ratio*, that is *mouth-reaſon*, or reaſon made audible by the mouth: a proof, that the Greeks and Romans conſidered Reaſon and Speech as very nearly allied.

That ſome inferiour animals ſhould be able to mimick human articulation, will not ſeem wonderful, when we recollect, that even by machines certain words have been articulated. But that the parrot ſhould annex thought to the word he utters, is as unlikely, as that a machine ſhould do ſo. *Rogue* and *knave* are in every parrot's mouth: but the ideas they ſtand for are incomprehenſible, except by beings endued with reaſon and a moral faculty.

It has however been a common opinion, and is probable enough, that there may be, among irrational animals, ſomething, which by a *figure* we may call *Language*, even as the inſtinctive economy of bees is figuratively called *Government*. This at leaſt is evident, that the natural voices of one animal are in ſome degree intelligible, or convey particular feelings, or impulſes, to others of the ſame ſpecies. The ſummons of the hen is underſtood by the chickens: and a ſimilar mode of communication may be obſerved, in many of the irrational tribes, between the parents and offſpring, and between one animal and his cuſtomary aſſociate. Nay, to dogs and horſes, and even to other creatures of leſs ſagacity, the voice of their maſter ſoon becomes familiar; and they learn to perform certain actions, on receiving certain audible or viſible ſignals, from thoſe whom they are wont to obey. This, however, is a proof, rather of their docility, and of the quickneſs of their eye and ear, than of any *intelligence* in regard to language. And it is more

more to the preſent purpoſe to remark, that in one and the ſame brute animal different paſſions often expreſs themſelves by different voices. How unlike, for example, are the cries of the ſame dog, when he barks at the ſtranger, ſnarls at his enemy, whines with hunger or cold, howls with ſorrow when he loſes his maſter, or whimpers with joy when he finds him again! *

But theſe, and the like animal voices, have no analogy with human ſpeech.—For, firſt, men ſpeak by art and imitation, whereas the voices in queſtion are wholly inſtinctive: for that a dog, which had never heard another bark, would notwithſtanding bark himſelf, admits of no doubt; and that a man, who had never heard any language, would not ſpeak any, is equally certain.—Secondly, the voices of brute animals are not broken, or reſolvable, into diſtinct elementary ſounds, like thoſe of man when he ſpeaks, (who is, from this circumſtance, called by Homer and Heſiod *Merops* or *voice-dividing*); nor are they ſuſceptible of that variety, which would be neceſſary for the communication of a very few ſentiments: and it is pretty certain, that, previouſly to inſtruction, the young animals comprehend their meaning, as well as the old.—And, thirdly, theſe voices ſeem intended by nature to expreſs, not diſtinct ideas, but ſuch feelings only, as it may be for the good

* Theſe, and ſome other varieties in the voice of this animal, are deſcribed by Lucretius with exquiſite propriety.

Irritata canum cum primum magna moloſsûm
Mollia ricta fremunt duros nudantia dentes;
Longe alio ſonitu rabie diſtracta minantur,
Et cum jam latrant, et vocibus omnia complent.
At catulos blande cum lingua lambere tentant,
Aut ubi eos jactant pedibus, morſuque petentes,
Suſpenſis veros imitantur dentibus hauſtus,
Longe alio pacto gannitu vocis adulant;
Et cum deſerti baubantur in ædibus, aut cum
Plorantes fugiunt ſummiſſo corpore plagas. V. 1062.

of the ſpecies, or for the advantage of man, that they ſhould have the power of uttering: in which, as in all other reſpects, they are analogous, not to our ſpeaking, but to our weeping, laughing, groaning, ſcreaming, and other natural and audible expreſſions of paſſion.

In this light they are conſidered by Ariſtotle, in the following paſſage. "Man of all animals is only poſſeſſed of ſpeech. Bare "ſound indeed may be the ſign of what is pleaſurable or painful; "and for that reaſon is it common even to other animals alſo. "For ſo far we perceive even their nature can go, that they have "a ſenſe of thoſe *feelings*, and *ſignify them* to each other. But "Speech is made to indicate what is expedient, and what hurtful, "and, in conſequence of this, what is juſt, and unjuſt. It is there- "fore given to men: becauſe this, with reſpect to other animals, "is to men alone peculiar, that of Good and Evil, Juſt and Un- "juſt, they only poſſeſs a ſenſe or feeling *."

Some animals ſeem to employ their voice, without any purpoſe of giving information to others of the ſpecies. The lark, ſings a great part of the day, even when alone. This affords a preſumption, that her ſong has nothing in it of the nature of ſpeech. That energy ſeems natural to the animal when ſoaring in the ſky: perhaps it may be of benefit to her, as an amuſement: certainly it is very pleaſing to the ear of man.

Some birds ſing, while preparing their neſts, and taking care of their young, and are ſilent the reſt of the year. But it is not the nature of ſpeech to be periodical: whereas thoſe energies muſt be ſo, which are the effect of periodical feelings. Others of the brute creation are moſt apt to utter their voices, when the weather is about to change. But can we ſuppoſe, that they are then *thinking*

* Tranſlated by Mr. Harris. See *Treatiſe concerning Happineſs*, note fifteenth.

of the weather, or that they *intend* to give information concerning it? Is it not more likely, that, as Virgil obſerves, their bodies being affected by alterations of the atmoſphere which we cannot perceive *, they are then, without any purpoſe, expreſſing inſtinctively certain pleaſant, or painful ſenſations; even as the infant of a month old does, while it is crying, or ſmiling?

We learn to ſpeak, by imitating others; and therefore he cannot ſpeak, who does not hear. It was once a vulgar notion, that a perſon brought up from infancy without hearing any language would of himſelf ſpeak Hebrew; this having been thought the firſt, the moſt ſacred, and the moſt natural dialect. But it is now acknowleged, and is even ſaid to have been proved by experiment, that ſuch a perſon would be dumb; or, at leaſt, would employ his voice in imitating the inarticulate ſounds he might have heard, or in expreſſing certain feelings by groans, laughter, cries, and the like modes of natural utterance.

I formerly knew a poor man, who ſpoke a very ſingular dialect. His name was William More; his age about ſixty. He was ſo deaf, that his neighbours doubted, whether he could be made hear any ſound whatever. He had conſtantly reſided in the pariſh where he was born, was never thirty miles from home, and, ſo far as I know, never ſaw a foreigner. The language he uttered was intelligible to thoſe only, who had beſtowed ſome attention upon

* Haud equidem credo, quia ſit divinitus illis
Ingenium, aut rerum fato prudentia major:
Verum, ubi tempeſtas et cœli mobilis humor
Mutavere vias, et Jupiter humidus auſtris
Denſat erant quæ rara modo, et quæ denſa relaxat,
Vertuntur ſpecies animorum, et pectora motus
Nunc alios, alios dum nubila ventus agebat,
Concipiunt. Hinc ille avium concentus in agris,
Et lætæ pecudes, et ovantes gutture corvi. Georgic. i. 415.

ilis.

it; and he himſelf underſtood no other. It was made up, partly of Engliſh or Scotch words, moſt of them much altered, and partly of other words that were altogether his own. Of the former claſs, I remember, that his uſual affirmation was *trot*, probably corrupted from *troth*; *corn* was *tora*; *come* was *tum*; and inſtead of *ſoldier* he ſaid *ſholta*. Of the latter ſort may be reckoned, *odee*, ſignifying *good*; *blava*, *evil*; *virrup*, a *duck*; *raad*, *vehemently*; *jurrè*, to *cut*, or *kill*; *plode*, a *man*; *pitoot*, a *gentleman*. As he had little knowledge but what belonged to the buſineſs of a labourer, his ideas were few, and his language very defective; conſiſting chiefly of nouns, adjectives, and verbs, with ſome adverbs: his words had no inflection: and I think he uſed neither articles, nor conjunctions, and ſcarce any pronouns. He looked ſteadily in the face of thoſe who ſpoke to him, and ſeemed to gather the meaning, by ſight, from the motion of their lips.

Though I was then very young, I had great curioſity to know the hiſtory of his early years: but could never learn more than this; that there was nothing remarkable in it; and that his father, and mother, and all his relations and neighbours, ſpoke like other people.—It ſeems probable, that he had never heard very acutely, but did not become quite deaf till he was four or five years old: the conſequence of which would be, his retaining ſome words imperfectly, and forgetting many others. For, if he had from his birth been as deaf as when I knew him, he never could have ſpoken at all: if he had been under that age when he loſt his hearing, he could hardly have articulated the letter R ſo diſtinctly as he did: and if he had been much older, he would no doubt have remembered more of his mother tongue. The peculiar formation of his own words it is impoſſible to account for, unleſs we were better informed in regard to his infancy and education. All his ſyllables were eaſily pronounced; he had little emphaſis, and no accent,

nor any diphthongal ſounds; and his articulations were performed by the lips, the tongue, and the palate, being ſeldom naſal, and, I think, never guttural. He was a chearful, ſober, honeſt man; and ſpoke reverently of the Supreme Being, by a name, which, though I have not forgotten, I do not chuſe to ſet down.*— Theſe facts, though little can be inferred from them, are not unworthy of notice.

We ſpeak, in order to communicate our thoughts to one another; which our ſocial affections incline us powerfully to do: and the practice of ſpeaking improves our natural faculty of ſeparating, arranging, and comparing our ideas. I call that faculty natural, and conſider it as the foundation of the art of ſpeech: for, without it, though ſome animals might be ſo taught, or a machine ſo conſtructed, as to articulate words, it would be impoſſible to ſpeak rationally, or with intelligence.

As what paſſes in my mind cannot itſelf appear to another man, it muſt be imparted, (if at all imparted) by means of *ſigns*, or outward actions obvious to ſenſe. And they, as expreſſive of human thought, may be divided into Natural and Artificial.

The *Natural* Signs of thought are thoſe changes in the complexion, eyes, features, and attitude, and thoſe peculiar tones of

* Biſhop Burnet gives a ſimilar inſtance of M. Godet's daughter of Geneva; who at the age of two years loſt her hearing, and never after could hear what was ſaid to her; though ſhe was not wholly inſenſible to great noiſes. By obſerving the motions of the mouth and lips of others, ſhe had acquired ſo many words, that out of theſe ſhe had formed a ſort of jargon, in which ſhe could hold converſation whole days with thoſe who could ſpeak her language. She knew nothing that was ſaid to her, unleſs ſhe ſaw the motion of their mouths who ſpoke; ſo that in the night they were obliged to light candles, when they wanted to ſpeak to her. She had a ſiſter, with whom ſhe had practiſed her language more than with any body elſe: and, what is ſtrange, though not unaccountable, by laying her hand, in the dark, on her lips and face, ſhe could perceive by their motion what was ſaid, and ſo could diſcourſe with her in the dark.

Burnet. Letter iv. page 248.

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the voice, which all men know to be ſignificant of certain paſſions and ſentiments. Thus Anger, Joy, Sorrow, Hope, Fear, Scorn, Contentment, Pity, Admiration, when under no reſtraint, appear in the voice, looks, and behaviour: and the appearance is every where underſtood, either by a natural inſtinct; or by our having learned experimentally, that a certain ſign accompanies, and indicates, a certain feeling, or idea. And that this kind of ſigns admits of conſiderable variety, is evident, not only from the pantomime, in which the whole progreſs of a dramatick fable is repreſented in dumb ſhow, and by natural ſigns only; but alſo from the manifold expreſſions of human thought, which are exhibited to the eye by painters and ſtatuaries. Yet, when compared with the endleſs variety of our ideas, theſe natural ſigns will appear to be but few. And many thoughts there are, in the mind of every man, which produce no ſenſible alteration in the body.

Artificial Signs, or Language, have, therefore, been employed univerſally for the purpoſe of communicating thought; and are found ſo convenient, as to have ſuperſeded in a great meaſure, at leaſt in many nations, the uſe of the Natural. Yet, where language has been little improved, as among ſavages, and is of courſe defective in clearneſs and energy, it is for the moſt part enforced by looks, geſtures, and voices, naturally ſignificant: and even ſome polite nations, the French for example, from an inborn vivacity, or acquired reſtleſneſs, accompany their ſpeech with innumerable geſtures, in order to make it the more emphatical; while people of a graver turn, like the Engliſh and Spaniards, and who have words for all their ideas, truſt to language alone for a full declaration of their mind, and ſeldom have recourſe to geſticulation, unleſs when violence of paſſion throws them off their guard. However, as the natural ſigns *may* give ſtrength and grace to the artificial,

artificial, it is expected, even where the greateſt national gravity prevails, that, in his publick performances, the former ſhould, in ſuch a degree, be adopted by the orator, as to ſhow that he is in earneſt, and by the ſtage-player, as that he may the more effectually imitate nature.

For elocution is not perfect, unleſs the artificial ſigns of thought are enforced by the natural, or at leaſt by ſuch of them, as are neither troubleſome to the ſpeaker, nor offenſive to the hearer. Words of indignation pronounced with a ſoft voice and a ſmile, jokes accompanied with weeping, or lamentation with laughter, would be ridiculous: but, on the other hand, if a player, in reciting a melancholy ſtrain, were to burſt out into real tears, he would loſe that ſelf-command, without which nothing can be done with elegance. Actors will never expreſs naturally what they do not intenſely feel *: yet their feelings muſt not diveſt them of their preſence of mind, nor diſqualify them for any exertion that belongs to their part. And I remember, that, on aſking Garrick, how it was poſſible for one who felt as he did, to act with ſo much nature and grace, and with ſuch perfect ſelf-command, he told me, that I had touched upon the moſt eſſential, and what he had always found the moſt difficult, point of theatrical imitation.

In that oratory, which is addreſſed to the paſſions, and which in this country is little uſed, the natural ſigns of thought muſt enforce the artificial with as ſtrong an energy, as in the action of the theatre. But the publick ſpeaker, whoſe aim is to inſtruct and perſuade, gives ſcope to thoſe natural expreſſions only, that imply conviction, and earneſtneſs, with a mild and benevolent demeanour, and ſometimes a modeſt dignity becoming the cauſe of truth and virtue. And in polite converſation, no voices, looks,

* See Hor. Ar. Poet. ver. 99—111.—and an Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick as they affect the Mind. Part i. chap. 3.

or attitudes are allowable, but ſuch as betoken kindneſs, attention, good-humour, and a deſire to pleaſe.

Des Cartes, and ſome other philoſophers, have endeavoured to explain the phyſical cauſe, which connects a human paſſion with its correſpondent natural ſign. They wanted to ſhow, from the principles of motion and of the animal economy, why Fear, for example, produces trembling and paleneſs; why Laughter attends the perception of incongruity; why Anger inflames the blood, contracts the brows, and diſtends the noſtrils; why Shame is accompanied with bluſhing; why Deſpair fixes the teeth together, diſtorts the joints, and disfigures the features; why Scorn ſhoots out the lip; why Sorrow overflows at the eyes; why Envy and Jealouſy look aſkance; and why Admiration raiſes the eyebrows, and opens the mouth. Such inquiries may give riſe to ingenious obſervation; but are not in other reſpects uſeful, becauſe never attended with ſucceſs. He who eſtabliſhed the union of ſoul and body knows how, and by what intermediate inſtruments, the one operates upon the other. But to man this is a myſtery unſearchable. We can only ſay, that tears accompany ſorrow, and the other natural ſigns their reſpective paſſions and ſentiments, becauſe ſuch is the will of our Creator, and the law of the human conſtitution.

The *Artificial* Signs of thought derive their meaning from human art and compact; and are not underſtood, except by thoſe who have been taught how to uſe them. Of theſe any man may invent a ſyſtem; and by their means converſe, with thoſe who are in the ſecret, ſo as that nobody elſe ſhall underſtand him.

They are divided into *Viſible* and *Audible*. For, though human thoughts may be communicated by touch, (as people of certain profeſſions are ſaid to know a brother, and to make themſelves known to him, by taking hold of his hand; and Mr. Sanderſon of Cambridge,

Cambridge, who was born blind, ſtudied and taught geometry by diagrams cut in wood;) yet tangible ſigns of thought are not in common uſe, nor at all requiſite on ordinary occaſions.

Of *Viſible* Artificial Signs there may be many ſorts. Dumb men uſe them in converſation, and enforce them by a variety of natural ſigns. And where a dumb man is known to make his thumb (for example) a ſign of *good*, and his little finger of *evil*, his meaning is underſtood as well when he holds up or points to thoſe organs, as if he were to utter the words *good* or *evil*. And, after he is inſtructed in the nature of written language, it would be no difficult matter to teach him how to make and uſe an alphabet, by pointing to the ſeveral joints of his fingers, or to other parts of his body; which among his friends would be of great benefit to him, both in the way of amuſement, and as an inlet to knowlege. Dumb men of quick parts do generally expreſs a word, or an idea, by a ſingle ſign; which is a more expeditious method than the other, but not ſo accurate, or ſo comprehenſive.

This ſort of viſible alphabet, by which different parts of the hand repreſent different vowels and conſonants, is much uſed, as I am told, in nunneries and boarding-ſchools; and conveys, when one becomes expert in it, ſentiments as clearly, though not ſo quickly, as words could do.

At ſea, when ſhips ſail in company, viſible ſigns are not only uſeful, but neceſſary. A ſyſtem of theſe, for the uſe of the Britiſh navy, was invented by James II, about an hundred years ago; and is ſaid to be ſo convenient, that it has not to this day been materially improved. Every Britiſh ſeaman in the King's ſervice is trained up in the knowlege of them: and, to prevent miſtakes from forgetfulneſs, every commander in the navy receives from the Admiralty a book, wherein are explained the meaning of the ſeveral ſignals, and the method of conveying orders or intelligence

from one ſhip to any other in the ſquadron. Theſe ſignals, many of which, that they may be the more ſignificant, are accompanied with the firing of guns, are made, by hanging out, from the ſeveral parts of the ſhip, lights in the night-time, and flags and ſtreamers of different colours by day. The fulleſt account of them, that I have ſeen, is in Chambers's Dictionary, under the word *Signal*.

The antients, particularly the Greeks, were remarkable for their ingenious contrivance of ſignals by fire. We are aſſured, that, in a mountainous country, they could in a moment, by means of torches, convey intelligence to a very great diſtance. They even invented a method of expreſſing, by the number and arrangement of flambeaus, every letter of the alphabet; ſo that a guard on one eminence could converſe, by ſpelling their words, with another many leagues off. There is an exact deſcription of it in Polybius; and in the ſeventeenth book of the Antient Hiſtory by Rollin; who adds, that he had ſeen a pamphlet, printed in 1702, and dedicated to the King of France by *Monſ. Marcel*, which explained a ſyſtem of ſignals, whereby any piece of news could be communicated by one ſhip to another at a diſtance, as quickly as it could be ſet down in writing.

Fire-ſignals are of great antiquity. Clytemneſtra, at Argos, is ſaid to have received, in this way, intelligence of the deſtruction of Troy, the very night in which it was taken. A fire, kindled by Agamemnon's order on mount Ida, was ſeen at Lemnos, where another was inſtantly lighted, which was repeated on Athos, and ſo forwarded from one eminence to another, where guards had been placed on purpoſe, till at laſt it ſhone on the heights of Arachne, and was deſcried by a watchman ſtationed on the top of Clytemneſtra's palace. The progreſs of theſe ſignals is minutely deſcribed by Eſchylus, in the tragedy of Agamemnon; which opens with a ſoliloquy of the watchman, complaining, that for nine years

he had paſſed the night in that place without ſleep, looking out for the promiſed ſignal. While he is ſpeaking, he diſcovers it, and gives notice to the queen; who, in announcing the good news, informs the chorus, by what means it had been tranſmitted to her. The paſſage is curious; and proves at leaſt, that ſignals by fire were well known in Greece in the days of Eſchylus; who flouriſhed five hundred years before Chriſt. Quintus Curtius relates, that they were frequent among the Aſiaticks in the time of Alexander: and we learn from Ceſar and Livy, that they were uſed by the Romans. Traces of them are ſtill to be ſeen on the tops of mountains in Spain. And in this kingdom there are ſeveral high hills, hollowed a little on the ſummit, which retain the marks of burning, and are by ſome believed to have been volcanoes; though I think it more probable, that they may have been ſtations, where fires were occaſionally lighted to alarm the country. Of theſe I remember three in the neighbourhood of Inverneſs, each viſible from the other, and about ten miles diſtant; and one in the county of Angus, not far from Aberlemno.

Any human action might be made the ſign of thought; but all are not equally convenient. Our ideas ariſe and ſhift with great quickneſs: and therefore, thoſe actions or ſigns only can do them juſtice in the expreſſion, which are eaſily performed, and of great variety, and in each variety obvious to ſenſe. By means of an alphabet formed by pointing to the joints of the fingers, and by other ſorts of geſticulation, many human ſentiments might no doubt be expreſſed; but viſible ſigns of this kind are of no uſe in the dark, and when diſtant are not perceptible; nor do they admit of ſufficient variety; nor are they ſo eaſy in the performance, as the neceſſities of life would often require. But Audible Signs are equally uſeful by night and by day, and may be underſtood at a conſiderable diſtance: and the ſounds of one and the ſame human voice

voice may be varied without end, and are, in all their varieties, eaſily managed, and by the human ear diſtinctly perceptible. Indeed, when we compare the ear with the voice of man, we are at a loſs to determine, whether the one is the more admirable for its power of diverſifying ſounds, or the other for that of diſtinguiſhing them.—Audible Signs, therefore, conſtitute language in all nations. And if men could always be preſent with thoſe to whom they wiſh to give information, ſignals, and every other viſible ſign of thought, would be unneceſſary; and ſpeech, as it is the readieſt, would be the only, vehicle of human ſentiment.

CHAP. II.

Of the organs of Speech, and the nature and powers of the human Voice.—Of Articulation. Vowel and Conſonant Sounds,—their formation, and various claſſes. Thirty two or thirty three elementary ſounds in the Engliſh tongue.

NOTWITHSTANDING the endleſs variety of human articulate voices, their elementary ſounds are few and ſimple, at leaſt in all the languages I am acquainted with.—But before I proceed to the elements of Speech, it may be proper to premiſe ſome obſervations on the nature and powers of the human voice.

Human Voice is air ſent out from the lungs, and ſo agitated, or modified, in its paſſage through the windpipe and larynx, as to become diſtinctly audible. The windpipe, wezand, or rough artery, is that tube, which, on touching the forepart of our throat externally,

nally, we feel hard and uneven. It conveys air into the lungs for the purpoſe of reſpiration and ſpeech. It conſiſts of cartilages, circular before, that they may the better reſiſt external injury; but flattiſh on the oppoſite ſide, that they may not hurt the gullet, or eſophagus, which lies cloſe behind, and is the tube whereby what we eat and drink is conveyed into the ſtomach. Theſe cartilages are ſeparated by fleſhy membranes; by means of which the windpipe may be ſhortened or lengthened a little, and, when neceſſary, incurvated, without inconvenience.

The top, or upper part, of the windpipe is called the Larynx; conſiſting of four or five cartilages, that may be expanded or brought together, by the agency of certain muſcles which operate all at the ſame time. In the middle of the larynx there is a ſmall aperture, called the Glottis, through which the breath and voice are conveyed, but which, when we ſwallow any thing, is covered by a lid called the Epiglottis: for if any part of our food or drink were to get into the windpipe by this paſſage, it would occaſion coughing, till it were thrown out again.

Galen, and many other philoſophers, affirm, that both the larynx and the windpipe co-operate in rendering the breath vocal. But later authors have determined, and I think on good grounds, that the human voice is produced by two ſemicircular membranes in the middle of the larynx, which form by their ſeparation the aperture that is termed the Glottis. The ſpace between them is not wider than one tenth of an inch; through which the breath tranſmitted from the lungs muſt needs paſs with conſiderable velocity. In its paſſage, it is ſuppoſed to give a briſk vibratory motion to the membranous lips of the glottis, and ſo to form the ſound which we call *voice*: by an operation, ſimilar to that of the two lips of the reed of a hautboy, when one takes them in one's mouth, and blows into them.

It

It ſeems, however, neceſſary, in order to the production of voice, that, by an energy of our will, a certain degree of tenſeneſs ſhould be communicated to the larynx, or at leaſt to the two membranes abovementioned: for we find, that we *can* breathe very ſtrongly without vocal ſound; and when we ſpeak or ſing, we are ſenſible of a peculiar tenſion or hardneſs in the organs of the throat, which ſeem to be more lax when we only breathe or whiſper. When we are in great pain, theſe organs of themſelves become tenſe, and transform our breathing into groans; a circumſtance, that is often of uſe to us; by raiſing pity in others, or bringing them to our aid, when we are incapable of ſpeech. And then, to repreſs our groans, by keeping the vocal membranes lax, requires an energy, which we do not care to continue, becauſe it is fatiguing and painful. Hence we ſay, that groaning relieves us; and in fact it does ſo: at leaſt, it is then more eaſy to groan, than to breathe without groaning.

The voice, thus formed, is ſtrengthened and mellowed by a reverberation from the palate, and other hollow places in the inſide of the mouth and noſtrils: and as theſe are better or worſe ſhaped for this reverberation, the voice is ſaid to be more or leſs agreeable. And thus the vocal organs of man appear to be, as it were, a ſpecies of flute, or hautboy; whereof the membranous lips of the glottis are the mouth, or reed, and the inſide of the throat, palate and noſtrils, the body: the windpipe being nothing more than the tube or canal, which conveys the wind from the lungs to the aperture of this muſical inſtrument.

Take the reed of a hautboy, put it between your lips, and blow into it; and a diſtinct ſound is heard: preſs it a little with your lips, blowing as before, and the ſound becomes more acute or ſhrill: preſs it ſtill more, that is, bring the two ſides of the reed ſtill cloſer, and the ſound is ſtill more acute. From this example

we

we may partly conceive, in what manner the human voice is varied, with reſpect to the acuteneſs or gravity of its tones. The glottis is found to be narrower in women and young perſons than in men; and hence mens voices are deeper, or graver, than thoſe of boys and women. And we can at pleaſure dilate or contract this aperture, and ſo faſhion the tones of our voice into every variety of the muſical ſcale. But all have not this faculty in the ſame degree. Some voices comprehend two, and, by ſtraining, even three octaves. Others have hardly the command of one. Two octaves are no uncommon medium. Voices that go very deep can ſeldom riſe high; and thoſe which are of a ſhrill treble are unable to reach the low notes of the baſs. In other words; when the aperture of the glottis is naturally wide, it cannot be made very narrow; and when it is naturally narrow, it cannot be made very wide. At leaſt, this ſeems to be a general rule; but it is not without exceptions. And it is ſomewhat remarkable, that of thoſe voices which are moſt neceſſary in harmony, as trebles and baſſes, there is great abundance; while counter-tenor voices, whereof one is ſufficient in a numerous chorus, are not often met with.—As to the ſtrength, or weakneſs, of the voice; it depends, on the ſtrength or weakneſs of the lungs; on the greater or leſs force that is exerted in emitting the breath; and partly too, perhaps, on the ſhape and magnitude of thoſe cavities in the throat and mouth, by which the ſound is reverberated.

It is hardly poſſible for him, whoſe muſical ear is naturally bad, ever to acquire ſuch a command of the membranes that form the glottis, as to ſeparate the tones of the voice by their true muſical intervals: which to perſons of a nice ear is ſo eaſy, even in infancy, that they find it difficult to do otherwiſe. Yet a nice ear is not always accompanied with an exact voice. The voice, like every other faculty, may be improved by exerciſe, and grow worſe by

neglect: and there is, in the vocal organs of ſome people, a certain unpliableneſs, which no cultivation is able to overcome.

If we conſider the many varieties of ſound, which one and the ſame human voice is capable of uttering, together with the ſmalneſs of the diameter of the glottis; and reflect, that the ſame diameter muſt always produce the ſame tone, and, conſequently, that to every change of tone a correſpondent change of diameter is neceſſary; we muſt be filled with aſtoniſhment at the mechaniſm of theſe parts, and the fineneſs of the fibres that operate in producing effects ſo minute, ſo various, and in their proportions ſo exactly uniform. For it admits of proof, that the diameter of the human glottis is capable of at leaſt ſixty diſtinct degrees of contraction or enlargement, by each of which a different note is produced; and yet the greateſt diameter of that aperture does not exceed one tenth of an inch. This, though certain in fact, is conceivable by thoſe only, who can form an idea of that diviſion, whereby an inch is parcelled out into ſix hundred parts. I ſpeak not of extraordinary voices, whoſe powers may be incomparably greater; as indeed ſome authors have by calculation proved that they are *. What is here affirmed will

* That the variations of diameter here aſcribed to the human glottis are only the half of what it is capable of, may be evinced as follows. Suppoſe a man can ſing from *Gamut* to *Alamire* of the treble , which is no extraordinary compaſs, being only two octaves and one *great tone*. Let him take his fundamental note from the third ſtring of the violoncello, and ſing two octaves. Then let the inſtrument be tuned one *comma* (or the ninth part of a great tone) higher, and let him take his fundamental note, and ſing two octaves, as before: and ſo proceed, raiſing the tone of the inſtrument in the ſame proportion, and ſinging two octaves accordingly, till the ſound of the ſtring be nine commas, or one great tone, higher than it was at the firſt. In this way he ſings ſixteen octaves, every one of which is in every note different from the reſt. Now in ſixteen different octaves there are one hundred and twenty different tones, which are all ſounded by the voice of him who makes this experiment: in the courſe of which, the diameter of his glottis, though no more than one tenth of an inch, muſt

will be found to hold true of any muſical voice of tolerable volubility and compaſs. And if ſo, we need not wonder, that the beſt ſingers ſhould often fail in the command of their voice. The fibres that miniſter to motions ſo exceedingly minute muſt themſelves be very delicate; and therefore liable to be affected by the ſtate of the air, and of the ſtomach, the general habit of the body, the emotions of the mind, and a thouſand other circumſtances.

When we ſing the notes of a tune without applying ſyllables, we uſe and vary our voice without articulation, and our vocal organs perform no other part than that of a wind inſtrument of muſick. Speech is made up of *articulate* voices: and what we call *Articulation* is performed, not by the lungs, windpipe, or larynx, but by the action of the throat, palate, teeth, tongue, lips, and noſtrils. Yet, in ſpeaking with *accent* *, the membranes of the glottis muſt be continually employed in contracting and dilating themſelves; becauſe, as will be obſerved hereafter, the voice is then continually riſing and falling in its tone: and, in ſpeaking with *emphaſis* *, the lungs are continually employed, not only in ſupplying that breath of which the voice is made, but alſo in emitting it ſometimes with more and ſometimes with leſs force; becauſe, as will appear by and by, the voice is then continually varying its energy in reſpect of ſtrength and ſoftneſs.—Speech is articulated voice: Whiſpering is articulated breath.

Articulation begins not, till the breath, or voice, has paſſed through the larynx. The ſimpleſt articulate voices are thoſe which proceed from an open mouth, and are by Grammarians called *Vocal*

muſt have undergone one hundred and twenty diſtinct variations. So that, if an inch were divided into twelve hundred parts, the diviſions would not be more minute than thoſe variations are, which in the caſe ſuppoſed would affect the diameter of the human glottis.

* See the fourth and fifth chapters.

or *Vowel* ſounds. In tranſmitting theſe, the aperture of the mouth may be pretty large, or ſomewhat ſmaller, or very ſmall: which is one cauſe of the variety of vowels; a particular ſound being produced by each particular aperture. Moreover, in paſſing through an open mouth, the voice may be gently acted upon, by the lips; or by the tongue and palate; or by the tongue and throat: whence another ſource of variety in vowel ſounds.

Thus nine ſimple vowels may be formed; which Wallis, in his excellent Grammar, endeavours to prove are all heard in the Engliſh language, though we have not nine vowel letters to expreſs them. But Dr. Kenrick, in the preface to his Rhetorical Dictionary, ſhows, that the number of our ſimple vowel ſounds is eleven *. Perhaps the pronunciation of Engliſh may have changed a little ſince the time of Wallis, who flouriſhed an hundred and thirty years ago; and there may be vowel ſounds in it now, which were not in it then. This will not ſeem an extravagant ſuppoſition, when it is conſidered, that Wallis gives the ſame ſound to the vowel in *lamb* and *dame*, which are now pronounced differently; makes the vowel ſound in *muſe* ſimple, which is now diphthongal; and informs us, that ſome old people in his time retained ſo much of Chaucer's pronunciation, as to ſay *houſè* and *horſè*, articulating in theſe and the like words the final *e* †, which is now invariably mute. In other tongues there may be ſimple vowel ſounds quite different

* Theſe eleven ſounds are, according to Kenrick, as follows. Numb. 1. Cur, Sir, Her, Monk, Blood.—2. Bull, Wolf, Puſh.—3. Pool, Troop.—4. Oft, Soft, George.—5. What, Was, War.—6. No, Foe, Beau.—7. Hard, Part, Laugh, Heart.—8. And, Hat, Bar. — 9. Bay, They, Fail, Tale, Great, Dale, Vale. — 10. Met, Sweat, Head, Bread, Realm, Ready.—11. Fit, Guilt, Engliſh.—But are not the vowels Number 2 and 3, the ſame in the ſound, and different only in the quantity; the former ſhort, and the latter long? If this be granted, our ſimple vowel ſounds are reduced to Ten.

† This is ſtill done by the vulgar in Scotland; but the words ſo pronounced are diminutives. Thus *houſè* is a ſmall houſe, *horſè* a little horſe. They alſo ſay, *Mannie*, *Gánnie*, *Staffie*, &c. meaning a little man, a little gun, a little ſtaff.

from ours. Such is that of the French *u*; which is not heard in England, or in the North of Scotland; but in all the lowland provinces of North Britain, from the Grampian mountains to the Tweed, is ſtill in very frequent uſe.

When the voice, in its paſſage through the mouth, is totally intercepted, or ſtrongly compreſſed, there is formed a certain modification of articulate ſound, which, as expreſſed by a character in writing, is called a *Conſonant*. Silence is the effect of a total interception; and indiſtinct ſound, of a ſtrong compreſſion: and therefore a conſonant is not of itſelf a diſtinct articulate voice; and its influence in varying the tones of language is not clearly perceived, unleſs it be accompanied by an opening of the mouth, that is, by a vowel.—The conſonants that proceed from an *interception* of the voice, are called *Clauſæ* or *Cloſe* by Wallis; who very ingeniouſly divides them into claſſes, upon the following principle.

The human voice, in paſſing through the mouth, may be *intercepted*, by the lips, or by the tongue and palate, or by the tongue and throat: and each of theſe interceptions may happen, when the voice is directed to go out by the mouth only; or through the noſtrils only; or partly through the mouth, and partly through the noſe.

Thus, if the voice, directed to the mouth only, be totally intercepted by the lips, we articulate what is expreſſed by the letter P; if by the tongue and palate, T; if by the tongue and throat, K. Theſe three conſonants are properly called *mutes*; becauſe theſe interceptions, unleſs preceded or followed by a vowel, produce abſolute ſilence.

Again; if the voice, directed to go forth, partly through the mouth, and partly through the noſe, be totally intercepted by the lips, we form the ſound expreſſed by B; if by the tongue and palate, D; if by the tongue and throat, the ſimple ſound of G, as

it is heard in the word *go*. This triad of conſonants are called *Semi-mutes*; becauſe without the aſſiſtance of any vowel they produce a faint ſound, which continues for a little time, and ſeems partly to paſs out by the noſe, and partly to reverberate from the roof of the mouth. And hence, when the noſe is ſhut, it is not eaſy for us to give them a diſtinct utterance.

Further; while the voice is paſſing out by the noſtrils chiefly, if the lips be cloſed, we hear the ſound of M; if the forepart of the tongue be applied to the palate, N is formed; and if the tongue be drawn a little backward towards the throat, we produce the final ſound of the words *ſing*, *ring*, *long*, &c. Theſe are called *Semi-vowels*; becauſe of themſelves, and without the aid of any vowel, they make a ſound which is not very indiſtinct, and may be continued as long as we pleaſe. If, while we are ſounding them, we ſuddenly ſhut our noſe, the ſound ceaſes entirely; which is a proof, that it goes out by the noſtrils. And if we attempt to articulate them, after having firſt ſhut our noſe, the ſounds produced will reſemble B, D, and G, more than M, N, and ING; a proof, that, in theſe two claſſes of conſonants, the mode of interception is almoſt, if not altogether, the ſame.

With the ſame diſpoſitions of the organs, and the ſame modes of emitting the breath, if the voice be not totally intercepted, but *ſtrongly compreſſed* in its paſſage, there is formed a ſecond order of conſonants, called by Wallis *Apertæ* or *Open*; and which are indeed the aſpirations of the mutes and ſemi-mutes. For the ſemi-vowels, if they could be aſpirated, would, in our author's opinion, become Groans or Lowings, rather than articulate voices. And yet perhaps in ſome languages they may be aſpirated, though they are not in ours.

Thus, if, in pronouncing P, or rather *ip*, we permit the breath to paſs out with ſome difficulty between our lips, we form that

ſound

ſound of F which is heard in *off*. And, in the ſame manner, from B are formed V (or that ſound of F which is heard in *of*) when the aperture of the lips is ſmall and oblong; and W, when that aperture approaches to the circular form. So from T, if the breath is allowed to paſs between the tongue and the teeth, we derive that ſound of *th* which is heard in the word *think*: from which if the tongue is drawn a little backwards, and the breath paſſes with a kind of whiſtling ſound between it and the palate, we articulate S. And, by the ſame proceſs, we change D, firſt, into that ſound of *Th* which is heard in *Thine*; and ſecondly, into Z, or that ſound of the letter S, which is heard in *mans*, *laws*, *pleaſe*, &c.—Theſe two ſounds of *Th*, which are ſo common in our tongue, and give us no trouble, are of moſt difficult acquiſition to foreigners *: a proof, that ſimple and eaſy articulations may be very laborious to thoſe, who have not been uſed to them in infancy: —adeo in teneris conſueſcere multum eſt.

In pronouncing S, if we draw the point of the tongue a little backwards, we change the conſonant into the final ſound of the word *bluſh*; which, though we mark it in writing by two letters *Sh*, is as ſimple a ſound as that of S.—In the ſame manner; namely, by drawing the point of the tongue a little backwards, while we articulate Z, we form the ſimple ſound of the French J; which, according to the analogy of our alphabet, would be expreſſed by the letters Zh. This ſound in its ſimple form is heard in *viſion*, *Aſia*, *deriſion*, *evaſion*, &c.: and makes the laſt part of the complex ſound of the ſoft G, as it is heard in *gem*; which complex ſound, if I miſtake not, might be reſolved into *dzh*.

* "I have ſeen," ſays Sir David Dalrymple, "P. Weſſeling, the editor of Diodorus "Siculus, diſtort his face into convulſions, while attempting to expreſs the juſt ſound "of a Greek *Tleta*." Annals of Scotland, vol. i. page 5.

The liquids L and R are acknowledged by Wallis to be anomalous. He is inclined to derive them from D and N. He mentions a tribe of American Indians adjoining to New England, who cannot articulate R or L; but, when they attempt either, fall into N, and inſtead of *lobſter* ſay *nobſten* *: and we know, that R is one of the laſt letters which European infants learn to pronounce, and that they are apt to uſe L in its ſtead. From all which we may gather, that the liquids N, L, and R, bear a cloſe affinity one with another.

If, while we articulate K, we let our breath paſs with a pretty ſtrong compreſſion between the middle of the tongue and throat, there is formed that guttural ſound, which in Scotland (where it is very common) is ſuppoſed to expreſs the Greek X, and in the vulgar dialect of that country is annexed to the letters *gh* in the words *might, light, bright, ſigh,* &c. In the ſame manner, by permitting the ſimple ſound of G, as it is heard in *go,* to eſcape from between the tongue and throat, in the form of an aſpiration, we pronounce another guttural, not unlike the former, which in Scotland makes the final ſound of the word *lough* or *loch* (lake), and in Spaniſh expreſſes the import of the firſt letter of the word *Juan.* Theſe two gutturals were certainly heard in the Anglo-Saxon (or one of them at leaſt); but have been long diſuſed in South Britain; and an Engliſhman finds it difficult to pronounce them; though to Scotchmen, who are inured to them from infancy, nothing is more eaſy.

The ſound of the conſonant Y (as in *year, yes,* &c.) is alſo conſidered by Wallis as an aſpiration of the ſimple G, formed by a large and ſudden aperture of the organs; but I am not entirely ſatisfied that this is the caſe.—In ſome other reſpects, his ſyſtem

* I have met with two perſons, natives of Scotland, who did the ſame.

may

may perhaps be exceptionable: but, as it is ingenious and ſimple, and in many particulars true, I thought a brief account of it, interſperſed with additional remarks, would give an idea of the manner in which the articulations of language are formed.

And now, we may aſcertain the exact number of ſimple elementary ſounds, which are heard in the language of England. Suppoſing H to mark, not an articulate voice, but only a breathing, (which is allowed by moſt grammarians to be its character) there will be found in the Engliſh tongue the following ſimple *conſonant* ſounds. 1. B, as in *ebb*. 2. D, as in *deed*. 3. F, as in *off*. 4. V, as in *of, love, velvet*. 5. G, as in *egg*. 6. K, as in *cook*. 7. L, as in *bell*. 8. M, as in *gem*. 9. N, as in *nun*. 10. P, as in *pope*. 11. R, as in *err*. 12. S, as in *aſs*. 13. Z, as in *zeal, laws, as*. 14, T, as in *it*. 15. W, as in *war, twang*. 16. Y, as in *you, yes, year*. 17. ING, as in *king*. 18. SH, as in *aſh*. 19. TH, as in *thumb*. 20. TH, as in *then, though, this*. 21. ZH, as in the French pronoun *je*; as in *viſion, deriſion*, &c; and as in the final ſound of the complex conſonant G, which is heard in the words *age, gem, George*, and which, as obſerved already, may be reſolved into *dzh*.

Of our other conſonants, C is ſuperfluous in both ſounds, the one being expreſſed by K, and the other by S; G, in the ſoft pronunciation, is not a ſimple, but a complex ſound; J is unneceſſary, becauſe its ſound, and that of the ſoft G, are in our language the ſame; Q, with its attendant U, is either complex, and reſolvable into Kw, as in *quality*, or unneceſſary, becauſe its ſound is the ſame with K, as in *opaque*; X is compounded of gs, as in *exact, example*, or of ks, as in *exerciſe, Alexander*; PH is ſuperfluous, becauſe F gives the ſame ſound; and CH is either compounded of *tſh* as in *church*, or ſimple, in which caſe it is ſuperfluous, being the ſame with K, as in *choler, chyle, archangel, character, ſtomach*.

Some think, that our *Y* and *W* are always vowel ſounds, and that the one might be expreſſed by *I*, and the other by *U*. If this be admitted, the number of our ſimple conſonants is reduced to nineteen. But this I think is a miſtake.—It is true, that *I* is ſometimes pronounced like the conſonant Y, as in the laſt ſyllable of *anion*, *opinion*, *William*; and Y like I, as at the end of a word, and when it follows a conſonant, as in *liberty*, *my*, *thy*, *chyle*. It is alſo true, that in *perſuade*, *ſuavity*, and ſome other words, the u has the exact ſound of w; and that, in the end of ſome diphthongal ſyllables, the conſonant w is put improperly for the vowel u, as in *flew*, *view*, &c.—But, on the other hand, when we articulate the conſonant y, as in *yoke*, we begin, not with a vowel ſound reſembling *i* or *e*, but with a ſpringy ſeparation of the tongue from the palate, which opens a paſſage to a compreſſed or intercepted voice, and is, in the judgment of Wallis, an aſpiration of the ſimple G. And, in pronouncing *war*, we begin, in like manner, not with an open mouth, or vowel ſound like *u* or *oo*, but with ſeparating, by a wide and circular aperture, thoſe organs which, if they had remained in cloſe contact, would have articulated the conſonant B. —Beſides, in analyſing the ſound of *qu*, as above, though I ſaid, that it might be reſolved into *kw*, I could not have ſaid that it was reſolvable into *ku*; for this would have implied, that *quality* (for example) was to be pronounced, not *kwality*, which is its real ſound, but *kewality*.—To which may be added, that the Italians, who pronounce our vowel *u*, both when it is diphthongal, as in muſe, *piutoſto*, and when it is ſimple, as in pull, *rumore*, *uccello*, *udire*, cannot without difficulty learn to pronounce the Engliſh conſonant *w*; which is a proof, that the articulations are different.

It appears then, that in the Engliſh tongue there are twenty one ſimple conſonant ſounds; and, according to Dr. Kenrick, there

are

are eleven ſimple vowels. So that the elementary ſounds of our language are no more than thirty two; or, reckoning H an articulation, thirty three.

In other languages however there may be many others. The French U was already taken notice of. He who articulates R in the throat, and with an aſpiration, utters a ſound never heard in England, but which is a Celtick or Erſe word, and in the highlands of Scotland denotes a *horſe*: and there they call a *calf* by a name, which I can neither deſcribe nor articulate, but which ſeems to begin with an aſpirated L. In the Scotch dialect there are two gutturals, CH, and GH, which are not in Engliſh; the Welch have many peculiar articulations: and if the language of the Hurons be, as is ſaid, wholly guttural, its elementary ſounds muſt be very unlike thoſe of the European tongues.

CHAP. III.

The Alphabet imperfect, and Spelling irregular; but neither ought to be altered:—Pronunciation cannot be the ſtandard of Orthography. — Of teaching the Deaf to ſpeak. — Of Diphthongs, Syllables, Words. — Of long and ſhort words.

IN order to be perfect, the Engliſh alphabet ought, therefore, to conſiſt of thirty three letters; namely, eleven vowels, and twenty two conſonants: for, H, whether the ſymbol of a voice, or of a breathing, cannot be diſpenſed with, becauſe in many words affecting the pronunciation. But it may be doubted, whether there ever was an alphabet ſo perfect, as to contain characters adapted to all the elementary ſounds of a language, and not one more or fewer. In moſt alphabets, perhaps in all, there are both defects and ſuperfluities.

Thus, in Engliſh, C, X, and Q are unneceſſary; and we have no ſingle character to mark the ſimple conſonant ſounds uſually expreſſed by TH, SH, and NG. Our alphabet of vowels is particularly imperfect; three diſtinct ſounds, or perhaps five, being ſignified by the firſt vowel letter, two or three by the ſecond, two by the third, five by the fourth, and two or three by the fifth *.

* According to Kenrick, A has five ſounds, which are heard in the words *hat*, *hate*, *hard*, *what*, *ball*: — E has three, as in *me*, *met*, *her*: — I has two, as in *thin*, *thine*: — O has five, as in *no*, *not*, *ſoft*, *wolf*, *monk*: — U has three, as in *pull*, *up*, *muſe*; which laſt, however, is not a ſimple vowel, but a diphthongal ſound. — Y in *liberty* is a vowel; in *yonder*, a conſonant; and in *by*, *thy*, *my*, a diphthong. According to Johnſon, A has three ſounds, as in *malt*, *father*, *place*: E has two, as in *me*, *met*: I, two, as above; O, two, as in *got*, *drone*: and U, three, as above.

Hence different vowels are often uſed to denote one and the ſame ſound. Thus in *cur*, *ſir*, *her*, *monk*, the ſame vowel ſound is heard, notwithſtanding the diverſity of the vowel letters: and in many words, vowels are ſeen, and conſonants too, which have no ſound at all; as E in *houſe*, A in *realm*, the ſecond O in *honour*, UGH in *though*, G in *gnomon*, K in *knowledge*, W in *know*, *blow*, &c. To which I may add, that ſome of our diphthongs are marked by ſingle vowels, as in the words, *muſe*, *mind*, *chyle*, *by*; and that we often uſe two vowel letters to ſignify a ſimple vowel ſound, as in *head*, *blood*, *good*, &c. But theſe and the like imperfections are not peculiar to Engliſh, but obtain more or leſs in all the tongues of Europe, and probably in all written languages whatever.

Nor is there any thing wonderful in this. There are not in Great Britain two provinces, which do not differ in ſome particulars of pronunciation; and in moſt countries the modes of ſpeech, eſpecially while literature is in its infancy, are vague and changeable. Hence, when men begin to write their mother tongue, it may be ſuppoſed, that they will differ greatly in their ſpelling, and in their notions of the powers of the letters: and he, who is in other reſpects the moſt popular, will probably give the law in theſe particulars, however injudicious his ſpelling may be, and however inelegant his pronunciation. Then, a laudable regard to old authors, and to etymology, and a deſire to fix the language, will determine ſucceeding writers to retain the old ſpelling, even when the pronunciation has become different. Thus, the final E in *houſe*, *horſe*, &c. which was certainly pronounced in the age of Chaucer, and not wholly diſuſed in that of Wallis, we ſtill retain in writing, though it has been mute for more than a century. Nor have we laid aſide the GH in the words, *light*, *bright*, *ſigh*, *though*, &c. (which was alſo pronounced in the antient language) notwithſtanding

ing

ing that the guttural is now no more articulated in any part of the Britiſh empire, except Scotland. And, in the opinion of our beſt grammarians, the words *honour*, *authour*, *oratour*, &c. ought not to loſe the *u* they have been ſo long poſſeſſed of, becauſe they came to us, not from the Latin *honor*, *auctor*, *orator*, but from the French *honeur*, *auteur*, *orateur*.

Every thing deſerves praiſe, which is done with a view to make language durable; for on the permanency of any tongue depends that of the literature conveyed in it. And if new words, new letters, or new modes of ſpelling, might be introduced at pleaſure, language would ſoon be diſfigured and altered; the old authors would erelong be laid aſide as unintelligible, and the new would be conſigned to oblivion before their time. Yet ſeveral attempts were made in the laſt century, to alter the ſpelling, and even the alphabet, of the Engliſh tongue. Sir Thomas Smith, Dr. Gill, and Charles Butler, thought it abſurd to ſpeak one way, and write another; and ſeem to have founded their reſpective plans of improvement upon this principle, that pronunciation ought to determine orthography: not conſidering that, as Dr. Johnſon well obſerves, "this is to meaſure by a ſhadow, and take that for a "model or ſtandard, which is changing while they apply it." For, according to this rule, pronunciation ought to be uniform throughout the kingdom; which, however deſirable, and however eaſy it may have appeared to ſome projectors, is, I fear, impracticable: and the alphabet, or the mode of ſpelling, muſt vary continually as the pronunciation varies; which would be a matter of ſuch nicety, as no degree of human wiſdom could regulate. Beſides, reformations of this kind, ſuppoſed practicable, would obliterate etymology, and, with that, the remembrance of many old cuſtoms and ſentiments, would take away from the ſignificancy

of many important words, and involve in confuſion both our grammar and our policy.

Let the language, therefore, be fixed, as much as poſſible, in the phraſeology, ſpelling, and alphabet; even though in all the three reſpects it might have been better than it is. A change in any of them would be dangerous, and produce no other good effect, than that of making *the language now ſpoken* more eaſy to foreigners: for to them, as well as to natives, it would increaſe the difficulty of ſtudying our literature in its full extent.—It may be ſaid, indeed, that all our good authors might be tranſcribed or tranſlated into the faſhionable letters and ſyllables. But this could not be. We have no criterion, univerſally acknowledged, for diſtinguiſhing good authors from bad: we have no laws to warrant the annihilation of property in books and manuſcripts: nor is it in the power of lawgivers, far leſs of philoſophers, to make a whole people renounce the written language of their fathers, wherein they find no inconvenience, and which is their only ſecurity for a great part of their wealth, and adopt in its ſtead a ſyſtem of cyphers and ſyllables, which they underſtand not, and of the utility of which they have had no experience*. In a word, our language is the baſis of Britiſh learning, as our laws are of the Britiſh government: if we value the ſuperſtructure, let us venerate the foundation, to which, if it is not compoſed of unſound materials, length of time will give more and more ſtability.

By attending to thoſe motions of the articulating organs, whereby the elementary ſounds of language are formed, ingenious men have contrived the art of teaching the deaf to ſpeak.

* The emperor Claudius, who though deſtitute of parts was not without ambition, aſpired to the honour of introducing three new letters into the Roman alphabet. They were in uſe during his reign; but, as the hiſtorian expreſſes it, were ſoon after *obliterated*. — quæ uſui imperitante eo, mox obliteratæ, &c. Tacit. Annal. lib. xi.

In order to this, the pupils are firſt taught to utter vocal ſound, and to know when they utter it: which, as an eminent profeſſor of the art informed me, is one of the moſt difficult parts of the whole procedure. For, as the ſcholar never heard any ſound, it muſt be long before he is made to know what his maſter means when he deſires him to exert his voice; and ſtill longer, before he can either do what is deſired, or know when, or how, he does it. Internal feeling, and external touch, muſt therefore ſupply the want of hearing. The voice is accompanied with certain perceptible tremors and tenſions of the organs in the mouth and throat: and when the ſcholar has long been made attend to theſe, he comes at laſt to perceive, by the *tangible* effects of vocal ſound, *when* he utters it, and *how*.

The next point is, to inſtruct him in articulation. So far as this is performed by *viſible* contacts or applications of the organs, it is not difficult to conceive, by what ſteps he may be led to it. But many articulations depend upon the throat, the inner part of the noſe, and other organs that in ſpeaking are not viſible. In regard to theſe, the pupils muſt receive information by touch. The maſter articulates a certain ſound, and deſires them to feel the tremors occaſioned by it in his noſe, and the adjoining parts; and then, after laying their hands on the ſame part of their faces, to utter a variety of ſounds, by way of trial, till they come to utter that, which produces the ſame tremors in their own mouth and noſtrils; giving them, at the ſame time, directions for the management of their tongue and lips; and illuſtrating the nature of the ſound they are in queſt of, by that of ſome other kindred ſound wherewith they are already acquainted. And thus, after long time and much labour, they may be taught to articulate moſt of the ſounds that are annexed to the ſeveral letters of the alphabet;

bet; and to join articulations together, ſo as to form ſyllables and words.

But this is not enough. They muſt alſo learn to diſtinguiſh the vocal ſounds that are uttered by the perſon who ſpeaks to them. This they cannot do by hearing, for they are deaf; nor by touch, for it would be unſeemly, if they were to handle the noſe, cheeks, and lips, of the ſpeaker: it muſt therefore be done by ſight. The ſpeaker pronounces very ſlow, making a ſhort pauſe at the end of each word, and gives a ſtronger energy than uſual to the operation of every muſcle that ſeparates or brings together his organs: and the dumb man, looking him ſteadily in the face, which is expoſed to the light, gueſſes at his words from the viſible agitation of the ſeveral parts of his countenance.

It is obvious, that the acquiſition of this talent muſt be extremely difficult, the exerciſe of it moſt laborious, and the words diſtinguiſhable by it very few. Nor is it poſſible, perhaps, for a dumb man ever to acquire ſuch a readineſs in it as ſhall give more pleaſure than pain to his company, or be of any real benefit to himſelf. The time, therefore, that is employed by thoſe unfortunate perſons in this ſtudy, might, in my opinion, be more advantageouſly laid out, in acquiring the art of drawing, and the knowledge of written language, whereof they are very capable, together with the ready uſe of a convenient ſyſtem of viſible ſigns, or ſymbols, for the communication of thought.

It may to ſome appear ſtrange at firſt hearing, that in the whole Engliſh tongue there ſhould be no more than thirty two ſimple elementary ſounds. But they, who know any thing of the powers of combined numbers, or who have conſidered in how many ways our elementary articulations may be formed into ſyllables and words, will not be ſurpriſed when they are told, that of theſe thirty two ſounds hundreds of languages might be compoſed,

equally copious with the Engliſh, and all different from one another.

One of the ſimpleſt combinations in language is the Diphthong: which is formed, when two contiguous vowel ſounds coaleſce in ſuch a manner, as that, though they form but one ſyllable, the ſound of both, or at leaſt a double ſound, is diſtinctly heard; as *oy* in *joy*, *ow* in *cow*, *ui* in *juice*. A diphthong is ſometimes marked by three letters, as *eau* in *beauty*, *ieu* in *lieu*; and ſometimes by one vowel letter, as *u* in *muſe*, *i* in *mind*, *y* in *ſtyle*: but it derives its name, and nature, from its ſound, and not from its letters: for the word *diphthong* denotes a double vowel ſound; and whatever marks the coalition of two diſtinct vowel ſounds, whether it be two letters, or three, or one, is really the mark of a diphthong. And when a monophthong, or ſimple vowel ſound, is marked by two vowel letters, as *oo* in *good*, *ea* in *bread*; or by three, as *eau* in *beau*; the combination is not a diphthong, though it may be called a double or treble vowel.

Grammarians, indeed, ſpeak of triphthongs, or three monophthongal ſounds coaleſcing in one ſyllable; and give *eye* and *beau* as examples. But, notwithſtanding the number of the letters, *eye* is as much a diphthong as *i* in *mind*, or as our affirmative particle *ay*, (though in pronouncing the latter a peculiar ſtreſs is laid upon the ſound of the firſt vowel); and *eau* in *beau* is as truly a monophthong, as the interjection O.—Some triphthongs, however, there are in Engliſh, though but few; and thoſe, I think, are marked by a ſingle vowel letter. Such are the ſounds annexed to the vowels in the words *ſky* and *kind*: in which, the diphthong expreſſed by *y* in the one, and *i* in the other, is apparently introduced, in pronunciation, with ſomething of the ſound of the Engliſh *e* as heard in the words *he*, *ſhe*, *be*.

And

And here I muſt take notice of a ſlight inaccuracy, which many Grammarians both Latin and Engliſh have fallen into. The former tell us, and indeed with truth, that æ and œ are diphthongs, and yet in ſpeaking Latin make them ſimple vowel ſounds: and the latter refer to the claſs of diphthongs *oo* in *good*, *ea* in *head*, *bread*, *realm*, and *ai* in *vain*, *plain*, &c; though the pronunciation of theſe is as truly monophthongal, or ſimple, as that of *u* in *pull*; *e* in *bed*, *bred*, *helm*; and *a* in *plane*, *vane*. In this particular, therefore, the Latin grammarian ought to reform his pronunciation; and the Engliſh, his account of the diphthong. For, that the Romans pronounced æ and œ as double vowel ſounds; the firſt ſimilar to our affirmative particle *ay*, and the laſt not unlike *oi* in *voice*, cannot, I think, be doubted. The firſt is ſometimes reſolved, by their beſt verſifiers Lucretius and Virgil, into two ſyllables, *materiæ* into *materiaï*, *aulæ* into *aulaï*; which I preſume would not have been done, if the ſound had been, as we make it, perfectly monophthongal. Nor, if they had pronounced *Cæſar*, as we do, *Ceſar* or *Keſar*, is it to be imagined that the Greeks would have expreſſed the vowel ſound of the firſt ſyllable of that name by two vowel letters *Kaiſar*. Nor would the Romans have transformed the Greek * *poinê* into *pœna*, or † *Philopoimên* into *Philopœmen*, if they had not pronounced *æ* as a diphthong. But this by the by.

Conſonants, by being joined to conſonants, produce many combinations of articulate ſound; and ſimple vowels, and diphthongs, may be joined to ſingle, or double, or treble conſonants; and thus an endleſs variety of ſyllables may be formed: and a ſyllable may be joined to other ſyllables, or ſtand by itſelf, ſo as to form ſhort or long words; and each vowel ſound may be long, or ſhort, and vary

* ποινή. † Φιλοποίμην.

the import of the ſyllable accordingly. So that, though the number of elementary ſounds is not great in any language, the variety of *poſſible* words, that may be formed by combining them, is in every language ſo great, as almoſt to exceed computation, and much more than ſufficient to expreſs all the varieties of human thought. But the *real* words, even of the moſt copious language, may without difficulty be numbered; for a good dictionary comprehends them all. In the Engliſh tongue, after deducting proper names, and the inflections of our verbs and nouns, I have reaſon to think, that they do not exceed forty thouſand.

We muſt not, however, eſtimate the number of our ideas by that of our words; the former being beyond compariſon more diverſified than the latter. Many thoughts we expreſs, not by particular terms appropriated to each, but by a periphraſis, or combination of terms, which under different forms of arrangement and connection may be applied to a great variety of different purpoſes; and many thoughts are communicated in tropes and figures; and many may ſometimes be ſignified by one and the ſame word. There are few terms in language that have not more than one meaning; ſome have ſeveral, and ſome a great number. In how many different ways, and to how many different purpoſes, may the verbs *do*, *lie*, *lay*, and *take*, (for example) be applied! Johnſon's Dictionary will ſhow this, and much more of the ſame kind; and leave the reader equally aſtoniſhed at the acuteneſs of the lexicographer, and at the complex nature and uſe of certain minute parts of human ſpeech. Even of our prepoſitions (as will be obſerved hereafter) one has upwards of twelve, one more than twenty, and one no fewer than thirty different meanings. And yet, when we underſtand a language, we are not ſenſible of any perplexity ariſing from theſe circumſtances: all ambiguities of ſenſe being, in a correct

correct ſtyle, prevented by what Horace calls *Callida junctura*, that is, by a right arrangement of the words, and other artifices of compoſition.

The quantity of diſtinct ſpeech that we pronounce with one effort of the articulating organs is called a *ſyllable*. In every ſyllable there muſt be one vowel ſound at leaſt; becauſe without an opening of the mouth there can be no diſtinct articulation. A ſyllable may be a ſingle vowel, as *a*, *o*; or a ſingle diphthong, as *ay*, *oi*; or either of theſe modified by one or more conſonants, placed before it, or after it, or on both ſides of it:—as *to*, *of*; *boy*, *oyl*; *dog*, *foil*; *dry*, *art*; *ſwift*, *broils*, *ſtrength*.

Language is made up of words; and words are the ſmalleſt diviſions of ſpeech that have ſignification. Syllables, as ſuch, have no meaning; for a ſignificant ſyllable is a word. Every word means ſomething, either of itſelf, or as joined to other words; and words derive their meaning from the conſent and practice of thoſe who uſe them.

If one were to contrive a new language, one might make any articulate ſound the ſign of any idea: there would be no impropriety in calling oxen *men*, or rational beings by the name of *oxen*. But where a language is already formed, they who ſpeak it muſt uſe words in the cuſtomary ſenſe. By doing otherwiſe, they incur the charge, either of affectation, if they mean only to be remarkable, or of falſehood, if they mean to deceive. To ſpeak as others ſpeak, is one of thoſe tacit obligations, annexed to the condition of living in ſociety, which we are bound in conſcience to fulfil, though we have never ratified them by any expreſs promiſe; becauſe, if they were diſregarded, ſociety would be impoſſible, and human happineſs at an end. It is true, that, in a book of ſcience founded on definition, words may be uſed in any ſenſe, provided their meaning be explained: in this caſe there is no falſehood, becauſe there is no intention

intention to deceive: but, even in this caſe, if the common analogies of language were violated, the author would be juſtly blamed for giving unneceſſary trouble to his readers, and for endeavouring capriciouſly to abrogate a cuſtom, which univerſal uſe had rendered more reſpectable, as well as more convenient, than any other that he could ſubſtitute in its room.

A word may be a ſingle ſyllable; or it may conſiſt of two, or of ſeveral ſyllables. Hence, in reſpect of length, as well as of ſound, words admit of great variety.

Some have ſaid, that the words of barbarous nations are very long; and that, as moſt nations have at one time or other been barbarous, moſt primitive tongues in their uncultivated ſtate are remarkable for the extraordinary length of their words; but that, by refinement, and practice in ſpeaking and writing, theſe come in time to be abridged, and made more manageable. And it cannot be denied, that into common diſcourſe abbreviations of words are gradually introduced, which were not at firſt in the language.—But we find, that the radical words of antient tongues are rather ſhort than long. This is true of the Hebrew, and is ſaid to be true of the Chineſe. In the Greek and Latin, though ſome inflections of compound verbs ſhoot out to a great length, the primitive verbs, nouns, pronouns, and the moſt eſſential particles, are comparatively ſhort. Of the Engliſh too it has been obſerved, that its fundamental words of Saxon original are moſt of them monoſyllables. And though ſome words of inconvenient magnitude may be found in every tongue, as *notwithſtanding* and *neverthelefs* in Engliſh, *verumenimvero* in Latin, and *concioſiacoſache* in Italian, (which by the by are made up of ſhort words joined together) yet it does not appear, that words are always improved by being ſhortened. On the contrary, our Engliſh abbreviations *dont*, *cant*,

ſhant, &c. though they have long been uſed in converſation, are to this day intolerable in ſolemn ſtyle.

Travellers, indeed, inform us of certain words of monſtrous length, that are current in ſavage nations; that, for example, in the dialect of the Eſquimaux, *wonnaweucktuckluit* ſignifies *much*; and that, on the banks of the river Orellana in South America, the number *three* is denoted by a word of twenty letters, *poetazzararorincouroac*. But is it certain, that thoſe travellers did not hear a ſentence, a circumlocution, or a deſcription, when they imagined they were hearing a ſingle word?—*A very great quantity* is a phraſe of the ſame import with *much*; and *the third part of the number nine* is a periphraſis for *three*. Suppoſe a foreigner, paſſionately fond of the marvellous, and who had formed a theory concerning long words, and was determined to find them among us as well as in South America, ſhould, after a week's reſidence in London, take it in his head that the Engliſh expreſs *three* by a word of twenty-ſeven letters, and *much* by another of eighteen: would not ſuch a miſtake be natural enough in ſuch a perſon?—It is, I think, very improbable, that long words ſhould abound among barbarians. For ſhort ones are more obvious, and leſs troubleſome, and are withal capable of ſufficient variety. And we cannot imagine, that they, whoſe garments are but a rag, and whoſe lodgings a hole, ſhould affect ſuperfluities in their language.

Long words are ſaid to give dignity to language, and ſhort ones to be detrimental to harmony. And there is truth in the remark; but it muſt not be admitted without limitation. Many long ones render language heavy and unwieldy: and ſhort ones are not harſh, unleſs where, by beginning or ending with hard conſonants, they refuſe to coaleſce with the letters that go before or follow. For, in pronunciation, the voice does not make a pauſe at the end of every word; and when two or three little words run eaſily into one another,

another, the effect in point of harmony is the ſame, as if one word of ſeveral ſyllables were ſpoken, inſtead of ſeveral words of one ſyllable. And therefore Engliſh lines of monoſyllables, though ſome criticks condemn them in poetry as diſſonant, *may* flow as eaſily and ſweetly as any other: as,

I live in hope, that all will yet be well.—

Arms and the man I ſing, who forced by fate.—

And I know not whether there be in the whole language a ſmoother paragraph than the following; in which, of eighty two words ſixty nine are monoſyllables. — "My beloved ſpake, and ſaid unto "me, Riſe up my Love, my fair one, and come away: For lo, "the winter is paſt, the rain is over and gone; the flowers "appear on the earth, the time of the ſinging of birds is come, "and the voice of the turtle is heard in our land: The fig-tree "putteth forth her green figs, and the vines with the tender "grape give a good ſmell: Ariſe, my Love, my fair one, and "come away."

The truth is, that a mixture of ſhorter with longer words may be neceſſary to harmony: but, in our language, a better ſound is heard from many ſhort words of Saxon original, if their initial and final articulations admit of an eaſy coaleſcence, than from a redundancy of long words derived from the Greek and Latin. For in Engliſh, though there is much Latin, and ſome Greek, yet the Saxon predominates; and its ſounds are moſt acceptable to a Britiſh ear, becauſe moſt familiar. And hence, with all its eaſe and apparent careleſneſs, the proſe of Dryden is incomparably more melodious, than that of the learned and elaborate Sir Thomas Brown. For the former adheres, where he can, to plain words of Engliſh or Saxon growth; while the other is continually dragging in gigantick terms of Greek or Latin etymology.

If a language were to be invented, and words lengthened and ſhortened upon principles of philoſophy, there can be no doubt, that ſuch as either have little meaning of their own, as articles, conjunctions, and prepoſitions, or continually recur in ſpeaking and writing, as auxiliary verbs and perſonal pronouns, ought to be ſhort; and that other words, of more important meaning, or leſs neceſſary uſe, may admit of a more complex articulation *. And in fact, though languages are formed gradually; and though their formation, depending upon cauſes too minute to be perceived, is ſaid to be accidental, or by chance; yet we find, that this principle has influence in moſt nations. Perſonal pronouns, articles, and auxiliary words, are commonly ſhort; and though ſome conjunctions are of unwieldy magnitude, the moſt neceſſary ones are manageable enough.

* See Campbell's Philoſophy of Rhetorick. Book iii. chap. 4.

CHAP. IV.

Of Emphaſis, 1. *Rhetorical.* 2. *Syllabick, which is either Long-vowelled, or Short-vowelled.* — *Of the Numbers or meaſures of Engliſh Poetry, as depending on Emphaſis; their nature, and varieties.*

WORDS alone do not conſtitute ſpeech. To all the languages we know, and probably to all others, belong *Emphaſis* and *Accent*; whoſe nature and uſe may be explained as follows.

EMPHASIS, which is a ſtronger exertion of the voice upon ſome words and ſyllables than upon others, is neceſſary, to give ſpirit and propriety to pronunciation, by marking, firſt, the moſt important words in a ſentence; and, ſecondly, thoſe ſyllables in a word, which cuſtom may have diſtinguiſhed by a more forcible utterance.

Firſt: to ſhow the neceſſity of pronouncing ſome words of a ſentence with a ſtronger emphaſis than others, let us make a trial upon the ſeveral parts of this brief interrogatory, Do you walk to town to-day? * — and we ſhall find, that every variation of the emphaſis gives a different meaning to the queſtion, and requires a different anſwer. If we exert our voice upon the pronoun, and ſay, "Do *you* walk to town to-day?" the anſwer might be, "No, "but my ſervant does." If it be ſaid, "Do you *walk* to town to-"day?"—it may be anſwered, "No, I ſhall ride." Let the queſtion be, "Do you walk *to town* to-day?"—the anſwer, if negative, may be, "No, I ſhall go down into the country." Laſtly, if we

* See the Preceptor, vol. i. page 43. Introduction.

were aſked, "Do you walk to town *to-day?*"—we ſhould perhaps anſwer, "No, but I ſhall to-morrow." Again, let the emphaſis be twice applied, "Do you *walk* to town *to-day?*"—and an anſwer containing a double emphaſis may perhaps be requiſite; "No, "I ſhall *ride* thither *to-morrow.*" And if the ſame words were addreſſed to us without any emphaſis on the part of the ſpeaker, we ſhould be at a loſs what to anſwer, becauſe his meaning would appear ambiguous.

One of the greateſt niceties in the art of reading is the right application of the emphaſis. And of this they only are capable, who perfectly underſtand what they read, and attend to the full import of every clauſe, and of every word. If we read without underſtanding, or without attention, we continually miſapply the emphaſis; and the hearer, if he is not very acute, muſt often miſtake the ſenſe. And therefore I am ſurpriſed, that Milton did not contrive a better expedient for ſupplying his loſs of ſight, than that of making his daughters read to him in Latin, Italian, Greek, and Hebrew; languages, whereof he had not taught them to know any thing but the letters. A hearer of ordinary talents could not put up with a reader who affixes no idea to what he articulates. Such readers muſt either puzzle, when they do not apply emphaſis, or miſlead, when they miſaplpy it. But Milton's memory and learning were almoſt as wonderful as his genius: and, after he grew blind, it is not likely, that he would deſire to hear any foreign books read to him, but ſuch as he was well acquainted with.

Children are not often taught to read with the proper emphaſis. Indeed, when books are put before them which they do not underſtand, it is impoſſible they ſhould. Let them, therefore, read nothing but what is level to their capacity; let them read ſlowly, and with attention to the meaning of every word; and let them be

not only ſet right when they miſapply the emphaſis, but alſo cautioned againſt the oppoſite extremes of too forcible and too feeble an application of it; for by the former of theſe faults they become affected in their utterance, and by the latter inſipid. I may add, that the pronunciation ought not to be equally emphatical on all ſubjects. If we rehearſe the words of ſorrow, humility, or love, a ſoft emphaſis, being the moſt natural, is the moſt graceful and expreſſive; but a more vigorous energy ſhould enforce the language of indignation, contempt, or earneſt remonſtrance. Moderation, however, is neceſſary in this as in other things. For when articulation becomes ſtrictly imitative, it is called theatrical, and gives offence in domeſtick life, becauſe inconſiſtent with that modeſty, which forms an eſſential part of true politeneſs. — Of the bad effects of theatrical imitation in the pulpit, I have ſpoken in another place *.

Hitherto we have conſidered emphaſis as affecting the pronunciation of *words*; and this may be called the *rhetorical emphaſis*. I now remark, in the ſecond place, that there are alſo *emphatick ſyllables*. In moſt words of more than one ſyllable, the voice is more vigorouſly exerted, and dwells longer, upon ſome of the component ſounds, than upon others; as upon the firſt of *blameleſs*, the ſecond of *revenge*, and the third of *reconcile*. — Moreover, the firſt and third ſyllables of the word *melancholy* are pronounced more ſtrongly, though not more ſlowly, than the ſecond and fourth: and of the word *diſſipation* the firſt ſyllable has a forcible and quick utterance, and the third is forcible and ſlow.

For, in our tongue, there are two ſorts of ſyllabick emphaſis. The one, terminating in a conſonant, is formed by a ſtronger or ſmarter exertion of the voice: the other, which frequently ends in a vowel or diphthong, is diſtinguiſhed by a longer continuance, as

* Eſſay on Memory, chap. 3.

well as by a powerful energy. Thus the firſt ſyllable of *ſtudious* and of *nation* is emphatical and long; but the firſt ſyllable of *ſtudy*, and of *paſſion*, though emphatical, is not long.

This, however obvious, has not always been attended to. In moſt Engliſh Dictionaries, prior to that of Dr. Kenrick, the emphatick ſyllable has the ſame mark, whether it be long or ſhort: nay, ſome grammarians have told us, that the emphatick ſyllable in Engliſh is always long. But he, who compares the firſt ſyllable of *nation* with the firſt ſyllable of *paſſion*, will obſerve, that, though both are emphatical, the former is long and ends in a vowel ſound, and that the latter is ſhort or quick, and ends in the conſonant S. —It is true, that the long emphatick ſyllable often ends in a conſonant ſound, as in *ſevere*, *redeem*, *divine*, *benign*; but in this caſe, it is ſtill the vowel or diphthong that is lengthened. — It is alſo true, that the other ſyllabick emphaſis is ſometimes long, as in *event*, *neglect*; but here the vowel is obviouſly ſhort, and the protracted ſound reſts upon the conſonants, and is owing to their duplicity, which forms a colliſion of the articulating organs, and a neceſſary delay in the pronunciation. Syllables of this latter ſort are by the Latin grammarians ſaid to be *long by poſition*.

Emphatick ſyllables are by ſome called *accented*; which is improper; *accent* being a thing totally different, as will appear hereafter. And therefore, on account of their reference to accent or tone, the epithets *acute* and *grave*, whereby one author diſtinguiſhes the two ſorts of ſyllabick emphaſis, muſt be rejected.

If it be aſked, in what reſpects they are neceſſary or uſeful in language; I anſwer, firſt, that, by their means, one and the ſame word may be applied without inconvenience to different purpoſes: which, though not very material perhaps, is however of ſome benefit. Thus *ref-uſe* is a noun, and *re-fuſe* a verb; and the ſame

diſtinction

diſtinction holds in *ſŭbjĕct* and *ſubjēct*, *ĭnſŭlt* and *inſūlt*, *cŏnvĕrt* and *cŏnvērt*, and many others.

But, ſecondly, Emphatick ſyllables are ſtill more uſeful, as on them depends, in a great meaſure, at leaſt in the modern tongues, and particularly in Engliſh, thoſe varieties in the ſound and motion of contiguous ſyllables, which give riſe to rhythm * and poetical harmony. Nay, whether it be owing to the very act of breathing, or to habits we have contracted in the uſe of our mother tongue, we find it almoſt impoſſible to pronounce a number of ſignificant ſyllables, without giving more emphaſis to ſome than to others. Pronunciation without emphaſis, or the voice applied with equal force upon every ſyllable, would ſound very uncouth to our ear, and ſeem to reſemble articulations produced by mechaniſm, rather than the ſpeech of an intelligent being. Without emphaſis even muſick would be inſipid and inexpreſſive.

The Greeks and Romans were determined, in the formation of their poetical meaſures, by the *quantity*, that is, by the proportion of time, in which their ſyllables were pronounced. In this reſpect, they divided them into long and ſhort. A ſhort and a long ſyllable made what they called the Iambick foot; and ſix Iambick feet, or a ſhort and a long ſyllable ſix times repeated, formed their Iambick Trimeter, whereof the following line of Horace, when rightly pronounced according to the *quantity*, is an example,

Bĕātŭs īllĕ qūī prŏcūl nĕgōtīīs.

Two long ſyllables made the foot Spondeus, and a long and two

* Rhythm is that peculiar movement, of the notes in muſick, and of the ſyllables in poetry, which may be imitated by the drum, or by the fingers ſtriking on a board. There is rhythm even in proſe: as the continuities and intermiſſions of the voice in ſpeaking, and the variations ariſing from long and ſhort, or from emphatick and non-emphatick, ſyllables, may all be imitated in the ſame manner. Of the effects of rhythm in muſick, ſee an *Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick*. Part i. chap. 6. ſect. 2. § 4.

ſhort

ſhort the Dactyl: and the verſe called Hexameter conſiſted of ſix feet, whereof any one of the firſt four might be either a Dactyl or a Spondee, the fifth was a dactyl, and a ſpondee the laſt. And thus, the iambick foot comprehending the time of three ſhort ſyllables, and the hexameter feet being each of them equal to four ſhort, or two long; it appears that the diviſions of the former were (to adopt a term of modern muſick) in *treble time*, and thoſe of the latter in *common time*.

But on what does the meaſure of Engliſh verſe depend? — Some have ſaid, on the number of ſyllables. But that is a miſtake. — The three following lines are of the ſame Iambick ſpecies; and yet, the firſt conſiſts of ten, the ſecond of nine, and the third of eight, ſyllables:

And many a youth, and many a maid
Were dancing in the neighbouring ſhade,
In holiday attire array'd.

Of theſe four lines the firſt and third have eight ſyllables, and the ſecond and fourth have nine; yet the meaſure is the ſame throughout;

Yet do not my folly reprove;
She was fair, and my paſſion begun;
She ſmiled, and I could not but love;
She is faithleſs, and I am undone.

The four that follow might all ſtand in the ſame verſe of the ſame ſong, and be ſung to the ſame tune, though in the firſt there are eleven ſyllables, in the ſecond twelve, thirteen in the third, and fourteen in the laſt.

And when I am gone, may the better ſort ſay,
He had ſenſe, he was modeſt, and harmleſly gay,
And a kind, unaffected, and good honeſt fellow,
In the morning when ſober, in the evening when mellow.

Our

Our heroick verſe, too, may conſiſt of ten ſyllables (which is the ſimpleſt and moſt common form of it) or of eleven, or of twelve: as,

Arms and the man I ſing, who forced by fate. —
Bellowing along the plains the monſter ran. —
Many a wide lawn, and many a waving grove. —

The following has been given, as a heroick line of fourteen ſyllables,

And many an humourous, many an amourous lay.

And, admitting a ſupernumerary ſyllable, the ſecond line of this couplet might be tolerated, though it has fifteen:

The hapleſs poet pen'd, alas! for pity,
Full many an amorous, many a querulous ditty.

It has indeed been thought by ſome criticks, that in our heroick verſe, when the ſyllables exceed ten in number, there muſt be redundant vowels, which in reading are ſuppreſſed or cut off, and inſtead of which, in printed books, the apoſtrophe is often inſerted. But, whatever be the caſe in printing, and writing, this is contrary to the practice of all good readers; who pronounce every ſyllable diſtinctly, and by ſo doing gratify our ear much more than if they had made the ſuppoſed eliſions. For, how ridiculous would it be, if one were to read the laſt line thus!

Full man' an am'rous, man' a quer'lous ditty.

This might indeed be called meaſure, but it could not be called Engliſh.

Some have imagined, that the rhythm of our verſe depends, like that of the Greek and Latin, not upon the number, but upon the *quantity*, of ſyllables. And it is true, that an Engliſh heroick line may be made up of a ſhort and long ſyllable *five times* repeated; in which caſe we may ſay, without any impropriety, that it is a pure Iambick of five feet: as,

Dĕſpair, rĕvēnge, rĕmōrſe tŏrmēnt thĕ ſōūl.

But

But it is no leſs true, that an Engliſh heroick line *may* be compoſed, wherein there ſhall not be one long ſyllable, except the laſt: as,

The buſy bodies flutter tattle ſtill.

Whatever may be ſaid of this line in other reſpects, it will at leaſt be allowed to be of the Engliſh heroick ſpecies: and yet, if we were to pronounce the ſecond, fourth, ſixth, and eighth ſyllables as if they were long, the articulation would be ridiculous:

The buzz-y bode-ies flutt-er tatt-le ſtill.

I grant, that thoſe heroick lines, which abound in ſyllables that are at once emphatical and ſhort, are not ſo proper for expreſſing ſentiments or images of dignity: yet ſtill they are of the heroick ſpecies; and no critick will ſay, that they are inconſiſtent with rule, or not juſtifiable by authority.

On what then does the meaſure of Engliſh verſes depend? Not on the *number* of the ſyllables, as we have ſeen: nor on their *quantity*; ſince an Engliſh heroick line may conſiſt of five ſhort and five long ſyllables, or of nine ſhort and one long ſyllable. — In fact, this matter is regulated by the *emphaſis*. In our verſe, there muſt be in every foot one emphatick ſyllable whether long or ſhort. And the alternate ſucceſſion of emphatick and non-emphatick ſyllables is as eſſential to Engliſh numbers, as that of long and ſhort is to the Latin and Greek. — Thus in that line,

The buſy bodies flutter tattle ſtill,

though there is not one long ſyllable till you come to the end, there are five emphatick ſyllables, each of them preceded by a ſyllable of no emphaſis. And in the other line,

Deſpair, remorſe, revenge, torment the ſoul,

there are alſo five emphatick ſyllables, each preceded by a non-emphatick ſyllable.

In what reſpect, then, do theſe two lines (which are allowed to be of the ſame ſpecies) reſemble each other, and in what reſpect do they differ? They differ in this reſpect, that one is made up of ſhort and long ſyllables alternately diſpoſed, while the other has in it only one long ſyllable: They agree in this, that both the one and the other is compoſed of non-emphatick and emphatick ſyllables placed alternately. It follows, that, though long and ſhort, or ſhort and long, ſyllables *may ſometimes* form the rhythm of Engliſh verſe, yet that which *invariably* and *eſſentially* forms it, is the interchange of emphatick and non-emphatick ſyllables.

In lines, that are intended to imitate the ſenſe by the articulation, or to be remarkably conciſe and ſignificant, an exuberance of emphatick ſyllables may ſometimes be found. But ſuch lines, whatever merit they may have in reſpect of energy, are not well-tuned; and perhaps could hardly be known to be verſe, if we did not find them among other verſes. The imperfection of their harmony, however, we overlook, if they have any other beauty to counterbalance it. Such is this of Milton:

Rocks, caves, lakes, fens, bogs, dens, and ſhades of death.

And ſuch is that, in a late Prologue, which I have heard Mrs. Abingdon pronounce very humouroufly:

Some great fat wife of ſome great fat ſhopkeeper.

Our language abounds in words of one ſyllable, many of which, being of ambiguous quantity, have no other emphaſis, but the rhetorical, which is fixed upon them by the ſenſe. In lines of monoſyllables, therefore, that are well-tuned, thoſe words, which by the rule of the verſe would have the ſyllabick emphaſis, have alſo the rhetorical emphaſis from the importance of their ſignification. If we were to miſtake the following line for proſe,—

The ſun was ſet, and all the plains were *ſtill*,

yet, if we read it with underſtanding, the rhetorical emphaſis, coinciding with the ſyllabick, and having indeed the ſame effect, would prove it to be poetical, and of the heroick ſpecies.

I ſhall conclude this part of the ſubject with two remarks. The firſt is, that though our poetry derives its meaſure from the emphaſis of ſyllables, and the Greek and Latin theirs from the quantity, we muſt not look upon the former as barbarous, and upon the latter as alone ſuſceptible of true harmony: the only inference we can reaſonably make is, that Greek and Latin verſes are more uniform than ours in reſpect of time. The rhythm of ſounds may be marked by the diſtinction of loud and ſoft, as well as by that of long and ſhort. Every nation has a right to determine for itſelf in theſe matters; and it is probable, that the Engliſh numbers are as delightful to us, as the Latin and Greek were to the Romans and Grecians. In like manner, though rhimes are intolerable in antient poetry, it does not follow, that they are contemptible in themſelves: moſt modern nations have them, and children and peaſants are charmed with them; which could not be, if they had not in certain circumſtances the power of pleaſing.

My ſecond remark is, that though thoſe terms in antient grammar, *trochæus*, *iambus*, *dactylus*, *anapæſtus*, *ſpondæus*, &c. do properly ſignify certain limited arrangements of *long* and *ſhort* ſyllables, it can do no harm to adopt them in Engliſh proſody. For our emphatick ſyllables are often long, and our non-emphatick ſyllables are often ſhort; and where this is the caſe, we uſe theſe terms without impropriety. And where this is not the caſe, if we call that foot a *trochee* (for example) which conſiſts of an emphatick and non-emphatick ſyllable, both of them ſhort, as *body*, we do not depart from the original meaning of words more than is frequently done, without blame, on other occaſions.

In fact, the cuſtoms of different countries are ſo different, that

when we borrow words from a foreign tongue, it is not always poſſible to confine them to their primitive ſenſe. With us, an *advocate* is one who pleads a cauſe in a court of judicature. An advocate in antient Rome was one, who aſſiſted with his countenance and advice the perſon who was obliged to appear before the judges, whether he ſpoke in his behalf or not.

Let us then have our trochees, iambuſes, and anapeſts, and our trochaick, iambick, and anapeſtick meaſures: only let it be remembered, that, in Engliſh proſody, a trochee is either a long and ſhort, (as *lowly*), or an emphatick and non-emphatick, ſyllable, (as *body*); an iambus, the reverſe, as *renown, repel*; an anapeſt, an iambus preceded by a ſhort ſyllable, as *magazine*; and a dactyl, a trochee followed by a ſhort ſyllable, as *thunderer, profligate*.

As our poetical numbers depend upon the alternate ſucceſſion of emphatick and non-emphatick ſyllables, it may be proper, before I proceed to the ſubject of *accent*, to give ſome account of the various ſorts of meaſure, that have been eſtabliſhed in Engliſh poetry; in deſcribing which, I muſt be underſtood to uſe the words trochee, iambus, dactyl, and anapeſt, in the ſenſe juſt now explained. And I ſhall take the liberty to mark our *rhythmical emphaſis* and *the want of it*, by the ſame characters, which in Latin proſody denote *long* and *ſhort* ſyllables.

Engliſh poetical meaſure may be divided into four kinds, Dactylick, Iambick, Trochaick, and *Anapeſtick*.

I. The Dactylick meaſure being very uncommon, I ſhall give only one example of one ſpecies of it, which I find in Dryden's *Albion and Albanius*.

Frŏm thĕ lŏw pălăce ŏf ōld făthĕr Ōceăn
Come we in pity your cares to deplore;
Sea-racing dolphins are train'd for our motion,
Moony tides ſwelling to roll us aſhore.

II. The

II. The Iambick is of all meaſures the moſt natural; for, as Ariſtotle obſerves, we often fall into it in our ordinary diſcourſe. Greek and Latin hexameters, and our own trochaick and anapeſtick numbers, are more artificial, becauſe more unlike the cadences of converſation. Our Iambicks we may ſubdivide into ſpecies, according to the number of feet or ſyllables whereof they conſiſt; and I ſhall follow the ſame rule of arrangement in deſcribing the other meaſures.

1. The ſhorteſt form of the Engliſh Iambick conſiſts of an iambus with an additional ſhort ſyllable; as

Diſdāinĭng,
Complaining,
Conſenting,
Repenting.

We have no poem of this meaſure, but it may be met with in ſtanzas. The example is taken from a ſong in the maſk of Comus.

2. The ſecond form of our Iambick is alſo too ſhort to be continued through any great number of lines; though in the following example it has a very good effect. It conſiſts of two iambuſes.

Wĭth rāvĭſh'd ēārs
The monarch hears,
Aſſ-umes the God,
Af-fects to nod.

It ſometimes takes, or may take, an additional ſhort ſyllable; as,

Ŭpōn ă mōūntăin,
Beſide a fountain.

3. The third form conſiſts of three iambuſes;

Nŏ wār, ŏr bāttlĕ's ſōūnd,
Was heard the world a-round.

with ſometimes an additional ſhort ſyllable; as,

Yĕ lāys nŏ lōngĕr lāngŭiſh,
For nought can cure my anguiſh.

4. The fourth form is made up of four iambuſes, with ſometimes an additional ſyllable, which gives a pleaſing variety:

Ŏr whēthĕr, ās ſŏme ſāgĕs ſīng,
The frolick wind, that breathes the ſpring,
Young Zephyr with Aurora playing, &c.

This meaſure, which we uſe both in burleſque and in ſerious poetry, is the ſame with the Iambick Dimeter of the antients; whereof, in its pureſt form, this is an example:

Ĭnārſĭt āēſtŭōſĭūs.

5. The fifth ſpecies of Engliſh Iambick is no other than our common meaſure for heroick poetry and tragedy. In its pureſt, or ſimpleſt, form it conſiſts of five iambuſes:

Thĕ dūmb ſhăll ſīng, thĕ lāme hĭs crūtch fŏregō.

but, by the admiſſion of other feet, as trochees, dactyls, and anapeſts, is capable of more than thirty varieties. Indeed, moſt of our common meaſures may be varied in the ſame way, as well as by the different poſition of their pauſes. And ſuch varieties, when ſkilfully introduced, give wonderful energy to Engliſh, Greek, and Latin numbers; and have, for this reaſon, been ſtudiouſly ſought after by Homer, Virgil, Milton, Dryden, and all other harmonious poets: variety being the ſoul of harmony, and nothing in language or in muſick more tireſome to the ear than an uniform ſameneſs of ſound and meaſure. — Our heroick verſe is ſometimes lengthened out by an additional ſhort ſyllable, and then becomes nearly the ſame with that of the modern Italians.

'Tis heaven itſelf that points out an hereafter.—
Che 'l gran ſepolchro liberò di Chriſto.

But in Engliſh, this is more common in blank verſe, than in rhime; and in tragedy, than in the epick or didactick poem; and among tragedians it is leſs faſhionable now, than it was formerly.

6. The

6. The ſixth form of our Iambick is commonly called the Alexandrine meaſure; becauſe, ſay the criticks, (but on what authority I know not) it was firſt uſed in a poem called Alexander. It conſiſts of ſix iambuſes.

Fŏr thōū ărt būt ŏf dūſt; bĕ hūmblĕ, ānd bĕ wīſe.

It is introduced ſometimes in heroick rhime; and, when ſparingly, and with judgment, occaſions an agreeable variety.

Waller was ſmooth; but Dryden taught to join
The varying verſe, the full reſounding line,
The long majeſtick march, and energy divine.

Spenſer makes it the laſt line of his great ſtanza; where indeed it has a very happy effect. By the ſame artifice, Milton gives ſuperlative elevation to ſome of his ſtanzas on the Nativity:

But firſt to thoſe ychain'd in ſleep
The wakeful trump of doom ſhall thunder through the deep.

and Gray, to the endings of his Pindarick meaſures. This verſe is generally pleaſing, when it concludes a poetical ſentence of dignity: as where the aged champion in Dryden's Virgil reſigns his arms, with a reſolution not to reſume them any more:

Take the laſt gift theſe wither'd arms can yield,
Thy gauntlets I reſign, and here renounce the field.

In meaſure and number of feet it is the ſame with the pure Iambick trimeter of the Greeks and Romans; of which every ſecond line of the ſixteenth epode of Horace is an example:

Sŭīs ĕt īpſă Rōmă vīrĭbūs rŭīt.

Some criticks confound our Alexandrine with the French heroick verſe. But the latter, though it ſometimes contains the ſame number of ſyllables, is not Iambick at all, but rather Anapeſtick, having for the moſt part two ſhort for one long ſyllable, and in rhythm correſponds nearly to the following:

Now

Now ſee, when they meet, how their honours behave:
Noble captain, your ſervant: Sir Arthur, your ſlave.
Pray how does my lady? My wife's at your ſervice.
I think I have ſeen her picture by Jervis.

The Alexandrine, like other Engliſh Iambicks, may occaſionally take an additional ſhort ſyllable:

With freedom by my ſide, and ſoft-eyed Melancholy.

7. The ſeventh and laſt form of our Iambick meaſure is made up of ſeven iambuſes:

Thĕ Lōrd dĕſcēndĕd frōm ăbōve, ănd bōw'd thĕ hēāvĕns hīgh,

which was antiently written in one line; but is now for the moſt part broken into two, the firſt containing four feet, and the ſecond three. Chapman's tranſlation of Homer's Iliad is the longeſt work I have ſeen in this meaſure. It is now conſidered as a Lyrick verſe; and is very popular, and indeed very pleaſing.

III. The ſhorteſt Trochaick verſe in our language is that uſed by Swift in a burleſque poem called a Lilliputian Ode, conſiſting of one trochee and a long ſyllable.

Īn ămāze
Loſt I gaze.

This meaſure is totally void of dignity, and cannot be uſed on any ſerious occaſion. I am therefore ſurpriſed, that Brown, in his excellent ode on the Cure of Saul, ſhould have adopted it in a ſpeech aſcribed to the Supreme Being:

Tumult ceaſe.
Sink to peace.

2. The ſecond Engliſh form of the pure Trochaick conſiſts of two feet, and is likewiſe too brief for any ſerious purpoſe;

Ōn thĕ mōūntăin,
By a fountain!

or of two feet and an additional long ſyllable:

In thĕ dāys ŏf ōld
Stories plainly told
Lovers felt annoy.

Theſe three lines are from an old ballad: the meaſure is very uncommon.

3. The third ſpecies conſiſts of three trochees;

Whēn thĕ ſēās wĕre rōārĭng,
Phyllis lay deploring:

or of three trochees with an additional long ſyllable;

Thēē thĕ vōīce thĕ dānce ŏbey.

This is often mixed with the Iambick of four feet, and makes an agreeable variety, when judiciouſly introduced, as in the *Allegro* and *Penſeroſo* of Milton;

Iamb. But come, thou goddeſs fair and free,
In heaven ycleped Euphroſyne.
Troch. Come, and trip it as you go;
On the light fantaſtick toe.

4. The fourth Trochaick ſpecies conſiſts of four trochees:

Dāys ŏf ēaſe ănd nīghts ŏf plēāſŭre.

Which followed alternately by the preceding, forms a beautiful Lyrick verſe, whereof we have a ſpecimen in one of the fineſt ballads in the Engliſh language:

Ās nĕar Pōrtŏbēllŏ lyĭng Ōn thĕ gēntlў ſwēllĭng flōōd
At midnight with ſtreamers flying Our triumphant navy rode.

It is remarkable, that (as Mr. Weſt has ſomewhere obſerved) the ſame meaſure occurs in the Greek tragedians, as in this of Euripides:

* Proſkunô s' anax nomoiſi barbaroiſi proſpesôn.

And there is an elegant Latin poem called *Pervigilium Veneris*, commonly aſcribed to Catullus; of which, allowing for ſome

* Προσκυνω σ' αναξ νομοισι βαρβαροισι προσπεσων.

varieties incident to the Latin Trochaick verſe, the meaſure is the ſame:

Ver novum, ver jam canorum; vere nubent alites;
Vere concordant amores; vere natus orbis eſt.

With an additional long ſyllable, our fourth Trochaick ſpecies would be as follows:

Īdlĕ, āftĕr dīnnĕr, īn hĭs chāīr,
Sat a farmer, ruddy, fat, and fair.

But this meaſure is very uncommon.

5. So is the fifth Trochaick ſpecies, conſiſting of five trochees; whereof I do not remember to have ſeen a ſpecimen in any printed poem.

Āll thăt wālk ŏn fōōt ŏr rīde ĭn chārĭŏts,
All that dwell in palaces or garrets.

This ſort of verſe, with an additional long ſyllable, might be thus exemplified:

Plēāſănt wās thĕ mōrnĭng, ānd thĕ mōnth wăs May,
Colin went to London in his beſt array.

Some Scotch ballads are in this meaſure; but I know not whether I have ever ſeen a ſpecimen in Engliſh.

6. The ſixth form of the pure Engliſh Trochaick conſiſts of ſix trochees; whereof the following couplet is an example:

Ōn ă mōūntăin ſtrētch'd bĕnēath ă hōārў wīllŏw
Lay a ſhepherd ſwain, and view'd the rolling billow.

which is, I think, the longeſt Trochaick line that our language admits of.

IV. The ſhorteſt poſſible Anapeſtick verſe muſt be a *ſingle* anapeſt:

Bŭt ĭn vāĭn
They complain.

But

But this meaſure is ambiguous: for, by laying the emphaſis on the firſt and third ſyllables, we might make it Trochaick. And therefore the firſt and ſimpleſt form of our anapeſtick verſe is made up of two anapeſts:

Bŭt hĭs cōūrăge găn fāĭl,
For no arts could avail.

or of two anapeſts with an additional ſhort ſyllable:

Thĕn hĭs cōūrăge găn fāĭl hĭm,
For no arts could avail him.

2. The ſecond conſiſts of three anapeſts:

Wĭth hĕr mīēn ſhĕ ĕnāmoūrs thĕ brāve,
With her wit ſhe engages the free,
With her modeſty pleaſes the grave;
She is every way pleaſing to me.

This is a delightful meaſure, and much uſed in paſtoral ſongs. Shenſtone's ballad in four parts, from which the example is quoted, is an exquiſite ſpecimen. So is the Scotch ballad of *Tweedſide*, and Rowe's *Deſpairing beſide a clear ſtream*; which laſt is perhaps the fineſt love-ſong in the world. And that the ſame meaſure is well ſuited to burleſque, appears from the very humourous ballad called *The tippling Philoſophers*; which begins thus, *Diogenes ſurly and proud*, &c. — Obſerve, that this, like all the other anapeſtick forms, often (indeed for the moſt part) takes an iambus in the firſt place,

Dĕſpāīrĭng bĕſīde ă clĕar ſtrēām;

and formerly in the firſt and third,

Grĭm kĭng ŏf thĕ ghōſts, măke hāſte
And bring hither all your train:

But this laſt variety is unpleaſing to a modern ear. — With an additional ſhort ſyllable it is as follows:

Săy̆s mў̆ ūnclĕ, I̊ prāy yŏu dĭſcōvĕr
Why you pine and you whine like a lover:

which, uſed alternately with the preceding, makes the meaſure of the witty ballad of Molly Mog, written by Gay, and often imitated.

3. The third form of the pure Engliſh anapeſtick conſiſts of four anapeſts:

Ăt thĕ clōſe ŏf thĕ dāy, whĕn thĕ hāmlĕt ĭs ſtĭll.—
If I live to grow old, as I find I go down.—

This meaſure, which reſembles the French heroick verſe, is common in Engliſh ſongs and ballads, and other ſhort compoſitions both comical and ſerious. It admits a ſhort ſyllable at the end,

On the cold cheek of Death ſmiles and roſes are blending:

and ſometimes alſo between the ſecond and third foot,

Ĭn thĕ mōrnĭng whĕn ſōbĕr, ĭn thĕ ēvenĭng whĕn mĕllŏw:

which is the longeſt form of the regular Anapeſtick in the Engliſh language.

To one or other of theſe ſeven Iambick, ſix Trochaick, and three Anapeſtick, ſpecies, every line of Engliſh poetry, if we except thoſe few that are compoſed of dactyls, may be reduced. I have given only the ſimpleſt form of each. The ſeveral licences or variations, that theſe ſimple forms admit of, might be without difficulty enumerated: but I cannot at preſent enter into the niceties of Engliſh proſody.

Sidney endeavoured to bring in Engliſh hexameters, and has given ſpecimens of them in the *Arcadia*. And Wallis, in his grammar, tranſlates a Latin hexameter,

Quid faciam? moriar? et Amyntam perdet Amyntas?

into an Engliſh one,

What ſhall I do? ſhall I die? ſhall Amyntas murder Amyntas?

Mr. Walpole, in his catalogue of Royal and Noble authors, aſcribes the following to Queen Elizabeth:

Perſius a crab-ſtaff, bawdy Martial, Ovid a fine wag.

But this ſort of verſe has never obtained any footing in our poetry: and I think I could prove, from the peculiarities of its rhythm, that it never can.

So much for the nature and uſe of EMPHASIS: which I divided into *Rhetorical* and *Syllabick*; ſubdividing the latter into the *long-vowelled* emphatick ſyllable, which is always long, and the *ſhort-vowelled* emphatick ſyllable, which, when long, is made ſo by the complexneſs of the final conſonants.

CHAP. V.

Of Accent. Its nature and uſe.— Standard of Pronunciation.

EMPHASIS is the work of the lungs; but ACCENT is performed by the contraction or dilatation of the glottis. For, while we ſpeak with underſtanding, our voice is continually varying, not only its emphaſis, but alſo its *tone*, from acute to grave, and from grave to acute. This is Accent. Inaccurate obſervers are not ſenſible of it in themſelves, but think they ſpeak without any tone; though at the ſame time they allow, that people who come from a diſtance have a tone in their ſpeech, that is perceptible enough, and not very agreeable. And the ſtranger complains of their accent in the ſame terms, and with equal juſtice.

Thus I have heard a man of Edinburgh ſay, We have no tone; our voice in ſpeaking is uniform, and not more grave, or more acute at one time, than at another; but go to Glaſgow, and there you will hear a tone; or go to Aberdeen, and you will hear a tone

ſtill

ſtill more remarkable, though of a different kind. Nay, a Londoner, a man of wit and genius, affirmed in my hearing, that the Engliſh ſpoken in the metropolis was for this particular reaſon the moſt elegant, becauſe there, in polite company, the ſpeech was unaccented, whereas, in every other part of the Britiſh empire, people ſpoke with a tone. And a clergyman of Virginia aſſured me very ſeriouſly, that the Engliſh of that province was the beſt in the world; and aſſigned the ſame reaſon in favour of the Virginian pronunciation. But every word theſe gentlemen ſpoke was to my ear a convincing proof, that they were miſtaken. It is true, the North-American Engliſh accent is not ſo animated, as that of Middleſex, and the adjoining counties; but it is very perceptible notwithſtanding. In fact, there is no ſuch thing in language as monotony, or a continuation of the ſame note in ſpeech, without ever riſing above, or falling below it. Some children are taught to read in this manner; but their pronunciation is inſipid and ridiculous. And though a man, who has a muſical ear, and the command of his voice, might no doubt utter many words without any variation of accent, yet, if he were to ſpeak ſo in company, he would be ſuppoſed to have loſt his wits.

But, if every body ſpeak with a tone, why, it may be ſaid, does not every body perceive his own, as well as his neighbour's? It may be anſwered, that ſome, nay that many, perſons do perceive their own accent; and that they, who do not, become inſenſible of it by habit. We ſometimes meet with thoſe who have acquired a cuſtom of ſpeaking very loud, or very low, and yet are not ſenſible, that they ſpeak lower or louder than other people. Nay profane ſwearers have been heard to affirm with an oath, that they were not ſwearing. Our native accent, eſpecially if we have never been from home, being continually in our ear, it is no wonder that we ſhould not diſcern its peculiarities. But let a man, who

has been born and bred in Aberdeen, live two or three years in Edinburgh or London; and he ſhall become both inſenſible to the tone of the place of his reſidence, and alſo ſenſible of the accent that adheres to the dialect of his native town. In England, in Ireland, in the ſouth and in the north of Scotland, the people ſpeak dialects of one and the ſame language: and yet it is not difficult to know, by the tone of his voice in ſpeaking, even before we hear him ſo plainly as to diſtinguiſh the words, whether the ſpeaker be of England or of Ireland, a native of Lothian, or of Kincardineſhire, of Aberdeen, or of Inverneſs. And if even the provincial dialects of the ſame tongue are diſtinguiſhable by their accents, we may with reaſon conclude, that the languages of different nations will be more remarkably diſtinguiſhed in this way: which in fact is found to be the caſe.

Of all the nations upon earth, the antient Greeks ſeem to have been the moſt attentive to language. Their own they ſtudied, both in the compoſition, and in the pronunciation, with extraordinary care. The tones of it could not eſcape the notice of that ſagacious people. In order to make theſe of eaſier acquiſition to ſtrangers, they did what no other nation ever thought of doing, they uſed in writing certain characters, ſtill retained in their books, and called the Greek accents, of which the meaning was, to regulate the tone of the voice in ſpeech. We know they were invented for this purpoſe; though we cannot now make any uſe of them in our pronunciation of the Greek tongue.

It has been ſaid, that the ſyllable marked with the *acute* accent was pronounced four or five notes higher than the non-accented ſyllables; that the *grave* accent ſignified a fall of the voice through the ſame interval nearly; and that the *circumflex* denoted a riſe followed by a fall, which, as it took up double the time of a ſimple fall or riſe, made the ſyllable ſo accented neceſſarily

long

long. But I am not ſatisfied with this account: for the paſſage quoted by a learned author, from Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, in proof of it, is very obſcure. At any rate, theſe marks could have regulated the ſyllabick accents only: whereas, with us, accent is more diſtinguiſhable in the cadence of words and phraſes *, than in ſyllables. Be this, however, as it will (for I affirm nothing poſitively in a matter ſo little known) it is evident, that the Latin word *accentus* (from *ad* and *cantus*), and the correſpondent term in Greek † *proſôdia*, (from *pros* and *ôdê*) muſt, in their primitive ſignification, have had a reference to ſong, or muſical tone, and not (as ſome have thought) to thoſe energies of the human voice, which are here expreſſed by the word Emphaſis.

But let it be obſerved, that though in ſpeech the voice is continually varying its tone, and is ſometimes more acute, and at other times more grave, it does not, in modern languages at leaſt, aſcend or deſcend, by thoſe muſical intervals which are called notes, but riſes and falls by degrees of variation incomparably more minute, and which our muſical language has no terms nor ſymbols to

* Mr. Sheridan, in thoſe elegant Lectures which I heard him deliver at Edinburgh about twenty years ago, diſtinguiſhed (if I rightly remember) the Engliſh interrogatory accent from the Iriſh and the Scotch, in this manner. His example was: "How "have you been this great while?"—in pronouncing which, he obſerved, that towards the end of the ſentence an Engliſhman lets his voice fall, an Iriſhman raiſes his, and a Scotchman makes his voice firſt fall and then riſe. The remark is well founded; but it is difficult to expreſs in unexceptionable terms a matter of ſo great nicety. I ſhall only add, that what is here ſaid of the Scotch accent, though it may hold true of the more ſoutherly provinces, is by no means applicable to the dialects that prevail in Aberdeenſhire, and other parts of the north: where the voice of the common people, in concluding a clauſe or ſentence, riſes into a very ſhrill and ſharp tone without any previous fall. "You bark in your ſpeech," ſays a man of Edinburgh to one of Aberdeen: "And you growl and grumble in yours," replies the Aberdonian. In Inverneſs-ſhire, and the weſtern parts of Moray, the accents become totally different, and reſemble the tones and aſpirations of the Erſe.

† προσωδια, from προς *ad*, and ωδη *cantus*.

expreſs.

expreſs. A muſician, ſounding the ſtring of a violin by drawing his bow acroſs, and at the ſame time making his finger *ſlide* up and down the ſtring without *lifting* it, would produce a ſort of ſound ſomewhat ſimilar, in its *mode* of riſing and falling, to thoſe varieties of accent which take place in language. An attempt has lately been made by Mr. Steele, to expreſs certain accents of the Engliſh tongue by a new-invented ſort of written characters. The work, I hear, is very ingenious; but, as I have not ſeen it, I can ſay nothing more about it.

From what has been ſaid, we may learn, that, as every nation and province has a particular accent, and as no man can ſpeak intelligibly without one, we ought not to take offence at the tones of a ſtranger, nor give him any ground to ſuſpect, that we are diſpleaſed with, or even ſenſible of them. However diſagreeable his accent may be to us, ours, it is likely, is equally ſo to him. The common rule of equity, therefore, will recommend mutual forbearance in this matter. To ſpeak with the Engliſh, or with the Scotch, accent, is no more praiſeworthy, or blameable, than to be born in England, or Scotland: a circumſtance, which, though the ringleaders of ſedition, or narrow-minded bigots, may applaud or cenſure, no perſon of ſenſe, or common honeſty, will ever conſider as imputable to any man.

Are, then, all provincial accents equally good? By no means. Of accent, as well as of ſpelling, ſyntax, and idiom, there is a ſtandard in every polite nation. And, in all theſe particulars, the example of approved authors, and the practice of thoſe, who, by their rank, education, and way of life, have had the beſt opportunities to know men and manners, and domeſtick and foreign literature, ought undoubtedly to give the law. Now it is in the metropolis of a kingdom, and in the moſt famous ſchools of learning, where the greateſt reſort may be expected of perſons adorned

with all uſeful and elegant accompliſhments. The language, therefore, of the moſt learned and polite perſons in London, and the neighbouring Univerſities of Oxford and Cambridge, ought to be accounted the ſtandard of the Engliſh tongue, eſpecially in accent and pronunciation: ſyntax, ſpelling, and idiom, having been aſcertained by the practice of Good authors, and the conſent of former ages.

And there are two reaſons for this preference. One is, that we naturally approve as elegant what is cuſtomary among our ſuperiours. And another, and a better, reaſon is, becauſe the moſt enlightened minds muſt be ſuppoſed to be the beſt judges of propriety in ſpeech, as well as in every other thing that does not affect the conſcience.

The ſtandard of ſpeech being thus aſcertained, provincial dialects are to be conſidered as more or leſs elegant, according as they more or leſs reſemble it. And it has been the wiſh of many, that the ſame modes of language ſhould prevail through the whole empire. But this, however deſirable, is perhaps impoſſible. At leaſt there never yet was any inſtance of it in an extenſive country. The Greeks themſelves, with all their philological accuracy, had different dialects: — the apoſtle Peter, when at Jeruſalem, was known by his ſpeech to be a man of Galilee: — Livy has been accuſed of provincial idioms, though his native city Padua was but two hundred miles from Rome: — in the ſouthern part of this iſland there have long been two diſtinct languages, the Engliſh and Welch; and two others in the north, the Scotch and Erſe, which are different from theſe, as well as from one another: — the dialects of Lancaſhire and Yorkſhire are hardly underſtood in London: — even in Kent, and in Berkſhire, we hear words and ſounds, that are not known in Middleſex: — nay, the ſpeech of the learned Londoner and Pa-

riſian differs not a little, both in idiom, and in accent, from that of his unlettered fellow-citizens.

As Emphaſis gives energy to pronunciation, Accent renders it graceful; and is no doubt of further benefit, in diſtinguiſhing from one another the ſeveral tribes of mankind. For in many caſes, it might be inconvenient to miſtake a ſtranger for a fellow-ſubject; or not to have the means of proving a man's identity, or his birth-place, from the tone of his language. By their handwriting, and features, individuals may be diſtinguiſhed; and the national arrangements of mankind, by their words and accent. And of all the peculiarities of a foreign tongue, accent is the moſt difficult for a grown perſon to acquire. No Frenchman, who has not paſſed his infancy or childhood in England, will ever ſpeak Engliſh with the true accent. Scotch men have lived forty years in London without entirely loſing their native tone. And it may be doubted, whether it is poſſible for one, who has lived the firſt twenty years of his life in North Britain, ever to acquire all the niceties of Engliſh pronunciation.—The ſame thing may be remarked of other languages, and the natives of other countries.

CHAP. VI.

Abſurdity of the Epicurean doctrine of the Origin of language: men muſt have ſpoken in all ages; the firſt man, by inſpiration. — The variety of original tongues, a proof of the Scripture hiſtory of Babel. — All languages have ſome things in common, which it is the buſineſs of Univerſal Grammar to explain.

WE learn to ſpeak, when our organs are moſt flexible, and our powers of imitation moſt active; that is, when we are infants. Yet even then, this is no eaſy acquiſition, but the effect of daily exerciſe continued for ſeveral years from morning to night. Were we never to attempt ſpeech, till we are grown up, there is reaſon to think that we ſhould find it exceedingly difficult, if not impracticable. This appears, not only from what is recorded of mute Savages found in deſarts, who, though ſagacious enough and of no great age, could never be taught to ſpeak diſtinctly; one of whom, anſwering this deſcription, was alive, and in England, a few years ago, and perhaps is alive ſtill: but alſo from a fact more obſervable, namely, that in every language there are certain accents and articulate ſounds, which they only can pronounce with eaſe, who have learned to do ſo when very young. Nay every province almoſt has ſome peculiarities of pronunciation, which the people of the neighbouring provinces find it very difficult to imitate, when grown up, but which, when they were children, they could have learned moſt perfectly in a few months. Infants, who have been taught to ſpeak one language, acquire others with amazing facility. I knew an inſtance of a French child of ſix years old, who, on coming to Britain, forgot his mother tongue, and learned all

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the Engliſh he had occaſion for, in little more than ſix weeks. A grown man, on the contrary, with all the helps of grammars, dictionaries, authors, maſters, and converſation, ſeldom acquires a foreign tongue ſo as to ſpeak it like a native.

If, then, there ever was a time, when all mankind were, as the Epicureans ſuppoſed, *mutum et turpe pecus*, a dumb and brutal race of animals, all mankind muſt, in the ordinary courſe of things, have continued dumb to this day.—For, firſt, to ſuch animals ſpeech could not be neceſſary; as they are ſuppoſed to have exiſted for ages without it: and it is not to be imagined, that dumb and beaſtly ſavages would ever think of contriving unneceſſary arts, whereof they had no example in the world around them.

Lucretius tells us, that, at ſome early period, nobody knows when, the woods being ſet on fire, either by lightning, or by trees grated againſt each other in the agitation of a ſtorm, human creatures, who, like the world and all things in it, had been formed of atoms falling together without order, direction, or cauſe, and who had hitherto lived diſperſed and naked, as well as dumb, were ſo enervated by the heat of the conflagration, that they could never after hold out againſt the injuries of the weather:—that, conſtrained to take ſhelter in holes and caverns, males and females, jumbled together by accident, became known to each other, and in time reſolved themſelves into ſmall aſſociations or families:—that from henceforth men knew their own offſpring; which formerly they did not; the intercourſe of the ſexes being then fortuitous and temporary, and without friendſhip on either ſide:—that the minds of thoſe rugged ſavages, ſoftened by the blandiſhments of domeſtick life, became in time ſomewhat more rational; and, after a little communication with the neighbouring families, found it neceſſary, for the general ſafety, to inſtitute certain artificial diſtinctions of right and wrong, whereof, till this period, they had never been

conſcious. Theſe new notions, however, could not be enforced, nor obtain authority, without promiſes and compact; for the making of which, it was further requiſite to invent certain ſigns of thought, that ſhould have a more definite meaning, than the yells and geſtures that had hitherto given expreſſion to their feelings. And thus, both ſpeech and moral ſentiments were invented; which, according to this account, were as really the work of human art, as houſes, waggons, ſhips, or any other piece of mechaniſm.

The beauty of Lucretius's poetry made this ſyſtem faſhionable at Rome. Horace adopted it, and has in a few well-known lines* given a ſummary of it; and Virgil, in his youth, (for he afterwards became a Platoniſt) is ſuppoſed to have been tinctured with it.

Cum prorepſerunt primis animalia terris,
Mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter,
Unguibus et pugnis, dein fuſtibus, atque ita porro
Pugnabant armis, quæ poſt fabricaverat uſus;
Donec verba, quibus voces ſenſuſque notarent,
Nominaque invenere; dehinc abſiſtere bello, &c.
Lib. i. Sat. 3. v. 97.

The following paraphraſe has nothing of the elegance of Horace or Lucretius; but ſeems to have all the elegance that ſo ridiculous a doctrine deſerves:

When men out of the earth of old
A dumb and beaſtly vermin crawl'd;
For acorns, firſt, and holes of ſhelter,
They, tooth and nail, and helter ſkelter,
Fought fiſt to fiſt; then with a club
Each learn'd his brother brute to drub;
Till, more experienced grown, theſe cattle
Forged fit accoutrements for battle.
At laſt (Lucretius ſays, and Creech)
They ſet their wits to work on *ſpeech*:
And, that their thoughts might all have marks
To make them known, theſe learned clerks
Left off the trade of cracking crowns,
And manufactured verbs and nouns.

Nay

Nay Tully himſelf *, though no admirer of Epicurean tenets, appears rather partial to this account of the origin of ſpeech, laws, and policy; which, though repugnant to hiſtory, and fraught with abſurdity, ſeveral authors of latter times have endeavoured to revive.

One would wonder, what charms men could find in a ſyſtem ſo degrading to our nature; or what evidence in that which has no other foundation, than poetical fancy and wild hypotheſis. The Pagans, indeed, who knew little of the origin of mankind, might be excuſed for favouring an opinion, which, as it appears in Lucretius, has at leaſt harmonious numbers, and elegant deſcription to recommend it. And yet, unſeduced by poetical allurement, Quintilian declares, in the language of true philoſophy, that moral ſentiments are natural to us, and that men had ſpeech from the beginning, and received that choice gift from their Creator. And Ovid's beautiful account of the firſt men ſeems to have been compoſed, partly from Heſiod's golden age, and partly from traditions founded upon the Moſaick hiſtory of the creation.—That we were at firſt good and happy, and loſt our felicity when we loſt our innocence,—is it not an idea more honourable to our nature, more friendly to virtue, and more conſonant to the general notions of mankind, than that we were in the beginning a ſpecies of wild beaſt, and afterwards by improvement degenerated into wicked and wretched men. If there be, in the conſciouſneſs of honourable deſcent, any thing that elevates the ſoul, ſurely thoſe writings cannot be on the ſide of virtue which repreſent our nature, and our origin, as ſuch as we ſhould have reaſon to be aſhamed of. But he, who tells me, upon the authority of Scripture, and agreeably to the dictates of right reaſon, that we are all deſcended from beings, who were created in the

* *De Inventione*, lib. 1. *Tuſcul. quæſt.* lib. 5.

image of God, wiſe, innocent, and happy; that, by their and our unworthy conduct, human nature is miſerably degraded; but that, on the performance of certain moſt reaſonable conditions, we may retrieve our primitive dignity, and riſe even to higher happineſs, than that of our firſt parents;—the man, I ſay, who teaches this doctrine, ſets before me the moſt animating motives to virtue, humility, and hope, to piety and benevolence, to gratitude and adoration.

Other abſurdities in this account of the origin of ſociety I may poſſibly touch upon hereafter. At preſent I would only obſerve, that *ſpeech* could not have been invented in the way here deſcribed. For to animals in this ſtate of brutality I already remarked, that language could not be needful: and it is hardly to be ſuppoſed, that dumb and beaſtly creatures would apply themſelves to the cultivation of unneceſſary arts, which they had never felt any inconvenience from the want of, and which had never been attempted by other animals. To which I may add, what is clear from ſome of the preceding obſervations, that Speech, if invented at all, muſt have been invented, either by children, who were incapable of invention, or by men, who were incapable of ſpeech. And therefore reaſon, as well as hiſtory, intimates, that mankind in all ages muſt have been ſpeaking animals; the young having conſtantly acquired this art by imitating thoſe who were elder. And we may warrantably ſuppoſe, that our firſt parents muſt have received it by immediate inſpiration.

As the firſt language, whatever it was, muſt therefore have been perfect; and liable to no depravation from a mixture of foreign idioms; and held in reverence by thoſe who ſpoke it, that is, by all mankind, on account of its divine original; we may believe, that it would continue unaltered for many ages. Accordingly Scripture informs us, that when the building of Babel was begun,

about

about eighteen hundred years after the fall, the whole earth was of one ſpeech. And, had no miraculous interpoſition taken place, it is probable, that ſome traces of it would have remained in every language to this day. For, though, in ſo long a time, many words muſt have been changed, many introduced, and many forgotten, in every country, yet men, being all of the ſame family, and all deriving their ſpeech from the only one primitive tongue, it may be preſumed, that ſome of the original words would ſtill have been in uſe throughout the whole earth: even as in all the modern languages of Europe ſome Greek, and ſome Hebrew, and a great deal of Latin, is ſtill diſcernible. But Providence thought fit to prevent this; and, by confounding the language of the builders of Babel, to eſtabliſh in the world a variety of primitive tongues.

This miracle could not fail to be attended with important conſequences. Thoſe men only would remain in the ſame ſociety who underſtood one another: and ſo the human race would be broken into a number of ſmall tribes or nations, each of which would keep together, and conſequently at ſome diſtance from the reſt. A general diſperſion would follow: and in this way it is probable, that the whole world would be ſooner inhabited, than if all the ſpecies had remained united in one great nation. And the diſtinctions of friend and ſtranger, of citizen and foreigner, would now take place: whence rivalſhip would ariſe; than which nothing more effectually promotes induſtry, and the various arts of life.

If it were not for what is recorded of Babel, the very great diverſities of human ſpeech would be a marvellous phenomenon. Languages are either Primitive, or Derived. That thoſe which are formed out of the ſame parent tongue ſhould all reſemble it and one another, and yet ſhould all be different, is not more wonderful, than that children and their parents ſhould be marked with a

general family likeneſs, and each diſtinguiſhed by peculiar features. Spaniſh, Italian, Portugueſe, French, and a great deal of the Engliſh tongue, are derived from the Latin; with the addition of many new words, and new modes of termination and ſyntax, which were introduced by the northern nations. And therefore all theſe languages reſemble the Latin and one another; and yet each is different from it, and from all the reſt. But, if we could compare two original or primitive tongues together, the Hebrew, for inſtance, with the Gothick or with the Celtick, or the language of China with that of the Hurons in North America, we ſhould not diſcern, perhaps, the leaſt ſimilitude: which, conſidering that all mankind are of the ſame family, could not be fully accounted for, without ſuppoſing, that ſome preternatural event, like that of the confuſion at Babel, had ſome time or other taken place. But this hiſtory ſolves all difficulties. And we have no more reaſon to be ſurpriſed, that different nations, though related in blood, ſhould ſpeak languages totally unlike, than that couſins of the twentieth remove, living in different climates, ſome in houſes and ſome in caves, ſome naked and others clothed, ſome burning in the torrid zone, and others freezing in the polar circle, ſhould differ in their features and complexion.

But, as the miracle at Babel introduced no material change into human nature; and as, ever ſince the flood, men have had the ſame faculties, have been placed in the ſame or in like circumſtances, have felt the ſame wants, found comfort in the ſame gratifications, and acted from the influence of the ſame motives; it is reaſonable to infer, that the *thoughts* of men muſt in all ages have been nearly the ſame. In the moſt antient hiſtories we find, that the modes of thinking and acting, of believing and diſbelieving, of approbation and diſapprobation, are perfectly ſimilar to what we experience in ourſelves, and in the world around us. Now, as human thoughts,

diſcover

diſcover themſelves by language, and as the thoughts of men in one age and nation are ſimilar to thoſe in another, is it not probable, that there may be in all human languages ſome general points of reſemblance, in ſtructure at leaſt, if not in ſound? Since, for example, all men in all ages muſt have had occaſion to ſpeak of acting, and of being acted upon, of good and of bad qualities, and of the various objects of outward ſenſe, muſt there not in every language be verbs, and adjectives, and nouns? What one nation calls * *hippos*, another may call *equus*, a third *cavallo*, a fourth *cheval*, and a fifth *horſe*; that is, different compoſitions of articulate ſound may ſtand for the ſame animal in different nations: but, in every nation, where this animal is known and ſpoken of, there muſt be ſome name for it; and words alſo to expreſs its qualities, as *good*, *bad*, *ſtrong*, *ſwift*, *weak*, *ſlow*, *black*, *white*, *great*, *ſmall*, and its actions, as *running*, *walking*, *eating*, *drinking*, *neighing*, &c.

Languages, therefore, reſemble men in this reſpect, that, though each has peculiarities, whereby it is diſtinguiſhed from every other, yet all have certain qualities in common. The peculiarities of individual tongues are explained in their reſpective grammars and dictionaries. Thoſe things, that all languages have in common, or that are neceſſary to every language, are treated of in a ſcience, which ſome have called *Univerſal* or *Philoſophical Grammar*; whereof I ſhall now endeavour to unfold the principles. The knowledge of it will not only illuſtrate what we may already have learned of the grammatical art; but alſo, by tracing that matter to its firſt elements, will give us more comprehenſive views of it than can be obtained from any particular grammar; and at the ſame time make us better judges of the nature and extent of human language,

* ἵππος.

and of the connection, that obtains between our words and thoughts. Conſidered as reſulting from, and as founded in, the faculties and circumſtances of human beings, the principles of grammar form an important, and very curious, part of the philoſophy of the human mind.

Much new diſcovery is not to be looked for, in an inveſtigation that has been ſeveral times attempted already with good ſucceſs. Yet moſt of thoſe who have gone before me in this inquiry (as far at leaſt as I am acquainted with them) have both profited by the labours of their predeceſſors, and alſo made conſiderable improvements of their own. Whether I ſhall be thought to have done ſo in any degree, I know not. This, however, let me be permitted to ſay, that for many of the following, as well as of the preceding, remarks, I am not indebted to former authors; that in ſome particulars I have ventured to differ, and I hope not without reaſon, from thoſe whom I eſteem, and by whoſe writings I have been inſtructed; and that, though ſeveral of the topicks are not without obſcurity, the whole is delivered in a ſtyle, which, by repeated experience, I know to be intelligible, and not unintereſting, even to very young perſons. Speculations of this nature are not ſo ſoon exhauſted as ſome people may imagine. Every writer and teacher, who has taken pains to form a ſtyle, and to underſtand his ſubject, will be found to have a manner of his own: and as long as readers and hearers differ in their taſtes and powers of comprehenſion, ſo long it may be uſeful, in explaining the ſciences, to vary the modes of illuſtration and argument.

But before I proceed to Univerſal Grammar, it will be proper to make ſome remarks on language rendered viſible by writing.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Art of Writing; its importance, and origin.—Different ſorts of it practiſed by different nations.—A ſhort Hiſtory of Printing.

A WORD is an audible and articulate ſign of thought: a Letter is a viſible ſign of an articulate ſound. The uſe of letters is a wonderful invention; but by no means univerſal. Every man can ſpeak who is not deaf; and men have ſpoken in all ages; but in many nations the art of writing is ſtill unknown.

Words ſpoken make an immediate impreſſion, but depend, for their permanence, upon the memory of the ſpeaker and hearer; and the beſt memory loſes more than it retains: but words written may be preſerved from age to age, and made as durable as any thing human can be.—When we ſpeak, we are underſtood no further than we are heard: but what is written may be ſent round the world, and circulated in all nations.—We can ſpeak no longer than we live: but the thoughts of men, who died three thouſand years ago, are ſtill extant in writing; and, by means of this divine art, will continue to entertain and inſtruct mankind to the end of the world.—Moreover, while we only meditate, our memory is not always ſo faithful as to enable us to reviſe our thoughts, compare them together, and render them conſiſtent: but by writing we make them paſs and repaſs in review before us, till we have made them ſuch as we wiſh them to be.—God has been pleaſed to reveal his will to us in writing; and, without this art, policy, which is the moſt venerable of all *human* inſtitutions, would be exceedingly imperfect.

The importance of writing to the virtue and happineſs of mankind, as well as to the aſcertaining, methodizing, preſerving, and extending, of human knowledge, is indeed ſo great, that one is apt to wonder, how any age or country ſhould be ignorant of an art, which may be acquired with ſo little difficulty, and exerciſed with ſo much pleaſure. But, though of eaſy acquiſition to us, it is in itſelf neither eaſy nor obvious. Savages articulate their mother tongue, without troubling themſelves about the analyſis of ſentences, or the ſeparation of words; of reſolving words into the ſimple elementary ſounds they have no idea: how then ſhould they think of expreſſing thoſe ſimple ſounds by viſible and permanent ſymbols! In fact, alphabetical writing muſt be ſo remote from the conception of thoſe who never heard of it, that without divine aid it would ſeem to be unſearchable and impoſſible. No wonder then, that ſome authors ſhould have aſcribed it to Adam, and ſuppoſed it to be the effect of inſpiration.

Of the nature of Antediluvian, or of the firſt, writing, whether it was alphabetical, or by hieroglyphicks, we can only form conjectures. The wiſdom and ſimple manners of the firſt men would incline me to think, that they muſt have had an alphabet: for hieroglyphick characters imply quaintneſs and witticiſm. That Moſes knew an alphabet, is certain: and we may venture to ſay, he learned it in Egypt, where he was born and educated.

If this be granted, the hieroglyphicks of Egypt and Ethiopia will appear of later date than alphabetical writing; and to have been contrived, as many learned men have thought, by prieſts or politicians, for expreſſing, in a way not intelligible to the vulgar, the myſteries of religion and government. — A hieroglyphick, or *ſacred ſculpture*, is an emblematical figure, which denotes, not an articulate ſound, as a letter does, but an idea, or thing. It is a repreſentation

a repreſentation of ſome part of the human body, or of ſome animal, vegetable, or work of art; but it means, not that which it repreſents, but ſomething elſe that is, or is ſuppoſed to be, of a like nature. Thus, the figure of a lamp, among the Egyptian prieſts, ſignified, not a lamp, but life; a circle was the emblem of eternity; and an eye on the top of a ſceptre denoted a ſovereign.

Hieroglyphicks muſt have been a very imperfect mode of expreſſing thought. They took up a great deal of room; could hardly be connected ſo as to form a ſentence; were made ſlowly, and with difficulty; and, when made, were no better than riddles.

Ceſar, in his account of the Druids of Gaul, relates, that they obliged their diſciples to get by heart ſo great a number of verſes, that the term of their education was ſometimes lengthened out to twenty years. And we are told, that they accounted it unlawful to commit thoſe verſes to writing, notwithſtanding that they underſtood the Greek alphabet, and made uſe of it in their ordinary buſineſs both publick and private. "Two things," continues he, "ſeem to me to have determined them in this: firſt, that their "tenets might not be publiſhed to the vulgar: and, ſecondly, "that, having no books to truſt to, they might be the more "careful to improve their memory, and more accurate ſtudents "of the myſteries of their order." *—May not the Egyptian hieroglyphicks have been invented for the ſame purpoſes? By the vulgar they could not be underſtood: and their enigmatical nature made it neceſſary for the prieſts to ſtudy them, and conſequently the doctrines implied in them, with extraordinary perſeverance and application.

When the Spaniards invaded Mexico in the fifteenth century, the news of their landing was ſent to the emperor Motezuma, not

* Cæſar. Bell. Gall. lib. vi. cap. 13.

by writing, or by hieroglyphicks (for the Mexicans had neither) but by a rude draught or picture of the ſhips. This is no doubt a natural way of expreſſing things viſible: but I cannot agree in opinion with thoſe authors, who ſuppoſe it to have been the moſt antient form of *writing*; as it is ſo laborious, ſo liable to be miſunderſtood, expreſſive of ſo few ideas, and in general ſo very inconvenient. The Mexican, who carried the news, was certainly able to give a verbal account of what had happened. If he carried alſo a draught of the ſhips, it muſt have been, as we carry plans, with a view to give a more lively idea than words could convey. European ſhips had never appeared in that part of the world before; and if thoſe people had any ſkill in drawing, it was as natural for them to practiſe it on ſo memorable an occaſion, as it would be for us, if a huge unknown ſea-monſter were to be thrown upon the land.

In Peru and Chili, when we firſt became acquainted with thoſe countries, there was found a curious art, that in ſome meaſure ſupplied the place of writing. It was called *Quipos*; and conſiſted in certain arrangements of threads, or knots, of different colours; whereby they preſerved, in a way which we cannot explain, inventories of their moveables, and the remembrance of extraordinary events. The knowlege of the Quipos is ſaid to have been a great myſtery, handed down by tradition from fathers to their children, but never divulged by the parent, till he thought his life near an end.—Belts of *wampum* (as it is called) are probably contrivances of a like nature, made of a great number of little beads of different colours artfully, and not inelegantly, interwoven. Theſe belts are uſed by the Indians of North America in their treaties; and are ſaid to expreſs, I know not how, the particulars of the tranſaction.

In China, if we believe what is reported by travellers, the art of writing has been underſtood theſe three or four thouſand years; and yet they have no alphabet to this day *. There is for each word a diſtinct character; and the number of words is ſaid to be fourſcore thouſand: ſo that a Chineſe Doctor grows old and dies, before he has learned one half of his letters. The characters are of the nature of hieroglyphicks, but much curtailed or contracted for the ſake of expedition; ſo that their primitive ſhape cannot be gueſſed from their preſent form. They divide them into four claſſes: the antient, which are preſerved on account of their antiquity, but never uſed; a ſecond ſpecies appropriated to publick inſcriptions; a third, common enough in printing and even in writing, but too unwieldy for daily uſe; and a fourth, more manageable, for ordinary buſineſs.—It is further ſaid of the Chineſe tongue, that every word in it is a monoſyllable; and that one and the ſame ſyllable may have ten or a dozen different meanings, according to the tone with which it is pronounced. If this be true, there muſt be more accent in it, than in any other language that has yet been heard of; and we need not wonder, that it is of ſo difficult acquiſition to ſtrangers.

Some of our modern philoſophers affect to be great admirers of the genius, policy, and morality of the Chineſe. The truth is, that Europeans know very little of that remote people; and we are apt to admire what we do not underſtand: and for thoſe who,

* This is the common opinion, and was once mine. But I have been lately informed, by a Scotch gentleman, who reſided long at Batavia, that a Chineſe, on hearing his chriſtian name and ſurname, wrote ſomething upon paper, and that another Chineſe, on ſeeing it, articulated the two words diſtinctly. This could hardly have been done, except by thoſe who underſtood the art of expreſſing by written ſymbols the *elementary ſounds* of language. And yet it is poſſible, that the ſyllables which compoſe the name might be Chineſe words. The gentleman, however, is of opinion, that the trading people of China have a ſort of alphabet.

like the Chineſe, obſtinately ſhut their eyes againſt the light of the Goſpel, the French authors, now-a-days, and their imitators, are apt to cheriſh an extraordinary warmth of brotherly affection.—But if we conſider, that, though their empire is ſuppoſed to have ſtood for upwards of four thouſand years, the Chineſe are ſtill unſkilled in almoſt every branch of literature; that their moſt learned men have never thought it worth while to invent or adopt an alphabet, though they muſt have heard that there is ſuch a thing in other parts of the world; that their painting, though gaudy, is without perſpective, and looks like a maſs of things, men, trees, houſes, and mountains, heaped on one another's heads; that, when a fire broke out at Canton, whereof Commodore Anſon was an eye-witneſs, they did not know how to extinguiſh it, but held out the images of their gods to it: if we alſo conſider their proneneſs to deceit and theft; their low cunning; their abſurd jealouſy and timidity, which refuſes almoſt all communication with the reſt of the world; their exceſſive admiration of their own wiſdom, and their contempt of other nations, although they muſt be ſenſible, that one European ſhip of war could have nothing to fear from the whole force of their empire;—if, I ſay, we reflect on theſe things, we ſhall be inclined to think, that they are an ignorant and narrow-minded people, dextrous indeed in ſome petty manufactures, but incapable of enterpriſe, and invention, and averſe to inquiry. The long continuance and ſtrictneſs of their policy, which ſome admire as the effect of profound wiſdom, is to me a proof of their want of ſpirit: thoſe nations being moſt liberal in their conduct to ſtrangers, and withal moſt liable to political commotion, who are moſt eminently diſtinguiſhed for magnanimity and genius.

When we think, how difficult, and how inadequate, the methods hitherto mentioned are, of rendering language viſible and permanent,

nent, we muſt be ſtruck with wonder at the uſefulneſs and perfection of the alphabet. By this invention, if it may be ſo called, although every ſound in language has a correſpondent ſymbol, yet the characters are ſo few, and of a form ſo ſimple, that one may learn the uſe of them in a very ſhort time. Nay, with the help of a few additional ſymbols, one alphabet might ſerve for many languages. The Latin, and all the modern tongues derived from it, have the ſame ſyſtem of letters: and if we were accuſtomed to ſee Greek and Hebrew in the Roman character, we ſhould read them as well in that as in their own.—When things are fairly reduced to their firſt principles, it is pleaſing to obſerve, how the underſtanding is enlightened, and how eaſy that becomes in practice, which before ſeemed impoſſible from its multiplicity. Chineſe Doctors have no doubt been told, that by the European methods a perfect knowledge of written language might be acquired in half a year; but I ſuppoſe it would be no eaſy matter to make them believe it.

The alphabets of different tongues differ conſiderably in the number, order, and ſhape of the letters; and, as was before obſerved, it is preſumable, that in all the alphabets now extant there are both defects and redundancies. But this, though an inconvenience, is not very material; as the difficulties of pronunciation that reſult from it are eaſily overcome.

The implements of writing have been different at different periods. In very early times, writing was performed by engraving upon ſtone. Such at its firſt appearance was the Decalogue. And in the deſerts that lie between Egypt and Paleſtine, the rocks of certain mountains are ſaid to be covered with antient characters, ſuppoſed by ſome to have been carved by the people of Iſrael, while they ſojourned in that wilderneſs. Afterwards, letters delineated with a coloured liquid upon vegetable ſubſtances, as wood, the bark of trees, the Egyptian papyrus, (whence our word *paper*) were found more con-

venient on all ordinary occaſions. The Engliſh term *book* is ſuppoſed to be derived from a Saxon word ſignifying a beech-tree; whence it would appear, that wooden manuſcripts were in uſe among our anceſtors; and every body knows, that, in Latin, the bark of a tree, and a book, are called by the ſame name. Animal ſubſtances, eſpecially the ſkins of ſheep, goats, and calves, which in time came to be manufactured into parchment and vellum, were better ſuited to the purpoſes of writing, on account of their ſmoothneſs, pliableneſs, and durability: they are ſtill uſed in conveyances; and the firſt authentick copy of every Britiſh ſtatute is engroſſed on parchment.

The Romans, while they were compoſing, wrote with the ſharp end of a bodkin or ſtylus upon tables covered with wax, and, when they wanted to correct any thing, eraſed the former impreſſion with the other end, which was flat: whence Horace adviſes the author, who would compoſe what ſhould be worthy of a ſecond reading, to make frequent uſe of the other end of his pen *, that is, to correct much and carefully. When it was finiſhed to their mind, they had it tranſcribed upon paper or parchment, or ſomething of the ſame nature, called by Horace *charta* and *membrana*; which they rolled up, and kept in a box commonly made of cedar wood, or anointed with oyl of cedar, as a ſecurity againſt worms and rottenneſs. This roll of written parchment they termed *volumen*; a word which we have adopted; although our way of making up our books is very different, and much more convenient.

Pens, ink, and paper, according to the preſent uſe, were firſt known in Europe about ſix hundred years ago: but ſome writers will not allow them to be ſo antient. The learned Dr. Prideaux is of opinion, that the art of making paper of linen or flax is an eaſtern

* Sæpe ſtylum vertas, iterum quæ digna legi ſint Scripturus. *Sat. i. 10. 72.*

invention,

invention, and was introduced into Spain by the Saracens. But obſerve, that the *charta* mentioned by Pliny and other claſſick authors, though, like our paper, uſed both for writing and for binding up goods in parcels *, and alſo compoſed of vegetable ingredients, was however a different preparation: being made of the filmy fibres of the inner bark of the papyrus, laid on a table firſt parallel and then tranſverſe, and glued together by the muddy water of the Nile, or, where that was wanting, by a paſte made of fine flour and common water.

Printing, as well as paper-making, is of high antiquity in China. But the Chineſe printing is very different from ours, and much more imperfect. They carve the characters of every page upon wood; ſo that their printing reſembles our engraving. The firſt European printers proceeded in the ſame manner; but, as they had no intercourſe with China, their art was of their own invention. Printing by types, or moveable letters, is a great improvement; for, in this way, with a ſmall proviſion of types, we may print many books different from one another: whereas, to make a book by the former method, there muſt for every page be an engraved block of wood; and the engravings could be of no further uſe, if the ſame book were never reprinted. This muſt have made our firſt efforts in printing very expenſive and ſlow; but, ſlow and expenſive as they were, the diſcovery was important, and made books incomparably more numerous, and conſequently cheaper, than ever they could have been while manuſcripts only were in uſe. For though the carving of the wooden plates would take up more time than the tranſcribing of ſeveral copies, yet when the plates were finiſhed, thouſands of copies might be printed off in a few days.

Little is known of the firſt printers: nor has either the era or the birth-place of this wonderful invention been exactly aſcertained.

* See Horace. Lib. ii. Epiſt. i. 270, 113. Lib. i. Sat. x. 4.

The

The general opinion is, that printing with moveable types was firſt practiſed at Mentz about the year one thouſand four hundred and fifty; and that an edition of the Bible of that date was the firſt printed book, Auguſtin *de civitate Dei* the ſecond, and Tully's *offices* the third.

One of the firſt printers was Foſt, or Fauſt, or Fauſtus, who is thought by ſome to have been the inventor of moveable types. He did not chooſe to let the world into the ſecret of his art, for fear of leſſening the price of his books. And therefore, when he expoſed a parcel of them to ſale at Paris, he gave out that they were manuſcripts; which he might the more eaſily do, becauſe no body could ſuppoſe they were any thing elſe. And, that they might paſs for ſuch, without ſuſpicion, he had in printing left blank ſpaces for certain capital letters, which he afterwards inſerted with the pen, flouriſhed and illuminated, according to the faſhion of the times. But, when it was obſerved, how exactly one copy correſponded with another, and that there was not the ſmalleſt variation in the ſhape, ſize, or place, even of a ſingle letter, he was thought to have done what no human power could execute, and conſequently to have intercourſe with evil ſpirits; and found himſelf obliged, in order to avoid proſecution and puniſhment, to divulge the myſtery of printing. Hence came the vulgar tale of Doctor Fauſtus; who is ſaid in the ſtory-book to have been a great magician, and to have ſold himſelf to the devil.

Of the uſefulneſs of Printing, as the means of multiplying books without end, of promoting the improvement of arts and ſciences, and of diffuſing knowledge through all the claſſes of mankind, I need not enlarge, as the thing is too obvious to require illuſtration. I ſhall only mention one particular, which is abundantly ſtriking. Common bibles are in this country ſold in ſheets to the retailer at fourteen ſhillings a dozen, or fourteen pence apiece; as I was informed

informed by a perſon who dealt in that article to a very great extent. Thus is the price of the beſt book in the world reduced ſo low, that every perſon, however poor, may have one, either bought with his own money, or given him in charity. But, before the invention of printing, it would have been a great matter if every pariſh could have afforded to have a bible; as the expence of writing out ſo great a book would have been at leaſt equal to that of building an ordinary country church.

To us, who are acquainted with both arts, it may ſeem ſtrange, that the Greeks and Romans, who excelled in the engraving of ſeals and medals, ſhould never think of plates or types for printing. But arts may appear obvious after they are known, which are very far from the imagination of thoſe who never heard of them. The affairs of this world are ordered by Providence, who makes human wiſdom ſubſervient to its own good purpoſes. That the magnet attracts iron, was known to the antients; but its power of giving a polary direction to that metal was not found out till the thirteenth century.

Few arts have ſo ſoon become perfect, as this of Printing. In the library of Mariſchal College there is a Latin tranſlation of Appian's Roman hiſtory, printed at Venice in the year fourteen hundred and ſeventy-ſeven, that is, in the twenty-ſeventh year of the art, which, in the nice cut of the letters and neatneſs of the preſs-work, is hardly inferiour to any book of the preſent age. Its only fault, which it has in common with all the printed books of an early date, is the great number of contractions. Theſe were much affected by the firſt printers, in imitation, no doubt, of the manuſcript-writers, to whom they were a conſiderable ſaving both of time and of paper. They are now diſuſed in moſt languages, except the Greek; and it is to be wiſhed perhaps, that they were not uſed at all. In writing for one's own uſe one may employ

abbreviations, or the cyphers of ſhort hand, or any other characters that one is acquainted with; though even this is not prudent, except when one is obliged to write with uncommon expedition: but what is to be laid before the publick, or any other ſuperiour, ſhould have all poſſible clearneſs, and ought therefore to be free from contractions, and the like peculiarities.

Before the middle of the ſixteenth century, that is, in leſs than a hundred years after the invention of printing, this art was brought to its higheſt perfection, by the illuſtrious Robert and Henry Stephen; who have a claim to our admiration and gratitude, not only as the greateſt of printers, but alſo as the moſt careful editors, and moſt learned men, of modern times. The former publiſhed a *Theſaurus*, or Dictionary, of the Latin, and the latter a *Theſaurus* of the Greek tongue: works of aſtoniſhing accuracy and erudition, and without doubt the greateſt works of their kind in the world. Henry's *Greek poets*, in folio, is to this day ſtudied, and imitated, as a model of typographical excellence. And that edition by Robert, of the Greek Newteſtament, of which a copy is juſt now before me, printed in the year one thouſand five hundred and forty ſix, and which is commonly called *O mirificam*, (poſſibly from the ſuperlative elegance of the printing, but probably from the two firſt words of the Preface) is not yet ſurpaſſed in reſpect of beauty, nor perhaps equalled. Their ſtyle of printing has been ſucceſsfully imitated by my lamented friends Robert and Andrew Foulis of Glaſgow, who did much for the improvement of their country, and eſtabliſhed a taſte for elegant printing in Scotland; and whoſe folio Homer is one of the fineſt and moſt correct books that ever came from the preſs.

The Theory of Language.

PART II.

Of Univerſal Grammar.

INTRODUCTION.

THE words of different languages differ greatly in ſound. Nay, in this reſpect, two languages may be ſo unlike, that the moſt perfect knowlege of the one would not enable us to underſtand a ſingle word of the other. If, therefore, all languages have ſome things in common, thoſe things muſt be ſought for, not in the *ſound* of the words, but in their *ſignification* and *uſe*.

Now words are of various characters in regard to ſignification: and if a perſon, ignorant of grammar, were to look into the vocabulary of any language, he would be ſo confounded with their multitude, as to think it impoſſible to reduce them into claſſes. And yet the ſpecies (or ſorts) of words in the moſt comprehenſive tongue are not many: in our own, which is ſufficiently copious, they amount to no more than TEN: and, in the following ſhort ſentence, every one of the ten may be found once, and ſome of them twice. "I now ſee the good man coming, but alas! he walks "with difficulty."—*I* and *he* are pronouns, *now* is an adverb, *ſee* and *walks* are verbs, *the* is an article, *good* is an adjective, *man* and *difficulty* are nouns, *coming* is a participle, *but* a conjunction,

with a prepoſition, and *alas* an interjection. One would think a language muſt be very imperfect, that has not a word to anſwer each of thoſe contained in this ſentence.

May we not then infer, that in every language there muſt be nine or ten ſpecies of words; or, to expreſs it otherwiſe, that Articles, Nouns, Pronouns, Adjectives, Verbs, Participles, Adverbs, Prepoſitions, Interjections, and Conjunctions, muſt be in all languages?—This, however, will not appear with full evidence, till we have taken a more particular view of theſe ſeveral ſorts of words; and ſhown each of them to be neceſſary, or how far each of them may be neceſſary, for expreſſing certain modes of human thought, to which, from the circumſtances of mankind in every age and nation, we have reaſon to think that all men would find it expedient to give utterance. Thus ſhall we unfold the principles of Univerſal Grammar, by tracing out thoſe powers, forms, or contrivances, which, being eſſential to language, muſt be found in every ſyſtem of human ſpeech that deſerves the name.

CHAP. I.

OF NOUNS.

SECT. I.

Of Nouns Primary, or Subſtantives. — Of Number, and Gender: which (taking theſe words in the Grammatical ſenſe) depend, partly upon the nature of things, and partly upon cuſtom and arbitrary rule.

THAT *nouns*, or the *names* of things, muſt make part of every language, will not be diſputed. Men could not ſpeak of one another, or of any thing elſe, without Subſtantives. Man, houſe, ſtone, mountain, earth, water, meat, drink, &c. muſt ſurely be ſpoken of in every nation.

A Subſtantive, or Noun, is a word denoting a ſubſtance; or, more properly, is "a word denoting the thing ſpoken of." Now the things we ſpeak of either have a real exiſtence, as man, tree, houſe, hatchet; or have had a real exiſtence, as Babylon, Eden, Ceſar; or are ſpoken of as if they had exiſted, or did exiſt, as Jupiter, Fairy, Lilliput; or are conceived by the mind as having at leaſt the capacity of being characteriſed by qualities, as virtue, beauty, motion, ſwiftneſs.—Theſe laſt are called Abſtract Nouns; and the underſtanding forms them, by abſtracting, or ſeparating, from any natural or artificial ſubſtance, either real, or imaginary, certain qualities, and making thoſe qualities the ſubject of meditation or diſcourſe: as — the eagle *flies* — its *flight* is ſwift: — the houſe *ſhakes*; its *ſhaking* is terrible: — Voltaire was *witty*; his *wit*

was indecent:—Minerva and Venus were *beautiful*; but the *beauty* of the former was majeſtick, and the *beauty* of the latter alluring.

That the formation of abſtract nouns is natural to man, in every condition wherein he can be placed, will appear, if we conſider, that it is for their *qualities* that things are valued and attended to; and that, therefore, we muſt often compare qualities with one another, and conſequently ſpeak of them as being deſirable, valuable, pleaſant, great, ſmall, good, evil, indifferent, &c. In this manner a quality is ſpoken of as ſome *thing*, that is itſelf characteriſed by qualities; which comes ſo near the deſcription of a ſubſtance, that language gives it a name of the ſubſtantive form.—Perhaps, however, it might be doubted, whether abſtract ſubſtantives be eſſential to language. Thouſands of them indeed there are in all the tongues we are acquainted with: but in many caſes their place might be ſupplied by other words; though I confeſs, that this would often give riſe to awkward circumlocutions.

The qualities, aſcribed to abſtract nouns or ideas, may themſelves be abſtracted, and become the things ſpoken of, and ſo be characteriſed by other qualities. Thus, from *beautiful animal*, *moving animal*, *cruel animal*, let the qualities be ſeparated, and aſſume the ſubſtantive form, and they become *beauty*, *motion*, *cruelty*; which, as if they were real things, may be characteriſed by qualities, *great* beauty, *ſwift* motion, *barbarous* cruelty. Theſe qualities alſo may be abſtracted, and transformed into *greatneſs*, *ſwiftneſs*, *barbarity*; which may have new qualities aſſigned them equally ſuſceptible of abſtraction, *tranſitory* greatneſs, *inconceivable* ſwiftneſs, *brutal* barbarity.

In ſpeaking of ſubſtances, or things, natural, artificial, imaginary, or abſtract, all men will have occaſion to mention, ſometimes one of a kind, and ſometimes more than one: *a man* is coming,

coming, or *men* are coming: I ſee a *ſhip*, or I ſee *ſhips*: he thought he ſaw a *ghoſt*, or he dreamed he was ſurrounded with *ghoſts*: Auguſtus had many *virtues*, Nero had not *one virtue*. In every language, therefore, nouns muſt admit of ſome variety in their form, to denote *unity* and *plurality*. If the word *man*, for example, had no plural, it could not be known, when one ſaid, I ſee the man coming, whether one or more than one was meant. The inconvenience ariſing from this ambiguity would ſoon ſhow the neceſſity of removing it, either by altering the termination, or the middle or initial letters of the word, or by ſome other contrivance.

But this is not equally neceſſary in all caſes. The word which denotes one individual ſubſtance and no other, and which Grammarians call a *proper name*, can never denote more than that one, and therefore cannot have plurality. *Epaminondas* can never be plural, ſo long as we know of no more than one of that name. In like manner, *Weſtminſter abbey* denotes one particular building, *Rome* one particular city, *Etna* one particular mountain, and the *Thames* one particular river.

When theſe, and the like words, aſſume a plural, they then ceaſe to be *proper* names, and ſignify a claſs or ſpecies of things, or perhaps ſupply the place of general appellatives. When I ſay, *the twelve Ceſars*, I uſe the noun, not as the proper name of an individual, but as a common appellative belonging to twelve perſons, to each of whom it is equally applicable. When I ſay, that *twenty Thameſes* united would not form a river ſo large as the Ganges, I uſe the word *Thames* to denote in general a river, or a quantity of running water, as large as the Thames. We ſpeak of the Gordons, the Macdonalds, the Howards, &c.; in all which caſes, it is plain, that the noun, which bears the plural termination, is not the diſtinguiſhing name of one man, but a general name common to every individual of a tribe or family.

Further: When any individual perſon has rendered himſelf famous in a particular way, his name is ſometimes given to ſuch as are famous in the ſame way; and then, it becomes, in like manner, a common appellative, and admits of plurality. Mecenas was a great patron of learning, and Virgil an excellent poet whom he patroniſed: and Martial has ſaid, that "Virgils will not "be wanting where there are Mecenaſes." Who does not ſee, that the meaning is, "Good authors will not be wanting, where "there are great patrons?"

We are told, in our Grammars, that proper names for the moſt part want the plural. But the truth is, that proper names *always* want it: for when a name, that is commonly applied to one individual, aſſumes a plural form, it ceaſes to be a proper name. And as every ſuch name *may* aſſume ſuch a form, the Latin Grammarians, as well as the Greek, might have given examples of proper names with plural terminations. For *Cæſares, Cæſarum, Cæſaribus*, are as agreeable to Latin analogy, as * *Aineiai, Aineiôn, Aineiais* are to Greek.—It will occur to you perhaps, that ſome proper names are always plural, and have no ſingular, as *Athenæ, Mycenæ, Thebæ, the Deviſes*, &c. But this is merely accidental; and reſults not from the nature of the thing, but from the cuſtom of a particular language; and is therefore a conſideration that belongs not to Univerſal Grammar.

Every name in language, that denotes a *genus* or a *ſpecies*, may be applied either to one, or to many individuals of a *kind* or *ſort* †, and

* Αινειαι, Αινειων, Αινειαις.

† When a number of things are found to reſemble each other in ſome important particulars, we refer them to one claſs, ſpecies, or tribe, to which we give a name; and this name belongs equally to each individual comprehended in that claſs or ſpecies. Thus, the word *man, homo*, denotes a claſs of animals, and is equally applicable to every human being. —— Again, finding ſeveral ſpecies or claſſes to reſemble each other in

and muſt by conſequence be capable of expreſſing plurality, as well as unity. *Homo*, therefore, and *man*, muſt admit of ſome ſuch variety, as *homines* and *men*; becauſe the word may be uſed of one perſon, or of any number of perſons, of the human ſpecies. And this diſtinction of Singular and Plural would ſeem to be eſſential to the nouns of every language: at leaſt we may venture to affirm, that it could not be wanting without great inconvenience. There are, indeed, in many tongues, and perhaps in all, ſome nouns that have no plural form, and others that have no ſingular, even when there is nothing in their ſignification to hinder it: but this, like the plural proper names, is accidental, and might have been otherwiſe, if cuſtom and popular uſe had ſo determined.

In the Attick dialect, and poetical language, of the Greeks, there is alſo a *dual* number to expreſs *two*. But this is not neceſſary; though ſeveral other antient tongues have it, particularly

in certain common qualities, we refer them to a higher claſs called a *genus*, to which we give a name, that is equally applicable to every ſpecies and every individual comprehended under it. Thus all living things on earth reſemble each other in this reſpect, that they have life. We refer them, therefore, to the genus called *Animal*; and this word belongs to every ſpecies of animals, and to each individual animal. — Moreover, all things, animated and inanimate, agree in this, that they are created; and in this view we refer them to a claſs ſtill higher, called *Creature*; a word which belongs equally to every genus and ſpecies of created things, and to each individual thing that is created. -- Further ſtill, All beings whatever reſemble one another in this reſpect, that they *are* or *exiſt*; whence we refer them to a claſs ſtill higher, and indeed the higheſt of all, called *Being*. — This gradation is ſeen at one glance in the following words; *Socrates*, *Man*, *Animal*, *Creature*, *Being*.

That claſs is called a *Species*, which comprehends under it, or is underſtood to comprehend, individuals; and that a *Genus*, which comprehends a number of ſpecies.

Antiently the Engliſh noun *Kind* was the ſame with *Genus*, and *Sort* with *Species*: but *kind* and *ſort* have long been confounded by our beſt writers; and we are obliged to borrow the words *genus* and *ſpecies* from the Latin: — though, indeed, in good Latin authors, *Species* never has that meaning which we here give it; and which in the language of Cicero would be expreſſed thus, *pars quæ ſubjecta eſt generi*, the claſs that is ſubordinate to the genus.

the Hebrew, the Gothick, and the Celtick. For, languages being formed in ſome meaſure by accident, it is no wonder that there ſhould be redundancies in them, as well as defects. — It has been ſaid, that *ambo* in Latin, and *both* in Engliſh, are duals. But it is hardly worth while to introduce a new term into any grammar, for the ſake of one example. Beſides, there is this difference between the words in queſtion and Greek dual nouns, that the latter are joined in ſyntax to verbs, adjectives and participles of the dual number; whereas *ambo* takes a plural verb, adjective and participle, and *both* takes a plural verb.

Another thing eſſential to nouns is *gender*. For language would be very imperfect, if it had no expreſſion for the *ſex* of animals. Now all things whatever are Male, or Female, or Both, or Neither.

The exiſtence of hermaphrodites being uncommon, and even doubtful, and language being framed to anſwer the ordinary occaſions of life, no proviſion is made, in any of the tongues we are acquainted with, for expreſſing, otherwiſe than by a name made on purpoſe, or by a periphraſis, Duplicity of ſex. The genders therefore are only two, the *maſculine* and the *feminine*: for what we call the *neuter* gender implies properly a negation of ſex, or that the thing which is ſaid to be of this gender is *neither* male nor female.

In Hebrew, there is no neuter; every noun being either maſculine or feminine: and when things without ſex are expreſſed by pronouns, or alluded to by adjectives, they are more frequently feminine than maſculine. *

All

* More particularly: The demonſtrative pronoun uſed for *this thing* (anſwering to τυτο *hoc*) when no ſubſtantive is expreſſed, is feminine. Thus, in the Septuagint, and in Mat. xxi. 42. Παρα κυριε εγενετο αυτη και εστι θαυμαστη: literally, A Domino *facta* eſt *hæc*, et eſt *miranda*.—Alſo when an adjective is uſed indefinitely without a noun, the gender

All animals have ſex; and therefore the names of all animals muſt have gender. But the ſex of all is not equally obvious, nor equally worthy of attention. In thoſe ſpecies that are moſt common, or whoſe outward appearance and circumſtances are particularly attended to, the male is ſometimes called by one name which is maſculine, and the female by a different name which is feminine. Thus in Engliſh we ſay man, woman; huſband, wife; king, queen; lord, lady; father, mother; ſon, daughter; nephew, niece; uncle, aunt; boy, girl; horſe, mare; cock, hen; boar, ſow, &c. In others of ſimilar diſtinction, the name of the male is altered only in the termination when applied to the female: as emperor, empreſs, antiently empereſs; patron, patroneſs; ſhepherd, ſhepherdeſs; widower, widow; maſter, miſtreſs, antiently maſtereſs, and ſtill pronounced ſo by the vulgar in ſome parts of Scotland. Sometimes we apply the ſame name to either ſex, only prefixing or ſubjoining a particle to denote the gender; as he-aſs, ſhe-aſs; cock-ſparrow, hen-ſparrow; peacock, peahen; moor-cock, moor-hen.

When the ſex of any animal is not obvious, or not material to be known, the ſame name, in ſome languages, is applied without variation to all the ſpecies, and that name is ſaid to be of the *common gender*, and aſſumes in concord either a maſculine or a feminine adjective, participle, or pronoun, according as the one ſex or the other is intended to be ſpecified; as, in Latin *Bos albus* a

gender in Hebrew is commonly feminine. Thus in Pſal. xii. 4. "A tongue ſpeaking "*great things*;" and Pſal. xxvii. 4. "*One thing* I deſired;" the adjectives anſwering to *great* and *one*, are feminine: Lingua loquens *magnas*: *Unam* petivi.

Something like this idiom is obſervable in the vulgar dialects of North Britain; at leaſt when things of eminence are ſpoken of. A Kincardinſhire man ſays, of the river, that *ſhe* is deep; of the watermill, that the froſt will not permit *her* to go, &c. But things of leſs conſideration, as a knife, a chair, &c. are neuter; and the ſun is invariably maſculine, and the moon feminine.

white ox, *Bos alba* a white cow: but if no account is made of the ſex, and only the ſpecies of animal ſignified, the gender of the name is frequently determined by its final letters *.

Beings ſuperiour to man, though we conceive them to be of no ſex, are ſpoken of as maſculine in moſt of the modern tongues of Europe, on account of their dignity; the male being, according to our ideas, the nobler ſex. But idolatrous nations acknowlege both male and female deities; and ſome of them have given even to the Supreme Being a name of the feminine gender.

When we perſonify the virtues, we ſpeak of them as if they were females; perhaps on account of their lovelineſs; or rather in compliance with the analogy of the Greek and Latin tongues. Thus we call Juſtice the queen of the virtues, not the king: and we ſay, that if Virtue were to take a viſible form, all the world would be enamoured (not of his, but) of her charms.

The antients made females of the Furies; thoſe dreadful beings, who were ſuppoſed to haunt the guilty in this world, and torment them in hell. This might be owing to the accidental termination of their name, or to ſome poetical fable concerning their origin: or perhaps it was thought, that, as nothing is ſo amiable as a beautiful and virtuous woman, ſo nothing is more hideous than extreme uglineſs and rage united in the female form.

Some authors have ſuppoſed, that it is natural for the human mind to conſider as maſculine the names of ſuch things as are eminent in power; and to make thoſe feminine which denote what

* In Greek, when women are mentioned merely as perſons, and without any regard to ſex, they are ſometimes in ſyntax connected with pronouns, articles, and participles, of the maſculine gender. Of this the learned Dr. Clarke gives a variety of examples in his notes on Hom. Iliad. lib. v. verſ. 778. Traces of the ſame idiom are to be ſeen in Latin authors. Thus in Plautus we read, *Quis ea eſt? Quis ea eſt mulier?* And thus, in Virgil, Eneas, ſpeaking of his mother Venus, ſays, Deſcendo, ac ducente *Deo*. Æneid. ii. 632.

is peculiarly fitted for receiving, containing, or bringing forth. But though many plauſible things may be ſaid for this theory, it is alſo liable to many objections.

What in this world is more powerful than Death, which no animal can reſiſt; or than the Sun, which is, as it were, the parent of life, both to animal, and to vegetable nature? Yet, though *Thànatos* is maſculine in Greek, and though Mr. Harris ſeems to think, that the notion of a female Death would be ridiculous, *mors* in Latin, *mort* in French, *morte* in Italian, and *muérte* in Spaniſh, are all feminine *: and, though the moon is feminine, and the ſun maſculine, in many languages, yet, in the Saxon and ſome other northern tongues, the ſun is feminine, and the moon maſculine.

If it is merely becauſe the *earth* is the common mother of all terreſtrial productions, that her name is feminine, it will be difficult to aſſign a ſufficient reaſon, why the *ſea* ſhould not alſo be feminine; ſince it is probable, that as many animals and vegetables may be produced in the ſea, as on the land. Its deep voice and boiſterous nature entitle it (according to Mr. Harris) to a maſculine name: but in Virgil, the fury Alecto, who was a female, and ſufficiently turbulent, utters a more terrifick yell than ever proceeded from the moſt tempeſtuous ocean †. Catullus and Ovid mention the ſea as a female, by the name *Amphitrite* ‡. And the common people of Scotland, when expreſſing the ſea by a pro-

* One of our moſt correct poets ſcruples not to make Death a female in the following paſſage:

Lo, in the vale of years beneath,
A grieſly troop are ſeen,
The painful family of *Death*,
More hideous than their *queen*. Gray's Ode on Eton College.

† Virg. Æneid. vii. 514.

‡ Catull. de nupt. Pel. et Thet. verſ. 11. Ovid. Metamorph. i. 14.

noun, often call it *She*, but I think never *He*: "Let us go and "look at the ſea; they ſay *ſhe* is very rough to-day."

It ſeems to us quite natural, that a ſhip ſhould be feminine; becauſe, as the learned author of *Hermes* obſerves, it is ſo eminently a receiver and container of various things, of men, arms, proviſions, and goods. Accordingly *naus* in Greek and *navis* in Latin are feminine; and Engliſh ſailors, ſpeaking of their veſſel, ſay, *She* is under ſail: nay, thoſe very perſons who call a war-ſhip a *man of war*, do ſtill adhere to the ſame idiom, and ſay, The man of war ſent out *her* boats. And yet, the French word for *ſhip*, *navire*, though derived from the Latin, is maſculine.

It were vain to attempt to reduce theſe peculiarities to general principles. Real animals, when ſpoken of with a view to their ſex, will no doubt in every country have names of that gender which befits their nature. But allegories are fantaſtick things; and genders, that have no better foundation, cannot be expected to be uniform in different countries. And thoſe imaginary beings, who are idolized by ignorant nations, may to a capricious fancy appear in ſuch a variety of lights, that it ſhall be impoſſible for a ſtranger, from what he may know of their ſuppoſed attributes, to determine any thing *a priori* concerning the gender, which cuſtom may in any particular country annex to their names. We have heard both of a god and of a goddeſs of war: and who will ſay, that Bellona is not as proper a name as Mars, for that imaginary demon? The god of ſtrength, one would think, muſt be male; and this may be given as one reaſon for the gender of Hercules. And yet Neceſſity, who muſt be ſtronger than Hercules, and all the heathen gods put together, is repreſented by Horace as a female perſonage *; for no other reaſon, that I can gueſs, but becauſe her name in Latin happens to have a feminine termination. It is

* Hor. Od. i. 35. ver. 17.

natural, one may ſay, that the power who is ſuppoſed to preſide over love ſhould be beautiful and feminine: and yet the Romans aſcribed this paſſion as much to the influence of a wicked little Boy, whom Virgil calls *Amor* and *Cupido*, as to that of his mother Venus. The charioteer of the ſun was Phebus, according to the claſſicks: but a Saxon poet would undoubtedly have preferred a female to that high office.

As things which have not animal life cannot with propriety be ſaid to have ſex, (for the ſexual arrangement of vegetables is a modern diſcovery, hinted at indeed by Ariſtotle *, but unknown to the authors of language) it would ſeem moſt natural, that the names of all inanimate things and abſtract ideas ſhould be of the *neuter* gender; that is, ſhould imply, that the things they ſtand for are of *neither* ſex. And in ſome languages this is no doubt the caſe. But in Greek and Latin, Italian, French, and Spaniſh, many nouns denoting abſtract ideas, and things without life, are maſculine, and many are feminine. The only good reaſon to be given for this is, that certain words are conſidered as of certain genders, on account of their final letters; becauſe accident and cuſtom have ſo determined. But, if it be aſked, why in Latin (for example) the termination *a* of the firſt declenſion ſhould be feminine, and of the third neuter; or why in either it ſhould be feminine or neuter, and not maſculine; I know of no reaſon, but what has been already aſſigned, namely, that in the Latin tongue ſuch is the rule, as eſtabliſhed by cuſtom: — by Cuſtom, I ſay, which in all human affairs has great authority, but which in giving laws to language is abſolute and irreſiſtable. † — It may be ſaid, indeed, that, while a people and their language are in a rude ſtate, and before men think of making grammars, it may be natural to ſay

* De Generat. Animal. lib. i. cap. 1.

† See Horat. Ar. Poet. verſ. 71, 72.

bonæ

bonæ pennæ (for inſtance), and *bonam pennam*, on account of the ſimilar ſound. There may be ſomething in this. But it goes not far in accounting for the fact I ſpeak of. For, to be according to rule, the termination of the adjective and participle muſt *often differ* from that of the correſponding noun: *ſplendidum diadema*, *plurimus ignis*, *pii vates*, *res tranquillæ*, being as much according to rule, as *ingenium bonum*, *viro bono*, *antennarum velatarum*.

In Engliſh, *moſt* names of things without ſex *are*, and all of them *may be*, neuter. We may ſay, ſpeaking of the ſun, either that *he* was, or that *it* was, eclipſed; and, of a ſhip, that *it* was wrecked, or that *ſhe* was. But, in all the other languages I know, the gender of moſt ſubſtantives is fixed. And, even in Engliſh, when ſpeaking of things inanimate, or of things without ſex, we cannot make that maſculine, which cuſtom has made feminine, nor that feminine which cuſtom has made maſculine, though we may make either one or the other neuter. Of the ſun I may ſay, *he* is ſet, or *it* is ſet, but I cannot ſay, *ſhe* is ſet; and of the moon, that *ſhe* is changed, or that *it* is changed, but not that *he* is changed. In like manner, ſpeaking of the human ſoul, I may ſay, that *it* does not think always, or that *ſhe* does not think always, but I cannot ſay, that *he* does not think always.

In ſtrict propriety of ſpeech, all Engliſh nouns, denoting what is without life, ought to be neuter: and when we make them maſculine or feminine, it muſt be underſtood to be by the figure called Perſonification. And it is no doubt an advantage in our tongue, and (as a very learned author * remarks) ſerves to diſtinguiſh our logical or philoſophical ſtyle from the poetical or rhetorical, that we may always ſpeak of what is without life, either as a *thing*, in the neuter, or, as a *perſon*, in the maſculine or feminine, as beſt ſuits our purpoſe. For this cannot be done ſo eaſily in other lan-

* Harris's Hermes.

guages;

guages; at leaſt it cannot be done, ſo as to mark the figure, or the want of it, by a variation of the gender. In Latin, Greek, and French, for example, *virtuè* is always feminine: but, in Engliſh, we may, as we pleaſe, make it either feminine or neuter; and ſay, with equal propriety, Virtue ſhall receive *her* reward, (where we ſpeak of Virtue poetically, or rhetorically, as a perſon), or, Virtue ſhall receive *its* reward, where we ſpeak of it with more philoſophical exactneſs.

In old Engliſh authors, I find *his* ſometimes uſed, where we now uſe *its*. Thus, in Leviticus, we read of "the brazen altar, and "*his* grate of braſs, *his* ſtaves, and all *his* veſſels." Hence I was once led to think, that this ſort of ſubſtantives, though neuter in modern Engliſh, were ſometimes in our antient language maſculine. But it was a miſtake. For in the firſt chapter of Geneſis we have the following words; and ſimilar phraſes there are in other parts of Scripture: "Let the earth bring forth graſs, the herb yielding "ſeed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit, after *his* kind whoſe ſeed "is in *itſelf*." * Now, if the noun *fruit-tree* had been conſidered as maſculine by our Tranſlators, the ſentence would have run thus:—"the fruit-tree yielding fruit after *his* kind, whoſe ſeed is "in *himſelf*." But as they apply to one and the ſame ſubſtantive, firſt the pronoun *his*, and then the pronoun *itſelf*, I infer, not that the ſubſtantive was then both maſculine and neuter, but, that the pronoun *his* was uſed as a poſſeſſive, in ſpeaking of neuter ſubſtantives, though it is now invariably applied to ſuch as are maſculine. †

From

* So in the third part of the Church's homily *againſt peril of Idolatrie*, "What can "an image, which when *it* is fallen cannot riſe again, which can neither help *his* friends, "nor hurt *his* enemies, expreſs of the moſt mighty God!"

† Dr. Campbell has fully explained this matter, by obſerving, with his uſual accuracy, that the word *its* is not to be found in our Bible: whence we may infer, that,

From theſe remarks it will appear, how far the genders of nouns are fixed by the nature of things, and how far they depend on cuſtom. — And ſo much for *Subſtantives*, or *Nouns*; a ſort of words, that muſt of neceſſity be in all languages whatſoever.

that, in the old language, it was not uſed, at leaſt in ſolemn ſtyle. See *The Philoſophy of Rhetorick*, vol. ii. page 394. Inſtead of that word, we have always, in the common Tranſlation, either *his* (as in the paſſages quoted) or a periphraſis, as *the path thereof*, for *its path*. *Itſelf*, indeed, occurs; but, in the old editions, is printed *it ſelf*, in two words, and, therefore, is to be conſidered as compounded, not of *its* and *ſelf*, but of *it* and *ſelf*. And this is the real origin of that reciprocal pronoun. *Self* in old Engliſh means *ſame*. So Shakſpeare,

Shoot another arrow that *ſelf* way
Which you did ſhoot the firſt. *Merchant of Venice.*

And ſo Dryden; who, like Homer, Ennius, Virgil, and other great poets, often affects the antique,

At that *ſelf* moment enters Palamon. *Knight's Tale.*

Himſelf, therefore, *itſelf*, *myſelf*, *thyſelf*, &c. did probably denote, according to etymology, *the ſame him*, *the ſame it*, *the ſame me*, *the ſame thee*, &c.

SECT. II.

The nature and uſe of Nouns Secondary, or Pronouns.

THE words now to be conſidered do not form a numerous claſs; nor are they, perhaps, ſo eſſential to human ſpeech as the former: but they are ſo convenient, that we have no reaſon to think there is any language without them. They are called by the Greeks * *Antônumiai*, and by the Latins *Pronomina*. And the name well expreſſes their nature; they being put † *anti tou onomatos*, *pro nomine*, inſtead of the noun or name. Their uſe, and the occaſion of introducing them into language, may be thus illuſtrated.

Suppoſe me to meet with a perſon, whoſe name I know not, and to whom I am equally unknown; and that we find it neceſſary to talk together. I want to give ſome information concerning myſelf, and to addreſs that information to him. But how is this to be done? He knows not my name, and I know not his. I might point to myſelf, when I meant to ſpeak of myſelf, and to him when I would ſpeak of him; but this would be inconvenient in the dark, and awkward in any circumſtances. Shall I begin with informing him of my name, and myſelf of his; and afterwards repeat my own name when I ſpeak of myſelf, and his when I ſpeak of him? Perhaps he might not chooſe to tell me his name, and I might be equally ſhy in regard to mine. But ſuppoſe this difficulty got over, and that I want to aſk him the road. If I confine myſelf to proper and ſubſtantive names, I ſay, "James begs as a favour of "Alexander, that Alexander would inform James, which is the

* Αντωνυμιαι. † ἀντι τȣ ὀνοματος.

" road to ſuch a place:" and, all the while, I muſt be pointing to myſelf and to him alternately, to ſignify, that I was ſpeaking of him and of myſelf, and not of any other perſons of the ſame names. If in ſo ſhort and ſimple an addreſs there is ſo much difficulty, it may well be imagined, that in a continued dialogue there would be a great deal more. *

Now for removing theſe difficulties there is a method very eaſy, and, I think, obvious enough to any rational being. Inſtead of the two proper names, ſubſtitute two pronouns, *I* and *You*; and there is no need either of knowing one another's names, or of pointing. " *I* beg as a favour of *You*, that *you* would tell *me*, which is the " road." Here, then, we ſee in part the origin, the nature, and the uſe, of Pronouns. They are the ſubſtitutes of proper names. This is the firſt and ſimpleſt idea of them; but it is not a complete one.

Further: Suppoſe two perſons to be talking of a third perſon, whoſe name they either know not, or do not care to be continually repeating: it is evident, that the eaſieſt way of managing ſuch a converſation would be to adopt a pronoun, ſuch as *he* and *him*. " I did not ſee Alexander to-day, but Alexander ſent word, that " Alexander would do Alexander the favour to call at my houſe in " the evening:" — is not this more complex, and leſs intelligible, than if I were to ſay, " I did not ſee Alexander to-day, but " *he* ſent word, that *he* would do *himſelf* the favour to call at " my houſe?"

Theſe three Pronouns, *I*, *Thou*, and *He*, are called in our grammars the pronouns of the *firſt*, *ſecond*, and *third perſon*. For it is

* Many queſtions might indeed be put, without either the knowledge of names, or the uſe of pronouns. In the caſe ſuppoſed, I might be well enough underſtood by aſking ſimply, Which is the road? But ſpeakers in ordinary converſation continually refer to, and addreſs, one another; and if they had no words to mark ſuch reference, the whole would be ambiguity and confuſion.

ſaid, that the ſpeaker, who denotes himſelf by the pronoun *I*, is the chief perſon with regard to his own diſcourſe. It ſhould rather be ſaid, that he is the perſon, whom we firſt attend to; for we naturally turn our eyes, and incline our ears, to the perſon who ſpeaks. He who is ſpoken to, and whom the ſpeaker addreſſes, by the pronoun *thou* or *you*, is the next who draws our attention. And the perſon or thing ſpoken of, expreſſed by *he* or *it*, is, in contradiſtinction to the other two, called the *third* perſon.

That the uſe of pronouns may be conſidered as poſteriour in time to that of nouns, and a kind of refinement upon it, appears from a fact, which every body muſt have obſerved, that when a child begins to ſpeak, and knows his own name, he is apt to uſe it in ſpeaking of himſelf; and it requires ſome pains, or ſome practice at leaſt, to teach him how to ſupply its place by the pronouns of the firſt perſon *I*, and *Me*.

If it be aſked, whether pronouns, like the nouns they repreſent, muſt admit the diſtinction of unity and plurality, the anſwer is obviouſly, yes. For one or more perſons may ſpeak, or one may ſpeak the ſentiment of many; and to one or to more perſons our ſpeech may be addreſſed; and the perſons or things ſpoken of may be either one or many. And therefore *I* muſt have a plural *we*; *thou* muſt have *ye* or *you*; and *he* or *it* muſt have *they*. And the ſame analogy muſt take place in all languages.

The Greeks and Romans, in addreſſing one perſon, uſed the ſingular of the pronoun, *thou*; whereas we, and many other modern nations, uſe the plural *you*. But in very ſolemn ſtyle, as when we invoke the Supreme Being, we uſe *Thou*: and, what is remarkable, we ſometimes uſe the ſame form of the pronoun in contemptuous or very familiar language. This laſt mode of ſpeech the French, who have it as well as we, expreſs by the verb *tutoyer*; and Shakeſpeare makes *thou* a verb of the ſame import: "If thou

" *thoueſt* him three or four times it will not be amiſs:" that is, if thou addreſſeſt him by the contemptuous or familiar appellation of *Thou*.—The people called Quakers profeſs, in imitation of the ſcripture ſtyle, to uſe *thou* on all occaſions, when ſpeaking to one perſon; but many of them ungrammatically put the oblique caſe *thee* in its place.

In the Latin tongue, it is a rule, when the pronouns of the firſt and ſecond perſon are joined by the copulative, to give precedency to the former, and ſay, *Ego et Tu*; but we uſe a contrary arrangement, *You and I*; for it would look like arrogance if one were to ſay in Engliſh, *I and You*. One Engliſh author, indeed, has, in a certain controverſial treatiſe, ſaid, not only, " I and " Doctor ſuch-a-one," (naming his opponent) but alſo, " I and " the Publick:" but it is a ſingularity, in which I believe he will not be imitated. Cardinal Wolſey was blamed for writing in one of his letters, *Ego et Rex meus*, I and my king; for this, though agreeable to the idiom of the language in which he wrote, is ſo repugnant to our manners, that it was thought nothing but the moſt extravagant vanity could have induced him to adopt it.

It is difficult to preſcribe laws to ceremony. A Spaniard, out of reſpect, walks before you out of his houſe; to intimate, that he has ſuch confidence in you, that he could leave it in your poſſeſſion: we, out of reſpect, make our friend walk out of our houſe before us; to intimate, that we account him the better man. The cuſtoms are contrary, though they proceed from the ſame principle.

A King, exerting his authority on a ſolemn occaſion, adopts the plural of the firſt perſon, " *We* ſtrictly command and charge:" meaning, that he acts by the advice of counſellors, or rather, that he is the repreſentative of a whole people. The ſame form of ſpeech was frequent in the mouth of an old Roman, though a private man: and, in alluſion to the Claſſick idiom, Engliſh authors do

ſometimes, in ſpeaking of themſelves, ſay *We* and *Us*, inſtead of *I* and *Me*; but of late (except when ſeveral writers are ſuppoſed to be concerned in the ſame work) it has been thought more elegant, becauſe it is become more faſhionable, at leaſt in ſerious compoſition, to uſe thoſe pronouns in the ſingular.—It appears, then, that though the three pronouns in queſtion are neceſſary in all languages, the modes of applying them are not in all nations uniform.

Thoſe of the firſt and ſecond perſons have no diſtinction of gender in any language I know *; nor is it neceſſary they ſhould. For perſons converſing together muſt know one another's ſex from the voice, dreſs, and other circumſtances; and therefore it is not more requiſite that their words ſhould imply it, than that my friend, every time he ſpeaks to me, ſhould tell me his name. *I* and *You*, therefore, *ego* and *tu*, belong to both ſexes indifferently, and are maſculine or feminine, according to the ſex of the perſons whoſe names they ſtand for. Thus a man would ſay, *Ego ſum ille quem quæris*, I am he whom you ſeek; but a woman would ſay, *Ego ſum illa quam quæris*, I am ſhe whom you ſeek. The pronoun *ego*, *I*, is the ſame in both ſentences: the other words, that admit of ſuch variation, aſſume the gender of the ſpeaker.

The pronoun of the third perſon muſt have the diſtinction of gender. It repreſents that which is the ſubject of the converſation; the gender whereof, if it be abſent, cannot be known to the hearer, unleſs notified by the words that are ſpoken. If the ſubject of converſation be a man, the pronoun that ſtands for it muſt be maſculine; if a woman, it muſt be feminine; if a thing, it may be neuter, unleſs the cuſtom of the language determine otherwiſe.

* In Hebrew, the pronoun of the ſecond perſon has the diſtinction of gender. But this cannot be neceſſary in language, becauſe it is particular.

So

So that in language it would ſeem neceſſary, or at leaſt convenient, that there ſhould be three pronouns of the third perſon, anſwering to *he*, *ſhe*, *it*; *ille*, *illa*, *illud*; *ekeinos*, *ekeinê*, *ekeino*.

The neceſſity, or the utility, of this, will be ſtill more apparent, (as Mr. Harris ingeniouſly obſerves) if we ſuppoſe it wanting. Suppoſe then, that in Engliſh there is no other pronoun of the third perſon but *he* and *him*; and that, in an account of Adam and Eve and the forbidden fruit, we read thus, "*He* prevailed on *him* "to eat *him*;" it is plain, that from theſe words we ſhould not know what was eaten, who did eat, or who adviſed to eat. But let the genders of the pronoun be diſtinguiſhed, "*She* prevailed on "*him* to eat *it*;" and all ambiguity vaniſhes.

Further: the thing or perſon ſpoken of, which is notified by the pronoun of the third perſon, may bear various relations to the ſpeakers, as well as to other things: it may be near, or diſtant, preſent or abſent, belonging to the ſpeaker, or to the hearer, or to ſome other perſon, &c. Hence it will be convenient to have a variety of pronouns expreſſive of the third perſon under theſe various relations; as *this*, *that*, *mine*, *thine*, *his*, *hers*, *theirs*, *ours*, &c. — But obſerve, that theſe words are not of the nature of pronouns, except when they ſupply the place of a noun; which is not always the caſe. They are pronouns, when we ſay, "Give me "*that*" (pointing to it) — "I will keep *this*." When they do not ſupply the place of a noun; but are joined to a noun, in order to aſcertain or define it, they belong to a claſs of words, to be conſidered hereafter, and may be called pronominal *articles*; as in theſe examples: *this man* I eſteem; *that man* I admire; *your ſtature* is tall; *my health* is bad, &c.

The perſon who ſpeaks, and the perſon who is ſpoken to, may either of them be the ſubject of converſation; as "*I* am *he* who "ſent you a letter yeſterday, *You* are the *man* I was looking for;"—

ſo

ſo that the pronouns of the firſt and ſecond perſon may coincide with the third: but with one another they cannot; for, to ſay, I am thou, or, thou art I, would not be ſenſe in any language, becauſe it implies a confuſion of perſons, and that a man is not himſelf, but ſome other man.

The pronouns of the firſt and ſecond perſon differ alſo in another reſpect from thoſe of the third. *I* and *Thou*, *We* and *Ye*, *Us* and *You*, *Me* and *Thee*, point out the perſons whoſe names they ſtand for, and are therefore underſtood even when nothing previous has been ſaid. But *He*, *She*, *It*, &c. are terms of univerſal application; and cannot be underſtood, unleſs they are referred to ſomething that went before, or is to come after, in the diſcourſe. If I ſay, "I am hungry," or, "Thou art good," the perſon ſignified by the pronoun is known to be no other than myſelf the ſpeaker, or him or her to whom I addreſs myſelf; and this is equally known, whether I have ſaid any thing previous or not. But if I begin a ſubject by ſaying, "*He* is wiſe, *She* is fair, I want *them*," I am not underſtood, till I ſay expreſly, what the perſons or the things are, to which I allude.

The diviſions of pronouns into Primitive and Derivative, and into Demonſtrative, Reciprocal, Interrogative, Poſſeſſive, &c. may be found in any common grammar; and therefore I ſhall ſay nothing of them in this place. But there is one diviſion of Pronouns, which muſt not be overlooked, becauſe it leads to ſome remarks of a more general nature.

All the pronouns hitherto mentioned may introduce a ſentence, and are therefore called *Prepoſitive*. But there is alſo a *Subjunctive* pronoun; the nature of which I ſhall illuſtrate by an example ſimilar to that which Mr. Harris has given.

If I ſay, "The magnet is a ſtone: The magnet attracts iron," I utter two ſentences, that are diſtinct and perfectly independent; for

for either may be underſtood without the other. If inſtead of the noun *magnet* in the ſecond ſentence I put the pronoun *it*, and ſay, "The magnet is a ſtone: it attracts iron;" the two ſentences are ſtill diſtinct in ſyntax, but in meaning not independent; for, to find the ſenſe of *it* in the laſt, you muſt look to what went before, which informs you, that *magnet* is the noun whoſe place is ſupplied by that pronoun. Now it is eaſy to join theſe two ſentences into one, by means of the copulative conjunction, "The magnet is "a ſtone, and it attracts iron." Remove the words *and it*, and in their ſtead inſert the pronoun *which* or *that*: "The magnet is a "ſtone, *which* attracts iron;" and you form one ſentence of the ſame meaning, and ſomewhat more conciſe than the other. This word *which* is the ſubjunctive pronoun I ſpeak of. You ſee it expreſſes the united powers of the copulative conjunction *and*, and of the prepoſitive pronoun *it*: and herein conſiſts its character. When it relates to a rational being, it commonly aſſumes, in modern Engliſh, the form *who* or *that*; and *which*, or *that*, when it alludes to things irrational or inanimate. In old Engliſh, *which* is often uſed where in modern Engliſh we ſhould ſay *who*; as in the firſt clauſe of the Lord's prayer. * It is ſometimes omitted in colloquial ſtyle, as in this example, "The perſon you ſpeak of is not the "perſon I mean." The correſpondent pronoun in Greek is † *hos* and *hoſtis*; in Latin, *qui*, *quæ*, *quod*.

* Some clergymen, to ſhow their extreme delicacy, read "Our Father, *who* art in "heaven." But if nothing will pleaſe them, but what is modern, why do they not alſo change *pardoneth* and *abſolveth* into *pardons* and *abſolves*, *ghoſt* into *ſpirit*, *world without end* into *through all eternity*, and all the other old words and terminations into new ones? Theſe old modes of language, in writings conſecrated to religious uſe, ſhould never be altered, till they become unintelligible, or ludicrous, or likely to occaſion a miſtake of the ſenſe.—Virgil, Salluſt, and Quintilian knew, and all good writers and criticks are ſenſible, that old words judiciouſly applied give an air of grandeur to certain kinds of compoſition, and that familiar expreſſions have often an effect directly contrary.

† ὃς — ὅστις.

But

But I will not affirm, that this ſubjunctive pronoun is either ſo neceſſary, or ſo frequent, in all languages, as in thoſe which are moſt familiar to us. Being framed for the purpoſe of ſubjoining one ſentence to another, and conſequently of making one complex ſentence of two or more ſimple ſentences, it is evident, that if we could be ſatisfied with expreſſing ourſelves in ſhort ſentences, this pronoun might in many caſes be wanted. And it is obſervable, that illiterate perſons and children rarely uſe it; joining their ſhort periods, where they chooſe to join them, by the connective *and*; which is indeed a ſimpler and more obvious expedient. In ſome very antient languages, too, as the Hebrew, which have been employed chiefly for expreſſing plain ſentiments in the plaineſt manner, without aiming at any elaborate length or harmony of periods, this pronoun occurs not ſo often, as in Greek and Latin, and thoſe other tongues, which have been embelliſhed by the joint labours of the philoſopher and rhetorician. Read the firſt chapter of Geneſis: and you will find that the ſubjunctive pronoun occurs but ſeldom; the ſentences being ſhort, particularly towards the beginning, and joined for the moſt part by the connective. And the ſame ſimplicity of compoſition is frequent in Scripture, eſpecially in the hiſtorical parts; which in that Divine book is a great beauty, and an evidence both of its truth, and of its antiquity. For had the diction been more elaborate, it would have had too much the air of human contrivance, and of the arts of latter times. But in other compoſitions, the ſame unadorned ſimplicity would not always be agreeable. For we are not diſpleaſed to find human decorations in a work of human art. Beſides, the ſentiments of inſpiration ſupport themſelves by their intrinſick dignity; whereas thoſe of men muſt often be ſupported and recommended by the graces of language. The inſpired author commands our attention, and has a right to it; but other writers muſt flatter and

amuſe, in order to prevail with us to attend.—But this by the by. I only meant to ſay, that complex ſentences, which without the ſubjunctive pronoun could not eaſily be framed, may be ſo contrived and diſpoſed, as to contribute not a little to the beauty of human compoſitions: though in writings of a higher order we neither expect nor deſire them; becauſe we know, that, however pleaſing, they are but human contrivances at the beſt. The ſame ornaments are unſeemly in a temple, which we admire in a private apartment; and that rhetorical art, which in Virgil and Cicero is ſo charming, would be quite unſuitable to the majeſty of Scripture.

The ſubjunctive pronoun may join two ſentences ſo cloſely, that to a ſuperficial obſerver they ſhall ſeem to be but one. What can be more clearly one ſentence, than the following, "The man "whom you ſee is Peter?" Is it poſſible, one might ſay, to analyſe it into two? Nothing more eaſy. Here are two diſtinct affirmations; and here, therefore, may be two ſentences. "You "ſee a man. That man is Peter." Both theſe are comprehended in the abovementioned propoſition; and theſe two taken together expreſs its full meaning. It is, therefore, not a ſimple, but a compound ſentence. In fact, wherever there is a ſubjunctive pronoun, there muſt be the import of both a pronoun, and a copulative conjunction: and all conjunctions connect ſentences, as will be ſeen hereafter.

CHAP. II.

OF ATTRIBUTIVES.

SECT. I.

Of Attributives — Adjectives, Participles, Verbs. — Their diſtinguiſhing characters. — Compariſon of Adjectives.

THE words hitherto conſidered have been called by ſome writers Primary and Secondary Subſtantives. Both claſſes denote ſubſtances or things; the former, directly; the latter, by ſupplying the place of the former.

But by nouns and pronouns alone not one human ſentiment could be expreſſed. There muſt, therefore, in all languages, be other claſſes of words. Men not only ſpeak of perſons and things, but alſo of the qualities, characters, and operations, of perſons and things. What would it ſignify to ſpeak of Ceſar, if one were never to ſay whether Ceſar was good or bad, or what were his qualities, or what his actions?

If we were to hear ſuch an expreſſion as, — *was brave* — *was admired* — *invaded Britain*, we ſhould naturally aſk, *who* was ſo? or, *who* did ſo? for till we be informed of this, we cannot know what is meant. Not that the words *brave, admired, invaded*, have no meaning; but becauſe they denote certain qualities or attributes, which lead our thoughts to the perſon or thing to whom they are ſuppoſed to belong. For qualities imply ſomething in which they inhere, or to which they pertain: and if there were no perſons or things in the univerſe, there could be no qualities or attributes.

Now the words that denote attributes or qualities are in general called *Attributives.*

The antient Greek Grammarians called them * *rhêmata*, *verba*, *verbs*: — whatever may be ſaid, or, more accurately, whatever may be affirmed, or denied, concerning any thing or perſon. Thus of Ceſar, it may be affirmed, that he was *brave*, that he was *admired*, that he *invaded Britain*; and of the ſame Ceſar, it may be denied, that he was *cruel*, that he was *deſpiſed*, that he *conquered Britain*. In theſe affirmations and negations, *Ceſar* is a ſubſtantive, name, or noun; *he* is a pronoun; and *brave*, *cruel*, *admired*, *deſpiſed*, *invaded*, *conquered*, are attributives.

In all the languages we know, and probably in all others, there are three ſorts of attributives, which are called in the grammars, Adjectives, Participles, and Verbs. — The Adjective denotes a ſimple quality, as brave, cruel, good, ſwift, round, ſquare. — The Participle denotes a quality, together with a certain modification of time; as *amans*, loving, which relates to time preſent; *amatus*, loved, which alludes to time paſt; and *amaturus*, about to love, which points at time future †. — The Verb is ſtill more complex than the participle. It not only expreſſes an attribute, and refers that attribute to time, paſt, preſent, or to come; but alſo comprehends an aſſertion; ſo that it may form, when joined to a noun, a complete ſentence, or propoſition. Thus when I ſay, *Alexander ambulat*, Alexander walks, I utter, though in two words, a complete ſentence: and this ſentence comprehends in it theſe four things: firſt, a ſubſtantive proper name, *Alexander*; ſecondly, an attribute, quality, or operation of Alexander, *walking*; thirdly,

* ῥήματα.

† This idea of the Participle may ſuffice at preſent; having been generally adopted by Grammarians. But it is not accurate; nay it is very inaccurate. See the fifth ſection of this chapter.

this

this quality or operation fixed down to the preſent time, *walks*, or *is walking*; and fourthly, this quality as affirmed to belong to the perſon ſpoken of, Alexander *is* walking.

From the verb take away the aſſertion, and there remains the attribute and the time, which are commonly thought to form the eſſence of the participle; and from the participle take away the time, and there remains the ſimple quality, as expreſſed by the adjective. Thus from *amat*, the verb, *loveth*, or *is loving*, take away the aſſertion *is*, and there remains *loving*, which is called a participle of the preſent time: and if we conſider the attributive *loving*, not as bearing reference to the preſent or to any particular time, but as expreſſing a perſon's general character which remains with him at all times, we transform it into an adjective; as when we ſay, a *loving* parent, a *ſympathiſing* friend, Ariſtides fuit *amantiſſimus* æqui. *Doctus*, *Spectatus*, *Probatus*, and many other attributives of the ſame nature, are participles, when they imply any notion of time; but adjectives, when they denote a quality ſimply, without regard to time.

All ſubſtances, natural, imaginary, artificial, and abſtract, and all perſons; and, in a word, whatever is expreſſed by a ſubſtantive, may be characteriſed by qualities, and, conſequently, joined in ſyntax to adjectives, to participles, and to verbs. We may ſay, a *tall man*, a *riſing man*, a *man ſpeaks* or *runs*: a *mournful muſe*, an *inſpiring muſe*, the *muſe inſpires* or *ſings*: a *ſwift ſhip*, a *toſſed ſhip*, the *ſhip overtakes* the enemy: of *virtue* we may ſay, that *it* is *lovely*, that *it* is *praiſed*, that *it brings* happineſs: and, of Socrates, that *he* was *wiſe*, that *he* was *condemned*, and that *he drank* poiſon. Pronouns, too, as they ſtand for nouns, may be characteriſed in the ſame manner; as in the two laſt examples.

From the method of arrangement commonly followed in grammars, we might be apt to conclude, that adjectives are of the ſame

claſs with nouns, and that the participle is a part of the verb. But when we examine theſe claſſes of words philoſophically, that is, according to their meaning and uſe, and without regard to their derivations, or final letters, we ſhall be ſatisfied, that the arrangement here given is right, and that the other, though not materially wrong, is however erroneous. In their nature, no two ſorts of words can be more unlike, than the ſubſtantive and the adjective; and therefore it muſt be a fault in diſtribution, to refer both to the Noun. The Subſtantive is the name of the thing ſpoken of, and in Greek and Latin is called *name*, for it is *onoma* in the one, and *nomen* in the other: and it would have been better, if in Engliſh we had called it *the name*, rather than *the noun*; for this laſt word, being uſed only in grammar, we are more apt to miſunderſtand, than the other, which is in familiar uſe. But the adjective is not the name either of a thing or of a perſon; nor is it a name at all: it denotes a quality; and the antient Greeks very properly called it, not *onoma*, but *epitheton* or epithet, and ſometimes rhêma; which laſt word means whatever is affirmed or denied of a thing or perſon. It is true, the term *rhêma* does not diſtinguiſh it from the verb and participle; but then it does not confound it with the noun or ſubſtantive. And in fact, the adjective or epithet partakes more of the verb and participle, than of the noun. So that, if there be any reaſon for diſtinguiſhing the noun from the verb, there is equal reaſon for diſtinguiſhing the noun from the adjective: and the term *adjective-noun*, however common, is really as incongruous, as *verb-noun* or *participle-noun* would be.

The reaſon, why Grammarians have confounded the adjective with the noun, ſeems to be, becauſe in Greek and Latin both are declined by caſes, reſemble each other in termination, and, when joined in ſyntax, agree in caſe, gender, and number. But this is no good reaſon. If it were, participles alſo ſhould be called nouns:

which in no grammar, ſo far as I know, has ever been done.—Adjectives are ſometimes called *adnouns*; which would ſeem not altogether improper, becauſe they are joined to nouns; but is not accurate, becauſe it does not diſtinguiſh the adjective from the participle and verb, which are alſo joined to nouns.*

The Participle, *Participium*, (in Greek † *metochê*) was probably ſo called, becauſe it *partakes* of the nature both of the verb and of the adjective; of the former, by expreſſing time, and of the latter, by denoting a quality. But, though derived from the verb, it is not to be conſidered as a part of it; becauſe, though it may reſemble a verb in expreſſing a quality with time, it implies no affirmation, and conſequently wants the verb's diſtinguiſhing character. If its derivation were to give it any right to be conſidered as a part of the verb, then the adverb *preſumptuouſly* might as well claim to be a *part* of the adjective *preſumptuous*, of the noun *preſumption*, and of the verb *préſume*. Accordingly, the Latin grammarians, while they confound adjectives with nouns, do yet very properly diſtinguiſh the participle from every other part of ſpeech.

Wherever adjectives and participles admit the diſtinctions of gender, number, and caſe, it would ſeem natural, that, in theſe three reſpects, they ſhould agree with the nouns to which they belong. Indeed, I cannot ſee, why adjectives and participles ſhould have thoſe diſtinctions, unleſs it be, that they may the more effectually coincide with their reſpective nouns. For *bonus*, *movens*, *good*, *moving*, or any other adjective or participle, conſidered in itſelf, cannot be of any number or of any gender: for it may be aſſerted

* If adjectives may ever with propriety be called *Adnouns*, it ſeems to be, when they are neceſſary to give the full ſignification of a noun. Thus the *golden eagle* is no more than the *name* of one ſpecies of the aquiline tribe. Accordingly, what in one tongue is thus expreſſed by two words may in another be ſignified by one. Thus χρυσαιετος is the name of the ſame bird in Greek. Similar inſtances are innumerable; as the *Mediterranean ſea*, a *ſetting dog*, &c. See *The Philoſophy of Rhetorick*. Book iii. chap. 2.

† Μετοχη, from μετεχειν participare.

of

of one, or of many; and of that which is either maſculine or feminine, and of that which is neuter. Twelve men or women, for example, may be *good*, or *in motion*, as well as one; and many ſorts of animals and inanimate things, as well as one ſort.—Agreeably to theſe remarks, we find, that in Latin, Greek, and ſome other languages, wherein the termination of adjectives and participles varies according to the gender and number;—that in thoſe languages, I ſay, adjectives and participles follow the gender, number, and caſe of the ſubſtantives to which they are joined: but Engliſh adjectives and participles, which never vary the termination, and are all of the nature of indeclinable Latin adjectives (as *frugi*, *nequam*, *centum*) adapt themſelves, without any change, to nouns of all genders, caſes, and numbers.—Whence we may infer, that the declenſion of adjectives and participles, though it takes place in many tongues, and may contribute to elegance and harmony of ſtyle, is not eſſential to language, and is therefore a conſideration which belongs not to Univerſal Grammar. And it will appear afterwards, that the ſame thing is true of the declenſion of nouns.

The *compariſon* of adjectives is another ſource of variety, which demands attention; that we may ſee how far it is, or is not, eſſential to language.—Things or perſons, that have a certain quality in common, may differ in reſpect of the *degrees* in which they have it. This paper is white, and ſnow is white; but ſnow is *whiter* than this paper. Pliny was eloquent, Ceſar was more eloquent, and Cicero was the moſt eloquent of the three. Sophocles was wiſe, Socrates was wiſer; but Solomon was the wiſeſt of men. Theſe, and the like degrees, of the ſame quality, muſt be obſervable in all ages and nations, muſt be ſpoken of by all men, and muſt therefore in one way or other be expreſſed in all languages.

In Latin and Engliſh, there are four ways of expreſſing this variety. The firſt is, by joining to the adjective an adverb of comparative

parative increaſe; as *more* hard, *very* hard, *moſt* hard; *magis durus*, *valde durus*, *maxime durus*.—The ſecond is, by varying the termination of the adjective: *wiſe*, *wiſer*, *wiſeſt*; *ſapiens*, *ſapientior*, *ſapientiſſimus*; * *ſophos*, *ſophôteros*, *ſophôtatos*.—The third is, by aſſuming other adjectives, which do themſelves denote both a quality and compariſon; as *good*, *better*; *bad*, *worſe*; *bonus*, *melior*, *optimus*.—The fourth is, by blending the two methods laſt mentioned: as in Engliſh, *good*, *better*, *beſt*; where *beſt* (contracted from the Saxon *Betteſt* or *Betſt*) is plainly allied to *better*, but *better* (though formed from the Saxon *Bet*) is, in Engliſh, a primitive word, not derived from *good*, nor from any other adjective now in the language. So in Latin, *malus*, *pejor*, *peſſimus*; and ſo in Greek † *kakos*, *cheirôn*, *cheiriſtos*.—In other tongues, other methods equally convenient, perhaps, and equally elegant, may have been adopted, for marking thoſe increaſing degrees of qualities, which are commonly called *degrees of compariſon*.

If it were aſked, whether participles have this variety, I ſhould anſwer, No. As attributives, they might have it, no doubt; for moſt attributes or qualities admit the diſtinctions of *more* and *leſs*: but participles, as expreſſive of time, cannot have this variety; becauſe time, whether conſidered as paſt, or preſent, or as future, admits not thoſe diſtinctions. Of two things that are good one may be *more* and the other *leſs* ſo; but if two perſons are *writing* at this preſent time, the writing of the one cannot be more connected with time preſent, than that of the other; and if Milton was writing in the laſt century, and Virgil twenty centuries ago, the time in which Milton wrote is *as really paſt*, as that in which Virgil wrote. And therefore, when an attributive, bearing the form of a participle, is varied by a comparative or ſuperlative termination, or has its

* Σοφος, σοφωτερος, σοφωταλος. † κακος, χειρων, χειριστος.

meaning heightened by an adverb of comparative increaſe, as *amans, amantior, amantiſſimus*; *doctus, doctior, doctiſſimus*; a *loving* friend, a *more loving* friend, a *moſt loving* friend,—that attributive is to be conſidered, not as a participle expreſſing a quality with time, but as an adjective expreſſing a ſimple quality.

As many verbs either denote, or imply action; and as the ſame action may be performed with greater or with leſs energy; it ſeems reaſonable, that they, as well as adjectives, ſhould admit of increaſe or of decreaſe in their ſignification; which is probably the caſe in all languages. But in every language that we know, it is done by means of adverbs, and not by varying the termination of the verb: for this would have added unneceſſarily to the complexneſs of that attributive, which in moſt languages is complex enough already. Thus we ſay in Engliſh, Brutus loved money *much*, Cato loved it *more*, Craſſus loved it *exceedingly*. So in Latin, *amat, magis amat, vehementer amat*.

Such adverbs as expreſs the meaning of attributives, may admit of compariſon, if the attribute itſelf be capable of *more* and *leſs*. Thus *diu*, for a *long* time, is varied into *diutius* and *diutiſſime*; *ſtulte*, in a *fooliſh* manner, or fooliſhly, into *ſtultius* and *ſtultiſſime*; *prope*, in a *near* ſituation, into *propius*, and *proxime*, &c. So in Engliſh we ſay, adverbially, long, longer, very long; fooliſhly, more fooliſhly, moſt fooliſhly; near, nearer, neareſt or next.

Thoſe words admit not of compariſon, which denote what is ſo definite as to be unſuſceptible of *more* and *leſs*. Quality, ſays Ariſtotle, admits of more and leſs; but ſubſtance does not. If this be allowed, it follows, that ſubſtantives do not admit of compariſon, but that attributives do. Goliah was *taller* and *ſtronger* than David; but David was as much a male of the human ſpecies as Goliah. If we ſay of any one, that he is *more a man* than another, we give to the noun the ſenſe of an attributive; for the meaning

muſt

muſt be, that he is *more manly*, or that he poſſeſſes ſome other good qualities in a higher degree. So when Pope ſays, of a certain perſon, that he is "a tradeſman, meek, and *much a liar*," the laſt phraſe is the ſame with *much given* to lying. And when the Scripture declares, of the phariſee's proſelyte, that he is *more a child of hell*; the meaning is, that he is *more liable* to puniſhment, becauſe more wicked; and therefore, the words *a child of hell*, have the import of an adjective.

Pronouns, as they ſupply the place of nouns, muſt, like them, be incapable of compariſon. It is true, we ſay in Engliſh the *very ſame*, and in Plautus we find *Ipſiſſimus* the ſuperlative of *ipſe* or *ipſus*. But theſe are redundancies. For *the ſame*, and *ipſe*, expreſs all that can be meant by *the very ſame*, and *ipſiſſimus*. Many ſuch ſuperfluities find their way into the language of converſation; but in ſolemn and elegant ſtyle it is better to avoid them.

Adjectives, whereof the meaning is already as extenſive as it can be, as *omnis*, *cunctus*, *totus*, *univerſus*; and thoſe that denote exact figure, or definite quantity or number, admit not of degrees of compariſon, becauſe they are unſuſceptible of *more* and *leſs*. Seven grains of ſand are as much and as really *ſeven*, as ſeven planets. My *two-foot* rule is as much a two-foot rule as yours. One circle cannot be *more circular* than another. We may ſay, however, that one *figure* is more *circular* than another *figure*. But in this example the adjective ſignifies, not exact figure, but *approaching to the figure of a circle*; and therefore, being, in reſpect of the figure, indefinite, is capable of more and leſs, and conſequently of compariſon.

How many *degrees* of compariſon are there? Every ſchool-boy can anſwer, Three; for three are mentioned by name in his grammar. How many parts are in an inch? A common joiner would perhaps anſwer, Eight, or Ten; for that is the number marked on

his foot-rule. But if we conſider this matter philoſophically, we ſhall ſee reaſon to affirm, that the degrees of compariſon are, like the parts of an inch, infinite in number, or at leaſt indefinite.—A mountain is larger than a mite:—by how many degrees? How much bigger is the earth than a grain of ſand? By how many degrees was Socrates wiſer than Alcibiades? or Cleopatra more beautiful than Octavia? or Varro more learned than Cato? Or by how many degrees is ſnow whiter than this paper? It is plain, that to theſe and the like queſtions no *definite* anſwers can be returned.

In quantities, however, that may be *exactly* meaſured, the degrees of exceſs may be exactly aſcertained, and definitely expreſſed. A foot is juſt twelve times as long as an inch; and a man ſeven feet high is double the height of one of forty-two inches. But in regard to *qualities*, and to thoſe quantities which cannot be meaſured exactly, it is impoſſible to ſay how many degrees may be comprehended in the comparative exceſs.

But though theſe degrees be infinite or indefinite in fact, they cannot be ſo in language. Nor would it be convenient, if language were to expreſs many of them. More need not be expreſſed than two; the firſt, to ſignify ſimple exceſs, which is commonly called the Comparative; and the other to denote very great exceſs, or the greateſt, which has obtained the name of the Superlative. * As to the Poſitive degree of compariſon, which grammarians talk of, it is nothing more than the ſimple form of the adjective, and implies not either compariſon or degree. The reaſon, ſays Ruddiman, why it has been accounted one of the three degrees, is, becauſe the other two are founded upon and formed from it.

But how is it poſſible by two words to expreſs accurately the various degrees of more and leſs, in which the ſame attribute may

* The expreſſion here is too brief to be accurate; but it will be more fully explained by and by.

appear

appear in thoſe things that we compare together? I anſwer, that, in meaſured quantities, and in qualities that may be aſcertained by the application of quantity, this is eaſily done by means of numbers:—as, a foot is *twelve* times *longer* than an inch; an hour is *ſixty* times *longer* than a minute; boiling water is *one hundred and ſixteen* degrees hotter than the human blood.—In regard to unmeaſured quantities and qualities, I anſwer, that the degrees of more and leſs may be expreſſed, intelligibly, at leaſt, if not accurately, by adverbs, or words of like import:—as, Socrates was *much* wiſer than Alcibiades; Snow is *a great deal* whiter than this paper; Epaminondas was *far* the moſt accompliſhed of the Thebans; the evening-ſtar is a glorious object, but the ſun is *incomparably* more glorious; the Deity is *infinitely* greater than the greateſt of his creatures. The inaccuracy of theſe and the like expreſſions is not a material inconvenience; and, though it were, it is unavoidable; for human ſpeech can only expreſs human thought; and where thought is neceſſarily inaccurate, language muſt be ſo too.

Sanctius, the author of a grammatical treatiſe called *Minerva*, maintains, that the Superlative degree does not imply compariſon. But, though he was a learned man, I muſt differ from him in this, as in many other things: and the leſs regard is due to his judgment, as he ſeems to have written with a view to eſtabliſh paradoxes, and abuſe the grammarians. To me the Superlative ſeems to be as really a comparative, as the Comparative itſelf. But that this may appear with full evidence, I muſt obſerve, that, in all the languages I know, and probably in all others, there are two Superlatives; which, though ſimilar in meaning, are different in their uſe. The firſt may be called the ſuperlative *of compariſon*; the ſecond, the ſuperlative *of eminence*.

1. When I ſay, that Cato was *more learned* than Marius, and that Varro was *the moſt learned* of all the Romans; is not a compariſon

pariſon of Varro with other learned Romans as plainly implied in the laſt clauſe, as a compariſon of Cato with Marius is in the firſt? For I would aſk, whether one who had never known or heard of any other Roman could truly and rationally ſay, "that "no other Roman was ſo learned as Varro;" a ſentiment, which is plainly ſignified when we ſay, that Varro was the moſt learned of all the people of Rome; and which no man (who had any regard to ſenſe or truth) would entertain, or expreſs, till after a compariſon had actually been made. So in this example, "Socrates was wiſer "than any other Athenian, but Solomon was the wiſeſt of men," Socrates is compared with the Athenians, and Solomon with mankind in general.

What then, it may be ſaid, if both imply compariſon, is the difference between the Comparative and the Superlative? Is it, that the ſuperlative always expreſſes *a greater exceſs* than the Comparative? No. Socrates was the *wiſeſt* of the Athenians, but Solomon was *wiſer* than Socrates:—here a higher ſuperiority of wiſdom is denoted by the comparative *wiſer*, than by the ſuperlative *wiſeſt*.—Is it, becauſe the Superlative implies a compariſon of *one with many*, while the comparative implies a compariſon of *one with one?* No: this is not always the caſe neither. The Pſalmiſt ſays, that "he "is *wiſer than all* his teachers;" where, though the comparative is uſed, there is a compariſon of *one with many*.—The real difference between theſe two degrees of compariſon may be explained thus.

When we uſe the Superlative, it is in conſequence of having compared individuals with the ſpecies to which they belong, or one or more ſpecies with the genus under which they are comprehended. Thus, *Socrates was the wiſeſt of the Athenians; the Athenians were the moſt learned of antient nations; Homer, Virgil, and Milton, are the greateſt of poets:*—where obſerve, that Socrates, though compared with his countrymen, is at the ſame time con-

ſidered as one of them; that the Athenians, though compared with antient nations, are conſidered as one of thoſe nations; and that Homer, Virgil, and Milton are conſidered as three individuals of that ſpecies of authors, with whom they are compared, and to whom it is affirmed that they are ſuperiour. And hence, this ſuperlative is in modern language followed by the prepoſition *of*, and in Greek and Latin by the genitive caſe of the plural; to ſignify, that the object, which has the pre-eminence, is conſidered as *belonging to that claſs* of things or perſons, with which it is compared.

But, when we uſe the comparative degree, the objects compared are ſet in *direct oppoſition*, and the one is not conſidered as a part of the other, or as comprehended under it. If I ſay, "Cicero was "more eloquent than the Romans," I ſpeak abſurdly; becauſe every body knows, that of the claſs of men expreſſed by the word *Romans* Cicero was one: but when I ſay, that Cicero was more eloquent than all the *other* Romans, or than any *other* Roman, I ſpeak not abſurdly; becauſe, though the perſons ſpoken of were all of the ſame claſs or city, yet Cicero is here ſet in contradiſtinction to the reſt of his countrymen, and is not conſidered as one of the perſons with whom he is compared.—Moreover, if the Pſalmiſt had ſaid, "I am the wiſeſt of my teachers," the phraſe would have been improper, becauſe implying that he was one of them: but when he ſays, "I am wiſer than my teachers," he does not conſider himſelf as one of them, but ſets himſelf in contradiſtinction to them.—Again, "Solomon was the wiſeſt of men:"—here Solomon is compared with a ſpecies of beings whereof he himſelf was one, and therefore the Superlative is uſed: but "Solomon "was of men the wiſer," is nonſenſe, (at leaſt in Engliſh) becauſe the uſe of the comparative would imply, that *he* was ſet in oppoſition to *mankind*; which is ſo far from being the caſe, that he is expreſly conſidered as one of them.

In

In Engliſh we cannot ſay, "he is the talleſt of the two;" it muſt be, "the taller of the two:" nor do we ſay, "he is the taller "of the three;" it muſt be "the talleſt." But this does not hold univerſally in other languages. The Greeks ſometimes have the ſuperlative, where we ſhould uſe the comparative. **Outis allê duſtucheſtatê gunê emou pephuken:* "there is no other woman *moſt* "wretched than I;" or, (to give the meaning in better Engliſh) "there is no other woman more ſuperlatively wretched." They alſo uſe the comparative inſtead of the ſuperlative. "And now "abide (ſays the Apoſtle) Faith, Hope, Charity; theſe three; but "the *greater* of theſe is Charity:" for the word in Greek is † *meizôn* and not ‡ *megiſtê*. Or we might render it thus: "And "now abide Faith, Hope, Charity, theſe three; but greater than "thoſe (that is, than faith and hope) is charity." In like manner, it is ſaid in the Goſpel, that "a grain of muſtard-ſeed is the "*ſmaller* of all ſeeds; but when grown up, it is the *greater* of herbs." In both theſe places, our Tranſlators have preſerved the Engliſh idioms. — Some examples of the ſame kind may be found in Latin authors: but they are not frequent, either in Latin, or in Greek.

2. The other Superlative I took the liberty to call the ſuperlative *of eminence*. It denotes very great exceſs or defect, but is not joined to any words that directly intimate compariſon: as when we ſay, Cicero was a *very eloquent*, or a *moſt eloquent* man; St. Kilda is a *very ſmall* iſland; a mouſe is a *moſt diminutive* quadruped.

Yet even in this Superlative, it may be ſaid, that ſomething of compariſon ſeems to be remotely or indirectly intimated; that, for example, when we ſay, "he is a very tall man," it muſt be underſtood, that we compare the perſon ſpoken of with other men, or his ſtature with the ordinary human ſtature. This is true: but

* Ουτις αλλη δυσυχεςατη γυνη εμε πεφυκεν. † Μειζων. ‡ Μεγιςη.

yet we cannot affirm, that compariſon is more clearly intimated in this ſuperlative, than in the ſimple attributive *tall*; for when we ſay, "he is a tall man," we muſt be underſtood to make the ſame reference to the ordinary ſize of men. So when we ſay, "Solomon "was a moſt wiſe, or a very wiſe man," we do indeed diſtinguiſh him from other men who were not ſo wiſe: but we mark a diſtinction of the ſame kind, though not the ſame in degree, when we ſay ſimply, that "Solomon was wiſe." Whereas, in the uſe of the former ſuperlative, the compariſon is direct and particular: for we not only expreſs great ſuperiority or inferiority, but alſo mention the perſons or things that are ſuperiour, as well as thoſe that are inferiour.

In Engliſh, we diſtinguiſh theſe ſuperlatives, by prefixing to the one the definite article *the*, ſubjoining the prepoſition *of* or *among*, with the name of the ſpecies or claſs of things compared; as "So-"lomon was the wiſeſt of (or among) men: Hector was the moſt "valiant of (or among) the Trojans." To the other ſuperlative we only prefix the indefinite article *a*: "he was a very good man; "he is a moſt valiant ſoldier." And obſerve, that our Superlative termination *eſt* is peculiar to the former: we may ſay "Homer "was the ſublimeſt, or the moſt ſublime, of poets;" but we cannot ſay, "Homer was a ſublimeſt poet;" it muſt be, "Homer "was a moſt ſublime, or a very ſublime poet." — Now, in Italian, the rule is contrary; for the ſuperlative termination denotes what I call the ſuperlative of eminence, *Cicerone fu eloquentiſſimo*, Cicero was moſt eloquent, or very eloquent, or Cicero was a moſt eloquent man: and the ſuperlative of compariſon is expreſſed by the adverb *piu* or *more*, which, with the definite article *il* prefixed, aſſumes the ſignification of *moſt*; as *Cicerone fu il piu eloquente dei Romani*, Cicero was the moſt eloquent of the Romans.

In a word, (that I may not take up more time with the peculiarities of individual tongues) different nations may have different contrivances for expreſſing theſe degrees of compariſon; but in one way or other it ſeems neceſſary that they ſhould be expreſſed in all languages.

In Hebrew, the compariſon of adjectives is intimated, not by inflection, but by the aid of a prepoſition. Thus, in the comparative, "Wiſdom is better than rubies," would be literally "Wiſdom is good above rubies." In the ſuperlative of compariſon, "He is the beſt of them all," would be, "He is good above them all." And, for marking the ſuperlative of eminence, they uſe adverbs correſponding to our *moſt*, *very*, &c. This method is extremely ſimple, and yet quite ſufficient for the purpoſe.

As I have here mentioned the Hebrew, and ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak of it once and again in the ſequel, I think it my duty to ſay, that for the little knowledge I have of the analogy of that language I am indebted to my amiable friend and colleague, Dr. Campbell; who in his *Philoſophy of Rhetorick*, and other works, has given many proofs of elegance as a writer, and of uncommon penetration as a philoſopher and critick; and who will ſoon (I hope) make an important addition to the Theological Literature of his country, by a new verſion of the four Goſpels, with explanatory notes and critical Diſſertations: a work for which he is eminently qualified; not only by his natural talents and philological accuracy, but alſo by his comprehenſive knowledge of the languages, and by that indefatigable zeal for religious truth, which has engaged him to make the ſtudy of the holy ſcriptures a great part of his daily employment for many years.

SECT. II.

The Subject of Attributives continued. — Of Verbs; — their general nature inveſtigated, and expreſſed in a definition. — Conjectures in regard to the Greek and Latin inflections.

THE Adjective denotes a ſimple quality: the Participle, a quality with time *: the Verb, a quality and time together with an aſſertion. This account was already given, to diſtinguiſh theſe attributives from one another. But Verbs being of all words the moſt complex and moſt curious, it will now be proper, to inquire more minutely into their nature; and to ſhow, from what modifications of human thought they derive their origin.

We are endowed, not only with ſenſes to perceive, and with memory to retain; but alſo with reaſon and judgment, whereby we attend to things, and compare them together, ſo as to perceive their characters and mutual relations. Thus I not only *perceive* the men whom I ſee to-day, and *remember* thoſe whom I ſaw yeſterday; but alſo *form judgments* concerning them: and thoſe judgments I expreſs, when I ſay, that one is ſtrong, another weak; one tall, another ſhort; one young, another old; one good, another bad; one wiſe, another fooliſh, &c.

Take now any one of theſe judgments, and expreſs it by itſelf; Solomon eſt ſapiens, Solomon is wiſe. — Concerning theſe three words, I obſerve, firſt, that they form a ſentence, or a complete enunciation of thought: ſecondly, that if the word *eſt*, *is*, were left out, the other two words, *Solomon wiſe*, or *wiſe Solomon*, would not form a ſentence: thirdly, that a ſubſtance or object is here

* See the fifth ſection of this chapter.

mentioned, *Solomon*, and a quality, *wiſe*; and that the one is *affirmed* to be the character of the other: and, fourthly, that if it were not for the ſame word *eſt*, *is*, nothing would be affirmed of either the quality or the object; for *wiſe Solomon* or *Solomon wiſe* contain no affirmation. Now the word *is*, or *eſt*, is one of thoſe words which are called *verbs*.—May we not then ſay, that "it is "the nature of a verb, firſt, to expreſs an affirmation; and, "ſecondly, to form, when united with a noun and a quality, a "complete ſentence?"

Before I proceed, it may be neceſſary to remark, that a ſentence comprehending a *thing*, a *quality*, and an *affirmation*, is in Logick called a *propoſition*; of which, the thing ſpoken of is the *ſubject*; the quality, affirmed, or denied, to belong to the ſubject, is the *predicate*; and the word, or words, containing the affirmation or negation, are the *copula*. Thus, in the laſt example, *Solomon* is the *ſubject* of the propoſition; *is*, the *copula*; and *wiſe*, the *predicate*. Thus, in the following propoſition, "To be juſt is commendable," *to be juſt* is the *ſubject*, or that concerning which the affirmation is made; *is*, the *copula*; and *commendable*, the *predicate*, or that which is affirmed of the ſubject.—Let it be further obſerved in this place, that every propoſition is either affirmative, or negative; that is, affirms or aſſerts, that the predicate either *does agree* with the ſubject, or *does not agree* with it. When I ſay, "God is good," I pronounce an affirmative propoſition: when I ſay, "Poverty is "not criminal," I utter a negative propoſition, wherein I affirm or aſſert, that *criminal* the predicate *does not agree* with *poverty* the ſubject. Every propoſition, therefore, whether affirmative or negative, does ſtill *imply* affirmation or aſſertion: for, to deny that a thing is, is to affirm that it is not; to ſay that "Pain *is not* "good," is the ſame thing with ſaying, "that it *is* evil," or "that "it *is* indifferent."—Of propoſitions poſitively affirmative the verb

alone

alone is the copula; as "God is good:" ſuch as are negatively affirmative have for their copula both the verb and the negative particle, as "Poverty *is not* criminal."—This being premiſed concerning propoſitions, I reſume the ſubject of verbs.

I ſaid, that a verb is "a ſpecies of word, which expreſſes an affirmation, and which may form, when united with a name and "a quality, a complete ſentence."—It may be worth while to conſider, whether the latter clauſe of this definition does not comprehend the former; that is, whether every ſort of *ſentence* does not expreſs or imply affirmation.

Sentences are of various kinds. A ſingle word may convey the full import of a ſentence. And this may happen in every part of ſpeech; the article and conjunction excepted, which can never ſtand by themſelves, becauſe they have no meaning, unleſs when they are joined with other words.

Firſt; a ſingle noun may ſtand for a ſentence, and imply an affirmation. One aſks, "Is Virgil or Lucan the better poet?" I anſwer, "Virgil." And this word thus connected comprehends an entire affirmative ſentence; "Virgil *is* the better poet."—Secondly, A pronoun may be a ſentence. If it be aſked, "Is he or "ſhe to blame?" and anſwered, *He*; this ſingle pronoun is equivalent to the following affirmative propoſition, "He *is* blame-"able."—Thirdly, An adjective may in its meaning be equally comprehenſive. "Is the day good or bad?" ſays one. I anſwer, "Good:" which means, "the day *is* good."—Fourthly, the ſame thing holds true of the participle. "Is he running or walking?" *Running*, may be the anſwer; which being reſolved amounts to "He *is* running."—Fifthly, A verb often comprehends a ſentence, eſpecially in the antient languages. *Albeo*; that is, Ego *ſum* albus, I *am* white: Dormit; Ille *eſt* dormiens; He *is* aſleep.—Sixthly, An adverb may ſtand for an affirmative ſentence. "Are you ſick?"

it is aſked. I anſwer, *No*; which is the ſame as if I had anſwered, negatively, "I *am not* ſick," or, poſitively, "I *am* well."—Seventhly, An interjection often contains a ſentence with affirmation; as when one tells me a melancholy tale, and I only anſwer, "Alas!" which implies, "I *am* ſorry."—Eighthly, A prepoſition may be an affirmative ſentence; "Was Virgil before Livy, or after?" The anſwer is *Before*; which is as truly an affirmative ſentence in this connection, as if I had ſaid "Virgil *was* before Livy."

Nay, even a conjunction, an article, or a letter, when taken *materially*, as the Grammarians ſay, that is, when put for itſelf, and not as the ſign of any thing elſe, may in a certain connection amount to a complete affirmative ſentence. "Is *yet* or *nevertheleſs* "the more common adverſative conjunction?" Anſwer; *Yet*: which implies, *Yet is* the more common.—"What is the definite "article in Engliſh?" Anſwer; *The*: that is, *The is* the definite article.—"What letter in our language is moſt offenſive to the "ear of a foreigner?" Anſwer, S; or S *is* the moſt offenſive.—All the ſentences hitherto ſpecified do plainly imply an affirmation; and that affirmation is expreſſed by *is* or *was*, or ſome other part of the verb *eſſe*, *to be*.

Moreover, Every ſentence contains a verb expreſſed or underſtood; and that verb muſt be in one or other of thoſe forms, which Grammarians call *moods*. Now every mood has a particular meaning, and gives a peculiar character to the ſentence: and, therefore, ſimple ſentences may be divided into as many ſorts, as there are ſuppoſed to be moods in a verb. I ſhall give an example of each; and it will appear, that whatever be the mood of the verb, or the form of the ſentence, there is ſtill in every ſentence an affirmation, or aſſertion, either expreſſed, or implied. Firſt, "He *is* good," is an *indicative* and affirmative ſentence: and the ſame thing may be ſaid of "He *is not* good;" which in a poſitive form may be expreſſed

preſſed thus, " He *is* evil."—Secondly, " I know not whether he " be good," Neſcio an bonus ſit, is a ſentence, wherein the *ſubjunctive* mood is uſed; and, if analyſed, will appear to be an affirmative propoſition to this purpoſe, " That he is good (or, his goodneſs) *is* to me unknown."—Thirdly, We uſe the mood called *Potential*, when we ſay, " He may be good," Licet illi eſſe bono; or " He ought to be good," Debet eſſe bonus; which are alſo affirmative ſentences, and may be otherwiſe expreſſed, " To be " good *is* in his power," and " To be good *is* his duty."—Fourthly, When we ſay, " May he be good," the mood is *optative*; and the words comprehend the following affirmation, " That he ſhould " be good *is* what I wiſh for."—Fifthly, When I aſk, " Is he good?" the mood is *interrogative*; and the queſtion may be reſolved ſo as to have the ſame character with the foregoing propoſitions: " It *is* " my deſire to be informed, whether he be good."—Sixthly, " Be " thou good," Eſto bonus, which is the mood called *imperative*, implies alſo an affirmation to this purpoſe, " It *is* my command, " or it *is* my intreaty, that thou ſhouldſt be good."—Theſe are the principal moods acknowledged by grammarians: how many of them may be *neceſſary* in language, will appear hereafter.—As to the *infinitive* mood, I ſhall ſhow in another place, that it partakes more of the nature of an abſtract noun, than of a verb; for it denotes no affirmation, and only expreſſes the pure meaning of the attributive, abſtracted from all conſiderations of number and perſon.

Having proved, more minutely perhaps than was needful, that every ſentence may be made affirmative; and it having been obſerved before, that, in order to expreſs affirmation, a verb is neceſſary in every ſentence; it remains, that a verb (according to the view we have hitherto taken of it) may be defined, " A word, " neceſſary in every ſentence, and ſignifying affirmation."

Now in all the ſorts of ſentences hitherto conſidered, the affirmation is, or may be, expreſſed by that verb, which the Latins call *ſubſtantive*, but the Greeks, more properly, a verb of exiſtence, * *eſti, eſt, is.* If then this verb may alone expreſs every ſpecies of affirmation, it would ſeem to follow, that no other verb is neceſſary in language. And, in fact, no other is ſo neceſſary as this: nay, if it were as natural, or as convenient, for men to ſignify their meaning in many words, as in few, and to call every thing by its own name, as to expreſs ſome things figuratively, we might perhaps affirm, that no other verb is *neceſſary*, nor any other form of it, but the third perſon ſingular of the preſent of the indicative, *eſt, is.*

But with the bare neceſſaries of life the moſt needy ſavage is not contented; he aſpires after convenience, and has even a taſte for ornament. And, in framing language, as in every other work, all men are more or leſs actuated by the ſame motives; and, for the ſake of elegance, as well as of utility, ſubſtitute one word for another, and croud the meaning of two or three into one; and ſometimes diverſify the ſame word with a number of inflections, ſo as to give it the power of expreſſing, without the aid of other words, a great variety of human thoughts. Theſe contrivances are more obſervable in Greek and Latin, than in the modern tongues, and in the verb more than in any other part of ſpeech. I have hitherto conſidered this attributive in its ſimpleſt, and moſt neceſſary form, as ſignifying pure affirmation. I now proceed to ſhow, how it comes to be more complex, by being applied to other purpoſes.

Some truths are eternal and unalterable; as, God is good; Virtue is praiſeworthy; The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. To expreſs the affirmation contained in theſe, and

* ἐστί.

the

the like propoſitions, the verb of exiſtence *is*, *eſt*, is alone ſufficient: for truths like theſe have no dependence on time, place, or perſon, but are at all times, and on all occaſions, invariably the ſame.

It may be ſaid, that the third perſon *plural* of this verb, *Sunt*, *Are*, is equally neceſſary with the third perſon ſingular; becauſe the ſubject of a propoſition may be *many*, as well as *one*. And it is true, that, in all the languages we know, cuſtom has made this third perſon plural neceſſary, by determining, that the verb ſhall agree in number with its nominative. But if cuſtom had determined otherwiſe, we might have done without it. If I were to ſay, "Health, peace, and a good name, *is* deſirable;" there would be a fault in the ſyntax, but nobody could be at a loſs to know my meaning: and, if cuſtom had not ſubjoined a plural verb to a plural nominative, or to two or more ſingular nominatives, there would have been no fault in the ſyntax. For, in old Engliſh, a verb ſingular ſometimes follows a plural nominative; as in the following couplet from Shakſpeare's *Venus and Adonis*,

She lifts the coffer-lids that cloſe his eyes,
Where lo, two *lamps* burnt out in darkneſs *lies*.

The ſame idiom prevails in the Scotch acts of parliament, in the vernacular writings of Scotch men prior to the laſt century, and in the vulgar dialect of North Britain to this day: and, even in England, the common people frequently ſpeak in this manner, without being miſunderſtood. Nay in Greek, which ſome affirm to be the moſt perfect of all languages; and in the Greek of Attica, which is allowed to be the moſt elegant dialect, the nominative plural of a noun of the neuter gender, and ſometimes even of maſculine and feminine nouns, is followed by the third perſon ſingular of the verb. And that, if the laws of the language had permitted, the ſame thing might have obtained without inconvenience in all caſes whatever,

whatever, will not, I think, be denied by any perſon who conſiders the matter impartially.

But innumerable affirmations there are, which have a neceſſary connection with *time*. That may be true now, which was not true yeſterday, and will not be true tomorrow. I may affirm concerning actions, that *have been performed*, or that *are now performing*, or that *will be performed hereafter*. Hence it would appear, that in a verb there muſt be ſome contrivance for expreſſing *time*.—I believe, however, it might be poſſible to frame a language, wherein paſt, preſent, and future time, as connected with affirmation, ſhould be expreſſed by adverbs, or other auxiliary words: but this would make ſpeech very unwieldy; and in fact we have no reaſon to think, that there is ſuch a language on earth. If therefore we conſider ſpeech, not as it *might be*, but as it *is*, we muſt enlarge the definition of a verb formerly given; and call it, "A word, "neceſſary in every ſentence, and ſignifying affirmation (or aſſer-"tion) with time." According to this idea, we may, by means of the verb alone, and without having recourſe to auxiliary words, affirm, or aſſert, not only what *is*, but alſo what *was*, and what *will be*.

Moreover, affirmations often have a connection with *perſons*, as well as with time. I may affirm ſomething concerning a quality, which belongs, or did belong, or will belong, to *me*, to *you*, or to *another*. *I am* reading; *you are* hearing; *he is* attentive: *I ſpoke*; *ye were* told; *he was* ignorant: *I ſhall write*; *you will be* undeceived; *he will be* thankful. This might be done, and often is, by prefixing to the verb the name of the perſon or perſons ſpoken of. But I may have occaſion to affirm concerning the qualities of a perſon whoſe name I know not: and if, in ſpeaking of myſelf, I were to uſe my own proper name prefixed to the verb, it would not be known, in many caſes, to the hearer, whether I were ſpeaking of myſelf,

myſelf, or of ſome other perſon of the ſame name. In a word, the ſame reaſons, that prove the expediency of uſing pronouns inſtead of proper names, will alſo prove the neceſſity or propriety, of contriving the verb ſo as that it may expreſs three perſons; the firſt perſon, when one affirms any thing concerning one's ſelf, *I am*; the ſecond, when one affirms concerning the perſon to whom one ſpeaks, *thou art*; the third, when one affirms concerning another, *he is*.

This *might* be effected by the ſimple contrivance of prefixing the perſonal pronouns to the verb, without any variation of the verb itſelf. For, though the Latins ſay, *nos ſumus, vos eſtis, illi ſunt*; giving to each perſon a different form of the verb; we expreſs ourſelves as *intelligibly*, when in Engliſh we ſay, *we are, ye are, they are*. And if this is intelligible in the plural, it muſt have been equally ſo in the ſingular, if cuſtom had permitted us to ſay, *I am, thou am, he am*; or *I is, thou is, he is*. In fact, *I is*, or *Iſe*, inſtead of *I am*, is frequent in Yorkſhire; and by illiterate people the pronoun of the firſt perſon is often coupled with the verb of the third, as *I thinks, I goes*; nay, *ſays I* may be met with in good Engliſh authors, as well as in common converſation. From all which we may infer (theſe barbariſms being equally intelligible with the Grammatical phraſes) that different inflections of the verb are not *neceſſary* to expreſs the different perſons. Yet, in all the languages we know, different inflections of the verb are uſed, more ſparingly in Engliſh than in moſt other European tongues, and in Greek and Latin with very great variety; which, as will be obſerved hereafter, is one chief cauſe of the ſuperior elegance and harmony of theſe languages.

As affirmations may be made concerning *one* perſon, or concerning *more than one*, it is obvious, that the verb muſt expreſs *number* as well as *perſon*: *Sumus, we are*, being as neceſſary in lan-

guage as *Sum, I am.* But if the plural pronoun be prefixed, a change in the verb, however elegant, is not *neceſſary* for expreſſing number. For in the Engliſh conjunctive mood, we ſay, without any ambiguity, *if I go, if thou go, if he go, if we go, if ye go, if they go.* And if this be done in one mood, without inconvenience, it might be done in another. Cuſtom alone would ſoon render, *We am, ye am, they am,* as expreſſive as *we are, ye are, they are.*

Our idea of a verb, thus enlarged, will give riſe to the following definition. "A verb is a word, neceſſary in every ſentence, ſigni-" fying affirmation, or aſſertion, with the deſignation of time, per-" ſon, and number."

But, if we conſider language, not as it might be in its rude ſtate, but as it has been actually improved in many, and perhaps in all nations, we ſhall ſoon be ſatisfied, that we have not yet completed the idea of a verb. In fact, the definition now given expreſſes only the nature of that verb, which the Latins call *ſubſtantive,* Sum, Fio, Forem, Exiſto, and the Greeks *the verb of exiſtence,* * *eimi, ginomai, pelomai, tunchanô, huparchô.*

As our thoughts ſhift with great rapidity, it ſeems natural, that thoſe, who would by adequate utterance do juſtice to what they think, ſhould rather ſhorten, than lengthen their expreſſion. Hence, in moſt languages, the words that are in continual uſe, as perſonal pronouns, articles, and the moſt common connectives, are generally ſhort. Hence, too, that tendency which we have in converſation, to join two words in one, as *dont* for *do not, ſhant* for *ſhall not, ant* for *are not, int* for *is not.* And hence thoſe multitudes of elliptical phraſes to be found in every language. It needs not then ſeem wonderful, that men ſhould expreſs two or more meanings by one word, when that can be done conveniently.

* Ειμι, γινομαι, πελομαι, τυγχανω, ὑπαρχω.

Now

Now ſome meanings more eaſily coaleſce than others. Between the attribute which is affirmed to belong to any ſubſtance, and the affirmation itſelf, there is a very cloſe affinity; and we naturally comprehend both in one word, and ſay, I *go*, inſtead of I *am going*; He *ſpoke*, inſtead of he *was ſpeaking*.

And thus our idea of the verb is completed. And we may now define it, "A word, neceſſary in every ſentence, ſignifying the "*affirmation* of ſome *attribute*, together with the deſignation of "*time*, *number*, and *perſon*."—Thus *lego*, *I read*, expreſſes the attribute *reading*, and *affirms* that attribute to belong, at the preſent *time*, to *one perſon*, which perſon is *myſelf*. So that this word *lego*, when analyſed, is found to comprehend theſe five meanings; *I*, the *perſon*, and *one* perſon; *am*, the *affirmation*; *now*, the *time*; and *reading*, the *attribute*: which all together form a compleat propoſition, including a ſubject, a predicate, and a copula, and withal intimating unity of perſon, and preſent time.

But the verbs of all languages are not quite ſo complex: and the foregoing definition is applicable, rather to Greek and Latin verbs, than to thoſe of our modern tongues. In Engliſh, the perſon muſt always be joined to the verb, in the form either of a noun or of a pronoun: for *read*, *readeſt*, *reads*, do not, like *lego*, *legis*, *legit*, form a ſentence, without their reſpective pronouns, or nominatives, *I read*, *thou readeſt*, *he reads*, or *Alexander reads*. In Engliſh verbs, too, time paſt is frequently, and time future always, expreſſed by auxiliary words, as *ſhall*, *will*, *have*, *had*, *was*, *did*, &c; whereas in Latin, and ſome other tongues, theſe varieties of time are ſignified by the inflections of the verb, *leget*, *legebat*, *legerat*, &c. In like manner, thoſe changes in the *manner* of affirmation, which give riſe to what Grammarians call the *modes* or *moods* of verbs, are ſignified in Engliſh by auxiliary words; but in ſome languages are expreſſed by varying the form of the verb. Thus *legiſſet* in Latin

is in Engliſh *he might have read*; the perſon being expreſſed by the pronoun *he*; the mood, by the auxiliary *might*; the time, by *might*, *have*, and *read*, conjunctly; and the attribute, by the participle *read*.—Is it not ſelf-evident, that thoſe tongues which comprehend ſo much meaning in their verbs, muſt be more expreſſive and harmonious, than thoſe that are forced to have recourſe to ſo many auxiliaries?

Auxiliary words, however, are not unknown either in the Latin verb, or in the Greek. In the paſſive of the former, the *indicative* perfect and pluſquamperfect, and the *ſubjunctive* perfect, pluſquamperfect, and future, are inflected by means of the verb of exiſtence, and the participle of time paſt, as *amatus eram*, *amatus fuero*, &c. And in the perfect and pluſquamperfect of the *ſubjunctive* and *optative* of the Greek paſſive verbs, there is a ſimilar contrivance.

But in our modern verbs and nouns the variety of auxiliary words is much greater. For the northern nations, who overturned the Roman empire, and eſtabliſhed themſelves in the conquered provinces, being an unlettered race of men, would not take the trouble either to impart their own language to the Romans, or to learn theirs with any degree of exactneſs: but, blending words and idioms of their own with Latin words inaccurately acquired, or imperfectly remembered, and finding it too great a labour to maſter all the inflections of that language, fell upon a ſimpler, though leſs elegant, artifice, of ſupplying the place of caſes, moods, and tenſes, with one or more auxiliary words, joined to nouns, verbs, and participles. And hence, in the Italian, Spaniſh, Portugueſe, and French languages, the greater part of the words are Latin (for the conquered were more in number than the conquerors); but ſo diſguiſed are thoſe words, by the mixture of northern idioms, and by the ſlovenly expedient now hinted at, as to have become at once like the Latin, and very different from it.—The antient Greek,

compared with the modern, is found to have undergone alterations ſomewhat ſimilar, but not ſo great. For with the northern invaders the Greeks were never ſo thoroughly incorporated, as were the Europeans of the weſt: and, when conquered by the Turks, they maintained their religion, and ſo preſerved their language from total depravation, though they could not prevent its debaſement.

On many topicks, it is eaſier to propoſe than to ſolve difficulties, and to aſk queſtions than to anſwer them. What is hinted in the laſt paragraph may be thought to account for the multitude of auxiliary words that belong to the verbs and nouns of modern Europe. But, for the multitude of *Inflections*, that are found in the nouns and verbs of the antient languages, how are we to account? Why did not the Greeks and Romans abound in auxiliary words as much as we?

Was it, becauſe their languages, like regular towns and fortifications, were *made* by men of learning; who planned them before they exiſted, with a view to the renown of the poets, philoſophers, and orators, who were to compoſe in them, as well as to the convenience of the people, who were to ſpeak them: while the modern tongues, like poor villages that extend their bounds irregularly, are the rude work of a barbarous people, who, without looking before or behind them, on the right hand, or on the left, threw their coarſe materials together, with no other view, than juſt to anſwer the exigency of the preſent hour?—This theory is agreeable to the ideas of ſome learned authors: but, if we pay any regard to hiſtory, or believe that human exertions are proportioned to human abilities, and that the Greeks and Romans were like other men, we cannot acquieſce in it.

They who firſt ſpoke Greek and Latin were certainly not leſs ignorant, nor leſs ſavage, than were thoſe moderns, among whom aroſe

aroſe the Italian, the Spaniſh, the French, and the Engliſh languages. If theſe laſt were formed gradually, and without plan or method, why ſhould we believe, that the Claſſick tongues were otherwiſe formed? Are they more regular than the modern? In ſome reſpects they may be ſo; and it is allowed, and will be proved in the ſequel, that they are more elegant: for, of two towns that are built without a plan, it is not difficult to imagine, that the one may be more convenient and more beautiful than the other. But every polite tongue has its own rules; and the Engliſh, that is according to rule, is not leſs regular than the Greek that is according to rule; and a deviation from the eſtabliſhed uſe of the language is as much an irregularity in the one as in the other: nor are the modes of the Greek tongue more uniform in Xenophon and Plato, or of the Latin in Cicero and Ceſar, than thoſe of the Engliſh are in Addiſon and Swift, or thoſe of the French in Rollin, Vertot, and Fenelon.

But why ſhould the inflections of language be conſidered as a proof of refinement and art, and the ſubſtitution of auxiliary words as the work of chance and of barbariſm? Nay, what evidence can be brought to ſhow, that the inflections of the Claſſick tongues were not originally formed out of obſolete auxiliary words prefixed, or ſubjoined, to nouns and verbs, or otherwiſe incorporated with their radical letters? Some learned men are of opinion, that this was actually the caſe. And though the matter does not now admit of a direct proof, the analogy of other languages, antient as well as modern, gives plauſibility to the conjecture.

The inflections of Hebrew nouns and verbs may upon this principle be accounted for. The caſes of the former are marked by a change made in the beginning of the word; and this change is nothing more than a contracted prepoſition prefixed, anſwering to the Engliſh *of, to, from:* as if, inſtead of *animal, of animal, to animal,*

animal, from animal, we were to pronounce and write *animal, fanimal; tanimal, franimal*; which, if we were accuſtomed to ſpeak ſo, would be as intelligible to us, as *animal, animalis, animali,* were to the Romans. — Of the Hebrew verb, in like manner, the perſons are marked by contracted pronouns ſubjoined or prefixed to the radical letters. Thus, *maſar,* he delivered; *maſartha,* thou deliveredſt, from *maſar* the root, and *atha,* thou; *maſarthi,* I delivered, from *maſar,* and *aothi,* me, &c. And in Erſe, a very antient ſpecies of Celtick, moſt of the inflections of the nouns and verbs may, if I am not miſinformed, be analyſed in a way ſomewhat ſimilar.

If the Engliſh, and other modern tongues, had been ſpoken for ages before they were written (which we have reaſon to think was the caſe with the Greek and Latin) it is probable, that many of our auxiliaries would have been ſhortened and ſoftened, and at length incorporated with the radical words, ſo as to aſſume the form of initial or final inflections. For it is while they are only ſpoken, and not written, that languages are moſt liable to alterations of this kind; as they become in ſome degree ſtationary from the moment they begin to be viſible in writing. But we know, that writing was practiſed in many, and perhaps in moſt European nations, previouſly to the very exiſtence of the modern languages: from which we may infer, that attempts would be made to write thoſe languages almoſt as ſoon as to ſpeak them. And if thus our auxiliary words were kept diſtinct in the beginning, and marked as ſuch by our firſt writers, it is no wonder that they ſhould have remained diſtinct ever ſince.

Had the Greek and Latin tongues been aſcertained by writing at as early a period of their exiſtence, their fate would perhaps have been ſimilar: and their inflections might now, like thoſe of the Hebrew, have been eaſily analyſed, and found to be auxiliary

words ſhortened and ſoftened by colloquial uſe, and gradually incorporated with the radical part of the original nouns and verbs. But it was the misfortune of the modern languages (if it can be called a misfortune) that their form was in ſome meaſure fixed, before it became ſo complete as it might have been; that, without paſſing through the intermediate ſtages of childhood and youth, they roſe at once (if I may ſo ſpeak) from infancy to premature manhood: and in regard to the Claſſick tongues it was a lucky circumſtance, that their growth advanced more gradually, and that their form was not eſtabliſhed by writing, till after it had been variouſly rounded and moulded by the caſual pronunciation of ſucceſſive ages. Hence, if there be any truth in theſe conjectures (for they lay claim to no higher character) it will follow, that the Greek and Latin tongues are for this reaſon peculiarly elegant, becauſe they who firſt ſpoke them were long in a ſavage ſtate; and that the modern languages are for this reaſon leſs elegant, becauſe the nations among whom they took their riſe were not ſavage. This looks very like a paradox. And yet, is it not more probable, than any thing which can be advanced in favour of that contrary ſuppoſition, adopted by ſome learned men, that the Claſſick tongues were planned by philoſophers, and the modern languages jumbled rudely into form by barbarians?

Before I proceed, it may be proper to obſerve, that ſeveral definitions of the verb have been admitted by Grammarians, different from that which I have given, and ſome of them perhaps equally good. — Some have defined it thus: "A verb is a word, which "forms, when joined to a noun, a complete ſentence." This is certainly true of the verb, and of no other part of ſpeech; but does not ſufficiently expreſs its character, as proceeding from an operation of the mind. — Others have ſaid, that a verb is "a word "ſignifying *to be*, *to do*, and *to ſuffer*." And true it is, that moſt

of

of thoſe attributives, which have a connection with perſons and times, may be referred to one or other of theſe three claſſes. But this definition does not mark the difference between the verb and the participle; becauſe it omits the affirmation, which is the verb's moſt eſſential character. — Ruddiman has very well expreſſed the nature of a Latin verb, in theſe words, "Verbum eſt pars orationis "variabilis, aliquid de aliqua re dici ſeu affirmari ſignificans." "A verb is a variable part of ſpeech, ſignifying, that ſome affir- "mation or aſſertion is made concerning ſome thing." — Ariſtotle ſays * *Rhêma eſti to proſſêmainon chronon:* "A verb is that which "ſignifies time, together with ſome other ſignification." But this appears to me to be very inaccurate: for it neither diſtinguiſhes the participle from the verb; nor takes any notice of the attribute or of the affirmation, both which belong eſſentially to all verbs whatever. Nay, according to this definition, certain adverbs, as *diu, heri, nudiuſtertius, cras, hodie,* &c. would be verbs; for they expreſs time, and withal ſignify, that the time is *long*, that it is limited to *yeſterday*, to *the day before yeſterday*, to *tomorrow*, to the *preſent day*, &c. — Buxtorff calls the verb Vox flexilis cum tempore et perſona, "a declinable word with time and perſon," which likewiſe overlooks both the affirmation and the attribute. — Some grammarians have ſaid, that "a verb is a word ſignifying actions "and paſſions." But *Sum, I am*, is a verb, and yet it ſignifies neither the one nor the other, neither acting, nor being acted upon: and *percutiens, ſtriking*, denotes action; and *vulneratus, wounded*, denotes *paſſion*, in the preſent ſenſe of the word; and yet both are participles. — Scaliger thought, that "things fixed, perma- "nent, and laſting," are ſignified by nouns, and "things tranſient "and temporary by verbs." But *hora, ventus, amnis, hour, wind,*

* Ῥῆμα ἐστι το προσσημαίνον χρονον.

river, ſignify things tranſient, and yet are nouns: and many verbs there are, which denote permanency, as *ſedet, ſtat, eſt, habitat, dormit, obiit*; *he ſits, he ſtands, he is, he dwells, he ſleeps, he died*, or *ceaſed* to live.

SECT. III.

The ſubject continued. Of the Times or Tenſes of verbs. Tenſes, 1. Definite in time. — 2. Indefinite in time, or Aoriſt. — 3. Complete, or Perfect, in reſpect of action. — 4. Incomplete, or Imperfect, in reſpect of action. — 5. Compound, uniting two or more times in one. — 6. Simple, expreſſive of one time only. — Remarks.

I Hinted, that the attributes, which have a connection with number and perſon, and may be made the ſubjects of affirmation, are reducible to one or other of theſe three heads, *to be, to act*, and *to be acted upon*; to which may be added a fourth, *to reſt*, or *ceaſe*, which however may perhaps be implied in the firſt. Verbs, therefore, there muſt be in all languages, to expreſs, firſt, *Being*, as Sum, I am; ſecondly, *Acting*, as Vulnero, I wound; thirdly, *Being acted upon*, as Vulneror, I am wounded; and fourthly, *Being at reſt*, as Dormio, I ſleep, Sedeo, I ſit.

Now, without ſome reference to *Time*, not one of theſe attributes can be conceived. For wherever there is *exiſtence*, it muſt continue for ſome time, how ſhort ſoever that time may be: and whatever exiſtence we ſpeak of, we muſt conſider, as paſt (he *was*), as preſent (he *is*), or as future (he *will be*); or as both paſt and

preſent (he *was* and *is*); or as both preſent and future (he *is* and *will* be); or as extending through time future, as well as through that which is preſent and paſt, as, he *was*, he *is*, and he *will continue* to be.—Further, wherever there is *action* either *exerted* or *received*, there muſt be *motion*; and all motion implies *time*. For when *many* contiguous places are gone through in a given time, the motion is ſwift; and when *few* contiguous places are gone through in the ſame time, the motion is ſlow.—*Reſt*, in like manner, implies duration: for if the want of motion did not continue for ſome time, we ſhould not know, that there was reſt.

Time, therefore, muſt make a part of the ſignification of all verbs, and of every part of every verb, in all languages whatever. And this leads me to ſpeak more particularly of the *Times* of verbs, which in Engliſh are improperly called the *Tenſes*; a word, whoſe *apparent* etymology would never lead us even to gueſs at its meaning; and which, if it were not explained to us, we ſhould not think of conſidering as a corruption of the Latin *tempus*, or of the French *temps*.

Time is naturally divided into Paſt, Preſent, and Future. All paſt time was once preſent, and all future time will come at laſt to be preſent. If therefore we deny the reality of preſent time, as ſeveral philoſophers both antient and modern have done, we muſt alſo deny the reality of paſt and future time, and, conſequently, of time altogether. Nay more: Senſe perceives nothing but what is preſent, Memory nothing but what is paſt, and Foreſight forms conjectures in regard to futurity. If, therefore, we ſay, that there is no preſent time, nor conſequently any future or paſt time, it will follow, that there are no ſuch faculties in man, as ſenſe, memory, and foreſight.

The fundamental error in the reaſonings of theſe philoſophers, on the ſubject of time, is, that they ſuppoſe the preſent inſtant to have,

have, like a geometrical point, neither parts nor magnitude; and that it is nothing more than the commencement of time future, and the concluſion of time paſt; even as the point, in which two right lines meet and form an angle, being itſelf of no magnitude, muſt be conſidered as the beginning of the one line, and the end of the other.

But, as nothing is, in reſpect of our ſenſes, a geometrical point, (for whatever we ſee, or touch, muſt of neceſſity have magnitude) ſo neither is the preſent, or any other, inſtant of duration, wholly unextended. Nay, we cannot even conceive an unextended inſtant: and that which we call the *preſent* may in fact admit of very conſiderable extenſion.—While I write a letter, or read a book, I ſay, that I *am* reading or writing it, though it ſhould take up an hour, a day, a week, or a month; the whole time being conſidered as preſent, which is employed in the preſent action. So, while I build a houſe, though that ſhould be the work of many months, I ſpeak of it in the preſent time, and ſay that I *am building* it. In like manner, in contradiſtinction to the century paſt, and to that which is to come, we may conſider the whole ſpace of a hundred years as time preſent, when we ſpeak of a ſeries of actions, or of a ſtate of exiſtence, that is co-extended with it; as in the following example: "In this century, *we are* more neglectful of the antients, "and *we are* conſequently more ignorant, than they *were* in the "laſt, or than perhaps they *will be* in the next." Nay the entire term of man's probationary ſtate in this world, when oppoſed to that eternity which is before him, is conſidered as preſent time by thoſe who ſay, "In this ſtate *we ſee* darkly as through a glaſs; but "in a future life our faith *will be* loſt in viſion, and *we ſhall know*, "even as we are known."

Time paſt, and time future, are, in themſelves *infinitely*, and, with reſpect to man, *indefinitely* extended: and, in ſpeaking of time

time paſt, or of time future, men may have occaſion to allude to different periods or extenſions of paſt or future time. And hence, in all the European languages we know, and probably in many other languages, there are in verbs ſeveral preterites and futures. Thus, in Engliſh, *I did it*, *I was doing it*, *I have done it*, *I had done it*, are plainly diſtinct preterites: and *I ſhall do it*, *I ſhall be doing it*, *I am about to do it*, *I ſhall have done it*, convey different ideas in regard to the tranſactions of future time.

But, in deſcribing the neceſſary *times* or *tenſes* of verbs, which is a curious part of ſcience, and the moſt difficult thing, perhaps, in the grammatical art, I muſt be ſomewhat more particular.

As the verbs, that ſignify *to act* and *to be acted upon*, are of all verbs the moſt complex, and muſt therefore have as great a variety of tenſes as any other verbs can have, I ſhall confine myſelf to them in the following analyſis of the tenſes. And when I have diſtributed the tenſes of active verbs into their ſeveral claſſes, and explained the nature of each, the ſubject may be preſumed to be ſufficiently illuſtrated.

The firſt attempt that was made in this nation, ſo far as I know, towards a philoſophical analyſis of the tenſes, may be ſeen in a grammar publiſhed in Queen Anne's time, and recommended by the *Tatler*, which is commonly called Steele's Grammar. It is in ſome reſpects more complete, than any other grammar of the Engliſh tongue that I have met with; and diſcovers a preciſion and an acuteneſs not to be found in the other writings of Sir Richard Steele; whence I am inclined to think it is not his. Indeed, from the variety of ſtyle and matter, as well as from the Dedication to the Queen, which is ſubſcribed *The Authors*, it would ſeem to have been the work of ſeveral hands.—About twenty years after, Doctor Clarke, in his very learned notes on Homer's Iliad, propoſed an arrangement of the tenſes; which, though imperfect, is ingenious;

and did certainly throw light upon the ſubject.—Mr. Harris, in his Hermes, publiſhed in the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty one, gave a more complete account of the tenſes, than any preceeding grammarian. His theory has however been objected to, in many particulars, by the author of a late work *On the origin and progreſs of language*; who has framed a new one, and a better, which he illuſtrates with great learning, and grammatical ſkill.—I have looked into all theſe authors; but, though I have received uſeful information from each, eſpecially from the laſt, I am not perfectly ſatisfied with any one of them. As there is ſomething peculiar in each of their ſchemes, ſo is there in that which follows. The truth is, that this is a ſubject of great nicety; and, being withal very complex, it is no wonder that it ſhould appear in different lights to different perſons. That I ſhould think favourably of my own theory, is natural; but it would be arrogance in me to preſume, that others will look upon it with equal partiality.

It is impoſſible to analyſe the Tenſes, without continual reference to ſome one language or other. If we take our ideas of them from the Greek and the Latin, we ſhall be inclined to think, that nine tenſes, or ten, or perhaps more, may be uſeful, or even neceſſary, in language. But if we were to judge of them according to the rules of ſome other tongues, we ſhould greatly reduce their number: no more than two, the *paſt* and the *future*, being acknowledged by the Hebrew grammarian. This ought to be kept in mind, that we may not multiply tenſes without neceſſity: at the ſame time let it not be forgotten, that, without reaſoning from the analogy of the Greek and the Latin, one could not do juſtice to the ſubject; thoſe being of all known languages the beſt cultivated, and the moſt comprehenſive. Beſides, in a ſpeculation of this nature, redundance is leſs faulty than defect. The more minutely we diſcriminate the tenſes, the more clearly we ſhall ſee from what modifications of human thought they derive their origin.

Some

Some will not allow any thing to be a tenſe, but what in one inflected word expreſſes an affirmation with time: for that thoſe parts of the verb are not properly called tenſes, which aſſume that appearance by means of auxiliary words. At this rate, in Engliſh, we ſhould have two tenſes only, the *preſent* and the *paſt*, in the active verb, and in the paſſive no tenſes at all. But this is a needleſs nicety, and, if adopted, would introduce confuſion into the Grammatical art. If *amaveram* be a tenſe, why ſhould not *amatus fueram?* If *I heard* be a tenſe, *I did hear*, *I have heard*, and *I ſhall hear*, muſt be equally entitled to that appellation.

The Tenſes of Active verbs I divide, firſt, in reſpect of *time*, into *Definite* and *Indefinite*. Thoſe parts of the verb that expreſs time indefinitely may be called *Aoriſts*. The word is Greek, and ſignifies *indefinite:* but the forms of the verb denoted by it are not peculiar to the Greek tongue, but muſt be in all languages, whether Grammarians take notice of them or not. And though, in the Greek Grammar, two *aoriſts only of paſt time* are mentioned, it will appear, that there may be, and in moſt languages probably are, aoriſts of the future, and even of the preſent, as well as of the paſt.

I. 1. When I ſay, *I read*, or *I am reading*, I expreſs preſent time *definitely:* for what I affirm of myſelf holds true at this preſent moment, but perhaps will not be true the next, and certainly was not true an hour ago, when I was aſleep. But when I ſay, "A "merry heart *maketh* a chearful countenance," I expreſs what is always true, what is not limited to any definite time, and what may be ſaid at any period of preſent time: that is, in pronouncing this maxim, I uſe the preſent tenſe, but I ſpeak of preſent time in general, or indefinitely; or, in other words, I uſe an *aoriſt of the preſent*. In all general aſſertions of this nature, expreſſed by preſent time, the tenſe is the ſame: as, Manners *make* the man;

The merciful man *regardeth* the life of his beaſt; The tender mercies of the wicked *are* cruel; A wiſe ſon *maketh* a glad father; Grande dolori ingenium *eſt*; Two and two *are* four, &c. And as all men muſt occaſionally ſpeak in this manner, every cultivated language muſt have a ſimilar contrivance; though there may be, and certainly are, many languages, in which the verb aſſumes no particular form in order to expreſs it; I mean, no form different from the definite preſent. How then, you will ſay, is it known? I anſwer, By the ſenſe of the words. If a verb of the preſent tenſe expreſs time indefinitely, that tenſe is truly an aoriſt of the preſent, whatever be its form or termination.

The Hebrews, whoſe verbs have no preſent, expreſs the meaning of this tenſe by the future. They who ſpeak Erſe do ſo too, though that language has a preſent. And in fact we often do the ſame, without ambiguity, or any awkward deviation from the idiom of the Engliſh tongue. We may ſay, A prudent man *conſiders* before he acts, or, A prudent man *will conſider* before he act: A wiſe ſon *maketh* a glad father, or, A wiſe ſon *will make* a glad father. Theſe and the like expreſſions are equally connected with the preſent and with the future. We are not ſuppoſed to exclude the future, when we affirm their truth with reſpect to preſent time: and if the law of the language required that we ſhould *always* expreſs them in future time, we ſhould not be underſtood to exclude the preſent, even in ſentences like the following; Two and two *will be* four, Virtue *will be* praiſeworthy, Honeſty *will be* the beſt policy.

The other preſent, called here the Definite preſent, and exemplified by *Lego*, *I read*, is, in Hebrew, ſupplied, ſometimes by other tenſes, but, moſt commonly, by a preſent participle active (called *Benoni* *); and, in particular caſes, by an impersonal *iſh*, ſignifying *there*

* This participle ſerves other purpoſes. It is ſometimes a verbal noun. Thus *moſer* is not only *tradens*, but alſo *traditor*: *ſhofet* is both *judicans* and *judex*. *S' ſetim*, the

there is, or *it is*, which always has the import of the preſent, and ſuits equally all perſons, genders, and numbers. So that, though in Hebrew verbs there is, properly ſpeaking, no preſent tenſe, yet there are in the language ſeveral contrivances that anſwer the ſame purpoſe. *Affirmation with reſpect to preſent time* is indeed ſo neceſſary in all nations, that we cannot well conceive how any language ſhould be unprovided of the means of expreſſing it.

I. 2. Secondly, when I ſay, *Scribam*, * *Grapſô*, *I ſhall write*, I utter a promiſe, in which future time is expreſſed indefinitely; for I do not allot the action of writing to any particular or definite part of time future. This, therefore, is an aoriſt of the future.—But when I ſay, *Scripturus ſum*, † *mellô graphein*, *I am about to write*, or *I am going to write*, I expreſs future time *definitely*, or without an aoriſt: for the meaning is, that I ſhall write immediately, or ſoon, after making the declaration. And this is, by moſt Grammarians, allowed to have been the import of that *paulo-poſt-futurum*, which is found in the paſſive verbs of the Greeks; where ‡ *tupſomai* ſignifies, indefinitely, or by the aoriſt, *I ſhall be beaten*; but ‖ *tetupſomai*, the paulo-poſt-future, denotes, I ſhall be *immedi-*

the plural of the latter, is the title of that book which we call *Judges*. The name is no doubt the ſame with that given by Latin authors to the chief magiſtrates of Carthage, Suffetes. See Liv. xxviii. 37. The Hebrew, the language of Canaan, as Iſaiah calls it, and that of the Phenicians, of whom the Carthaginians were a colony, were originally the ſame, with perhaps ſome difference of dialect. But the Romans, like the Ephraimites, could not pronounce the letter *Schin*, and therefore turned it into S, adding, as was uſual with them, a termination from their own language.—Sometimes in the New Teſtament we find the preſent participle active uſed in the ſame way. Thus ὁ πειραζων is *the tempter*, and ὁ βαπτιζων *the Baptiſt*.—*Benoni*, the name of the active preſent participle, ſignifies *intermediate*: and the participle is ſo called, perhaps, becauſe it comes as it were between the two Hebrew tenſes, the paſt and the future. It is ſpelled differently from the name *Benoni*, which Rachel when dying gave her newborn ſon, (Geneſ. xxxv. 18); though when expreſſed by Roman characters they appear the ſame.

* γραψω. † μελλω γραφειν. ‡ τυψομαι. ‖ τετυψομαι.

ately beaten, or I am about to be beaten. This, both in Latin and Engliſh, we expreſs by means of an auxiliary word or two, *Sum ſcripturus, I am about to write:* of which it is remarkable, that the auxiliary verb *ſum, I am,* points at preſent time; while the participle *ſcripturus, about to write,* implies future time; whence we gather, that this form of the verb ſignifies time future joined to time preſent, or, in other words, that the futurity ſpoken of is preſently to commence.—The Hebrews have no paulo-poſt-future; but by joining to their future ſuch adverbs as *quickly, immediately, ſoon,* &c. they eaſily expreſs the meaning. The ſame thing may, I ſuppoſe, be done in all other languages. Conſequently, the paulo-poſt-future is not a neceſſary tenſe.

As general maxims may be ſignified by the aoriſt of the preſent, ſo the aoriſt of the future is often uſed in legiſlative ſentences:—Thou *ſhalt* not kill, Thou *ſhalt* not ſteal; in which it is obvious, that no particular period of future time is meant, but future time indefinitely, * *aoriſtôs*, or in general. It is thy duty, *at all times,* and on *all occaſions,* to abſtain from theft and from murder. Here again we ſee a co-incidence of the future with the preſent. By a change of the phraſe, every precept of this ſort may be referred to preſent time: *It is* thy duty not to kill; *It is* thy duty not to ſteal: or, *I command* thee not to kill; *I forbid* thee to ſteal, &c.—The Preſent, though it cannot be called a part of the Future, is however an introduction to it. But the Future and the Paſt are of no kindred; and, being ſeparated by the Preſent, can never be contiguous.

I. 3. That there is an *aoriſt of the paſt,* is eaſily proved. The Greek verbs, and the Engliſh too, have a particular form to expreſs it, without the aid of auxiliary words. † *Egrapſa, I wrote,* or

* Αοριςως. † Εγραψα.

I did

I did write, denotes, that the action of writing is *paſt*, but refers to no particular period of paſt time. When I ſay, "He *ſent* me a "letter, and I *anſwered* it," both *ſent* and *anſwered* are aoriſts, and point at paſt time indefinitely: the letters ſpoken of may, for any thing that appears in the ſentence, have been written and ſent a year ago, or twenty years ago, or laſt ſummer, or laſt week, or yeſterday; for the tenſes refer to no one portion of paſt time more than another.—But if I ſay, "He ſent me a letter, and I *have* "*anſwered* it," the verb *he ſent* is an aoriſt; but *I have anſwered* is not an aoriſt; for it points at paſt time more definitely, and means, that I anſwered it *juſt now*, or *lately*.—It is worth while to attend to this auxiliary verb, by which we expreſs *definite paſt time*; *I have anſwered*; *I have*, being the preſent tenſe, points at time preſent; and *anſwered*, being the participle of the paſt, refers to time paſt: whence we infer, that the time expreſſed by theſe words, *I have anſwered*, is a mixture of the preſent with the paſt, or rather, *the paſt terminating in or near the preſent*. And that this is the true character of the tenſe in queſtion, will appear more clearly by and by.

We ſee then, that verbs expreſs not only Preſent, Paſt, and Future time; but alſo time paſt, preſent, and future, either, firſt, *indefinitely*, that is, by aoriſts, or, ſecondly, *definitely*.

But obſerve, that the Engliſh auxiliary *have* is not always definite, even when joined to the preterite participle. "I *have heard* "it ſaid, I know not when, or by whom, that Charles the ſecond "on his death-bed declared himſelf a papiſt." Here the words *I have heard*, are ſo far from being definite in regard to time, that they may allude to a fact which happened ten, twenty, thirty years ago, or not one year ago, or to a fact of which no body knows when it happened.

Obſerve,

Obſerve, further, that, in order to define or aſcertain time exactly, the verb alone, even in the definite tenſes, is not ſufficient, but muſt be illuſtrated by adverbs, or other words ſignificant of exact time. For our notions in regard to the extent of time vary according to the nature of the actions ſpoken of: and if theſe be important, or of long continuance, or not uſual, we are apt to conſider the time, which precedes or follows them, as ſhort, becauſe they make a ſtrong impreſſion, and appear of great magnitude. A year after one's houſe is finiſhed, one may ſay, "I *have* "*finiſhed* my houſe:" but, "I *have anſwered* Alexander's letter," is underſtood to have a ſhorter retroſpect; unleſs the writing of the letter was a work of great labour and time. In like manner, "I am to build a houſe," may be ſaid a year before one begins to build; but, "I am to take a walk," expreſſes a very near futurity. And therefore, as the expreſſion of time by verbs, eſpecially of time paſt and future, is rather relative than abſolute, adverbs, and other words, come to be neceſſary, when we would ſpeak with preciſion of paſt and future time. "I am *juſt going* to take a "walk;—I ſhall build a houſe *this ſummer*;—I have *this moment* "finiſhed my letter," &c.

II. The tenſes of active verbs may be divided, ſecondly, *in reſpect of the mode of action* ſignified, into Perfect, which denote *complete action*, and Imperfect, which denote *incomplete action*.

A late author mentions another claſs of tenſes, which he calls *Indefinite*, and of which he ſays, that they denote action, but without ſpecifying, whether it be complete or incomplete. And, as an example, he gives the aoriſt of the paſt, * *Egrapſa*, *I wrote*, or *I did write*. But I cannot ſee, that there is any ground for this diviſion. No other grammarian, ſo far as I know, either antient or modern, has taken notice of it; while the diſtribution of tenſes

* Εγραψα.

into *perfect* and *imperfect* ſeems to be as old as grammar itſelf. And the learned Author, whom I allude to, affirms, that "in our "grammatical inquiries we cannot quit the footſteps of the "antients, without the greateſt hazard of going wrong." This novelty, however, I reject, not becauſe it is new, but becauſe I do not underſtand it. I can conceive a complete action, that is, an action, which has had, or is to have, a beginning and an end: I can alſo conceive an incomplete action, that has had a beginning, but which is not, or is not ſaid to be, ended. But an action, which, though it muſt have had a beginning, is conſidered as neither ended nor continued, as neither complete nor incomplete, I cannot conceive at all. When I ſay, "I wrote a letter," the *paſt time* is *indefinite*, but a *complete action* is plainly ſignified: if the letter had not been finiſhed, "I was writing," would have been the proper tenſe. In like manner, "I wrote," though it does not imply, that the thing written, whether book or letter, was finiſhed, (for no particular writing is ſpecified) does yet ſignify, that the *act of writing* was both begun and ended. If it had not been *begun*, it could not be referred to paſt time; and if it had not been *ended*, or *diſcontinued*, (for theſe words applied to the ſimple act of writing are of the ſame import) it would have been ſtill going on; and the affirmation concerning it would be to this purpoſe, "I have been writing all the morning, "and am ſtill writing."—But, to return to the ſecond general diviſion of tenſes, into Perfect, denoting *complete action*, and Imperfect, which denote *incomplete action*.

II. 1. The aoriſt of the preſent may be ſaid to denote incomplete action. When I ſay, "A merry heart *maketh* a chearful "countenance," I expreſs by the word *maketh* an action, or operation, which is always *a doing*, and never can be ſaid to be *done* and *over*. For the time never yet was, ſince man was made, when gladneſs of heart did not diſplay itſelf in the countenance, and,

while human nature remains unaltered, the time will never come when it ſhall ceaſe to do ſo.

Further, the definite preſent, I mean the preſent that is definite in reſpect of time, does alſo denote incomplete action. While I am writing a letter, I ſay *Scribo, I write,* or *I am writing*; which implies, that part of the writing is done, and that part of it is not done; that the action is begun, but not ended.

But the moment the writing is completed, I ſay, or I may ſay, "I have written;" in which are comprehended theſe three things. Firſt, that the action is *complete*; for which reaſon the tenſe is called *perfectum*, the perfect: a word, which, from the frequent uſe of it in our grammars, may ſuggeſt *to us* the idea of *paſt time*; but which in reality ſignifies *perfect* or *complete* action: for, that there is a *perfect* of the *future*, as well as of the *paſt*, will appear in the ſequel. — Secondly, the words "I have written" imply, that the action is not only complete, but alſo *paſt*; for which reaſon, the tenſe is called *preteritum perfectum*, the complete paſt, or the preterite perfect, or more briefly the *preterperfect*. — Thirdly, theſe words imply, that the action is *juſt now* completed, or *very lately*. From this relation of the preterperfect to preſent time, (for, as I already obſerved, it denotes paſt time ending in the preſent, or near it,) the Stoicks, who were accurate grammarians, called it *the perfect or complete preſent*: but, as it denotes what *is done*, and, conſequently, *what is not now a-doing*, I think it better to call it by its ordinary name, the preterperfect.

For this tenſe the Greeks have a particular form * *gegrapha*; the Engliſh, and other moderns, expreſs it by an auxiliary verb joined to the participle, *I have written.* But it is remarkable, that for this tenſe the Latin verb has no particular inflection; for the ſame Latin word denotes both the preterperfect and the aoriſt of the

* γεγραφα.

paſt. *Scripſi*, for example, ſignifies, not only *I wrote*, or *I did write*, (referring to paſt time indefinitely) but alſo, *I have written*, referring to an action paſt and lately compleated. Hence ariſes a ſmall ambiguity in the uſe of the Latin verb, from which the verbs of many other languages are free. But, by means of adverbs, and other auxiliary words that hang looſely upon the ſyntax of language, this ambiguity in the Latin tongue may be prevented, wherever it is likely to prove inconvenient.

And here we learn to correct an error in ſome of the common grammars; where *amavi* is tranſlated *I have loved*; as if it were a true preterperfect, and nothing elſe, like the Greek * *pephiléka*: whereas it is both a preterperfect, and an aoriſt of the paſt, anſwering both to *pephiléka*, and to † *ephiléſa*; and ſhould therefore be rendered, *I loved*, *I did love*, or *I have loved*. And children ſhould be taught, that, though theſe three Engliſh phraſes are here connected by the particle *or*, and are every one of them expreſſed by the Latin *amavi*, they are not of the ſame import; for that the laſt may ſometimes differ conſiderably in ſignification from the other two.—One miſtake leads to another. The imperfect *amabam* is in the common grammars rendered, *I loved or did love*; as if it were the aoriſt of the paſt, and the ſame with the Greek *ephiléſa*: whereas, ſo far as it is really the *imperfect*, it correſponds to the Greek ‡ *ephiloun*, and, as will appear by and by, ought to have been tranſlated *I was loving*. I do not however affirm, that it is *never* an aoriſt of the paſt. But, in good authors, that is not its common uſe; and when it is, the tenſe loſes that character which entitles it to be called *imperfect*.

The Hebrews, having but one preterite, muſt confound, as the Latins do, the preterperfect with the aoriſt of the paſt, and make

* πεφιληκα. † ἐφιλησα. ‡ ἐφιλουν.

one word ſerve for both. When Job received the news of thoſe accumulated calamities, which at once diveſted him of all his property, and of every domeſtick comfort, he rent his clothes, fell down upon the ground, and worſhipped; and, according to our tranſlation, ſaid, "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away: "bleſſed be the name of the Lord." Here, (as the learned Author of *the origin and progreſs of Language* obſerves) the two preterites are elegantly diſtinguiſhed; the firſt being the aoriſt, the other the preterperfect. "The Lord *gave*;" this happened formerly, but at what period of paſt time is not ſaid:—and, "the Lord *hath* "*taken* away;" this had juſt happened, or very lately, ſo that it might be ſaid to be felt at the preſent moment. In the Hebrew, the tenſe is in both clauſes the ſame: and the paſſage literally tranſlated would be, "The Lord gave, and the Lord took away," or perhaps, "The Lord hath given, and the Lord hath taken "away." Job's meaning may, no doubt, be underſtood from theſe expreſſions; but ſeems to be more emphatically ſignified in our Engliſh bible, than by either of them, or even by the original Hebrew itſelf.—The preterperfect, therefore, as diſtinguiſhed from the aoriſt preterite, is rather an uſeful, than a neceſſary, tenſe. In Latin, by means of an adverb of preſent time joined to the preterite, its full import might in many caſes be given; though not ſo elegantly, perhaps, as in Greek or Engliſh. Jehova dedit; et nunc abſtulit Jehova: ſit nomen Jehovæ benedictum.

The Latins, as Mr. Harris and other learned authors have obſerved, ſometimes uſe their perfect tenſe, to denote the annihilation or diſcontinuance of the attribute expreſſed by the verb: *fuit*, for example, to ſignify *he has been, he is no more*; *vixit*, *he has lived, he is dead*; and, at the concluſion of Academical harangues, *dixi*, *I have done ſpeaking, I am ſilent*. In this view, the verbs *fuit*, *vixit*, and *dixi* are to be conſidered as *preterperfect*; that is, as expreſſing

an attribute connected with *that definite paſt time which terminates in or near the preſent*.—Thus, when Cicero had, by virtue of a ſort of dictatorial authority conferred on him by the Senate for a temporary purpoſe, put to death ſome noblemen of Rome, who had been concerned in Catiline's conſpiracy, he appeared in the forum, and, in the hearing of all the people, who were anxious to know the event, cried out with a loud voice, "*Vixerunt*," they *have lived*; that is, *they are dead*; "their life continued down to this time has "juſt now terminated." Perhaps Cicero might have a ſcruple to uſe a more explicit term; *death* being one of thoſe words that the Romans thought it ominous to pronounce on certain occaſions. Or perhaps, though what he had done was conſtitutional, and of great publick utility, yet, being extraordinary, and in a popular ſtate ſomewhat hazardous at ſuch a time, he might wiſh to mitigate the general opinion of its ſeverity, by announcing it in ſuch a manner, as ſhould fix the attention of the people rather upon the *lives* and *crimes* of the conſpirators, than upon their puniſhment.

Virgil has introduced the ſame idiom, with the happieſt effect, in one or two paſſages of the Eneid. On the night of the deſtruction of Troy, Eneas, warned in a dream that the city was betrayed and on fire, ſtarts from his bed, and, alarmed by the uproar of the battle, and the glare of the conflagration, ruſhes out in arms to attack the enemy. In his way he meets Panthus the prieſt of Apollo. What is the ſtate of our affairs, Panthus, ſaid he; what is to be done? Panthus with a groan replied,

> Venit ſumma dies, et inductabile tempus
> Dardaniæ: *fuimus* Troes, *fuit* Ilium, et ingens
> Gloria Teucrorum.

"Our laſt hour is come: Troy *has been*: we *have been* Trojans." As if he had ſaid, "Trojans, and their city, and all their glory, are

" to be reckoned among the things that *have been*, but are now no " more."—The ſame poet, ſpeaking of Ardea, an antient Rutilian town, has theſe words,

——— et nunc magnum manet Ardea nomen,
Sed fortuna *fuit*.

" Ardea is ſtill a great name; but its fortune *has been*, or is over " and gone." Rueus, indeed, the learned editor of Virgil for the uſe of the Dauphin, explains the word otherwiſe, and makes it ſignify, that " fortune had ſo determined:" and in this he is countenanced by Scaliger. But the interpretation here given is more ſuitable to the context, as well as to the ſolemn phraſeology of the poet; and is, beſides, warranted by Taubmannus and Mr. Harris.

I ſaid, that the nature of the tenſe we now ſpeak of is more fully expreſſed by the common appellation of *preterperfect*, than by that of the *perfect preſent*, which is the name the Stoicks gave it. And ſo indeed it is for the moſt part. But I ought to have added, that this tenſe in Greek does ſometimes imply, not paſt time terminating in or near the preſent, nor even complete action, but *paſt and preſent time united*; in which caſe it becomes a ſort of preſent, and, in Doctor Clarke's opinion, ſhould be called, not the preterperfect, but the *preſent perfect*: as in the following line of Homer:

* Kluthi meu, Argurotox', hos Chruſên amphibebêkas;

" Hear me, O God of the ſilver bow, who *haſt been and art* the " guardian of Chryſê."

Mr. Harris ſeems to think, that, in Virgil, the preterperfect often implies the ſame ſort of time with the preſent. That this is never the caſe, I will not affirm. But, if I miſtake not, moſt of the paſſages he has quoted will be found to have a more expreſſive

* Κλῦθι μευ Αργυροτοξ' ὃς χρυσην ἀμφιβεβηκας. Iliad. i.

meaning, if we ſuppoſe the tenſe in queſtion to ſignify *paſt* time. For example,

——— Si brachia forte *remiſit*,
Atque illum in præceps prono *rapit* alveus amni.

I would render thus: "If he who rows againſt the ſtream *has inter-* "*mitted* for a moment the exertion of his arms, headlong *he is* "inſtantly born by the current of the river." For *atque* is here uſed in the antique ſenſe, and denotes *immediately*; as in that line of Ennius,

Atque atque ad muros properat Romana juventus.

—So in the deſcription of the night-ſtorm of thunder, lightning, and rain,

Terra *tremit*, *fugere* feræ—†

"The earth is trembling"—you feel it, and therefore that commotion is *preſent*: but, when you look around you, *fugere feræ*, you find that the wild beaſts have diſappeared, and therefore *had fled* away, before you lifted up your eyes.—Again, when the poet ſays,

—— tardis ingens ubi flexibus *errat*
Mincius, et tenera *prætexit* arundine ripas: ‡

"The great Mincius *rolls* ſlowly winding along, and *fringes* (or "*borders*) his banks with reeds;" I agree with Mr. Harris, that the two verbs are the ſame in reſpect of time; but I do not find, that the tenſes are different. The learned author probably miſtook the preſent of *prætexo* for the preterit of *prætego*: which laſt is a word that Virgil never uſes, and which I cannot recollect to have ſeen in any Claſſick of the Auguſtan age.

Once more, when Virgil ſays, of a ſhip,

—— illa noto citius, celerique ſagitta,
Ad terram *fugit*, et portu ſe *condidit* alto. ‖

* Georg. i. ver. 202. † Georg. i. ver. 330. ‡ Georg. iii. ver. 15. ‖ Æneid. v.

"Swifter

" Swifter than the wind, or an arrow, ſhe *flies* to land;"—this is preſent; " and now," before I can ſpeak the word, " ſhe *has run* " into the harbour." There is in this example the ſame diverſity of time, as if I were to ſay: " See how ſwiftly the boy purſues " the butterfly; he *runs*—and now he *has caught* it."—But of this, enough.

II. 2. The tenſes of paſt time denote two ſorts of actions; firſt, actions *complete* or *perfect*, and ſecondly, actions *incomplete* or *imperfect*.

Firſt, I ſay, the tenſes of paſt time denote complete actions. Of this kind, for the moſt part, is the preterperfect above deſcribed, which expreſſes paſt time as ending in the preſent, or near it.—Of this kind, alſo, is the aoriſt of the paſt * *egrapſa*, *I wrote*, or *I did write*; as already obſerved.

And of the ſame kind is the tenſe called *Pluſquamperfectum*; which denotes complete action connected, not with preſent, but with paſt time. That this is its import, will appear from an example. " He came to forbid me to write, but I *had written* be- " fore he came." Here obſerve, that the words *I had written* refer, firſt, to a complete action; ſecondly, to paſt time; and, thirdly, *to an action that was prior in time to another action which is alſo paſt*. This is the peculiar meaning of the pluſquamperfect: ſo that in three reſpects it reſembles the preterperfect, namely, in denoting *complete action*, *paſt time*, and *paſt time definite*; but from the preterperfect it differs in this one reſpect, that the time expreſſed by it terminates not in time preſent, but at ſome point of the time that is paſt. And the double reference which it bears to paſt time appears in our complex way of expreſſing it, *I had written*; in which it is obſervable, that the auxiliary *had* and the participle *written* are both ſignificant of paſt time. The Greeks and

* εγραψα.

Latins

Latins elegantly expreſs this tenſe by one word, which is derived immediately from the preterperfect, to which indeed it bears a nearer affinity than to any other tenſe: *ſcripſi, ſcripſeram*; * *gegrapha, egegraphein.* — So much for thoſe tenſes of paſt time, which denote *complete action.*

Secondly, there is alſo a preterite tenſe, which denotes *incomplete action: Scribebam, I was writing.* In this expreſſion it is implied, that the action is *paſt*, that it *continued*, or might have continued for ſome time, but that it was *not finiſhed.* The tenſe therefore is very properly called the *imperfect preterite.* The Greeks gave it a name ſignifying † *extended*; and deſcribed it more particularly, by ſaying, that "it is the extended and incomplete part "of the paſt." — Eneas, in Virgil, ſpeaking of the deſtruction of Troy, relates, that, after he had conducted his father and followers to a place of ſafety, he returned alone to the burning city, in queſt of his wife Creuſa, who was miſſing. He went firſt to his own houſe, thinking, ſhe might have wandered thither: but there, he ſays,

—— *Irruerant* Danai, et tectum omne *tenebant*;

"the Greeks *had ruſhed* in, and *were poſſeſſing* the whole houſe." Obſerve the effect of the pluſquamperfect, and imperfect, tenſes. The Greeks *had ruſhed* in, *irruerant*; that action *was over*, and had been compleated *before he came*: but the act of poſſeſſing the houſe, *tenebant*, was *not over*, nor *finiſhed*, but *ſtill continuing.* This example is taken notice of by Mr. Harris. I ſhall give another from Virgil, and one from Ovid.

In the account of the paintings, which Eneas is ſurpriſed to find in the temple of Juno at Carthage, they being all, it ſeems, on the ſubject of the Trojan war, the poet mentions the following circumſtance,

* γεγραφα, εγεγραφειν. † παρατατικος.

Ter

Ter circum Iliacos *raptaverat* Hectora muros,
Exanimumque auro corpus *vendebat* Achilles:

which informs us both of the action of the picture, and of the event that was ſuppoſed to have preceded it. "Achilles *had* "*dragged* the body of Hector three times round the walls of "Troy;" — this is the previous event; — "and *was ſelling*," that is, was repreſented in the act of delivering, "the body to Priam, "and receiving the ranſom." All this is eaſily conceived; and an excellent ſubject it is for a picture. But if, without diſtinguiſhing the tenſes, we were to underſtand the paſſage, as Dryden has tranſlated it,

Thrice round the walls of Troy Achilles drew
The corpſe of Hector, whom in fight he ſlew, &c.

we ſhould be inclined to think, that Virgil knew very little of the laws, or of the powers, of painting. For, according to this interpretation, Achilles muſt have been painted in the act *of dragging Hector three times* round Troy, and alſo in the act of delivering the body to Priam. Pitt, Trapp, and Ogilvie, in their Tranſlations, have fallen into the ſame impropriety; a proof, that the theory of tenſes has not always been attended to, even by men of learning.

When Dido had juſt ſtruck the fatal blow, and lay in the agonies of death, the behaviour of her Siſter, as deſcribed by Dryden, is ſomewhat extraordinary. Anna was at a little diſtance from the pile, on which lay the unfortunate queen; but, hearing of what had happened, ſhe ran in diſtraction to the place, and addreſſed Dido in a long ſpeech. That being ended,

—— She mounts the pile with eager haſte,
And in her arms the dying queen embraced;

Her

Her *temples chafed,* and *her own garments* tore,*
To ſtanch the ſtreaming blood, and cleanſe the gore.

The ſpeech is very fine, and very pathetick; in Virgil, at leaſt, it is ſo: but, as it appears in Dryden, (and Pitt commits the ſame miſtake) never was any thing of the kind more unſeaſonable. The poor lady was dying, the blood ſtreaming from her wound; and yet this affectionate ſiſter (for ſuch we know ſhe was) would not attempt any thing for her relief, till ſhe had declaimed for fourteen lines together. — But, from Virgil's own account we learn, that Anna did not loſe a moment. She *had mounted* the lofty pile, and *was holding* her dying ſiſter to her boſom, and weeping, and *endeavouring* to ſtop the effuſion of blood, all the while that thoſe paſſionate exclamations were breaking from her.

—— Sic fata, gradus *evaſerat* altos
Semianimemque ſinu germanam amplexa *fovebat*
Cum gemitu, atque atros *ficcabat* veſte cruores.

This the Engliſh poet would have known, if he had not confounded the imperfect tenſe with the perfect and pluſquamperfect, and ſuppoſed them all to mark the ſame ſort of time and of action. Similar blunders are frequent in Dryden, and in all the other tranſlators of Virgil that I have ſeen.

In Ovid, when the Flood was abated, Deucalion, having concluded a very tender ſpeech to Pyrrha with this ſentiment, "It "has pleaſed the Gods, that we are the only ſurvivors of the whole "human race;" the poet adds,

Dixerat; et *flebant*: placuit celeſte precari
Numen. —

* Conſidering Dido's condition, to *chafe her temples* was abſurd, if not cruel: and to inſinuate, that Anna on this occaſion did not ſpare *her own clothes*, is ridiculouſly trifling. Virgil ſays not a word of chafing temples, or of tearing garments.

" He *had done ſpeaking*; and they *were weeping*; when it oc-
" curred to them to implore the aid of the Goddeſs of the place."
The ſpeech had been for ſome time concluded; then followed a pauſe, during which they wept in ſilence; and, while they were weeping, they formed this pious reſolution. The pluſquamperfect, followed by the imperfect, is here very emphatical, and gives in two words an exact view of the behaviour of this forlorn pair; which would be in a great meaſure loſt, if, confounding the tenſes in Engliſh, we were to tranſlate it, as is vulgarly done; " He
" ſpoke, and they wept:" which marks neither the continuance of the laſt action, nor that it was ſubſequent to the firſt. — If children are not well inſtructed in the nature of the ſeveral tenſes, it is impoſſible for them to enter into the delicacies of claſſical expreſſion.

The Latins elegantly uſe this imperfect tenſe to ſignify actions that are cuſtomary, and often repeated. Thus *dicebat* may imply, *he was ſaying*, or *he was wont to ſay*; the ſame with *ſolebat dicere*. For actions that have become habitual, or which are frequently repeated, may be ſaid to be always going on, and may therefore with philoſophick propriety be expreſſed by the imperfect tenſe.

It alſo deſerves notice, that the antient painters and ſtatuaries, both Greek and Latin, made uſe of this tenſe, when they put their names to their performances. On a famous ſtatue of Hercules ſtill extant are inſcribed theſe words, * *Glycôn Athênaios epoiei*, Glycon Athenienſis *faciebat*, Glycon an Athenian *was making* it. The phraſe was thought modeſt; becauſe it implied, that the artiſt had indeed been at work upon the ſtatue, but did not pretend to ſay that he had finiſhed it, or made it complete: which would have been the meaning, if he had given it in the aoriſt † *epoiêſe*, *fecit*,

* Γλυκων Αθηναιος ἐποιει. † ἐποιησε.

made it. Some of our printers have adopted the ſame tenſe at the beginning or end of their books; "*Excudebat* Henricus Stepha-"nus: *Excudebant* Robertus et Andreas Foulis."

Ceſar, whoſe narrative is not leſs diſtinguiſhed by its modeſty, than his actions were by their greatneſs, often uſes the imperfect, in ſpeaking of himſelf, where I think he would have uſed the perfect, if he had been ſpeaking of another. This muſt have been wonderfully pleaſing to a Roman; who would be much more ſenſible of the delicacy, than we are. Indeed, the beſt antient and modern criticks, particularly Cicero, Quintilian, and Roger Aſcham, ſpeak with a ſort of rapture of the exquiſite propriety of Ceſar's ſtyle. And as to his narrative, though he pretended to nothing more, than to write a journal or diary, (for ſuch is the meaning of the word, which is vulgarly tranſlated *Commentaries*)—as to his narrative, I ſay, Cicero declares, that no man in his ſenſes will ever attempt to improve it. The frequency of theſe imperfects in Ceſar has, if I miſtake not, another uſe: for it keeps the reader continually in mind, that the book was written from day to day, *in the midſt* of buſineſs, and while the tranſactions there recorded might be ſaid rather *to be going on*, than to be completed.

From the few examples here given it will appear, that the Imperfect and Pluſquamperfect are very uſeful, and may be the ſource of much elegant expreſſion; and that, if one were not taught to diſtinguiſh, in reſpect of meaning as well as of form, theſe tenſes from each other, and the preterit from both, one could not pretend to underſtand, far leſs to tranſlate, any good Claſſick author. The want of them, therefore, in Hebrew, muſt be a deficiency. Yet, in a language, like the Hebrew, which has been employed chiefly in delivering ſentiments and recording facts, in the ſimpleſt manner, with little rhetorical art, and without any oſtentation of harmonious and elaborate periods, this is not perhaps ſo material a deficiency, as at firſt ſight it may appear.

For firſt, if we are willing to diſpenſe with elegance and energy, the preterit may often be uſed for the pluſquamperfect. If I ſay, "He came to forbid me to write, but *I wrote* before he came, "(inſtead of *I had written*)," the meaning is perceptible enough; though not ſo grammatically expreſſed as it might have been, nor indeed ſo ſtrongly. In the tranſlation of the fourteenth chapter of St. Matthew, we have theſe words: "And Herod ſaid unto "his ſervants, This is John the Baptiſt; he is riſen from the dead; "and therefore mighty works do ſhow forth themſelves in him. "For Herod *had laid hold* on John, and bound him, and put him "in priſon, &c." Here the pluſquamperfect *had laid hold and bound* is elegantly uſed. But the Greek, following, as in many other parts of the Goſpels, (eſpecially of Matthew's Goſpel) the Hebrew idiom, has the aoriſt of the preterit: "For Herod, having "laid hold on John, *bound* him, and *put* him in priſon." This gives the ſenſe; though not ſo emphatically, as it is expreſſed in the Engliſh Bible.*

Secondly: The preterit *may* be uſed, without ambiguity, for the imperfect. This change might often be made in Ceſar, as already hinted. The French *j'etois* and *je fus* are both rendered in Engliſh *I was*. And, inſtead of *Stephanus excudebat*, at the bottom of a title-page, if we were to read *Stephanus excudit*, the phraſe, though leſs claſſical, would be equally intelligible. So liable, indeed, are theſe two tenſes to be confounded, that in ſome Latin grammars (as formerly obſerved) we find *I loved or did love* given as the interpretation of *amabam*.

Thirdly: The Hebrews do ſometimes give the full ſenſe of the pluſquamperfect, by prefixing, to the infinitive of the verb, or to a ſort of verbal noun called a gerund, the word *calah, he finiſhed*,

* Other examples of the preterit uſed for the pluſquamperfect, ſee in Luke xix. 15. John v. 13. Apocalyps. xxi. 1.

or

or *he made an end of*. "As ſoon as Iſaac made an end of bleſſing "Jacob"—might, according to the ſyntax of thoſe languages that have a pluſquamperfect, be thus rendered without any impropriety, "As ſoon as Iſaac *had bleſſed* Jacob." *—A ſimilar idiom we have in Engliſh; as when, inſtead of *dixerat*, we ſay, *he had done ſpeaking*, or *he had ceaſed to ſpeak*.

III. 1. It remains now to ſhow, that the tenſes expreſſive of *future* time may alſo denote, firſt *Incomplete* actions, and ſecondly *Complete* actions.

Firſt, *Scribam, I ſhall write*, denotes incomplete action: for it does not ſay, whether I am to write for a long or for a ſhort time, or whether I am to finiſh what I begin. This part of the verb, therefore, to which the Greek † *grapſô* correſponds, is an *imperfect future*; and is alſo, (as was formerly ſhown) an aoriſt of the future. In our way of expreſſing it, by the auxiliaries *ſhall* and *will*, its character appears manifeſt. *Shall* or *will* refers to future *time* indefinitely; and *write* refers to an action, which is indeed to begin, but of whoſe completion nothing is ſaid.

In like manner, *Scripturus ſum, I am about to write*, though definite in regard to time, becauſe it implies, that the action is immediately to commence, is yet as much an *imperfect* as the other future, becauſe it ſays nothing of the finiſhing or compleating of the action.

But, ſecondly, *Scripſero, I ſhall have written*, or *I ſhall have done writing*, is a *perfect future*, and denotes complete action. And our complex way of putting it in Engliſh does fully expreſs its character; *I ſhall have written*: for *ſhall* denotes future time, *written* implies paſt action; and *have written* ſignifies *complete action*, with *paſt time terminating in the preſent*. So that the whole meaning

* Geneſ. xxvii. 30. See alſo Numb. xvi. 31. † γραψω.

is,

is, that "when a certain time now future comes to be preſent, a "certain action will then, and juſt then, be finiſhed."—This tenſe the Greek tongue, for all its copiouſneſs, cannot expreſs in one word. * *Eſomai gegraphôs* is the phraſe for it; *eſomai* the future of † *eimi I am*, and *gegraphôs* the preterperfect participle; "I ſhall "be in the condition of having written." The Latin grammarians call it *the future of the ſubjunctive mood*; for which they are ſeverely blamed by Dr. Clarke, in his notes upon Homer; who contends, and I think with reaſon, that it is as really *indicative*, as *Scribam*, and *Scriptus ero*. The learned Doctor calls it the *perfect future*. Voſſius gives it the ſame name; which Ruddiman ‡ approves of: and Mr. Harris, and the Author of a Treatiſe, *On the origin and progreſs of language*, deſcribe it under the ſame character.—In Hebrew, the full import of this tenſe is given by joining the future of *calah* (he made an end of) to the infinitive or gerund of another verb. Thus, "And it ſhall be, when the officers *have made an* "*end of ſpeaking* unto the people, that they ſhall make captains of "the armies to lead the people,"—would have been equally juſt in reſpect of ſenſe, and better ſuited to the conciſeneſs of the original, if it had been rendered, "And it ſhall be, when the officers *ſhall have ſpoken* unto the people," &c. §

IV. There is yet another light, in which the tenſes may be conſidered. Some of them, as we have ſeen, unite two times (as it were) in one; others expreſs one time only. The former may be called *Compound* tenſes; the latter *Simple*.

1. Of the Compound Tenſes, one is the preterperfect ‖ *gegrapha*; which unites the paſt with the preſent; as particularly appears in our way of expreſſing it, with an auxiliary of the preſent, *I have*, and a participle of the paſt, *written*; I have written.

* εσομαι γεγραφως. † ειμι. ‡ Rudiments of the Latin tongue, page 43.
§ Deuteron. xx. 9. ‖ γεγραφα.

Another

Another is the pluſquamperfect, *Scripſeram*, which unites *the paſt with the paſt*, by intimating, that a certain paſt action was completed before another action which is alſo paſt. The union of theſe two paſt times is alſo ſignified by us, when we join the preterite of the auxiliary *had* with the preterite of the participle *written*; I had written.

A third compound tenſe is the future of complete action, or the perfect future *Scripſero*, I ſhall have written, * *Eſomai gegraphôs*; which, as appears by the Engliſh and Greek way of expreſſing it, forms an *union* of the preterperfect, that is, *of the complete paſt ending in the preſent*, with the *future*. Of this tenſe it is remarkable, that in the Engliſh (as in the Greek) way of expreſſing it, *I ſhall have written*, or, *I ſhall have done writing*, there is no auxiliary of the ſubjunctive mood: a circumſtance, that ſufficiently ſhows the abſurdity of calling it *the future of the ſubjunctive*.

A fourth is the definite future, *Scripturus ſum*, I am going to write, or, I am about to write: in which the preſent is united with the future, *Sum* with *Scripturus*, to intimate a futurity that is juſt commencing. We expreſs it in Engliſh by a ſort of figure: I am *going* to write; that is, I am engaged in an action which is preparatory to, or will be immediately followed by, the act of writing. The other Engliſh phraſe is, I am *about* to write; that is, I am at the *point*, the *nearer end*, or *the beginning* of the action of writing: for *bout* in French denotes *point* or *end*; and *au bout*, at the point, or at the end; ſo that it is probable we have derived this idiom from the French language.

A fifth compound tenſe is in Latin *Scripturus eram*; in Greek † *Emellon graphein*; in Engliſh, I *was about* to write. We uſe

* εσομαι γεγραφως. † εμελλον γραφειν.

it,

it, to expreſs an action, which at a certain time now paſt would have taken place immediately, if ſomething had not happened to prevent or defer it, or at leaſt to claim a prior attention. So in the tenth chapter of the Apocalypſe; "And when the ſeven thunders "had uttered their voices, I was about to write, *Emellon graphein:* "and I heard a voice from heaven, ſaying unto me, Seal up thoſe "things which the ſeven thunders uttered, and write them not." It is therefore a compoſition of the paſt *eram*, with the definite or paulo-poſt *future*, *Scripturus*. But there is not in any language, ſo far as I know, a contrivance for comprehending all this in *one word*; and therefore, like ſome other tenſes, it muſt be ſignified by auxiliary words joined to the participle of future time.

I ſhall be writing, * *Eſomai graphôn*, is the laſt compound tenſe that I ſhall mention. It occurs in ſentences like the following, "I cannot come tomorrow before dinner, for *I ſhall be writing* all "the morning;" and is therefore a coalition of the *future* with the *imperfect*. It differs however from the incomplete future formerly deſcribed, and exemplified by *Scribam*, I ſhall write. This laſt denotes incomplete action, and indefinite (or aoriſtical) futurity: but *I ſhall be writing* denotes *both theſe*, together with *extended* or *continued action*. — So much for *compound* tenſes; which unite two or more times in one. — If the reader will not allow theſe two laſt forms of expreſſion to be Tenſes, I ſhall not inſiſt on it, that they are. I call them ſo, becauſe they have been ſo called by others.

2. The *ſimple* tenſes, expreſſive of *one time only*, are theſe that follow. — 1. The definite preſent, *Scribo*, *I write*. — 2. The aoriſt of the preſent, "A merry heart *maketh* a chearful countenance." — 3. The aoriſt of the paſt, † *Egrapſa*, *I wrote*, or *I did write*. —

* εσομαι γραφων. † εγραψα.

4. The aoriſt of the future, *Scribam, I ſhall write.* — 5. The imperfect, or the continued and incomplete paſt, *Scribebam, I was writing.* — Theſe tenſes have all been ſufficiently deſcribed under other characters.

And now, of the ELEVEN TENSES here explained, which, being a ſtrange as well as an odd number, we may, by omitting the two laſt, and retaining the Paulo-poſt-future (becauſe there is a tenſe of that name in the Greek Grammar) reduce to NINE, the number of the Muſes; — of theſe eleven tenſes, I ſay, the arrangement and general nature may be ſeen at one glance, in the following Table.

TENSES OF ACTIVE VERBS.

DEFINITE IN TIME.

The *Preſent.* Scribo. I write. Number 1.
The *Preterperfect.* I have written. Numb. 2.
The *Paulo-poſt-future.* Scripturus ſum. Numb. 3.

INDEFINITE IN TIME, OR AORIST.

The *Preſent.* A merry heart maketh, &c. Numb. 4.
The *Paſt. Egrapſa.* I wrote, or I did write. Numb. 5.
The *Future.* Scribam. I ſhall write. Numb. 6.

COMPLETE IN RESPECT OF ACTION.

The *Preterperfect.* I have written. Numb. 2.
The *Aoriſt of the paſt.* I wrote. Numb. 5.
The *Pluſquamperfect.* I had written. Numb. 7.
The *Future perfect.* Scripſero. I ſhall have written. Numb. 8.

INCOMPLETE IN RESPECT OF ACTION.

The *Imperfect and continued paſt.* I was writing. Numb. 9.
The *Aoriſt of the future.* Scribam. I ſhall write. Numb. 6.
The *Paulo-poſt-future.* Scripturus ſum. Numb. 3.

COMPOUND, AS UNITING TWO OR MORE TIMES IN ONE TENSE.

The *Preterperfect.* Paſt with preſent. Number 2.
The *Pluſquamperfect.* Paſt with paſt. Numb. 7.
The *Future perfect.* Preſent and paſt with future. Numb. 8.
The *Paulo-poſt-future.* Preſent with future. Numb. 3.
The *Paſt with future.* Scripturus eram. Numb. 10.
The *Imperfect with future.* I ſhall be writing. Numb. 11.

SIMPLE, EXPRESSIVE OF ONE TIME.

The *Definite preſent.* Numb. 1.
The *Aoriſt of the preſent.* Numb. 4.
The *Aoriſt of the paſt.* Numb. 5.
The *Aoriſt of the future.* Numb. 6.
The *Imperfect and extended paſt.* Numb. 9.

The Tenſes, reduced to Nine, are, 1. The *Indefinite Preſent.* 2. The *Definite Preſent.* 3. The *Imperfect.* 4. The *Indefinite Preterit*, or *Aoriſt of the Paſt.* 5. The *Preterperfect.* 6. The *Pluſquamperfect.* 7. The *Indefinite or Aoriſt Future.* 8. The *Paulo-poſt-future.* 9. The *Perfect Future.*

It will perhaps occur, that there are two Greek tenſes, whereof in this long detail I have given no account; namely, the *ſecond aoriſt*, and the *ſecond future.* The truth is, that I conſider them as unneceſſary. Their place, for any thing I know to the contrary, might at all times be ſupplied by the firſt aoriſt and the firſt future. Some grammarians are of opinion, that the firſt aoriſt ſignifies time paſt in general, and the ſecond, indefinite time paſt; and that the firſt future denotes a nearer, and the ſecond a more remote futurity. But this, I apprehend, is mere conjecture, unſupported by proof. And therefore I incline rather to the ſentiments of thoſe who teach, that the ſecond future and ſecond aoriſt have no meaning different from the firſt future and firſt aoriſt; and that

they are the preſent and imperfect of ſome obſolete theme of the verb, and, when the other theme came into uſe, happened to be retained, for the ſake of variety perhaps, or by mere accident, with a preterite and future ſignification. Be this as it will; as theſe tenſes are peculiar to the Greek, and have nothing correſponding to them in other tongues, we need not ſcruple to overlook them as ſuperfluous.

Different nations may make uſe of different contrivances for marking the times of their verbs. The Greeks and Latins diſtinguiſh their tenſes, as well as their moods, and the caſes of their nouns, adjectives, and participles, by varying the termination, or otherwiſe changing the form, of the word; retaining, however, thoſe radical letters, which prove the inflection to be of the ſame kindred with its theme. The modern tongues, particularly the Engliſh, abound in auxiliary words, which vary the meaning of the noun or attributive, without requiring any conſiderable varieties of inflection. Thus, *I did read, I ſhall read, I ſhould read,* have the ſame import with *legi, legam, legerem.* It is obvious, that a language, like the Greek and Latin, which can thus comprehend in one word the meaning of two or three, muſt have ſome advantages over thoſe which cannot. Perhaps indeed it may not be more perſpicuous: but, in the arrangement of words, and conſequently in harmony and energy, as well as in conciſeneſs, it may be much more elegant. Every ſentiment that Greek or Latin can expreſs may in one way or other be expreſſed in Engliſh. But if we were to attempt the ſame varieties of arrangement, we ſhould ſee a wonderful ſuperiority in the former. Virgil could ſay,

Formoſam reſonare doces Amaryllida ſilvas:

But we cannot ſay, "Fair to reſound thou teacheſt Amaryllis the "woods." Had the poet's verſe permitted, the ſyntax of his lan-

guage would not have hindered him from changing the order of theſe five words in many different ways, with equal ſignificancy. But when we attempt more than two or three modes of arrangement, we are apt to fall into ambiguity or nonſenſe. Nay, in many caſes we are limited to one particular arrangement. A Roman might have ſaid, *Achilles interfecit Hectorem*, or *Hectorem interfecit Achilles*, or *Achilles Hectorem interfecit*, or *Hectorem Achilles interfecit*, or *Interfecit Hectorem Achilles*, or *Interfecit Achilles Hectorem*: but we muſt ſay, *Achilles ſlew Hector*; for, if we vary the ſentence ever ſo little, we produce ambiguity, nonſenſe, or falſehood; ambiguity, as *Achilles Hector ſlew*; nonſenſe, as *Slew Hector Achilles*; falſehood, as *Hector ſlew Achilles*.

It has been obſerved of the Engliſh, that they are much inclined to ſhorten their words into monoſyllables; which a certain author wittily aſſigns as a proof, that taciturnity is natural to the people. It may alſo be remarked, that we are not friendly to inflection: for, few as the terminations of our verbs are, we ſeem inclinable to reduce their number. Thus ſome authors confound *wrote* with *written*, or rather aboliſh *written*, and uſe *wrote* inſtead of it; and ſay, not only, "he *wrote* a book," which is right; but alſo, "the book is well *wrote*," inſtead of "well *written*." To miſtake the aoriſt of the paſt for the preterite participle, would have a ſtrange effect in Latin or Greek; and is not leſs ungrammatical in Engliſh.—In like manner, ſome of our writers ſeem to forget, that Engliſh verbs have in the indicative mood a ſecond perſon ſingular; for they ſay, *thou writes*, inſtead of *thou writeſt*: which is as improper in our language, as *tu ſcripſit* would be in Latin. And, both in ſpeech and in writing, it has been too cuſtomary, of late years, to diſcontinue the uſe of that conjunctive or ſubjunctive mood, which was formerly, by our beſt writers, introduced after

ſuch.

ſuch words as *if, though, before, whether, unleſs*, &c: as, "If he "*write*, I will anſwer him,"—"Though he *ſlay* me, I will truſt in "him,"—"I expect to ſee him before he *go* away," &c. inſtead of which phraſes, many people would now ſay, leſs properly, "if "he *writes*—though he *ſlays*—before he *goes*," &c. *——This however is the more excuſable, becauſe the indicative may ſometimes be elegantly uſed in ſuch a connection: as, "If there *is* a "Power above us, he muſt delight in virtue." For the firſt clauſe, though introduced by *if*, is not meant to expreſs what is in any degree doubtful, indefinite, or dependent: and therefore, it has not that character, which diſtinguiſhes the ſubjunctive from the indicative.—As our language has too little inflection, it is pity it ſhould loſe any of the little it has.

Paſt time being prior to preſent, and preſent to future, one would think, that grammarians, in arranging the tenſes, ſhould have given the firſt place to the preterites. Yet in the Greek and Latin, and all modern grammars, the order is different, and the preſent has the precedency: which by Scaliger is thus whimſically accounted for. What ſtands connected with preſent time is perceived by ſenſe alone, and may therefore be known in ſome degree to all animals; but memory, as well as ſenſe, is requiſite to give information of what is paſt; and, in order to anticipate the future, ſenſe, memory, and reaſon are all neceſſary.—The true reaſon I take to be this. The Preſent is put firſt, becauſe in Greek and Latin it is conſidered as the theme or root of the verb; every other tenſe being derived from it, and it derived from no other tenſe: and the Preterits take place of the Future, in Latin, on account of the natural precedency of paſt to future time; and, in Greek, the

* This, and the preceding, and ſome other grammatical and verbal improprieties, are frequent in Sterne.

Future takes place of the Preterits, becauſe from the Future the Preterits are derived.

Having finiſhed the ſubject of Tenſes, I proceed to explain the nature of *Moods*, and to inquire, in what reſpects they are eſſential to language.

SECT. IV.

The ſubject continued. — Of the Modes, or Moods of verbs. — Gerunds and Supines. — Species of verbs.

IN ſpeaking, we not only convey our thoughts to others; but alſo give intimation of thoſe peculiar affections, or mental energies, by which we are determined to think and ſpeak. Hence the origin of *Modes* or *Moods* in verbs. They are ſuppoſed to make known our ideas, with ſomething alſo of the intention, or temper of mind, with which we conceive and utter them.

In moſt languages, the uſe of moods is a matter of ſome difficulty; and the ſource of much elegance, in marking with a ſignificant brevity certain minute varieties of meaning, which without this expedient would produce awkward circumlocutions. This will appear from ſome of the following examples. And the advantages here hinted at are more conſpicuous in Greek and Latin, than in Engliſh. For in thoſe languages the moods are marked by particular inflections of the verb; and the rules for their uſe are aſcertained more exactly than in our tongue, and better adapted to the varieties of human thought.

As

As the theory of moods is not altogether the ſame in any two languages, one cannot enter into it with any great degree of minuteneſs, in an inquiry into the principles of Univerſal Grammar. All therefore I have to do in this place, is to give ſome account of their general nature, and ſhow in what reſpects they may be eſſential to language.

If I affirm concerning that which I conceive abſolutely to be preſent, or paſt, or future, I uſe what is called the *Indicative* or *Declarative* mood: as *I go, I was going, I had gone, I went, I ſhall go.* In all hiſtory and ſcience this mood predominates; and in every language it is neceſſary. It is the buſineſs of the hiſtorian to ſay, not what Ceſar *might have done*, or what he *might have been*, but what he *was*, and what he *did:* the truths of geometry are invariable, and therefore abſolute: and the philoſopher conſiders the works of nature as they *are, have been*, and *will be*, and not as they *might have been* under the influence of different laws.

If, together with the ſimple affirmation of the verb, I alſo expreſs ſome modification or affection of it, ſuch as power, poſſibility, liberty, will, duty, &c. the mood is called *Potential:* as *I may write, I might have been conſulted, I could live on vegetables, I would ſpeak if I durſt, He ſhould have acted otherwiſe.*

If I ſignify, by means of a verb, ſomething which is affirmed, not abſolutely by itſelf, but relatively to ſome other verb on which it is dependent, I uſe the *Subjunctive* mood: as, I eat, *that I may live; if he go*, I will follow; *whether he be alive*, I know not. This has alſo been called the *Conjunctive* mood; perhaps becauſe the verb ſo modified is often uſhered in by a conjunction, *that, if, whether*, &c.

The *Optative* mood is ſaid to expreſs a wiſh or deſire; and in Greek is marked by a particular form or inflection of the verb. Yet, even in Greek, a wiſh may be expreſſed by other moods beſides the optative;

optative; and, without the aid of one or more auxiliary words, cannot be expreſſed even by the optative itſelf. Whence it may be inferred, that this mood is ſuperfluous, even in Greek; and, as it is found in no other tongue, that it cannot be eſſential to language. In fact, the Greek optative often conveys the meaning of a Subjunctive, or Potential. By the Attick writers it is ſometimes uſed to expreſs thoſe contingencies that depend on the human will.*— In Latin, there is no need of an Optative; wiſhes being ſignified by the Subjunctive modified by certain auxiliaries expreſſed or underſtood: as *Utinam ſaperes* (that is, *Opto ut, uti,* or *utinam ſaperes)* "I wiſh that you were wiſe:" *O ſi Jupiter referat præteritos annos* (that is, *O quantum gauderem,* or *O quantum proficeret, ſi Jupiter,* &c.) "O that Jupiter, (or I wiſh that Jupiter) would reſtore the "years that are paſt:" *Sis bonus felixque tuis*; where *utinam* is underſtood, or *Precor ut ſis bonus,* &c. Similar contrivances take place in other tongues.

As to the Potential mood, it may, I think, in all caſes, be reſolved into either the Indicative or the Subjunctive: and therefore, and becauſe in Latin and Greek it is not marked by any peculiar inflection of the verb, I do not conſider it as eſſential to language, or as worthy of being diſtinguiſhed in Grammar by a particular name. "I *may* go," is the ſame with "It *is in my power* to go;" which is a poſitive and abſolute affirmation, requiring a verb of the indicative mood. "He *ſhould have* gone," appears to be equally abſolute, when reſolved thus, "It *was* his duty to go." And in like manner, "He *would have* gone," is nothing more than, "He "*was* willing to go." And "I *might have been* conſulted," is not materially different from, "It *was* in the power of others to have "conſulted me." In theſe examples, the Potential coincides with the Indicative.—And in the following paſſage from Horace,

* Origin and Progreſs of Language.

Sed

Sed tacitus paſci ſi poſſet corvus, *haberet*
Plus dapis ——

the laſt clauſe, which is commonly referred to the Potential, may be reſolved into the indicative and ſubjunctive thus: *Si corvus poſſet paſci tacitus, ita res eſt*, or *fieri poteſt, ut haberet plus dapis*; which is a ſentence conſiſting of one abſolute affirmation, or indicative verb, and of two ſubordinate or relative clauſes, in both which the mood is ſubjunctive.

The Imperative Mood ſeems to be only an elliptical way of expreſſing that, which implies abſolute affirmation, and which therefore might be with equal clearneſs, though not with equal brevity, expreſſed by the Indicative. "Go thou," is the ſame in meaning with, "I command, or I intreat thee to go:" "*Spare* us, good "Lord," may be reſolved into, "*We beſeech* thee, good Lord, to "ſpare us."

The Infinitive may be called, if you pleaſe, *the infinitive, indefinite, or imperſonal form of the verb:* but a mood it certainly is not; becauſe it implies no mental energy, or intention. Nay, if the eſſential character of the verb be, what it has been proved to be, to expreſs Affirmation, it will follow, that the infinitive is not even a part of the verb. For it expreſſes no affirmation; it has no reference to perſons or ſubſtances; it forms no compleat ſentence by itſelf, nor even when joined to a noun, unleſs it be aided by ſome *real* part of a verb either expreſſed or underſtood. *Lego, legebam, legi, legeram, legam*, I read, I was reading, I have read, I had read, I ſhall read, do, each of them, amount to a compleat affirmative ſentence: but *legere*, to read, *legiſſe*, to have read, *lecturum eſſe*, to be about to read, affirm nothing, and are not more applicable to any one perſon, than to any other.

But, though the Infinitive is no part of the verb, even as the ground whereon the houſe ſtands is no part of the building, it may be

conſidered as the foundation of the whole verb; becauſe it expreſſes the ſimple attribute, on which, by means of inflections and auxiliary words, the authors of language have reared that vaſt fabrick of moods and tenſes, whereby are ſignified ſo many varieties of affirmation, and action, of time, perſon, and number. And this attribute it expreſſes abſtractly, as ſomething capable of being characteriſed by qualities, or made the ſubject of a propoſition; which comes ſo near the deſcription of a noun, that in moſt languages it may be uſed, and frequently is uſed, as a noun: whence ſome antient grammarians called it, *the verbal noun*, or, more properly, *the noun of the verb* *. Thus *Scire tuum nihil eſt* † is the ſame with *Scientia tua nihil eſt*; and *Reddes dulce loqui, reddes ridere decorum*, is equally elegant and expreſſive with, *Reddes dulcem loquelam, reddes decorum riſum* ‡. Thus, in Engliſh, we may ſay, "*Death* is certain," or "*To die* is certain;" "He loves *learning*;" or "He loves *to learn*."—In ſome languages, particularly the Italian and Greek, the article is prefixed to theſe infinitive nouns; which, if poſſible, makes their ſubſtantive nature ſtill more apparent; as *Il mangiare*, the eating; *l' eſſere*, the being: || *To philoſophein boulomai êper to ploutein*, I chooſe *to philoſophize* rather than *to be rich*; which is the ſame with, I chooſe *philoſophy* rather than *riches*. But to ſuch infinitives we do not prefix the article in Engliſh, becauſe cuſtom has ſo determined; nor in Latin, becauſe that language has no article §. In the Claſſick tongues, they ſupply the

* Non inepte hic modus (Infinitivus) a veteribus quibuſdam *Verbi Nomen* eſt appellatum. Eſt enim (ſi non vere ac ſemper, quod nonnulli volunt, Nomen Subſtantivum) ſignificatione certe ei maxime affinis; ejuſque vices ſuſtinet per omnes caſus. Ruddiman. Gram. major. par. ii. pag. 217.

† Perſius. ‡ Horace.

|| Το φιλοσοφειν βουλομαι ηπερ το πλουτειν.

§ Pronominal articles are ſometimes joined to theſe infinitives in Latin: as, Cum *vivere ipſum* turpe ſit nobis. Totum *hoc* diſplicet *philoſophari*. Cicero.

place of all the caſes: in Engliſh, they may go before a verb, as nominatives, as "*To learn* is deſirable;" or after it, as accuſatives, as "I deſire *to learn*;" but they never follow a prepoſition, ſo far as I recollect, except in one paſſage of Spenſer, which, being contrary to idiom, or at leaſt obſolete, is not to be imitated:

For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake
Could ſave the ſon of Thetis *from to die:*

that is, The having been dipt in Lethe could not ſave the ſon of Thetis *from death.*

Some authors will have it, that there are alſo in language an Interrogative mood, expreſſing a deſire of verbal information; and a Requiſitive, expreſſing a deſire of being aſſiſted or gratified. And this laſt they ſubdivide into two ſpecies, the Precative, when we addreſs a ſuperiour, and the Imperative, when we command an inferiour. But ſuch a multiplying of moods appears to be unneceſſary. The Requiſitive differs not *in form* from the Imperative *. The Interrogative is commonly expreſſed, not by any form of the verb contrived on purpoſe, but by a particular arrangement of the words, as *It is ſo: Is it ſo?*——or by the addition of ſome particle, as *Eſt verum: eſtne verum?*——or merely by a change in the emphaſis or tone of the ſpeaker, as, *I did ſo: You did?* meaning, Did you ſo indeed?—And it is well obſerved, by the learned and accurate Ruddiman, "that if we will conſtitute as many moods, as there "are various modifications wherewith a verb or affirmation may "be affected, we muſt multiply them to a very great number; "and, beſides the Indicative, Subjunctive, Potential, Optative, "Imperative, and Interrogative, have alſo a Permiſſive, an Hortative, a Precative, a Conceſſive, a Mandative, a mode to ex-

* In Hebrew, an earneſt requeſt is ſignified by adding to the Imperative the particle *na*; as *Hoſanna, Save, I beſeech thee.*

" preſs volition, and another to ſignify duty:"—which, inſtead of improving the grammatical art, would only render it the more confuſed and difficult, without adding any thing to the regularity or ſignificancy of language.

Since, then, it appears, that the Potential may be reſolved into the Indicative and Subjunctive; that the Optative is ſuperfluous, being, even in Greek, a ſort of Subjunctive; that the Imperative is an Elliptical form of the Indicative; that the Infinitive is no mood at all; and that the other ſuppoſed moods abovementioned have no real foundation in language, nor claim any particular notice from the Grammarian;—it ſeems to follow, that to verbs, conſidered as expreſſive of affirmation, two moods only are *neceſſary*; the Indicative, to ſignify *affirmation abſolute*; and the Subjunctive, to denote *affirmation relative, dependent, or conditional.* Indeed it is not eaſy to conceive any mode of affirmation, which may not be reſolved into one or other of theſe two. And, in the Latin tongue, which is not defective in this particular, there are, properly ſpeaking, no more than three moods, the Indicative, Subjunctive, and Imperative: which laſt I ſhall allow to be a mood, (as it is found in ſo many languages) though not a neceſſary one.—As to the Infinitive, it is impoſſible to prove, by any juſt reaſoning, that it has any title to the name of mood, or even to be conſidered as a part of the verb.

In fact, we might repeat, in regard to Moods, a remark formerly made on the degrees of compariſon of adjectives. Their number is in nature indefinite: but as nothing in language can be ſo, it is more convenient to reduce them to two or three, which by means of auxiliary words may be ſufficient to comprehend them all, than vainly to endeavour to provide an adjective for every poſſible degree of compariſon, or a mood for each particular energy of mind that may give a character to affirmation.

That

That I may not be thought more paradoxical than others, in what has been advanced on this ſubject, I ſhall conclude it with obſerving, that Perizonius reduces the moods of a finite verb to three, the Indicative, Subjunctive, and Imperative; that Ruddiman includes the Optative and Potential in the Subjunctive; that the learned author of an Eſſay on *the Origin and progreſs of language* admits, with me, only two moods of affirmation; that Scaliger denies that moods are neceſſary to the verb; and that Sanctius explodes them altogether, as having no natural connection with it.

And in behalf of this opinion of Sanctius and Scaliger many plauſible things might be ſaid. The moods ſeem reducible to two; the Indicative and Subjunctive. Every ſcholar knows, that a conſiderable part of the elegance of the Latin verb ariſes from the right application of them; and that, if in Cicero, Ceſar, and Virgil (for example) the tenſes of the latter were to be changed into the correſponding tenſes of the former, the language would appear even uncouth in the ſound, as well as inaccurate with reſpect to the ſenſe. But it may be queſtioned, whether this is not in part the effect of habit. We have always been accuſtomed to Subjunctive tenſes in Latin; and can hardly conceive that it would be intelligible without them. And that without them it would not be elegant, is allowed. But, ſetting elegance aſide, and independently on the habits acquired in reading the claſſicks, might we not, in one way or other, expreſs every neceſſary affirmation, by means of the Indicative only? Certain it is that, in many caſes, if the laws of ſyntax would permit, the ſenſe would not hinder us from uſing that mood inſtead of the other. In vulgar Engliſh, as already obſerved, this is done every moment, without any other inconvenience, than that of offending the critick, and gradually corrupting the purity of our tongue. Nay, there is reaſon to think, that many people now ſpeak and write Engliſh, without ever uſing a Subjunctive,

tive, (except *would, could,* and ſome other auxiliaries) or knowing that there is ſuch a thing in the language. Even the Latin Grammarian allows, of certain conjunctions, that they may govern either of theſe moods. And where the rule for the uſe of the Subjunctive is more determinate, as in ſentences like the following, Neſcio an bonus *ſit*, I know not whether he *be* good, the Indicative *might*, without ambiguity, expreſs the meaning, Neſcio an bonus *eſt*, I know not whether he *is* good.

If then the Subjunctive, however ornamental and uſeful, is not to be reckoned among the neceſſaries of ſocial life, we need not be ſurpriſed, that in Hebrew, in which ſimplicity is more ſtudied than ornament, the moods ſhould be only two, the Indicative and Imperative. The Infinitive, indeed, is named as a third mood in the grammar of the language; but that is in compliance with the erroneous practice of other grammarians.

GERUNDS and SUPINES are of great importance in Latin; but being in a manner peculiar to that language, it belongs not to Univerſal Grammar to conſider them particularly. Yet a remark or two on the ſubject may not be improper.

The *Gerund* is a noun derived from the verb; but is no part of the verb, becauſe in itſelf it does not poſſeſs the power of affirmation. It has two diſtinct offices. When in the nominative caſe it is joined to *eſt* with a dative, or in the accuſative to *eſſe* with a dative, it denotes *neceſſity* or *duty*: as *moriendum eſt mihi*, I *muſt* die; *Scio moriendum eſſe mihi*, I know that I *muſt* die: *Vivendum eſt mihi recte*, I *ought* to live honeſtly; *Fateor vivendum eſſe mihi recte*, I confeſs that I *ought* to live honeſtly. In this uſe, it is properly called a *gerund*; for that word implies, that ſomething muſt be, or is to be, done. And there is in Greek a ſort of participial adverb, ſometimes called the adverb of poſition, which expreſſes the meaning of this gerund, as * *Iteon moi*, *Eundum eſt mihi*, I muſt go:

* ἰτέον μοι.

oiſteon

* *oiſteon kai elpiſteon, ferendum et ſperandum eſt,* we ought to endure and to hope. In Engliſh, and other modern languages, there is nothing correſpondent to this gerund; its place being ſupplied by an auxiliary verb, of duty, *ought*, or of neceſſity, *muſt*.

In another view, the Latin gerund is a verbal ſubſtantive, approaching in ſignification to that of the infinitive noun; but having this advantage over the Latin infinitive, that it admits of terminations to mark its caſes, and coincides more eaſily in ſyntax with nouns and adjectives. Examples may be ſeen in the Latin grammar. In Greek this ſort of Gerund is the leſs neceſſary, becauſe the infinitive itſelf may be reſolved into caſes, by means of the neuter article: as, † *ek tou oran gignetai to eran*, of ſeeing comes loving; ‡ *to ploutein eſtin en tô chrêſthai*, Being rich conſiſts in uſing. We have in Engliſh a verbal noun, of the ſame form with our active participle, which noun coincides in meaning with this Latin gerund: as, he is incapable *of writing*, he is addicted *to writing*, he *practiſes writing*, he is fatigued *with writing*.

From the infinitive of the Hebrew, by means of certain prefixed letters, (which are indeed contracted prepoſitions) are formed four words called Gerunds; which are very ſerviceable in that language, and ſometimes ſupply the place of what in other tongues we term the pluſquamperfect tenſe, and Subjunctive mood. Thus from *maſor, tradere*, are formed *bemſor, in tradendo; chimſor, cum tradidiſſem*, &c.; *limſor, ad tradendum; mimſor, a tradendo*. This ſomewhat reſembles the uſe, which, in Greek, by the help of prepoſitions and the neuter article, may be made of the infinitive taken as a noun.

The origin of the word *Supine*, as a term in grammar, has given riſe to ſeveral conjectures. Sanctius, who never heſitates, is of

* οἰϛεον καὶ ἐλπιϛεον. † ἐκ του ὁρᾶν γίγνεται το ἐραν.

‡ τὸ πλυτειν ἐϛιν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι.

opinion,

opinion, that the word ſo called is an emblem of a ſupine or indolent man: for that, as the buſineſs of ſuch a man muſt be done by others, ſo the office of the *ſupine* may be executed by various other phraſes; *diſcedo lectum*, for example, by *diſcedo lecturus*, by *diſcedo ad legendum*, and by *diſcedo ut legam*. Priſcian thinks, not leſs whimſically, that the Supine, being placed in grammars at the bottom of the verb, ſeems to ſupport the whole weight of the conjugation; like a man lying *ſupine*, or with his face upwards, and preſſed down to the earth by a huge pile of burdens. — But however myſterious their name may be, the nature of the two Latin ſupines is very well underſtood. Like the gerunds, they are no parts of the verb, but verbal nouns; the firſt ending in *um*, which is always of the accuſative caſe, governed by *ad* underſtood, and preceded by a verb of motion; and the ſecond in *u*, which is always of the ablative, governed by *in* underſtood, and preceded by an adjective: as *abiit (ad) deambulatum*; *facile (in) dictu*. So they are explained by the moſt accurate of all Latin Grammarians, Ruddiman.

I ſhall now give ſome account of the ſeveral ſpecies or ſorts of verbs, and ſo conclude this part of the ſubject.

In all the languages I know, and probably in all others, Verbs are of different ſorts. Excluſive of the verb of exiſtence, which is of a peculiar character, and has been already deſcribed, they may all be divided into Active, Paſſive, and Neuter.

1. As human affairs depend upon Action, and as human ſpeech is employed on human affairs, it muſt happen, in all poſſible conditions wherein we can be placed, that affirmations will often be made in regard to actions. Verbs, therefore, which affirm concerning action, and which are called *Active*, there muſt be in all languages; as *I love, thou blameſt, he ſtrikes, they purſue*.

2. Every created being that *acts* is liable *to be acted upon:* and what we ſuffer, or feel, from being acted upon, that is, from being the *ſubjects* or the *objects* of action, muſt be of great importance to life and happineſs, and therefore cannot fail to be ſpoken of, under the form of affirmation, and ſo render *Paſſive* verbs neceſſary; as *thou art loved, I was blamed, he is ſtricken, they are purſued.* In the Claſſick tongues, the greateſt part of the paſſive Verb (or Paſſive Voice, as it is alſo called) is formed from the active, by a change of termination; as *amor*, I am loved, from *amo*, I love; * *tupto-mai*, I am beaten, from † *tuptô*, I beat. But, in the modern tongues of Europe, the Paſſive verb is made up of the participle paſſive, expreſſing the attribute, and of the verb of exiſtence denoting the affirmation and the time; as *Amor, I am loved; Culpabitur, he will be blamed.*

When the name of the being that acts, or the pronoun which ſtands for that name, leads the ſentence, the verb, aſſuming its nature, is active; as *Cæſar ſubegit Galliam*, Ceſar ſubdued Gaul. When the being which is acted upon, that is, when the ſubject, or when the object of the action, leads the ſentence, the verb is Paſſive, as *Gallia ſubacta eſt a Cæſare*, Gaul was ſubdued by Ceſar.

I diſtinguiſhed between the ſubject, and the object, of an action; and there is reaſon for doing ſo in this place. The *ſubject* of an action is affected by the action; the *object* of the action is not ſo affected. Thus, when I ſay, I hear a ſound, I ſee a man, *man* and *ſound* are the *objects*; and when I ſay, I build an houſe, I break a ſtone, *houſe* and *ſtone* are the *ſubjects*, of the action. The firſt is called *intentional* action, the ſecond is called *real.* Both are expreſſed by active verbs. For, though in the actions called intentional we are partly paſſive, becauſe an impreſſion is made upon us; yet there is an energy on our part, as we may exert our will, and employ

* τυπτομαι. † τυπτω.

our organs, for the purpoſe, either of receiving that impreſſion, or of excluding it.

Active verbs are ſubdivided into *Tranſitive* and *Intranſitive*. An active tranſitive verb is ſo called, becauſe the action ſignified by it *paſſes from* the agent *(tranſit)* towards ſome other perſon or thing; as, I *ſee* a man, I *build* an houſe. This verb, therefore, is naturally placed between two ſubſtantives; the firſt denoting the agent, which is of the nominative caſe, becauſe there is nothing to make it of any other; and the ſecond, denoting the perſon or thing, towards which the action is exerted; and which, in languages that have caſes, is commonly of the accuſative, though ſometimes alſo of the genitive, the dative, or the ablative, according to the arbitrary rules of the language; as, *Potitur rerum, favet amico, utitur fraude.* — In the modern tongues, which have little or no variety of caſes, that which acts is naturally put before the verb, (for the agent is always prior to the action, as the cauſe to the effect) and that which is acted upon is put after the verb; as, Achilles ſlew Hector: and, in alluſion to the terms of Greek and Latin grammar, we call the firſt the nominative, and the laſt the accuſative; though they derive theſe names, not from their inflection (for they have none), but merely from their poſition, or from their dependence upon the verb. Sometimes, however, where the ſenſe cannot be miſtaken, or where we have an oblique caſe, we may change this order, for the ſake of harmony, of energy, or of variety; and put the nominative after the accuſative, or even after the verb: as, Him they ſlew; Me they inſulted; Created thing nor valued he, nor ſhun'd.

When one acts upon, or towards, any object, that object is Paſſive in regard to the action: and, therefore, all theſe active tranſitive verbs may be changed into paſſives, when that which is acted

acted upon leads the ſentence; as *Ego laudo te*, I praiſe thee; *Tu laudaris a me*, thou art praiſed by me.

An Active *Intranſitive* verb is that whoſe action *does not paſs* from the agent to any other perſon or thing; as I live, I run, I walk. This ſort of verb cannot properly take an accuſative after it, becauſe the actions have nothing exteriour to the agent upon which they can be ſaid to be exerted; nor, conſequently, can it be changed into a paſſive, becauſe, where actions are not exerted upon, or towards, any thing, there is nothing paſſive in regard to thoſe actions. — Intranſitive verbs are by moſt authors called *Neuter*, that is *neither* active nor paſſive: but I think with very little propriety. Paſſive indeed they are not; but ſurely it will not be pretended, that in running, walking, flying, &c. there is no action. — When they take an accuſative after them, as *vivere vitam felicem*, to live a happy life; *ire longam viam*, to go a long journey, they put off the Intranſitive character, and are to be referred to the other claſs of active verbs; and their place may be ſupplied by verbs tranſitive. Thus, to *live* a happy life, *vivere vitam felicem*, is the ſame with *degere vitam felicem*, to *lead* a happy life: and, to *go* a long journey, is the ſame with, to *perform* a long journey.

3. That is properly a *Neuter* verb, which affirms neither action nor paſſion; but ſimply denotes the ſtate, poſture, or quality, of things or perſons; as *Sto*, I ſtand; *manes*, thou remaineſt; *dormit*, he ſleeps; *floremus*, we are flouriſhing; *albetis*, ye are white; *mortui ſunt*, they are dead. It is obvious, that theſe verbs, like thoſe of the former ſpecies, can neither take accuſatives after them, nor be transformed into paſſives; becauſe, where there is no action, nothing can be acted upon. True it is, that in ſome languages, both neuter and intranſitive verbs are uſed in the paſſive *imperſonally*: but this is an idiom, depending, not on the nature of things, but on the arbitrary rules of thoſe languages; and beſides, when this

is done, whatever the *form* of the verb may be, the *ſignification* is not neceſſarily paſſive. Thus *ſtatur* may mean *ſtant*; *curritur*, *currunt*; *turbatur*, *eſt turba*; *pugnatur*, *pugnant*.

Theſe, I think, are all the ſorts of verbs that are neceſſary in language, and, conſequently, all that Univerſal Grammar has to conſider. But, in the Greek and Latin grammars, other kinds of verbs are ſpecified; which I ſhall give ſome account of, though a very brief one. For, firſt, they do not properly come within my plan; and ſecondly, they may all, in reſpect of ſignification, be referred to one or other of the claſſes already mentioned.

When the ſame being that acts is alſo the ſubject or object of the action, the verb may be called *Middle*; as Acteon *ſaw himſelf* in the ſtream, Cato *ſlew himſelf*. This, in moſt languages, may be expreſſed by an active verb governing the reciprocal pronoun: but, antiently, it ſeems, the Greeks expreſſed it by a particular ſeries of inflections, that have been called by Grammarians *the middle voice*. Few examples, however, of reciprocal action ſignified by this middle verb, can now be produced, except from the earlieſt authors *. In latter times, it came to reſemble the Deponent of the Latins; having a ſignification purely active, though, in ſome tenſes, a paſſive termination.

The Hebrews have a form of the verb, or, as it is called, a Conjugation, which reſembles in its uſe the old middle verb of the Greek tongue. Thoſe of their Grammarians, who reject the vowel-points as a rabbinical and modern invention, reduce the conjugations to five, which they name *Kal*, *Niphal*, *Hiphil*, *Hophal*, and *Hithpael*. Theſe five may be reduced to three; for *Kal* and *Niphal* are but the active and paſſive voices of the ſame verb; and ſo are *Hiphil* and *Hophal*. *Hithpael* has no paſſive.

* See Hom. Il. iii. 141. xiii. 168. Odyſſ. v. 491. ix. 296.

In *Kal* we have the primitive verb, as *maſar*, *tradidit*, *he delivered:* for, among the Hebrews, the third perſon ſingular of the preterit is the root of the verb. In *Hiphil* ſomething of Cauſation is implied; as *himſir*, *tradere fecit*, *he cauſed to deliver.*

Hithpael is the form, that correſponds to the old Greek middle verb: as *hithmaſer*, *tradidit ſe*, *he delivered himſelf.* This at leaſt is its moſt common ſignification. In neuter verbs, however, it differs not materially from the conjugation *Kal:* *halach* and *hithhalach* both ſignify *ambulavit*, *he walked.* And ſometimes it emphatically expreſſes *aſſuming the appearance* of a character without the reality. "There is, ſays Solomon, *mithghaſher*, that maketh himſelf rich, "yet hath nothing: there is *mithroſheſh*, that maketh himſelf poor, "yet hath great riches."

It may be remarked here, though foreign from the ſubject, that in certain Engliſh neuter verbs of Saxon original ſomething is diſcernible, not unlike the analogy of the Hebrew conjugations *Kal* and *Hiphil.* *To ſit*, *to lie* *, *to riſe*, *to writhe*, *to fall*, are neuters, that might be referred to the former conjugation; to which correſpond the following actives in *Hiphil*, *To ſet*, *to lay* *, *to raiſe*, *to wreathe*, *to fell*, that is, *to cauſe to ſit*, *to cauſe to lie*, *to cauſe to riſe*, *to cauſe to writhe*, *to cauſe to fall.*

Inceptive

* Is it not ſtrange, that, in the preſent language of England, not only in converſation, but even in ſome printed books of conſiderable name, the neuter *to lie*, and the active *to lay* ſhould be ſo frequently confounded; and that, inſtead of *he lies* on the ground, and *he lay* on the ground, it ſhould be ſaid *he lays*, and *he laid?* Would not a man of education be aſhamed to be found ignorant of the difference between an active and a neuter verb? Or could he think it creditable to miſtake *jecit*, *he threw*, for *jacuit*, *he lay?* Yet this vulgar idiom is not leſs barbarous. If the humour of confounding active verbs with neuter ſhould continue to prevail, we may ſoon expect to ſee, and to hear, ſentences like the following: "I *laid* in bed till eight; then I *raiſed*, and *ſet* "a while in a chair; when on a ſudden a qualm came on, and I *felled* upon my face."— Our life muſt come to an end; but let us live as long as we can: our language may alter; but let us wiſh it permanent, and do our beſt to make it ſo.

Pope.

Inceptive verbs are appropriated to the beginnings of action, or rather of condition; as *calesco*, I begin to be warm; *tumesco*, I begin to swell. In Latin, they are often productive of elegance, by preventing circumlocution; but they are not found in the Greek, nor are they necessary in any language.

Equally unnecessary, though not less elegant, are the Greek and Latin *Desideratives*, which signify desire; as * *brôseiô*, *esurio*, I desire to eat; † *polemêseiô*, *bellaturio*, I have a desire to go to war.

Deponent verbs, which with an active signification have a passive termination, as *loquor*, I speak; and *Neutral-passive* verbs, which have an active termination and a passive signification, as *vapulare*, to be whipped, *veneunt*, they are sold, are not uncommon in the Latin tongue. The former are said to have their name from *deponere*; because they *lay aside* that passive sense, which one would expect from their final syllables.—The verb *liceo* is a very singular one; for with an active termination it has a passive sense, and with a passive termination an active sense: *Liceor* means, I offer a price; and *Liceo*, I am valued or set at a price.

The Latin *Frequentative* verb denotes frequency: as *pulso*, I strike often, which is an active transitive; *cursito*, I run often, which is an active intransitive; and *dormito*, I sleep often, which is neuter. This verb is not necessary; but, like the inceptive and the desidera-

Pope has in one place, for the sake of a rhyme, admitted this barbarism. Priam, *lying* at Achilles's feet, says, Iliad xxiv,

For him, through hostile camps I bent my way,
For him, thus prostrate at thy feet I *lay*:

which is the more provoking, because it is in one of the finest passages of the poem, and in a passage where, in general though not throughout, the Translator has the honour to outdo his original. It might have been easily avoided.

For him, through hostile camps I pass'd, and here
Prostrate before thee in the dust appear.

* Βρωσειω. † πολεμησειω.

tive, it contributes ſomething to that elegant conciſeneſs, which is ſo peculiarly the character of the Roman language.

Impersonal verbs are uſed only in the third perſon ſingular; and in Greek, Latin, and Italian, never appear with a nominative before them: as * *dei, oportet; exeſti, licet; baſta*, it is enough; the perſon, concerning whom they affirm, being expreſſed by an oblique caſe dependent on the verb; as *intereſt omnium*, all are concerned; *licet tibi*, you may, or it is allowed you; *penitet me*, I repent; *mi baſta*, it is ſufficient for me. The Engliſh verbs, *it behoves, it irketh, it becomes*, are alſo called Impersonal by our Grammarians; and do indeed reſemble the Greek and Latin impersonals in two reſpects, that they are only uſed in the third perſon ſingular; and that they expreſs the perſon, concerning whom they affirm, by a ſubſequent or dependent oblique caſe: for we cannot ſay, *I behove*, or *thou behoveſt*; but we ſay, *It behoves me, it behoves thee.* But theſe Engliſh impersonals differ from the antient in this, that they have always before them a nominative expreſſed: for, *behoves me, irks me, becomes me*, without the pronoun *it* prefixed, are not according to the Engliſh idiom.

It has been diſputed, whether the Greek and Latin Impersonal verbs are always dependent on a nominative underſtood or expreſſed: and by very able Grammarians the matter has been decided in the affirmative. Thus, to *refert omnium, negotium* or *res* is the ſuppoſed nominative: and *delectat me ſtudere* ſeems to be nothing different from *ſtudere delectat me*; where *ſtudere*, the infinitive noun, is properly the nominative to *delectat*. The controverſy is foreign from my purpoſe, and therefore I will not enter upon it. I ſhall only obſerve, that among the Latin Grammarians it was carried on with a vehemence that is ridiculous enough. Priſcian had ſaid,

* δει — ἐξεστι.

that

that all Impersonal verbs are really Personals, because they have nominatives, which, whether expressed or not, are still implied. He was answered by Augustinus Saturnius, in the following terms: "May the Gods confound you, Priscian, together with that same "doctrine of yours"—and he goes on to urge his objections. "Nay "but," replies Sanctius, "may the Gods confound you, Augustine, "together with those cavillings of yours; for I do maintain, that "Priscian is in the right:"—which in the sequel he endeavours to prove. Ruddiman, who had more sense, as well as more temper, than any of these wise men, observes very coolly and properly, that, whatever be determined concerning the supposed nominative of impersonal verbs, this we are sure of, that it never can be a *person*, but must always be a *thing*: for which reason, the verbs in question are called *Impersonal*; a name, that conveys a pretty just idea of their nature.

SECT. V.

The Subject continued. — Further Remarks on the Participle.

THAT the Participle expreſſes a quality or attribute with time, has more than once been taken for granted in the courſe of this inveſtigation, and is generally admitted by Grammarians. Ruddiman, one of the moſt cautious of them, declares it to be eſſential to the Participle, firſt, that it come immediately from a verb, and, ſecondly, that in its ſignification it include time. And therefore, continues he, *larvatus*, maſked, is not a participle, becauſe it comes from a noun, and not from a verb; and *tacitus*, ſilent, though it comes from a verb, is not a participle, becauſe it does not ſignify time *. And all the writers on Univerſal Grammar that I am acquainted with concur in the ſame doctrine.

And this is, perhaps, the moſt convenient light, in which the Participle can be conſidered in Univerſal Grammar: for it is not eaſy, nor, I believe, poſſible to deſcribe it more minutely, without entering into the idioms of individual tongues. In fact, the participles of ſome languages differ widely in their nature from thoſe of others: and even, of one and the ſame language, ſome participles ſeem to be of one character, and ſome of another.

1. As the firſt grammarians drew all their ideas from the Greek tongue, in which there are participles correſpondent to the preſent, preterit, and future tenſes; it was natural for them to ſuppoſe preſent time to be included in the participle of preſent time (as it is called), paſt time in the preterit participles, and future time in the participles of the future. And this being once ſuppoſed by the acuteſt of all Grammarians, the Greek, might naturally be ad-

* Rudiments of the Latin tongue, page 62.

mitted unexamined, or but ſlightly examined, by their brethren of other countries, and of latter ages.

But the Greek participles of the preſent do not always expreſs preſent time; nor is paſt time always referred to by their preterit participles: nay, on ſome occaſions, time ſeems not to be ſignified at all, by either the former, or the latter. When Cebes ſays, *Etunchanomen peripatountes en tô tou Chronou hierô* *, We *were walking* in the temple of Saturn, the participle of the preſent, *walking*, is by means of the verb, *were*, applied to time paſt, (which an adjective in the ſame connection might have been); and therefore of itſelf cannot be underſtood to ſignify any ſort of time. If one chooſe to affirm, that the participle thus applied muſt ſignify time: then the words *at a walk*, or the adjective *merry*, muſt alſo ſignify time, when it is ſaid, We were *at a walk* in the meadow, or, We were *merry* in the meadow;—which no body, I think, will maintain.—Again, When we read in the Goſpel, *Ho piſteuſas ſōthēſetai* †, the participle belongs to the aoriſt of paſt time, and the verb is of future time; yet we muſt not render it, "He "who believed ſhall be ſaved:" for it appears from the context, that the believing here ſpoken of is conſidered as poſteriour in time to the enunciation of the promiſe. Here, therefore, the participle loſes the ſignification of paſt time: and may be rendered, by the indefinite preſent, "He *who believeth* ſhall be ſaved;" or by the future, (which often coincides in meaning with the indefinite preſent) "He *who will believe* ſhall be ſaved;" or merely by a noun, which in its ſignification is not connected with time, "*The believer* "ſhall be ſaved."—Can it be ſaid then, that the participle in this place neceſſarily implies any ſignification of time, when we ſee, that its full import may be expreſſed, either by preſent, or by future

* Ετυγχανομεν περιπατουντες εν τῳ τε χρονε ἱερῳ.

† Ο πιςευσας σωθησεται. See Mark xv. 16.

time,

time, or without any reference to time paſt, preſent, or future?—Greek, as well as Latin and Engliſh, participles, often take the ſignification of nouns, and conſequently loſe that of time: as * *ho peirazôn*, the tempter, *ho kektêmenos* †, the maſter, or proprietor.

2. In Latin, the future participle of the active verb does indeed expreſs future time: *Scripturus*, about to write. But the future participle of the paſſive, in *dus*, "does not ſo much import futurity (I quote the words of Ruddiman) "as neceſſity, duty, or merit. "For there is a great difference between theſe two ſentences, *Dicit* "*literas a ſe ſcriptum iri*, and *Dicit literas a ſe ſcribendas eſſe*; the "firſt ſignifying, that a letter will be written by him, or that he "will write a letter; and the ſecond, that a letter muſt be written "by him, or that he is obliged to write a letter. For (con-"tinues our Author) though Sanctius and Meſſ. de Port Royal "contend, that this participle is *ſometimes* uſed for ſimple futurity, "yet I think, that Perizonius and Johnſon have clearly evinced "the contrary:" ‡—that is, I preſume, that it is *never* uſed for ſimple futurity.

The Latin active participle of preſent time is frequently uſed to denote a quality ſimply, and as it is at all times, or without reference to any particular time; in which caſe, it aſſumes the nature of an adjective, or perhaps even of a noun: as *amans æqui*, a lover of equity; or, one whoſe general character it is at all times, that he loves equity.

The Latin paſſive participle of paſt time (as it is called) may likewiſe, by loſing all ſignification of time, become an adjective; as in the words *doctus*, *eruditus*, *ſpectatus*, *probatus*, &c.: and is ſometimes, by means of the ſubſtantive verb, applied even to future time in that tenſe, which is commonly called *the future of the*

* ὁ πειραζων. † ὁ κεκτημενος.

‡ Rudiments of the Latin tongue, page 47.

ſubjunctive, but which ought to be called *the future perfect of the indicative: amatus fuero*, I ſhall have been loved.

It appears then, that of the Greek and Latin Participle it is not enough to ſay, that "it is a word derived from a verb, and de-"noting an attribute with ſome ſignification of time." But this definition will be found ſtill more inadequate, when applied to the participles of the modern languages.

3. In Engliſh (and what is ſaid of the Engliſh participle will in general hold true of the French and Italian):—in Engliſh, I ſay, we have but two ſimple participles; which are here exemplified by *writing*, and *written*. For *about to write*, or *going to write*, is a complex, and indeed a figurative, way of expreſſing the import of a Latin and Greek participle, *grapſŏn*, and *ſcripturus*.

The firſt, *Writing*, is the participle of the active verb; the other, *Written*, is the participle of the paſſive: I *am writing* a paragraph; but *it is not yet written*. It may be added, that the former ſignifies *imperfect action*, or action begun and not ended; *I am writing* a ſentence: and that the latter ſignifies *action complete*, *perfect*, or *finiſhed*; the ſentence *is written*.—This appears to be a leſs exceptionable way of diſtinguiſhing them, than if it had been ſaid, that the former expreſſes *preſent time*, and the latter *time paſt*.

But, of itſelf, does not the firſt denote preſent, and the ſecond paſt, time? I anſwer, No. Let us examine them in their order.

By the firſt participle, *Writing*, when joined to a verb of preſent time, preſent action is no doubt ſignified: but it is ſignified, not by the participle, but by the tenſe of the verb; for the ſame participle, joined to a verb of a different tenſe, may denote either paſt or future action;—we may ſay, not only *I am writing*, but alſo, *I was writing* yeſterday, and *I ſhall be writing* tomorrow. Nor let it be ſuſpected, that this participle varies its time, when joined to the ſubſtantive verb only. It may be joined to other verbs, and

ſtill

ſtill admit the ſame variety: he *went* away *muttering*; he *will return ſmiling*; he *walks* about *meditating*.

The ſecond, *Written*, which I call the paſſive participle, may be thought to be naturally enough referred to paſt time, becauſe it expreſſes complete action: for an action is certainly paſt, when it is compleated. But this participle may, for all that, be referred to preſent time, and to future, as well as to paſt. The letter *is now written*: it *was written yeſterday*: it *will be written tomorrow*. Is not the time, in theſe examples, ſignified by the verbs *is*, *was*, and *will be*, as really as in the following; the ſea *is now calm*: it *was calm yeſterday*: it *will be calm tomorrow*? If then, in the former ſentences, the participle *written* ſignify an attribute with time, the adjective *calm*, in the latter examples, muſt alſo ſignify an attribute with time: in which caſe, it will be difficult to diſtinguiſh between the nature of the adjective, and that of the participle. But, ſuppoſe the participle *written* to be *paſſive*, and to ſignify *complete action*; and it may, in its nature, be eaſily diſtinguiſhed from the adjective *calm*, which does not imply either *action received*, or *action complete*.

But if *Written* be a paſſive participle, why do we meet with it in the compound tenſes of the active verb; in the preterperfect, *I have written*; in the pluſquamperfect, *I had written*; and in the future perfect, *I ſhall have written*? This queſtion will not appear of hard ſolution, if we vary a little the order of theſe auxiliaries. Inſtead, then, of, I have written a letter, I had written a letter, and I ſhall have written a letter, ſay, *I had a letter written*, *I have a letter written*, and, *I ſhall have a letter written*; an order, which, on ſome occaſions, and on ſubjects that admit a more harmonious phraſeology, might be tolerated in verſe: and it will appear, that the participle *written* belongs, not to the nominative *I*, the perſon *who acts*, but to the accuſative *letter*, the thing *acted upon*, or (to give it

it in other words) the thing which in reſpect of the action is *paſſive*.

That this is a true ſtate of the caſe, and no arbitrary ſuppoſition, may appear from the analogy of other modern languages. In French, wherever the participle is *declined*, it agrees in gender and number, not with the agent, but with the thing acted upon: as, *La harangue* que j'ai *faite*, and, *Les vers* que j'ai *faits*; not *fait* in either caſe. The ſame holds in Italian. *

If it be aſked, whence this mode of ſpeaking could take its riſe; it may be anſwered, that in the barbarous Latin uſed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (when the modern tongues began to aſſume their preſent form) it was not uncommon, inſtead of *Amavi illum*, I have loved him, and *Scripſi literas*, I have written the letter, to ſay *Habeo illum amatum*, and *Habeo ſcriptas literas*. The new languages adopted the idiom. Or perhaps the idiom paſſed from the new languages into the barbarous Latin of that time.

As the paſſive participle *written*, when combined with the active auxiliaries *have* and *had*, ſupplies tenſes in the active verb, I have written, I ſhall have written, I had written: ſo, when combined with the active participle *having*, the ſame paſſive participle forms an active preterperfect participle. For *having written* is as really ſuch in Engliſh, as † *gegraphôs* is in Greek. And this, being further combined with the perfect participle of the ſubſtantive verb *been*, ſupplies a preterperfect paſſive participle, *having been written*, which exactly correſponds to the Greek *gegrammenos* ‖. The ſame perfect participle paſſive *written*, joined with the imperfect active participle of the ſubſtantive verb, *being*, makes a preſent perfect participle paſſive, *being written*, which gives the meaning of the Greek ‡ *graphomenos*.

* So in Diodati's Bible. Geneſ. iii. 12, 13. Ed Adamo diſſe, La *donna che* tu hai *poſta* meco, &c.—E la Donna riſpoſe, Il ſerpente *m'* ha *ſoddotta*, &c.

† γεγραφως. ‖ γεγραμμενος. ‡ γραφομενος.

One of the greateſt defects in the Engliſh tongue, with regard to this part of ſpeech, ſeems to be the want of an *imperfect paſſive participle*. For example: If it be aſked, What is your friend doing? and anſwered, He *is building* a houſe; this is right: for the imperfect active participle, with the preſent tenſe of the ſubſtantive verb, expreſſes properly enough *action juſt now going on, but not finiſhed*. But if to the queſtion, Is your friend's houſe built? the anſwer, which is not uncommon, be given, No, but it is building; this is not right, becauſe a paſſive ſenſe is ſignified by an active participle. We muſt, therefore, in this caſe, if we would ſpeak grammatically, vary the phraſe, and ſay, No, but he is building it; or ſomething to that purpoſe.

In old Engliſh, this defect was ſometimes ſupplied by prefixing the prepoſition *in* to the active participle: as, "Forty and ſix years "was this temple *in building*." But this would now appear formal; and indeed, in the caſe ſuppoſed, hardly intelligible: The houſe is not built, but it is *in building*.

In the original Greek, of the paſſage quoted in the laſt paragraph from the ſecond chapter of St. John's Goſpel, the verb is of the firſt aoriſt paſſive; which, it ſeems, might ſignify imperfect and continued action, as well as indefinite paſt time. In Latin, it might be rendered, according to the idea which our Tranſlators muſt have had of it, *Quadraginta et ſex annos hoc templum ædificabatur*. For that this is the true grammatical ſenſe of the imperfect paſſive, though not always adhered to by Roman writers, we have the authority of Ruddiman.*

* The indicative tenſes of the Paſſive Latin verb are thus diſtinguiſhed by that moſt accurate Grammarian. — "Let the ſubject of diſcourſe be the building of a houſe. "1. When I ſay *Domus ædificatur*, I mean that it is juſt now a building, but not "finiſhed. 2. When *Ædificabatur*, that it was then, or at a certain paſt time, a build-"ing,

If the Participle eſſentially implies time, it would not be eaſy to give a reaſon, why neuter verbs ſhould not, as well as active, have participles both of preſent time, and of paſt. According to the common theory, *dormiens*, ſleeping, is the preſent participle of a neuter verb: but where is the preterit participle? Of active verbs we have participles of either ſort; *amans*, loving, *amatus*, loved; *audiens*, hearing, *auditus*, heard, &c. But of *dormio*, I ſleep, *ſedeo*, I ſit, *floreo*, I flouriſh, though there are participles of preſent time (as they are called) *dormiens*, ſleeping, *ſedens*, ſitting, *florens*, flouriſhing, there are none of paſt time. And yet, theſe attributes may be ſpoken of as paſt, as well as preſent. He ſlept, he ſat, he flouriſhed, may be ſaid, as well as, he ſleeps, he ſits, he flouriſhes.

How is this difficulty to be ſolved? By rejecting the common theory, and adopting what is here offered. Call the one participle *Active*, and the other *Paſſive*: and then, what is more eaſy, than to ſay, that to Neuter verbs, which can never be Paſſive, no paſſive participle can ever belong?

Excepting, therefore, the Greek participles, which are more numerous, and perhaps leſs underſtood, than thoſe of other tongues;

" ing, but not then finiſhed. 3. *Ædificabitur*, that ſome time hence it ſhall be a build-
" ing, without any formal regard to the finiſhing of it. — But when I make uſe of the
" *Participle perfect*, I always ſignify a thing compleated and ended: but with theſe
" ſubdiſtinctions. 1. By *Ædificata eſt*, I mean ſimply, that it is finiſhed; without
" any regard to the time when. 2. *Ædificata fuit*, it is finiſhed; and ſome time ſince
" has intervened. 3. *Ædificata erat*, it was finiſhed at a certain paſt time referred to,
" with which it was contemporary. 4. *Ædificata fuerat*; it was finiſhed before a cer-
" tain paſt time referred to, to which it was prior. 5. *Ædificata erit*, it ſhall be finiſhed
" ſome time hereafter, either without regard to a particular time when; or with reſpect
" to a certain time yet future, with which its finiſhing ſhall be contemporary. 6. *Ædi-*
" *ficata fuerit*, it ſhall be finiſhed and paſt before another thing yet future, to which its
" finiſhing ſhall be prior." — The Author then goes on to ſhow, which he does in a very ingenious and ſatisfactory manner, how it comes to paſs, that theſe tenſes are ſo often uſed promiſcuouſly by Latin writers. See *Rudiments of the Latin Tongue*, page 45.

may we not, from what has been ſaid, infer, that Participles, *as expreſſing the attribute of the verb without affirmation*, ought to be diſtinguiſhed, not into thoſe of paſt, preſent, and future time, but into, 1. *Active and imperfect*, which ſignify action, or condition, begun, continuing, and unfiniſhed, as *ſcribens*, writing, *dormiens*, ſleeping: 2. *Paſſive* and *Perfect*, which denote action complete, as *ſcriptus*, written: and, 3. *Future*, expreſſive of action, or condition, which is to commence, but has not yet commenced, as *ſcripturus*, about to write, *dormiturus*, about to ſleep, and (if you pleaſe) *ſcribendus*, about to be written.

If now it be aſked, in what reſpects the adjective differs from the participle: I anſwer, firſt, that the former, though it may be derived from a verb, (as *tacitus*, ſilent, from *taceo)* is not, like the participle, neceſſarily derived from it: and, ſecondly, that thoſe *varieties* of expreſſion and form, which relate to the *continuance*, *completion*, and *futurity*, of *action* and *condition*, and which belong eſſentially to the participle, are not characteriſtical of the adjective. Other diſtinctions might be ſpecified, but theſe are ſufficient.—The Adjective denotes a quality ſimply: the Participle denotes a quality, together with ſeveral other conſiderations relating to the continuance, completion, and futurity, of action and condition.

Theſe remarks were reſerved to this place: becauſe, without the knowledge of ſome things in the two laſt ſections, they could not be underſtood. If, on account of the unavoidable repetition of certain technical terms, the reader ſhould find them in any degree obſcure, he needs not be diſcouraged; as none of either the foregoing, or the ſubſequent, reaſonings depend upon them.

SECT. VI.

The ſubject of Attributives continued.—Of Adverbs.

THE Greek word * *Epirrhêma*, which anſwers to *adverb*, properly ſignifies ſomething *additional to an attributive:* for, as was already obſerved, all ſorts of attributives, the adjective and participle as well as the verb, were called † *rhêmata*, or verbs, by the antient grammarians. In this etymology of the name, we partly diſcern the nature of an Adverb. It is a word joined to attributives; and commonly denotes ſome circumſtance, manner, or quality, connected with their ſignification.

Adverbs are joined—to verbs, as *fortiter pugnavit*, he fought *bravely*; —to participles, as *graviter ſauciatus*, *grievouſly* wounded; —to adjectives, as *egregie fidelis*, *remarkably* faithful. They are joined even to nouns: but, when this happens, the noun will be found to imply the meaning of an attributive; as when Livy ſays, *admodum puella*, *very much* a girl, the ſenſe plainly is, a girl *very young*. Adverbs are alſo joined to adverbs: for the circumſtances, manners, or qualities, denoted by this part of ſpeech, may themſelves be characteriſed by other circumſtances, manners, or qualities; as *multo minus audacter*, *much leſs boldly*; *ſat cito* ſi *ſat bene*, *ſoon enough* if *well enough*.

Some grammarians conſider the adverb as a ſecondary attributive; or, as a word denoting the attribute of an attribute. Theodore Gaza ſays, that it is, as it were, the verb's epithet or adjective: and Priſcian obſerves, that, when added to verbs, it has the ſame effect which an adjective has when joined to a noun. And

* ἐπιῤῥῆμα. † ῥήματα.

that

that this is a true character of many adverbs, cannot be denied: for which reaſon I have referred this part of ſpeech to the chapter of Attributives. A verb, adjective, or participle cannot be where a ſubſtantive is not, either expreſſed or underſtood: and an adverb is equally dependent upon its *verb*. When I ſay, Ceſar fought valiantly; the attribute *fought* is characteriſed by the adverb *valiantly*, as Ceſar the perſon is by the verb *fought*. Agreeably to this notion of Adverbs, it would be eaſy to ſpecify a great number of them, which limit, enlarge, or otherwiſe modify, the meaning of the verbs, participles, adjectives, and adverbs, to which they are joined: as, he walked *much*, he walked *little*, he walked *ſlowly*, *quickly*, *gracefully*, *awkwardly*, &c.; — he was wounded *ſlightly*, *grievouſly*, *mortally*, *incurably*, *dangerouſly*; — *more* brave, *leſs* brave, *prudently* brave, *oſtentatiouſly* brave, &c.; — bravely, *more* bravely, *moſt* bravely, *very* bravely, *much leſs* bravely, &c.

Many adverbs there are, however, which do not ſo properly mark the attributes of attributes, as ſome remoter circumſtance attending an attribute or our way of conceiving it, and ſpeaking of it. Such are the ſimple affirmative and negative *yes* and *no*. — Is he learned? No. Is he brave? Yes. Here the two adverbs ſignify, not any modification of the attributes *brave* and *learned*; but a total negation of the attribute, in the one caſe; and, in the other, a declaration that the attribute belongs to the perſon ſpoken of. — Such alſo are thoſe adverbs, of which in every language there is a great number, that denote *time*, *place*, *certainty*, *contingency*, and the like: as, he is *here*, he will go *tomorrow*, he will *certainly* come, he will *probably* ſpeak. For, when I ſay, "He goes *ſlowly*," I expreſs by the adverb a certain modification of going; — but when I ſay, "he will go the day after this day," or, "he will go "*tomorrow*," I ſay nothing as to the *mode* of going, nor do I

characterize the attribute *going* at all; I only ſay, that, at ſuch a time, *going* will be the attribute, or the action, of ſuch a perſon.

Adverbs are indeed applied to many purpoſes; and their general nature may be better underſtood by reading a liſt of them, than by any deſcription or definition. Moſt of them ſeem to have been introduced into language, in order to expreſs by one word the meaning of two or three: *in what place*, for example, by *where?* — *to what place*, by *whither?* — *in a direction aſcending*, by *upward*; — *at the preſent time*, by *now*; — *at what time*, by *when?* — *at that time*, by *then*; — *many times*, by *often*; — *not many times*, by *ſeldom*; — *it is done as it ſhould be*, by *well* done; — *it is done with wiſdom*, by *wiſely* done; — *it is certain that* he will come, by he will *certainly* come, &c. Even *yes* may be expreſſed by circumlocution, without an adverb; as, Are you well? *Yes*; that is, *I am well.* And, where the predicate of a negative propoſition may be ſupplied by a word of contrary meaning, *No* or *Not* may be diſpenſed with, and the propoſition becomes poſitive: Are you ſick? *No:* that is, I am well; — He is *not* preſent, that is, he is abſent.

In Hebrew, though there are ſeveral adverbs of negation, there is no affirmative adverb anſwering to *yes*. *Yea* occurs only once in the Engliſh Old Teſtament, namely in the third chapter of Geneſis, where it has a different meaning. The defect is always ſupplied by a periphraſis, in the way here hinted at: as, Is he well? *He is well.* The Latin ſeems originally to have been deficient in the ſame reſpect. *Ita*, *etiam*, and *maxime*, are, when uſed in this ſenſe, elliptical circumlocutions.

Hence it appears, that adverbs, though of great uſe, becauſe they promote brevity, and conſequently energy, of expreſſion, are not among the moſt eſſential parts of language; becauſe their place might be ſupplied in almoſt all caſes, by other parts of ſpeech. However they are found in great abundance, in moſt languages: whence

whence we may infer, that it is natural for men to have recourſe to them on certain occaſions.

Adverbs expreſſive of quality are in Greek, Latin, Engliſh, &c. almoſt innumerable. In Hebrew, they are not very many; but the want is eaſily ſupplied. The maſculine of the adjective is often uſed adverbially; *tob* is *bonus* and alſo *bene*; *Rang* is both *malus* and *male*:—which is ſometimes done in Engliſh; as when *right*, *wrong*, *ill*, *well*, &c. are uſed adverbially, as well as for adjectives. But this want the Hebrews more commonly ſupply by a prepoſition and a noun: for *truly*, they ſay *in truth*; for *righteouſly*, *in righteouſneſs*. Even in adjectives they do not greatly abound. They ſay, *God of juſtice*, inſtead of *juſt God*; and *throne of glory* inſtead of *glorious throne*. We often do the ſame: we may ſay indifferently, either a wiſe man, a wealthy man, a courageous man, &c. or a man of wiſdom, of wealth, of courage, &c.

I ſaid, that Adverbs promote energy of expreſſion. But this happens only when they promote brevity too, and are ſparingly uſed, and choſen with judgement. A ſuperabundance of them, or of adjectives, makes a ſtyle unwieldy and tawdry. For it is from its nouns, rather than from its attributives, that language derives ſtrength: even as a building derives ſtability rather from the walls and rafters, than from the plaſtering, wainſcotting, and painting. Young writers, however, are apt to think otherwiſe; and, with a view to invigorate their expreſſion, qualify every verb with an adverb, and every noun with an epithet. And ſo, their compoſitions reſemble a houſe, whoſe walls are ſupported by poſts and buttreſſes; which not only make it unſeemly to the eye, and inconvenient by taking up too much room, but alſo juſtify a ſuſpicion, of weakneſs in the work, and unſkilfulneſs in the architect. Such a period as the following will explain what I mean. "I am honeſtly, ſeriouſly, and "unalterably of opinion, that nothing can poſſibly be more in-

"curably

" curably and emphatically deſtructive, or more deciſively fatal, to " a kingdom, than the introduction of thoughtleſs diſſipation, and " the pomp of lazy luxury." * Would not the full import of this noiſy ſentence be better expreſſed thus: " I am of opinion, that " nothing is more ruinous to a kingdom, than luxury and diſſipa- " tion?"—Now obſerve, that in the former there are eight adverbs and four adjectives, and in the latter one adjective, and one adverb. If two garments are ſufficient for elegance and uſe, who would burden himſelf with twenty? But this by the by.

Some authors affirm, that adverbs may be found in all the ten *Categories*; and think, that the moſt effectual way of arranging them, is to refer them to the ſeveral categories to which they belong. The Categories, or, as they are called in Latin, the Predicaments, are ten general heads of diviſion, to which Ariſtotle and his followers ſuppoſed, that every thing, or idea, conceivable by the human underſtanding, might be reduced. They are as follows. 1. Subſtance. 2. Quantity. 3. Quality. 4. Relation. 5. Action. 6. Paſſion. 7. Time. 8. Place. 9. Situation. 10. Habit; or, the being Habited †. This arrangement was long conſidered as Perfect; but has fallen into diſrepute, ſince the Peripatetick philoſophy began to decline. It muſt be owned, however, that, if we arrange the Adverbs according to it, we ſhall have a pretty extenſive

* *The pomp of lazy luxury*——a phraſe of Lord Shafteſbury's.

† " Cornelius was forced to give Martin ſenſible images. Thus calling up the " coachman he aſked him what he had ſeen at the bear-garden. The man anſwered, he " ſaw two men fight a prize; one was a fair man, a ſergeant of the guards; the other " black, a butcher: the ſergeant had red breeches, the butcher blue: they fought upon " a ſtage about four o'clock, and the ſergeant wounded the butcher in the leg. Mark, " quoth Cornelius, how the fellow runs through the predicaments. Men, *ſubſtantia*; " two, *quantitas*; fair and black, *qualitas*; Sergeant of the guards and Butcher, *Relatio*; " wounded, *actio et paſſio*; fighting, *ſitus*; ſtage, *ubi*; four o' clock, *quando*; blue and " red breeches, *habitus*."——If the reader is unacquainted with the categories, this example will be a help to his memory.

idea

idea of their nature, and of the various purpoſes to which they may be applied. But this has never been done, ſo far as I know, by any grammarian; and therefore I am apprehenſive, that the following attempt may be found erroneous.

1. Under *Subſtance*, the firſt category, may be comprehended ſuch adverbs as *Eſſentially*, *ſubſtantially*, *ſpiritually*, *corporeally*, *angelically*, *Socratically*, &c.

2. Under *Quantity*, the ſecond, may be arranged thoſe adverbs, that denote extenſion, or number. Of the former ſort are, *much*, *greatly*, *exceedingly*, *enough*, *almoſt*, *ſcarcely*, and the like. Of the latter are *once*, *twice*, *thrice*, *ſecondly*, *thirdly*, *fourthly*, &c.

3. *Quality*, the third category, is, according to Ariſtotle, of four ſpecies: comprehending, firſt, Intellectual habits, to which correſpond ſuch adverbs as *virtuouſly*, *vitiouſly*, *wiſely*, *valiantly*, *fooliſhly*, &c.; ſecondly, Natural powers of the mind or body, to which may be referred, *powerfully*, *ſenſibly*, *willingly*, *forcibly*, *feebly*, &c.; thirdly, Qualities perceived by ſenſe, expreſſed adverbially by *ſoftly*, *warmly*, *coldly*, *loudly*, *ſweetly*, *clearly*, &c.; fourthly, Figures of things with or without life, to which claſs we may refer, *elegantly* (ſhaped), *circularly*, *triangularly*, &c.

4. The adverbs that ſignify *Relation* (the fourth predicament) are of various kinds. They expreſs, firſt, Reſemblance, as, *ſo*, *thus*; ſecondly, Contrariety, as, *otherwiſe*, *differently*, *contrariwiſe*, &c.; thirdly, Order, as, *afterwards*, *next*, *firſt*, *ſecondly*, &c.; fourthly, Coexiſtence, or Aſſemblage, as, *together*, *jointly*, &c.; fifthly, Separation, as, *ſeparately*, *diverſely*, *only*, *chiefly*, *eſpecially*, *ſingularly*, &c.; ſixthly, Cauſe and Effect, as, *therefore*, *conſequently*, &c.

5. *Action* is the fifth category: and, as there are many ſorts of it, ſo are there many claſſes of adverbs to expreſs it. As, firſt, Bodily action, *ſwimmingly*, *ſnatchingly*, *curſim*, *carptim*, &c.: ſecondly,

ſecondly, Mental action,—as deſire, *utinam, O that*;—denying or forbidding, *no, not*;—aſſuring, *indeed, certainly, undoubtedly*;—granting, as *well* (be it ſo);—affirming, as *yes, truly*;—preferring, as *rather, eſpecially*;—doubting and conjecture, as *perhaps, poſſibly, probably*;—interrogation, in regard, firſt, to time, as *when?* ſecondly, to place, as *where?* thirdly, to quantity, as *quantum, quot*, how much, how many? fourthly, to quality, as *how, quomodo?*—Motion, as *ſwiftly, ſlowly*, &c.;—Reſt, as *quietly, ſilently, ſtill.*

6. Adverbs belonging to the ſixth category, and expreſſive of *Paſſion*, are, *confuſedly, diſtractedly, feelingly*, and the like.

7. Thoſe that belong to the ſeventh, which is *Ubi*, or *Place*, are very numerous, and by Ruddiman are divided into five claſſes. They ſignify, firſt, in a place, as *where? here:* ſecondly, to a place, as *whither? hither:* thirdly, towards a place, as, *backward, forward, upward, downwards*, &c.: fourthly, from a place, as *whence? hence, thence:* fifthly, by or through a place, as (in Latin) *qua? hac, illac, alia*, which, however, are no adverbs, but pronouns of the ablative caſe, to which *viâ* is underſtood.

8. The eighth predicament, *when?* or *time*, may be ſuppoſed to comprehend all the adverbs of time; which are alſo very numerous, and may be divided into, firſt, thoſe of time preſent, as *now, today:* ſecondly, thoſe of time paſt, as *then, yeſterday, lately:* thirdly, thoſe of time future, as *preſently, immediately, tomorrow, not yet:* fourthly, thoſe of time indefinite, as *when, ſometimes, always, never:* fifthly, thoſe of continued time, as *long, how long, long ago:* ſixthly, thoſe of repeated time, as, *often, ſeldom, again, now and then*, &c.

9. *Situation*, or *Poſition*, the ninth predicament, has not many adverbs belonging to it. *Supinely*, however, is one: and, *obliquely, pronely* (if there be ſuch a word) *ſideways*, &c. may be others.

10. The tenth, *Habitus*, denotes ſomething additional and exterior to a ſubſtance, but not a part of it; as a diadem, a coat, a

gown, &c. There are not in any of the languages I know (ſo far as I remember) adverbs of this ſignification; ſuch ideas being moſt commonly expreſſed by nouns, as, he wore a cloak, his head was encircled with a diadem. Yet I do not deny the reality of ſuch adverbs; and it is poſſible I may have met with them, though they do not now occur. If the Engliſh idiom would allow the word *ſuccinctly* to have its original meaning, it might perhaps be an adverb of the tenth category; as in this example, He was dreſt *ſuccinctly*, that is, in garments tucked up:—but this is not Engliſh; nor is *ſuccinto* in Latin ever uſed in any other ſenſe, than that of *briefly*, or *compendiouſly*.—By the by, I cannot ſee, for what purpoſe Ariſtotle made a ſeparate category of the tenth; for to me it ſeems included in ſome of the preceding. A *crown* is as really a *ſubſtance*, as the head that wears it, and may laſt a thouſand years longer *. Or, if it is *the having* of the crown, or *the being crowned*, that diſtinguiſhes the category, as when we ſay, *a crowned head*, then *crowned* denotes a quality perceived by ſenſe, and ſo belongs to the third predicament. Indeed this is not the only objection that might be made to the doctrine of the categories. Whoever treats of it in the way of detail, and without prejudice, will find, if I miſtake not, that in ſome things it is redundant, and in others defective. Wiſhing, however, to give in this place ſome account of that celebrated diviſion; as it was for many ages believed to be the foundation of all human ſcience; I choſe to arrange the adverbs by categories, rather than according to that ſimpler (though not leſs comprehenſive) ſcheme, which is given by the learned and accurate Ruddiman in his Rudiments of the Latin tongue.

* "The greateſt difficulty was, when they came to the tenth predicament. Crambe "affirmed, that his *habitus* was more a *ſubſtance* than he was; for his cloaths could "better ſubſiſt without him, than he without his cloaths." *Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus.*—Ridentem dicere verum quid vetat?

Since this was written, PHILOSOPHICAL ARRANGEMENTS have been publiſhed; a work of uncommon erudition; in which the doctrine of the Categories is unfolded at large, with great preciſion of language, and in a ſtyle as entertaining, as can well be applied to arguments ſo abſtracted, and of ſo little uſe. I ſay, Of ſo little uſe: for after all that the ingenious and elegant author has advanced, I am ſorry to be obliged to declare, that in this doctrine I ſee little more, than an elaborate ſolution of trifling difficulties made on purpoſe to be ſolved: as conjurors are ſaid to have raiſed ghoſts, and other ſhadowy bugbears, merely to ſhow their addreſs in laying them. It may have been a convenient introduction to the verbal part of the Greek philoſophy, and to the art of ſophiſtical declamation: but of its tendency to regulate the underſtanding, to illuſtrate moral truth, or to promote the improvement of art, or the right interpretation of nature, I am not ſenſible at all. This is ſaid, not with any view to detract from others; but only to account for my own conduct, in diſmiſſing, after ſo ſlight an examination, that celebrated part of antient literature.

As to the formation and derivation of adverbs, it depends ſo much on the idiom of particular languages, that one cannot enter upon it, without going beyond the bounds of Univerſal Grammar.

CHAP. III.

Of INTERJECTIONS.

THE Interjection is a part of ſpeech in all the languages known to Europeans. Whether it be in all others, is not certain. For, though it have its uſe, and may often promote pathos or energy, we cannot ſay, that it is ſo neceſſary, as the noun, the pronoun, or the attributive. Its place might indeed be ſupplied, in moſt caſes, by other words, if the cuſtoms of ſociety would permit. I am ſorry, or, I feel pain, conveys the ſame meaning with *alas!* though perhaps not ſo emphatically: but the defect of emphaſis may be owing to nothing more than this, that the one expreſſion is leſs common than the other on certain occaſions. In like manner, without being miſunderſtood, we might ſay, inſtead of *fye!* I diſlike it, or, I abhor it; and, inſtead of *ſtrange! (papæ!)*, I am ſurpriſed, or, I am aſtoniſhed, might be uſed with no bad effect.

The name *Interjection* expreſſes very well the nature of this part of ſpeech. It is a word *thrown into* diſcourſe *(interjectum)* in order to intimate or expreſs ſome emotion of the mind: as, I am, *alas!* a miſerable ſinner: *fye, fye!* let it not be heard of: *well done! (euge!)* thou haſt proved thyſelf a man. It is, indeed, as Ruddiman obſerves, a compendious way of conveying a ſentence in a word, that the ſhortneſs of the phraſe may ſuit the ſuddenneſs of the emotion or paſſion expreſſed by it.

For Interjections are not ſo much the ſigns of thought, as of feeling. And that a creature, ſo inured to articulate ſound as man is, ſhould acquire the habit of uttering, without reflection, certain

vocal ſounds, when he is aſſaulted by any ſtrong paſſion, or becomes conſcious of any intenſe feeling, is natural enough. Indeed, by continual practice, this habit becomes ſo powerful, that in certain caſes we ſhould find it difficult to reſiſt it, even if we wiſhed to do ſo. When attacked by acute pain, it is hardly poſſible for us not to ſay *ah!* or *alas!*—and, when we are aſtoniſhed at any narrative or event, the words, *ſtrange! prodigious! indeed!* break from us, without any effort of the will.

In the Greek Grammar, Interjections are referred to the claſs of adverbs; but, I think, improperly. They are not adverbs in any ſenſe of the word. They expreſs not the attributes of attributes; nor are they joined to verbs, to participles, or to adjectives, as adverbs are; nor do they limit or modify the ſignification of attributives in any reſpect whatever. The Latin grammarians have, therefore, done better, in ſeparating the interjection from other parts of ſpeech, and giving it a particular name. And in this they are followed by all who have written grammars of the modern tongues.

It has been ſaid, that interjections are the remains of thoſe barbarous cries, by which (according to the Epicurean ſyſtem) the firſt men expreſſed their feelings, before the invention of the art of ſpeech. But I deny, that Speech is an art, in this ſenſe of the word. I cannot conceive, how a ſet of mute, ſavage, and beaſtly creatures ſhould on a ſudden commence philoſophers, and form themſelves into an academy, or meet together in a large cave, in order to contrive a ſyſtem of words, which, without being able to ſpeak themſelves, they afterwards taught their dumb and barbarous brethren to articulate. Orpheus, performing at a publick concert, for the entertainment of lions, tygers, and other wild beaſts of quality; or Amphion making the ſtones and trees dance to the ſound of his harp, till, after many awkward bounces and caperings, they at laſt took their ſeats, in the form of towns and caſtles, are in my judgment as

reaſonable ſuppoſitions. It admits of proof, from the nature of the thing, as well as from hiſtory, that men in all ages muſt have been ſpeaking animals; that the young learned the art by imitating their elders; and that our firſt parents muſt have ſpoken by immediate inſpiration. *

Some grammarians maintain, that the interjection is no part of ſpeech at all, but a mode of utterance common to all nations, and univerſally underſtood:—in other words, that *fye*, *alas*, *huzza*, *euge*, *apage*, *eh bien*, *ahilaſſo*, &c. are as common, and as intelligible, over the whole earth, as a diſpleaſed, a ſorrowful, a joyful, or an angry countenance. It is ſtrange, thoſe authors did not recollect, that, if we except O! Ah! and one or two more, the interjections of different languages are as different as their nouns or verbs: *ai* in Greek being expreſſed by *eheu* in Latin, and in Engliſh by *alas!*—and *woes me!* being in Latin *hei mihi*, and in Greek *oimoi*. Some interjections indeed may be borrowed by one nation from the language of another; thus *apage* and *euge* are the ſame in Latin and in Greek. But ſome nouns and verbs are, in like manner, borrowed by one nation from another; yet we do not ſuppoſe, that ſuch words, becauſe current in Greece, Italy, and England, are univerſally intelligible, or form any part of that language, which, in contradiſtinction to *artificial*, I have formerly deſcribed under the name of *natural*. †

Interjections, though frequent in diſcourſe, occur not often in elegant compoſition. Unpractiſed writers, however, are apt to exceed in the uſe of them, in order, as they imagine, to give pathos to their ſtyle: which is juſt as if, in order to render converſation witty or humourous, one were to interrupt it with frequent peals of laughter. The appearance of violent emotion in others does not always raiſe violent emotion in us: our hearts, for the moſt part,

* See Part i. chap. 6. † Part i. chap. 1.

are

are more effectually ſubdued by a ſedate and ſimple utterance, than by interjections and theatrical geſture. At any rate, compoſure is more graceful than extravagance; and therefore, a multitude of theſe paſſionate particles will generally, at leaſt on common occaſions, ſavour more of levity than of dignity; of want of thought, than of keen ſenſation. In common diſcourſe this holds, as well as in writing. They who wiſh to ſpeak often, and have little to ſay, abound in interjections, *wonderful*, *amazing*, *prodigious*, *fye fye*, *O dear*, *Dear me*, *hum*, *hah*, *indeed*, *Good life*, *Good Lord*, and the like: and hence, the too frequent uſe of ſuch words tends to breed a ſuſpicion, that one labours under a ſcantineſs of ideas.—In poetry, certain ſuperfluities of language are more allowable than in proſe; yet ſome elegant Engliſh poets are at pains to avoid interjections. Tragick writers are often intemperate in the uſe of them. We meet with entire lines of interjections in the Greek plays. But it is yet more provoking to ſee an Engliſh tragedian endeavour to work upon the human heart by ſuch profane expletives, as Flames and furies! Damnation! Heaven and earth! not to mention others of ſtill greater ſolemnity. If the poet has no other way to make up his verſe, or to ſhow that his hero is in earneſt, I would recommend to him the more harmleſs phraſeology of Fielding's *Tom Thumb*,

Confuſion! horror! murder! guts! and death!

Interjections denoting imprecation, and thoſe in which the Divine Name is irreverently mentioned, are always offenſive to a pious mind: and the writer or ſpeaker, who contracts a habit of introducing them, may without breach of charity be ſuſpected of profaneneſs. To ſay, with a devout mind, God bleſs me, can never be improper: but to make thoſe ſolemn words a familiar interjection expreſſive of ſurpriſe or peeviſhneſs, is, to ſay the leaſt of it, very indecent.

As to common oaths and curſes, I need not ſay any thing to convince my reader, that they are utterly unlawful, and a proof that the ſpeaker has at one time or other kept bad company. For to the honour of the age let it be mentioned, that profane ſwearing is now more generally exploded in polite ſociety, than it uſed to be in former times. In this reſpect, as in many others, the wits of Charles the ſecond's reign were moſt infamous. Queen Elizabeth was addicted to ſwearing: and moſt of our old kings and barons are ſaid to have diſtinguiſhed themſelves by the uſe of ſome one particular oath, which was in their mouths continually. There is a great deal of this ribaldry in the poems of Chaucer.

In the antient Grammars we have adverbs of ſwearing, and interjections of imprecation: nay, I think I have been told formerly, that in Latin, and in Greek too perhaps, there are oaths for men, and oaths for women; and that if either ſex invade the privilege of the other in this matter, it is a violation of the laws of ſwearing, and of grammar. Swearing ſeems to have been more frequent in the Grecian dialogue, than in the Roman. Almoſt every affirmation in Plato may be ſaid to be depoſed upon oath.

One interjection, we are told, expreſſes laughter. But it is rather a mark in diſcourſe, to denote, that the ſpeaker is ſuppoſed to laugh in that place. For if, inſtead of the inarticulate convulſion which we call laughter, one were to pronounce thoſe three articulate ſyllables, *ha ha he*, the effect would be ridiculous. Laughter is no part of ſpeech, but a natural agitation, common to all mankind, and univerſally underſtood.

It is needleſs to ſubjoin a liſt of Interjections, as they are but few, and may be ſeen in any common grammar.

CHAP. IV.

Of Connectives and Articles.

EVERY individual word, which is comprehended under the ſeveral ſpecies hitherto mentioned, conveys ſome idea to the mind, even when pronounced ſeparate. Thus *love*, the noun, *lovely*, the adjective, *loveſt*, the verb, *loving*, the participle, *lovingly*, the adverb; thus the pronouns *I*, *thou*, *he*, *that*, *this*, *ſhe*, *they*, &c.; and thus the interjections, *alas*, *fie*, *ſtrange!*—have, each of them, ſome meaning.

But ſome ſorts of words there are, which, like ciphers in arithmetick, have no ſignificancy when ſeparate, though when joined to other words they are very ſignificant. Thus, *from*, *in*, *and*, *with*, *the*, convey no idea. But when I ſay, "He came *from* London, "*in* the chariot, *with* a friend *and* ſervant," the ſenſe is compleat; and is made ſo by theſe little words; which are now ſo important, that, if we leave them out, and ſay, "He came London the cha-"riot a friend ſervant," we ſpeak nonſenſe.

It may be obſerved, that there are in this ſentence two other little words, that of themſelves mean nothing, *a* and *the*, but which, when connected, as above, are found to be *uſeful*, though not abſolutely *neceſſary*. For, if we ſay, "He came from London "in chariot with friend and ſervant," there is a meaning; which, though awkwardly expreſſed, according to the idiom of our tongue, may however be gueſſed at; and which, rendered literally into Latin, Venit Londino in curru cum amico et ſervo, is neither awkward nor ungrammatical.

Thoſe words, therefore, which become ſignificant by being connected with other words, may be divided into two claſſes; the *Neceſſary* and the *Uſeful*. The former we call *Connectives*; the latter *Articles*. Of which in their order.

SECT. I.

Of CONNECTIVES.

EVERY thing that is a Connective in language muſt connect either words or ſentences, that is, either ideas or affirmations. When I ſay, "He came from home," the word *from* connects two words, *came* and *home*: when I ſay, "He came from home, and he "comforted me," the word *and* connects two ſentences; the firſt, "He came from home;" the ſecond, "He comforted me." The former ſort of Connectives are termed *Prepoſitions*; the latter, *Conjunctions*.

§ 1. *Of Prepoſitions: with Remarks on the* Caſes.

The term *Prepoſition* ſignifies *placing before*: and it is true of almoſt all the words of this claſs, that they are, or may be, *put before* the word which they connect with ſomething previous: as, "The enemy armed *with* darts, and mounted *on* horſes, fled *from* "us, *in* confuſion, *over* the plain, *towards* the river, *at* the foot "*of* the mountains, *beyond* which they could not paſs."

A Prepoſition may be defined; "A part of ſpeech, not ſignifi- "cant of itſelf, but of ſuch efficacy, as to unite two ſignificant "words, which, according to the nature of things, or the rules "of the language, could not otherwiſe be united." The former part of this definition muſt be plain enough already: the latter may need illuſtration. Let us inquire then, what is meant by ſaying, "that ſome words, from the nature of things, and others, "by the rule of the language, can be united in no other way, "than by prepoſitions."

Firſt, when things are intimately connected in nature, one would think, that the words which ſtand for them might eaſily coaleſce in language, without the aid of connectives. And ſo in fact they often do. No two things can be more cloſely united, than a ſubſtance and its quality; a man, for example, and his character. Theſe therefore of themſelves coaleſce in all the known languages: and we ſay, a *good man*, a *tall man*; *vir bonus*, *vir procerus*. Here prepoſitions are quite unneceſſary. — Further, there is a connection equally intimate between the agent and the action; for the action is really an attribute of the agent: and therefore we ſay, the *boy reads*, the *man walks*; the noun coaleſcing with the verb ſo naturally, that no other word is requiſite to unite them. — Moreover, an action, and that which is acted upon by it, being contiguous in nature, and mutually affecting each other, their names would ſeem to be mutually attractive in language, and capable of coaleſcing without external aid; as, he *reads a book*, he *beats his breaſt*, he *builds an houſe*, he *breaks a ſtone*. — Further ſtill; an attributive is naturally and intimately connected with the adverb which illuſtrates or modifies its ſignification: and therefore, when we ſay, he *walks ſlowly*, he is *very learned*, he is *prudently brave*, it is plain that no prepoſition can be neceſſary to promote the coaleſcence. — Theſe few examples may ſuffice to ſhow, that, from the very nature of things, ſome words may be, and are connected, without the aid of prepoſitions.

But, ſecondly, it is no leſs natural, that, to mark the connection of ſome other words, prepoſitions ſhould be neceſſary. If we ſay, "the rain falls heaven; — the enemy ran the river; — Creuſa "walked Eneas; — the tower fell the Greeks; — ſhe led him the "houſe; — Lambeth is Weſtminſter-abbey;" — there is obſervable in each of theſe expreſſions, either a total want of connection, or ſuch a connection as produces falſehood or nonſenſe: and it is evident,

evident, that, before they can be turned into ſenſe, the gap muſt be filled up by ſome connecting word; as thus, "the rain falls "*from* heaven; — the enemy ran *towards* the river; — Creuſa "walked *behind* Eneas; — the tower fell *upon* the Greeks; — ſhe "led him *into* the houſe; — Lambeth is *over againſt* Weſtminſter-"abbey." — We ſee then, how prepoſitions may be neceſſary to connect thoſe words, that in their ſignification are not naturally connected.

Thirdly; It was hinted, that, by the rule of certain languages, ſome words, though coaleſcing in ſenſe, cannot be connected in diſcourſe, without prepoſitions. When this happens, it is owing to ſome peculiar defect, or to ſome other peculiarity, in thoſe languages. For example: the inſtrument wherewith one performs an action muſt have a natural connection with that action; ſo natural indeed, and ſo intimate, that they cannot be ſeparated. The words, therefore, which ſtand for them, may, in languages that decline their nouns by caſes, be united without a prepoſition: as *Scribit calamo*. But, if a language has no caſes, or very few, it may ſo happen, that merely by ſubjoining the name of the inſtrument to the active verb we ſhall *not* be able to mark the connection. Thus, in Engliſh, "he writes a pen," having no definite ſenſe, cannot mark connection, or any thing elſe. Here then, in our tongue, a prepoſition comes to be neceſſary to aſcertain a particular union of words, which, according to the Engliſh idiom, cannot be ſo conveniently united in any other way; and ſo we ſay, "he "writes *with* a pen." I ſay, — "which cannot be *ſo conveniently* "united:" for that without a prepoſition the ſame ſenſe *may* be expreſſed, admits of no doubt; as, "he writes, and a pen is the "inſtrument." What then is the advantage of uſing prepoſitions in a caſe of this kind? The advantage is conſiderable: for by this ſimple expedient we ſignify in few words what would otherwiſe

require many. — Again, in the Latin idiom, *Arguitur furti* has a definite meaning; the firſt word denoting accuſation, and the ſecond a crime; and the connection between them being marked by the caſe of the noun. But in Engliſh, "He is accuſed theft," has no clear meaning; becauſe there is nothing to ſhow, how the words are connected, or whether they be connected or not. But, by means of a prepoſition (which ſupplies the want of a caſe) "He "is accuſed *of* theft," we unite them together, and remove all doubt in regard to their ſignification.

The Latin Grammarians reckon up twenty-eight prepoſitions governing the accuſative caſe; fifteen that take the ablative; and four, that have ſometimes the one caſe, and ſometimes the other: — in all forty-ſeven. But ſeveral of theſe are ſuperfluous; ſome rarely occur; and a few are by the beſt Grammarians accounted adverbs rather than prepoſitions. Hence we may infer, that many prepoſitions are not neceſſary in language. Thoſe in our tongue hardly exceed thirty.

But it is to be obſerved, that almoſt every prepoſition we are acquainted with has more than one ſignification, and that ſome of them have ſeveral. The Engliſh *of*, for example, denotes *concerning*, as, A Treatiſe *of* human nature; denotes the matter of which a thing is made, as, a cup *of* ſilver; denotes the means, as, to die *of* hunger; denotes *among*, as, *Of* three horſes two were lame; denotes *through*, or, in conſequence of, as, It is *of* the Lord's mercies that we are not conſumed; denotes *from*, as, London is ſouth *of* York; denotes *out of*, as, *Of* this little he had ſome to ſpare; denotes *extraction*, as, Alexander the ſon *of* Philip; denotes *belonging to*, as, He is *of* the tribe of Judah; denotes, *containing*, or *filled with*, as, a glaſs *of* wine, an hogſhead *of* ale; — and has ſeveral other ſignifications. In like manner, we might ſpecify thirty ſenſes of the prepoſition *for*; about twenty of *from*, and the ſame number

nearly of *with*, *by*, and ſome others: for which I refer to Johnſon's Dictionary. Theſe varieties of meaning give trouble to thoſe who are acquiring a language; but are attended with no inconvenience, when one is maſter of it. So that we may repeat, that a ſmall number of prepoſitions are ſufficient for the ordinary purpoſes of life. In Greek, which is ſaid to be more perfect than any other tongue, there are only eighteen: moſt of which, however, vary exceedingly in their ſignification, according to the caſes that they govern, and according as they are uſed in a proper, or in a figurative, ſenſe.

For I ſpeak here of the *ſeparable* prepoſitions, which are diſtinct and complete words. Thoſe that are called *Inſeparable*, are not to be conſidered in Univerſal Grammar; being neither connectives, nor words, but only ſyllables, which generally add ſomething to the ſignification of thoſe words wherewith they are compounded, but never ſtand by themſelves: as (in Engliſh) *a*, *be*, *con*, *mis*, *de*, *dis*, &c. in the words, *abide*, *bedeck*, *conjoin*, *miſtake*, *decipher*, *diſpleaſe*, &c.

Prepoſitions, in their original and literal acceptation, ſeem all to have denoted Relations of place. This at leaſt is true (if I miſtake not) of all the Latin and Greek prepoſitions without exception, as well as of all the Engliſh. *Till*, indeed, or *until*, is now uſed of time only, as in this phraſe, "I never heard of him till this mo-"ment:" but antiently it had, and among the vulgar in Scotland it ſtill has, a more general ſenſe, being of the ſame import nearly with *to* or *towards*; as in this line of Spenſer,

He rouſed himſelf full blithe, and haſten'd *them until.*

Priſcian thinks, that the Latin *clam* is not, as it is commonly ſaid to be, a prepoſition, but rather an adverb; and aſſigns this reaſon among others, that it never has any reference to *place* in its ſignification.

The

The importance of prepoſitions, in marking, with equal brevity and accuracy, *relations in place*, will partly appear from the following ſentences. "He went *to* a city, *at* the foot *of* the hill, *over* "*againſt* a lake, that ſtretches *before* a wide common. *On* this ſide "*of* the city, the road winds *about* ſome great rocks, that riſe fifty "feet *above* the level of the plain, then goes ſtraight *towards* the "weſt, *among* buſhes, *between* two little hills. When he came "*within* the walls, and had got *nigh* to the market-place, *beneath* "the citadel, the enemy fled *from* him, *through* the ſtreets, *out of* "the city, and *along* the banks of the lake, *without* their baggage, "till they eſcaped *in* boats *beyond* the river. He followed *after*, and "was not far *behind*, them; having *with* him ſome friends, whom "he had brought *from* home," &c.

But, in all languages, Prepoſitions are uſed figuratively, to ſignify other relations, beſides thoſe of place. For example, as they who are *above* have in ſeveral reſpects the advantage of ſuch as are *below*, prepoſitions expreſſing high and low place are uſed for ſuperiority and inferiority in general: as, "he is *above* all diſguiſe;—he ſerves "*under* ſuch a captain;—he rules *over* the people;—he will do "nothing *beneath* his high ſtation."——*Beyond* implies, not only diſtance of place, but alſo, that between us and the diſtant object ſomething intervenes, which is alſo at ſome diſtance; as, "he is "beyond ſea." But perſons, or things, ſo ſituated with reſpect to us, cannot be immediately in our power: and hence, *beyond* is uſed figuratively, and in general, to ſignify, *out of the reach*, or *out of the power of*: as "Goodneſs beyond thought,—Glorious beyond "compare,—Gratitude beyond expreſſion."—Take another example. *By* denotes *nearneſs*; and *with*, *fameneſs*, of place: as "She "was with him;—I found him cloſe with Swift;—his dwelling is "by the ſea;—By the rivers of Babylon we ſat and wept." Now they who are *with* us, or who are *by* us, that is, who are in our company,

company, or who are near at hand, may co-operate with and aſſiſt us; but the former with a more immediate agency, and cloſer connection, than the latter. Hence that figurative uſe of the prepoſitions *by* and *with*, which is obſervable in ſentences like the following: He walks *with* a ſtaff, *by* moonlight; He was taken *by* ſtratagem; and killed *with* a ſword.—Put the one prepoſition for the other; and ſay, He walks *by* a ſtaff *with* moonlight: He was taken *with* ſtratagem, and killed *by* a ſword: and it will appear, that they differ in ſignification more than one at firſt view would be apt to imagine.

Hitherto I have conſidered prepoſitions as ſeparate words. But they are often prefixed to, ſo as to form a part of, other words; as *overvalue*, *undergo*, &c. in which caſe, they generally impart ſomething of their own meaning to the word with which they are compounded. And that this imparted meaning has in many caſes an alluſion to place, is well illuſtrated by Mr. Harris, in the following manner. "Suppoſe a given ſpace. *E* and *ex* ſignify *out of* that "ſpace; *per*, *through* it, from beginning to end; *in*, *within* it, ſo "as not to reach the boundary; *ſub*, *under* it. Hence, *E* and *Per* "in compoſition augment. *Enormis* is ſomething not ſimply big, "but big in exceſs, ſomething got out of the rule, and beyond the "boundary: *Dico*, I ſpeak, *Edico*, I ſpeak out; whence *edictum*, "an edict, ſomething ſo effectually ſpoken, as that all are ſuppoſed to hear and to obey it: *Fari*, to ſpeak, *Effari*, to ſpeak "out; whence *effatum*, an axiom, or ſelf-evident propoſition, "addreſſed as it were to all men, and calling for univerſal aſſent: "*Permagnus*, *perutilis*, great throughout, uſeful in every part.— "On the contrary, *In* and *ſub* diminiſh and leſſen. *Injuſtus*, *iniquus*, "unjuſt, unequitable; that *lies within* juſtice and equity, that "reaches not ſo far, that falls ſhort of them. *Subniger*, blackiſh, "*ſubrubicundus*,

" *ſubrubicundus*, reddiſh; tending to black, and tending to red, but " *under* the ſtandard, and *below* perfection."

So far Mr. Harris. I ſhall only add, that it is not eaſy to account for ſome coalitions of this nature; as, for example, the Engliſh compounds *underſtand* and *underſtanding*. It may, however, be offered, in the way of conjecture; that, as he who *ſtands under* a thing perceives its foundation, and how it is ſupported, and whether it be well ſupported; ſo he may be ſaid to underſtand a doctrine, who comprehends the grounds or evidences of it *. Many ſuch words there are in every language, to exerciſe the wit of the fanciful etymologiſt.

Words compounded with prepoſitions are very numerous in moſt tongues, but eſpecially in Greek. There we find prefixed to a word, not only one prepoſition, but frequently two, and ſometimes even three. Thus † *hupekproluein* is compounded of three prepoſitions (anſwering to *under*, *from*, and *forward*) and a verb ſignifying *to looſe*; and this word is uſed by Homer to denote the *unyoking* of mules, by drawing them *forward*, *from under* the chariot. Other languages may expreſs the ſame ideas by means of three or four words; but none, I believe, but the Greek, could expreſs them all in one. ‡

Some Engliſh prepoſitions change the meaning of verbs, by being put after them. Thus, to caſt, is to throw, but, to *caſt up*, is to compute, or calculate: to give, is to beſtow, but, to *give over*, is to ceaſe, to abandon, to conclude to be loſt: to knock, is to beat, but to *knock under* is a vulgar idiom denoting ſubmiſſion. So, to

* Mr. Harris gives another etymology. See *Hermes*, page 371.

† ὑπεκπρολυε.ν. Odyſſ. vi. 88. See alſo Odyſſ. vi. 87.

‡ So λαμβανειν to take; καταλαμβανειν to take hold of; προκαταλαμβανειν to take hold of before another, to preoccupy; ἀντιπροκαταλαμβανειν, to preoccupy in oppoſition to another.

take

take after, to learn of, to reſemble; to *take off*, to copy, or mimick; to *take on*, to be much affected; to *take up*, to reform; to *take up with*, to be contented with; and innumerable others.

A prepoſition often loſes its connecting power, and becomes an adverb. Thus *round* is a prepoſition, when one ſays, He went round the walls; and an adverb when it is ſaid, I turned round, to ſee who called me. The ſame thing happens in other languages. There are two or three Latin words, of which it is doubted by the beſt Grammarians, whether they be adverbs or prepoſitions. But it is not every prepoſition that admits of ſuch a change. *Of*, *with*, *from*, and ſome others, are never adverbial.

It may ſeem ſtrange, that, in the courſe of this long inquiry concerning the eſſentials of language, ſo little ſhould have been ſaid on the ſubject of CASES. The reaſon is, that Caſes are not eſſential to language. They are indeed of great importance in Greek and Latin: but a language may be ſignificant enough without them, or at leaſt with very few. We have no Caſes in Engliſh, except the addition of *S* in the genitive, as, "the Lords day;" and in the pronouns *I*, *we*, *thou*, *ye*, *he*, *they*, *ſhe*, *it*, which in the oblique caſe become *me*, *us*, *thee*, *you*, *him*, *her*, *them*. And of our genitive in *S* it may be obſerved, firſt, that it is leſs in uſe now than formerly; and ſecondly, that it has ſometimes a meaning different from that of the other genitive formed by the prepoſition *of*, as in the above example; for, *the Lords day*, and *the day of the Lord*, are not ſynonimous; the former ſignifying *Sunday*, the latter, *the day of judgment*, or, a day in which God will manifeſt himſelf in an extraordinary manner. This however may be owing to the repetition of the definite article, which in the latter phraſe points out one particular day (or time) different from all others.

Thoſe varieties of ſignification, which in the Greek and Latin nouns are marked by caſes, are in Engliſh and the other modern

languages of Europe marked, for the moſt part, by prepoſitions; ſuch as *of*, *to*, *for*, *by*, *with*, and *from*. Our nominative and accuſative, indeed, are known by their poſition, the firſt being put before the verb, and the laſt after: at leaſt this is the general rule; from which, however, writers, eſpecially poets, often deviate, (as already obſerved) when that can be done without perplexing the ſenſe.

In Hebrew, the caſe of the noun is marked by a change made, not in the end, but in the beginning of the word; and this change is plainly a prepoſition prefixed, but contracted in pronunciation. Thus *melech* is *a king*; *lemelech*, *to a king*; *mimelech*, *from a king*: *el* being the prepoſition that correſponds to the Engliſh *to*; and *min* being ſynonimous with *from*.

In the Erſe or Gaelick, the oblique caſe, correſponding to the Latin genitive, is characteriſed by a change in the vowel or diphthong of the laſt ſyllable; as *Oſſian*, Oſſian; *Oſſiain*, of Oſſian: *Sagard*, a prieſt; *Sagaird*, of a prieſt:—the accuſative being the ſame with the nominative; and the dative and ablative diſtinguiſhed (like our dative and ablative) by prepoſitions.

There is ſome inaccuracy in the doctrine of Caſes, as commonly received among Grammarians; ſo that it is not eaſy, nor perhaps poſſible, to expreſs the meaning of the word *caſe* in a definition. For, what is it, that conſtitutes a caſe? Is it a peculiar termination, or inflexion of the noun? Then, firſt, in the plural of Latin nouns, there can be no more than four caſes, becauſe there are no more than four terminations; the dative being uniformly the ſame with the ablative, and the nominative with the vocative. And then, ſecondly, it cannot be ſaid, that there are, in any one of the declenſions, ſo many as ſix caſes of the ſingular: for, in the firſt, the genitive and dative agree in termination; in the ſecond, the dative and ablative; in the third, the nominative and vocative; in the fourth,

fourth, the nominative, vocative, and genitive; and in the fifth, both the nominative and vocative, and the genitive and dative.

In fixing the number of their caſes, the Latin grammarians ſeem to have been determined by three conſiderations: firſt, by the termination or inflexion; ſecondly, by the meaning, or the relation ſubſiſting between the noun and the word that governs it; and thirdly, by a regard to uniformity, or a deſire of giving the ſame number of caſes to the ſingular and to the plural, and of allowing as many to one declenſion, as to another. And I am inclined to think, that, by this method, though not ſtrictly philoſophical, both their declenſions and their ſyntax are rendered more intelligible, than they would have been upon any other plan.

If we admit the termination to be the ſole characteriſtick of a Caſe, then there are in Engliſh no more caſes, than the few above ſpecified. If caſes are to be diſtinguiſhed by the different ſignifications of the noun, or by the different relations which it may bear to the governing word, then we have in our language as many caſes almoſt, as there are prepoſitions: and, above a man, beneath a man, beyond a man, round about a man, within a man, without a man, &c. ſhall be caſes, as well as, of a man, to a man, and with a man. In fact, it can hardly be ſaid, that there are Caſes, in any ſenſe of the word, except in thoſe nouns that vary their terminations: and therefore, we may repeat, that there are no caſes in Engliſh, or very few; and that, conſequently, Caſes are not eſſential to language. For that, though the few we have were ſtruck out of the Engliſh tongue, it would ſtill be intelligible, though not ſo elegant, is a point, which can hardly admit of diſpute. In ſome parts of England, *ſhe* is uſed for *her*, and *we* for *us*, without inconvenience; the genitive in *S* is leſs frequent than that other genitive which is formed by the prepoſition *of*, and both are equally perſpicuous; and, *of I*, *to I*, *of thou*, *with thou*, *I ſaw*

he, I ſaw they, if they were as common, would certainly be as well underſtood, as *of me, to me, of thee, with thee, I ſaw him; I ſaw them.*

The origin of the word *Caſe*, and of ſome other grammatical terms relating to nouns, is very oddly explained by ſome authors; but has plauſibility enough to deſerve notice. They tell us, that, among the moſt antient Greek Grammarians, a line falling perpendicularly was the ſymbol of the nominative caſe; and that lines falling, not perpendicularly, but with different degrees of obliquity, were conſidered as the ſymbols of the other caſes. Hence the firſt obtained the name of *Caſus rectus*, or *the erect caſe*; and the others were called *Caſus obliqui, the oblique caſes:* hence they were all denominated *Caſus*, or *Fallings:* and hence, an enumeration of the ſeveral caſes or fallings of the noun is known by the name of a *Declenſion*; becauſe it exhibits a ſort of declining progreſs, from the noun's perpendicular form, through its ſeveral ſymbolical obliquities.

If it were aſked, Whether a language with caſes, like the Greek and the Latin, or one, which, like the Engliſh, *declines* its nouns by prepoſitions, deſerve the preference; I ſhould anſwer; firſt, that in point of perſpicuity neither has any advantage over the other; *Regis, regi, rege*, of a king, to a king, with a king, being all equally intelligible:—and ſecondly, that the modern has more ſimplicity than the antient; becauſe he who can decline one Engliſh noun may, if he know the ſingular and plural terminations, decline any other; which is by no means the caſe in the Latin and Greek.

But, thirdly, it muſt be allowed, that the Claſſick tongues derive from the inflection of their nouns a very great ſuperiority, in reſpect of elegance. For, firſt, what they expreſs by one word *pennæ* (for example) we cannot expreſs by fewer than two, or perhaps

haps three, *of pen, of a pen, of the pen.* Beſides, the varieties of termination in the Greek and Latin nouns contributes not a little to their harmony: while the unvaried ſound of our ſubſtantives, with the perpetual repetition of ſuch little words as *of, to, for, with,* &c. give a harſhneſs to the language, which would certainly be offenſive to an ear, that had long been inured to the modulation of the antient tongues.

But the chief advantage of diverſified termination, both in nouns and in verbs, conſiſts (as formerly hinted) in this, that it leaves the compoſer at liberty to place his words in any order, which he may think will moſt effectually promote variety, and energy, as well as harmony, of ſtile. Whereas, in the modern tongues, the relation that one word bears to another being in a great meaſure determined by their poſition, we are often confined to one particular arrangement; and, when we depart from that, and attempt thoſe deviations from the grammatical order which are ſo graceful in antient authors, are apt to write obſcurely and affectedly.—In this reſpect, however, the Engliſh tongue is more ſuſceptible of variety than the French, and Engliſh verſe than Engliſh proſe. Indeed, almoſt all arrangements of words, that do not perplex the ſenſe, are permitted in our poetry, eſpecially in our blank verſe: a privilege, whereof Milton availing himſelf in its full latitude, diſplays in the *Paradiſe Loſt* a variety and elegance of compoſition, which have never been equalled in any other modern tongue, and may bear to be compared with the moſt elaborate performances of antiquity.

Our want of inflection in our nouns, adjectives, and participles, makes us, in our written language, more dependent upon punctuation, than the antients were. Indeed, of punctuation, as we underſtand it, they had no idea: and it does not appear, that they ſuffered any inconvenience from the want of it. Whereas, in

modern language, the miſplacing or omiſſion of a point will often alter the ſenſe: and, if we had no points, we ſhould find it difficult to write ſo as to be underſtood; to write elegantly, and yet intelligibly, would be impoſſible. There is a paſſage in Cato; which, from being generally, if not always, miſpointed, is, I think, generally miſunderſtood:

The ways of heaven are dark and intricate,
Puzzled in mazes, and perplex'd with errors:
Our underſtanding traces them in vain,
Loſt and bewilder'd in the fruitleſs ſearch; &c.

Thus the lines are printed in all the editions I have ſeen. And yet, it can hardly be ſuppoſed, that Addiſon's piety would have permitted him to ſay, or to make Cato ſay, that "the ways of heaven "are perplexed with errors;" or that his taſte would have warranted ſuch an expreſſion as, "the ways of heaven are puzzled." I therefore preſume, that the firſt line is a ſentence by itſelf, and ought to end in a point or colon; and that the ſequel, ranged in the grammatical order, amounts to this; "Our underſtanding, "puzzled in mazes, and perplexed with errors, traces the ways of "heaven in vain:" which is both elegant and true. Now this ambiguity could not have taken place in Latin or Greek, nor indeed in French or Italian, even though there had not been one point in the ſentence: becauſe the participles *puzzled* and *perplexed* would have been made to agree with the ſingular noun *underſtanding*; in which caſe they could not alſo agree with the plural noun *ways*.

In explaining the ſeveral caſes, and ſhowing, why there are neither more nor fewer, and why ſo many, and what is the nature of each, ſome authors have been more particular, and diſplayed greater ſubtlety, than in my opinion was requiſite. As to the number of caſes, grammarians have always differed in their ſentiments, and

are

are not reconciled to this day. Many explode the ablative, becauſe the Greeks could do without it; and ſome will not allow the vocative to be a caſe, becauſe it is often, both in Latin and in Greek, the ſame with the nominative. Ariſtotle and the Peripateticks maintained, that the nominative is not a caſe; and the Stoicks were equally poſitive, that it is. In the Armenian language, the number of caſes is ſaid to be ten: and I ſhould not wonder, if a grammarian, much given to novelty and paradox, were to affirm, that there are in Engliſh as many caſes almoſt as there are prepoſitions. While opinions are ſo different in regard to the preciſe number, it is vain to inquire, why there are neither more nor fewer, and why ſo many.

The nature of each particular caſe may be better underſtood by examples, than by logical definition. Indeed, all the definitions I have ſeen of the ſeveral caſes are liable to objection; except, perhaps, that of the nominative, which is given by Mr. Harris, who calls it, "That caſe, without which there is no regular and perfect ſentence."

"The Accuſative," ſays the ſame author, "is that caſe, which "to an efficient nominative, and a verb of action, ſubjoins, either "the effect, or the paſſive ſubject:"—the effect, as when I ſay, *Lyſippus fecit ſtatuas*, Lyſippus made ſtatues; the ſubject, as in this example, *Achilles vulneravit Hectora*, Achilles wounded Hector.—But this, though frequently, is not univerſally true. When it is ſaid, *Antonius læſit Ciceronem*, the firſt word is an efficient nominative, the ſecond an active verb, and the third an accuſative, according to the definition: but when I ſay, *Antonius nocuit Ciceroni*, the efficient nominative and active verb are followed, not by an accuſative, but by a dative. And there are other verbs of active ſignification, as *Portior*, for example, which take after them, rarely an accuſative, ſometimes a genitive, and frequently an ablative. And what ſhall

we ſay of accuſatives governed by prepoſitions; as *habitat juxta montem*, he dwells near the mountain? For neither is *habitat*, *he dwells*, an active verb; nor is the mountain, in any ſenſe of the words, either the ſubject or the effect of his dwelling; and yet *montem*, the mountain, is the accuſative.

The Genitive, according to the ſame learned writer, expreſſes all relations commencing *from* itſelf; and the Dative, all relations tending *to* itſelf. Yet, when I ſay, *editus regibus*, deſcended of kings, I expreſs a relation commencing *from* the kings, who are, notwithſtanding, of the ablative caſe, in the Latin: and *eripuit morti*, he reſcued from death, is in Latin dative, and expreſſes, for all that, a relation tending, not *to* death, but *from* it.—One may ſay indeed, that theſe are refinements in the language, and deviations from the primitive ſyntax. But I know not, how we are to judge of caſes, except from the purpoſes to which they are applied in the languages that have them; nor on what authority we have a right to ſuppoſe, that the primitive ſyntax of Greek and Latin was different from that which we find in Greek and Latin authors.

In a word, every caſe, almoſt, is applied to ſo many purpoſes in ſyntax, that to deſcribe its uſe in a ſingle definition, ſeems to be impoſſible, or at leaſt ſo difficult, and withal ſo unneceſſary, that it is not worth while to attempt it. None of the antient grammarians, ſo far as I know, has ever made the attempt: and I believe it will be allowed, that in this ſort of ſubtlety they are not inferiour to their brethren of modern times.

§ 2. *Of Conjunctions.*

I divided Connectives into two claſſes; Prepoſitions, which connect words, and Conjunctions, which connect ſentences.

A Conjunction may be thus defined: "A part of ſpeech, void "itſelf of ſignification, but of ſuch efficacy, as to join ſentences "together, and ſhow their dependence upon one another." The

Conjunction,

Conjunction, ſays Ariſtotle, makes many *one*: and Ammonius compares the words of this claſs to thoſe pegs and nails by which the ſeveral parts of a machine are united.

Perhaps it may be thought, that Conjunctions, as well as prepoſitions, do ſometimes connect words; as when we ſay, He is a learned *and* a wiſe *and* a good man. But this ſentence, when analyſed, will be found to conſiſt of three diſtinct ſentences; — he is a learned man; — he is a wiſe man; — he is a good man; or, — he is learned, — he is wiſe, — he is good: which three would for ever remain diſtinct and ſeparate, if we had no connecting words to unite them in one ſentence; even as the ſeveral parts of a ſhip would remain ſeparate, if we had no pegs or nails to faſten them together. So, when it is ſaid, Peter and John went to the temple, it may ſeem, that the conjunction *and* connects only the two names *Peter* and *John*: but it really connects two ſentences, — Peter went to the temple, — John went to the temple; for unleſs we ſuppoſe the words, *went to the temple*, to belong both to Peter and to John, the expreſſion has no meaning.

In this account of the Conjunction, Scaliger, Sanctius, Voſſius, Urſinus, and Mr. Harris agree. But Perizonius is of opinion, and Ruddiman ſeems to think, that conjunctions do ſometimes connect words, and not ſentences; as in examples, like the following: Saul *and* Paul are the ſame: This book coſt a ſhilling *and* more: There is war between England *and* France. Each of theſe, no doubt, is one ſentence, and, if we keep to the ſame phraſeology, incapable of being broken into two. For, if inſtead of the firſt we ſay, "Saul is the ſame — Paul is the ſame," we utter nonſenſe; becauſe the predicate *ſame*, though it agrees with the two ſubjects in their united ſtate, will not agree with either when ſeparate. If we ſay, inſtead of the ſecond, "This book coſt a ſhilling—this "book coſt more," we ſpeak with little meaning, or at leaſt inaccurately.

curately. And, inſtead of the third, if we ſay, "There is war "between England — there is war between France," we fall into nonſenſe as before; becauſe the prepoſition *between*, having a neceſſary reference to more than one, cannot be uſed where one only is ſpoken of.

Yet, from theſe and the like examples, I do not ſee that any exception ariſes to the general idea of this part of ſpeech, as expreſſed in the definition. For in each of theſe a double affirmation ſeems to be implied; and two affirmations certainly comprehend matter ſufficient for two ſentences. If, therefore, not one of the examples given can, in its preſent form, be reſolved into two, it muſt be owing, not to the want of ideas, but to ſome peculiarity in the expreſſion. Let us, therefore, without adding any new idea, change the expreſſion, and mark the conſequence.

The firſt example, "Paul *and* Saul are the ſame," is very elliptical. Its ſeeming import is, either that two different names are the ſame name, which cannot be; or that two different perſons are the ſame perſon, which is equally abſurd. To expreſs the whole thought, therefore, in adequate language, we muſt ſay, "Paul and "Saul are names that belong to one and the ſame man." And this plainly comprehends two ſentences: Saul and Paul are names, — Saul and Paul belong to one and the ſame perſon. *

In the ſecond example, are plainly implied two affirmations, and conſequently two ſentences. "This book coſt a ſhilling" — (which is true, though not the whole truth) and — "This book coſt more "than a ſhilling."

Even three affirmations, and of courſe three ſentences, may be ſuppoſed to be comprehended in the third example. "France is "at war — England is at war — They are at war with one "another." Taking it in another view, we may ſay, that here

* See Part i. Chap. 1. Sect. 2.

one aſſertion is made concerning the one country, and another of the ſame import concerning the other, and that there muſt by conſequence be ideas to furniſh out two affirmative ſentences: "England is at war with France—France is at war with England."

In ſome ſentences of this nature, the conjunction may be conſidered as ſuperfluous. Where this happens, the meaning may be expreſſed in one ſentence, without the aid of any conjunction: as, Peter went with John to the temple: Saul is the ſame with Paul.

Copulative conjunctions, therefore, where they are not quite ſuperfluous, (as if we were to ſay, I ſaw twenty *and* four men, inſtead of twenty four) will I think be found in moſt, or perhaps in all caſes, to connect together either ſentences, or words that comprehend the meaning of ſentences.

Sentences may be united, even when their *meanings* are disjoined, or oppoſed to one another. When I ſay, "Peter and John went "*becauſe* they were called," I join three ſentences in one; and the two laſt are, as it were, the continuation of the firſt: Peter went —John went—they went becauſe they were called. But if it be ſaid, "Peter and John went, *but* Thomas would not go," though there are three ſentences joined in one, as before, the import of the laſt is, by means of the particle *but*, ſet in a ſort of oppoſition to the two firſt. Hence Conjunctions have been divided into two kinds, *Conjunctive*, which join ſentences, and alſo connect their meanings; and *Disjunctive*, which, while they connect ſentences, disjoin their meanings, or ſet them, as it were, in oppoſition.

Theſe two claſſes have been ſubdivided by Grammarians into ſeveral ſubordinate ſpecies. It would be tedious to enumerate all the arrangements that have been propoſed. I ſhall juſt give the heads of Mr. Harris's ſubdiviſion; which will convey an idea of the various uſes to which the Conjunction may be applied.

" 1. The Conjunctions, that unite both ſentences and their " meanings, are either *Copulative* or *Continuative*. The Copulative " may join all ſentences, however incongruous in ſignification: " as, Alexander was a conqueror, *and* the loadſtone is uſeful. " The Continuative joins thoſe ſentences only which have a natu- " ral connection; as, Alexander was a conqueror *becauſe* he was " valiant.

" Continuatives are of two ſorts, *Suppoſitive*, and *Poſitive*. The " former denote connection, but not actual exiſtence; as, You " will be happy *if* you be good. The latter imply connection, " and actual exiſtence too; as, You are happy *becauſe* you are " good.

" Moreover Poſitive Continuatives are either *Cauſal* or *Collective*. " Thoſe ſubjoin cauſes to effects; as, He is unhappy *becauſe* he is " wicked: theſe ſubjoin effects to cauſes; as, He is wicked, *there-* " *fore* unhappy. *

" 2. Disjunctive Conjunctions, which unite ſentences while they " disjoin their meaning, are either *Simple*, which merely disjoin; " as, It is *either* John *or* James: or *Adverſative*, which both diſ- " join, and mark an oppoſition; as, It is not John, *but* it is James.

" Adverſative Disjunctives are divided into *Abſolute* and *Com-* " *parative:* Abſolute, as when I ſay, Socrates was wiſe, *but* Alex- " ander was not; Comparative, as in this example, Socrates was " wiſer *than* Alexander.

* *Therefore* was formerly mentioned as an adverb. And an adverb it is, when, without joining ſentences, it only gives the ſenſe of *for that reaſon*. When it both gives that ſenſe, and alſo connects, as when we ſay, " He is good; therefore he is " happy," it is a conjunction. The ſame thing is true of *conſequently*, *accordingly*, and the like. When theſe are ſubjoined to *and*, or joined to *if*, *ſince*, &c. they are adverbs, the connection being made without their help; when they appear ſingle, and unſupported by any other connective, they may be called conjunctions.

" Adver-

" Adverſative Disjunctives are further divided into *Adequate* and " *Inadequate:* Adequate, as when it is ſaid, He will come *unleſs* " he be ſick, that is, his ſickneſs only will be an adequate cauſe " to prevent his coming; Inadequate, as if it were ſaid, He will " come *although* he be ſick, that is, his ſickneſs will not be a ſuf- " ficient or adequate cauſe to prevent his coming."

That all the Conjunctions neceſſary in language may be referred to one or other of theſe heads, I will not affirm. Perhaps it is impoſſible to determine, how many may be *neceſſary*. This we know, that barbarous nations have but few; that cultivated tongues, like the Greek and Latin, have a conſiderable number, (the Latin upwards of eighty); but that of this number ſome, being ſynonimous with others, and introduced for the ſake of variety, cannot be neceſſary; though they are uſeful, becauſe they may be ornamental.

Yet from this laſt circumſtance it muſt not be inferred, that there is a redundancy of connectives in theſe languages. We ſhall be inclined to think there is rather a deficiency, when we conſider, that one and the ſame conjunction has often ſeveral different ſignifications. Thus, the Latin *autem* denotes, *but, nay, beſides, indeed, on the contrary*; and has other niceties of meaning, to which perhaps there are no correſpondent particles in the Engliſh tongue. The true import of ſuch connectives, as well as of other ambiguous words, can be aſcertained only by the context. And it is a great fault, in teaching the Claſſicks, when children are not inured to give to the conjunctions, which come in their way, that preciſe meaning, which an intelligent maſter will perceive that the context fixes upon them. For, if the ſcholar is permitted invariably to render *autem* (for example) by the Engliſh *but*, he muſt often loſe the ſenſe of his author; and, inſtead of being led by the con-

nective to trace out the dependence of ſentences, he will be more at a loſs, than if that particle had been omitted.

Plutarch, in his Platonick queſtions, in order to account for that ſaying of Plato, that language is made up of nouns and verbs, has taken more pains than was neceſſary, to ſhow, that the noun and the verb are of all parts of ſpeech the moſt important. His reaſoning, however, is rather too much in the way of allegory, to convey clear ideas and full conviction. True it is, as he ſays, that nouns and verbs may form ſentences, independently on prepoſitions, articles, conjunctions, and adverbs; whereas theſe laſt cannot form ſentences, nor have any diſtinct meaning, without nouns and verbs. It is alſo true, that, (as he proves by a quotation from Demoſthenes), by leaving out conjunctions, one may ſometimes join the more ſignificant words in cloſer union, and ſo give energy to particular paſſages: and that, from the want of articles, the Latin tongue is not the leſs perſpicuous; nor Homer's Greek the leſs elegant, for the omiſſion of them. Yet if, in the uſe of ſpeech, we were to confine ourſelves to nouns and attributives; and never have recourſe to prepoſitions, to mark relations of place, nor to conjunctions, to aſcertain the dependence of one part of our diſcourſe upon another, I apprehend, that we ſhould be much at a loſs, even on common emergencies; and that, in matters of inveſtigation and ſcience, we muſt be abſolutely incapable of accurate expreſſion.

There are two ways of thinking, and, conſequently, of ſpeaking, and writing. We ſometimes think miſcellaneouſly, (as one may ſay) when the preſent thought has little connection with what goes before, or follows. At other times, our ideas proceed in a train; and the preſent is naturally introduced by the foregoing, and naturally introduces the ſubſequent. This laſt is no doubt the moſt rational, as it is the moſt methodical, way of thinking; for in this way,

way, many different ideas acquire one tendency, and are all employed for the ſupport and illuſtration of ſome one point, and of one another. In the one caſe, our thoughts reſemble a multitude, in which are many individuals, but thoſe are unconnected; and, therefore, though there be great number, there is not proportionable ſtrength. In the other, our thoughts may be compared to an army in order of battle, where the ſtrength is in proportion to the number; becauſe the individuals are mutually dependent on, and ſupported by, one another; ſo that the force of each may add to that of all the reſt, and all the reſt may be ſaid to ſecond the efforts of each individual.

Now Conjunctions are thoſe parts of language, that, by joining ſentences in various ways, mark the connections, and various dependencies, of human thought. And therefore, if our thoughts be really connected and mutually dependent, it is moſt likely (as every man in ſpeaking and writing wiſhes to do juſtice to his ideas) that conjunctions will be employed, to make that connection, and thoſe dependencies obvious to ourſelves, and to others. And where there is, in any diſcourſe, a remarkable deficiency of connecting particles, it may be preſumed, either that there is a want of connection, or that ſufficient pains has not been taken to explain it.

The ſtyle of the beſt authors of Greece and Rome abounds in conjunctions and other connecting words. Take any page in Cicero, eſpecially where he ſpeaks in his own perſon, and in the way of inveſtigation, as in his books of Moral Duties; and you ſhall hardly ſee a ſentence, that has not in, or near, the beginning, an *autem*, or *enim*, *ſed*, or *igitur*, or ſome other connective: by which we may inſtantly diſcover the relation, which the preſent ſentence bears to what went before; as an inference, an objection, an illuſtration, a continuation, a conceſſion, a condition, or ſimply as one ſentiment ſubjoined to another by a copulative. The ſtyle of Seneca,

Seneca, on the other hand, and that of Tacitus, are in this reſpect deficient. Their ſentences are ſhort, and their connectives *few*; ſo that the mutual dependence of their thoughts is rather left to the conjecture of the reader, than expreſſed by the author. And hence, we are told, it was, that the emperor Caligula remarked, (though we can hardly ſuppoſe Caligula to have been capable of ſaying ſo good a thing) that the ſtyle of Seneca was *Arenam ſine calce*, Sand without lime; meaning, that matter, or ſenſe, was not wanting, but that there was nothing to cement that matter into one uniform and ſolid maſs.

This uncemented compoſition has of late become faſhionable among the French and their imitators. One of the firſt who introduced it was Monteſquieu, an author of great learning and extraordinary penetration; who, as he reſembled Tacitus in genius, ſeems to have admired his manner, and copied his ſtyle. Like him, and like Florus, of whom alſo he was an admirer (as appears from his *Eſſay on Taſte*) he affects ſhort ſentences, in the way of aphoriſm; full of meaning, indeed, but ſo conciſe in the expreſſion as to be frequently ambiguous; and ſo far from having a regular connection, that their place might often be changed without inconvenience. This in philoſophical writing has a diſagreeable effect, both upon the memory, and upon the underſtanding of the reader.

Firſt, upon his memory. Nothing tends more to impreſs the mind with a diſtinct idea of a complex object, than a ſtrict and natural connection of the parts. And therefore, when a diſcourſe is not well connected, the ſentiments, however juſt, are eaſily forgotten; or, if a few be remembered, yet their general ſcope and tendency, having never been clearly apprehended, is not remembered at all.

And,

And, ſecondly, upon his underſtanding. To read a number of detached thoughts, although it may amuſe the fancy, does not ſufficiently exerciſe the rational faculties. Of ſuch thoughts, that only which is preſent is attended to; and, if we underſtand it, we do all that is required of us. But, when we peruſe a regular inveſtigation, wherein many ſentiments are employed to illuſtrate or evince one leading point of doctrine, we muſt attend, both to the preſent thought and to that which went before, that we may perceive the connection; we muſt alſo compare the ſeveral ideas together, in order to diſcern their agreement or diſagreement, as well as the influence of all the premiſes in eſtabliſhing the concluſion. This is a moſt wholeſome intellectual exerciſe. It puts all our rational powers in motion, and inures us to a methodical way of thinking and ſpeaking: and ſo quickens attention, ſtrengthens memory, and gives direction and vigour to our inventive powers.

As the faſhionable mode of unconnected compoſition is leſs improving to the mind of the reader, ſo it promotes a habit of inaccuracy and negligence in a writer. One of the greateſt difficulties in writing is, to give a right arrangement to the ſeveral thoughts and parts, whereof a diſcourſe is made up: and that arrangement is the beſt, in which the ſeveral parts throw moſt light upon one another. But when an author thinks himſelf at liberty to write without connection, he is at little pains to arrange his ideas, but ſets them down juſt as they occur; ſometimes taking up a ſubject in the middle, and ſometimes at the end; and often quitting one point before he has diſcuſſed it, and recurring to it again when he ought to be engaged in ſomething elſe. In a word, he is apt to be more intent upon the brilliancy of particular thoughts, than upon their coherence: which is not more wiſe in an author, than it would be in an architect to build a houſe rather of round, ſmooth,

and ſhining pebbles, than of ſtones of more homely appearance hewn into ſuch figures as would make them eaſily and firmly incorporate; or, than it would be in any man, rather to thatch his body with gaudy feathers, or ſplendid rags, than to cover it with one uniform piece of cloth, ſo ſhaped and united, as to defend him from the cold, without incumbrance.

Conjunctions, however, are not the only words that connect ſentences. Relative pronouns, as I formerly obſerved *, do the ſame; for a relative implies the force both of a pronoun and of a connective. Nay, the union by relatives is rather cloſer, than that by mere conjunctions. The latter may join two or more ſentences in one; but, by the former, ſeveral ſentences may incorporate in one and the ſame clauſe of a ſentence. Thus, You ſee a man *and* he is called Peter, is a ſentence conſiſting of *two* diſtinct clauſes united by the copulative *and*: but, The man *whom* you ſee is called Peter, is a ſentence of *one* clauſe, and not leſs comprehenſive than the other. Yet relatives are not ſo uſeful in language, as conjunctions. The former make ſpeech more conciſe; the latter make it more explicit. Relatives comprehend the meaning of a pronoun and conjunction *copulative*: conjunctions, while they *couple* ſentences, may alſo expreſs oppoſition, inference, and many other relations and dependencies.

Till men began to think in a train, and to carry their reaſonings to a conſiderable length, it is not probable, that they would make much uſe of conjunctions, or of any other connectives. Ignorant people and children generally ſpeak in ſhort and ſeparate ſentences. The ſame thing is true of barbarous nations: and hence uncultivated languages are not well ſupplied with connecting particles. The Greeks were the greateſt reaſoners that ever appeared

* Part II. Chap. i. Sect. 2.

in

in the world; and their language, accordingly, abounds more than any other in connectives: of which, though we cannot now account for them all, we may be aſſured that few or none were ſuperfluous.

Conjunctions are not equally neceſſary in all ſorts of writing. In poetry, where great conciſeneſs of phraſe is required, and every appearance of formality avoided, too many of them would have a bad effect. In paſſionate language too, it may be proper to omit them: becauſe it is the nature of violent paſſion to ſpeak rather in disjointed ſentences, than in the way of inference and argument.—Books of aphoriſm, like the Proverbs of Solomon, have few connectives; becauſe they inſtruct, not by reaſoning, but in detached obſervations. And narrative will ſometimes appear very graceful, when the circumſtances are plainly told, with ſcarce any other conjunction than the ſimple copulative *and:* which is frequently the caſe in the hiſtorical parts of Scripture.—When narration is full of images or events, the omiſſion of connectives may, by crouding the principal words upon one another, give a ſort of picture of hurry and tumult, and ſo heighten the vivacity of deſcription; as in that line of Lucretius,

Vulneribus, clamore, fuga, terrore, tumultu.

But when facts are to be traced down through their conſequences, or upwards to their cauſes; when the complicated deſigns of mankind are to be laid open, or conjectures offered concerning them; when the hiſtorian argues either for the elucidation of truth, or in order to ſtate the pleas and principles of contending parties; there will be occaſion for every ſpecies of connective, as much as in philoſophy itſelf. In fact, it is in argument, inveſtigation, and ſcience, where this part of ſpeech is peculiarly and indiſpenſably neceſſary.

Sometimes, the repetition of a connective, even where it is not neceſſary, adds weight to a remonſtrance, by calling the reader's attention to each individual clauſe: as, "*If* there be any virtue, "and *if* there be any praiſe, &c. Will you ſacrifice liberty, *and* "truth, *and* honour, *and* conſcience, *and* preſent convenience, "*and* future renown, *and* eternal felicity, *and* all to gratify a "tyrant?"

Grammarians have diſtinguiſhed the conjunction into Prepoſitive, Subjunctive, and Common. The firſt is always the firſt word of a clauſe or ſentence; as *et*, *aut*, *nec*, &c. in Latin; *and*, *unleſs*, *but*, &c. in Engliſh. The ſecond is never the firſt word of a ſentence or clauſe; as *too* in Engliſh, and *autem* in Latin. And the third may be either the firſt, or not the firſt, as the writer or ſpeaker pleaſes; as, in Engliſh, *however*, *conſequently*, *therefore*, &c; and, in Latin, *namque*, *ergo*, *igitur*, &c. This matter is to be determined, not by the ſenſe of the words, or the nature of the thing, but merely by the faſhion of the language.

There are conjunctions, that have an influence on the mood of the following verb; ſome governing the Indicative, and ſome the Subjunctive. If this were to depend on the meaning of the connective, and the nature of the mood, we might eſtabliſh it as a rule, that all Conditional, Hypothetical, Conceſſive, and Exceptive conjunctions ſhould take the Subjunctive mood, on account of their dependent character, which implies ſomething doubtful or contingent: and that, therefore, we ought to ſay, "*If* he *come* "he will be welcome,"—not, "If he comes;" "*Though* thou "*ſlay* me, yet will I truſt in thee,"—not, "Though thou ſlayeſt;" "*Except* a man *be* born again," (—not, "is born") he cannot ſee "the kingdom of God;" "*Whether* he *come* as a friend or as a foe, "I will uſe him honourably;"—not, "Whether he comes." Other conjunctions of a more poſitive, abſolute, and independent ſignification,

nification, ought for the ſame reaſon to govern the Indicative: as "The room is dark *becauſe* the day *is* cloudy: *Since* he *repents*, "I forgive him: *As* he *is* a worthy man, he may be aſſured of my "friendſhip."—But this rule is not without exception. It deſerves, however, to be remembered; as it is generally attended to by Latin authors; and as in Engliſh we can ſeldom or never go wrong, if we follow it. *

SECT. II.

Of the ARTICLE.

THE words, that become ſignificant by being joined to other words, I divided, in the beginning of this chapter, into two claſſes, the *Neceſſary*, and the *Uſeful*. The former, called Connectives, being now conſidered, it only remains, that I explain the latter, which are known by the name of *Articles*.

The word *article*, *articulus*, † *arthron*, properly ſignifies *a joint*. It would ſeem, that the firſt Grammarians thought there was ſomething of a joining power in the words of this order. But, if they thought ſo, they were miſtaken. The article is no connective. It is a Definitive: being uſed for the purpoſe of defining, aſcertaining, or limiting, the ſignification of thoſe words to which it is prefixed. Perhaps, however, they may have given it this name, with a view to ſome metaphorical alluſion.

In order to diſcover its uſe, we muſt recollect, that all nouns, proper names excepted, are general terms, or common appella-

* See above, page 413.

† ἄρθρον.

tives.

tives. The word *mountain* is equally applicable to all mountains, and the word *man* to all men. Every veſſel of a certain ſize and form, which is made for ſailing, may be called *ſhip*: and the terms *valour*, *bounty*, *wiſdom*, belong to every perſon, who is valiant, bountiful, wiſe.

But, though it is true, of the *names* of things, that they are of *general* meaning, things themſelves are all *individuals*. No one man is either leſs or more than one; and every man has peculiarities, whereby he may be diſtinguiſhed from all others.

How, then, are we to reconcile the univerſality of names with the individuality of things? In other words: when we make uſe of a common appellative, as *man*, *houſe*, *mountain*, what method do we take to intimate, that we ſpeak of one, and not of many; of an individual, and not of a ſpecies? There are ſeveral ways of doing this: and, particularly, it may be done by Articles, or Definitives.

For example: I ſee an animated being, which has no proper name, or of whoſe proper name I am ignorant. In ſpeaking of it, therefore, I muſt refer it to its ſpecies, and call it *man*, *dog*, *horſe*, or the like; or, if I know not the ſpecies, I refer it to its genus, and call it *animal*. But this animated being is itſelf neither a genus, nor a ſpecies; it is an individual: and therefore, in ſpeaking of it, ſo as to mark its individuality, I call it *a horſe*, *a man*, *a dog*, *an animal*: which intimates, that I ſpeak of one, and not of many; of an individual being, and not of a claſs of beings. This article, therefore, *A* or *An*, has the ſame ſignification nearly with the numerical word *one*. And accordingly, in French and Italian, the ſame word that denotes unity is alſo the article of which I now ſpeak. Nay, in ſome of the dialects of old Engliſh, this ſeems to have been the caſe; for *an* is the ſame with *one* in the Saxon; and the vulgar in Scotland ſtill uſe *a* (pronouncing it, as in the word

name) in the ſenſe of *one*; as *a day*, one day, "*a morning* I was "early out," for, one morning.—Now obſerve, that, when it is ſaid, I ſee a man, I ſee an animal, the *a* or *an*, though it aſcertains the individuality, gives no further intimation concerning the thing ſpoken of. It is therefore called the *Indefinite article*.

Again: I ſee a certain animal, which I never ſaw before, or of which, though I may know to what ſpecies it belongs, I have no previous acquaintance; and I ſay, I ſee *an* elephant, *a* dwarf, *a* bear, &c. Next day, the ſame animal comes again in view; and I ſay, recognizing it as the ſame, There is *the* elephant, *the* dwarf, *the* bear: changing the former indefinite article into another, which not only intimates individuality, but alſo implies previous acquaintance. This, from its power of aſcertaining ſome one individual, in preference to others of the ſame ſpecies, is called the *Definite article:* and it will appear in the ſequel to be much more *uſeful* than the other.

We have, therefore, in Engliſh, two articles or definitives, *A* or *An*, and *The:* the former applicable to *any one* of a kind or ſort; the other uſed for the purpoſe of diſtinguiſhing *ſome particular one*. In French and Italian there are two correſpondent articles.

In Greek, there is no indefinite article; the noun without an article having the ſame meaning with our indefinite article prefixed to a noun; as * *anêr*, a man: but there is a definite article † *ho, hê, to*, which is for the moſt part of the ſame import with our Engliſh *the*; as ‡ *ho anêr*, the man.

In the Hebrew, as in Greek, there is no indefinite article; but there is a definite article, which they prefix to the noun ſo as to make one word with it; and which, like the Engliſh article, has no diſtinction of gender or number.

* ἀνηρ. † ὁ, ἡ, τὸ. ‡ ὁ ανηρ.

In

In the Erſe or Gaelick tongue, they have alſo a definite, but no indefinite, article. And the uſe of the article ſeems to have been pretty general in all the primitive tongues of the north of Europe, the Gothick, and Teutonick, as well as the Celtick; from which we may account for the prevalence of theſe little words in our modern tongues. For it is remarkable, that, though all the languages derived from the Latin have articles, yet the Latin itſelf has none. Whence then did they get theirs? I anſwer, from thoſe northern nations who overturned the empire of Rome, and who, though they in part adopted the language of the vanquiſhed Romans, did alſo introduce into it a great variety of their own words and idioms.

That which is very eminent is ſuppoſed to be generally known. Hence the definite article may convey an idea of eminence, as well as of previous acquaintance. *A king* is any king; but *the king* is that perſon whom we acknowlege for our ſovereign. So when we ſay ſimply, the kingdom, the nation, the government, we of Great Britain mean the Britiſh government, nation, kingdom, &c.

Sometimes we denote eminence by omitting the article: we ſay, a member of parliament; an act of parliament; rather than, of *the parliament*. In this caſe, the thing ſpoken of is ſo very eminent, that it needs no article to make it more ſo: and beſides, a parliament, in our ſenſe of the word, is an inſtitution peculiar to Britiſh policy. The twelve French Parliaments are rather courts of juſtice than legiſlative aſſemblies. And, among the vulgar of North Britain, whoſe language abounds in French idioms, the ſame idea appears to be ſtill annexed to the term: for they ſpeak of appealing *to the Britiſh parliament* from a ſentence of the Court of Seſſion; though they know, that the appeal is made, not to the Parliament, (in the Engliſh ſenſe of the word) but to the Houſe of Lords.

In

In Greek too, as in Engliſh, the article is a mark of eminence: * *ho poiêtês*, the poet, is uſed for Homer, the greateſt of poets; and † *ho ſtageiritês*, the Stagyrite, for Ariſtotle, who was the moſt famous of all the natives of the city Stagyra.

That which is nearly connected with us, or which from its vicinity we have been long acquainted with, becomes eminent in our eyes, even though, in itſelf, and compared with other things of the ſame kind, it be of no particular importance. One who lives near a very little town ſpeaks of it by the name of *the town*. Every clergyman within his own pariſh is called *the miniſter* or *the parſon*; and if in a village there be only one merchant or one ſmith, his neighbours think they diſtinguiſh him ſufficiently, by calling him *the ſmith* or *the merchant*. A tree, a rock, a hill, a river, a meadow, may be ſpoken of in the ſame manner, with the ſame emphaſis. He is not returned from *the hill:* he is bathing in *the river:* I ſaw him on the top of *the rock:* Will you take a walk in *the meadow?* A branch is blown down from *the tree.* In theſe examples, the definite article is uſed; becauſe the thing ſpoken of, being in the neighbourhood, is well known, and a matter of ſome importance to the people who are acquainted with it.

That we may perceive, yet more clearly, the ſignificancy of the articles, let us put the one for the other, and mark the conſequence. When it is ſaid, that "the anceſtors of the preſent Royal "Family were kings in England three hundred years before *the* "Conqueror," the ſenſe is clear; as every body knows, that the perſon here ſpoken of by the name of *the conqueror* is William duke of Normandy, who ſubdued England about ſeven hundred years ago. But if we ſay, that "the anceſtors of the Royal Family "were kings in England three hundred years before *a* conqueror,"

* ὁ ποιητης. † ὁ ſαγειριτης.

we ſpeak nonſenſe.—Again, when it is ſaid, that "health is *a* moſt "deſirable thing," there is no man who will not acquieſce in the propoſition; which only means that health is *one* of thoſe things that are to be very much deſired. But, take the other article, and ſay, "Health is *the* moſt deſirable thing," and you change it from true to falſe: for this would imply, that nothing is ſo deſireable as health; which is very wide of the truth; virtue, and a good conſcience, being of infinitely greater value.—Moreover, if, inſtead of "Man is born to trouble," we ſay "*A* man is born to trou- "ble," there is no material change in the ſenſe; only the former is more ſolemn; perhaps becauſe it is more conciſe: and here, by the by, we may ſee, that the indefinite article is ſometimes of no great uſe. But if we ſay, "*The* man is born to trouble," the maxim is no longer general; ſome one particular man is hinted at; and they to whom we ſpeak would naturally aſk, What man?

The learned Biſhop Lowth has ſhown, in his excellent Engliſh grammar, that, in ſome inſtances, our tranſlation of the New Teſtament has miſrepreſented the ſenſe of the original Greek, by not attending to the article. "When the Spirit of truth is come," ſays the tranſlation, "he will guide you into *all truth*:" a promiſe, or a prophecy, which was not fulfilled by the event; for, after the coming of the Spirit on the day of Pentecoſt, it is probable, that the Apoſtles remained ignorant of many truths; indeed, it is not poſſible, that they could know every thing. But in the Greek of this paſſage we have an article (omitted in the Tranſlation) which gives a very different ſenſe:—"he will guide you into "all *the* truth;"* that is, into all Evangelical (or Chriſtian) truth; a prediction, which the event did fully juſtify.—Take another inſtance. When a Roman Centurion perceived the miraculous cir-

* Εις πασαν την αληθειαν.

cumſtances

cumſtances that accompanied the Crucifixion, our Bible informs us, that he ſaid, "Truly this was *the Son* of God:" which would imply, what is not likely, that this centurion was acquainted with our Saviour's hiſtory and doctrines, and particularly knew, that he called himſelf the Son of God, in a peculiar and incommunicable ſenſe. But the Greek has not this article; and ſhould therefore have been rendered, "Truly this was *a ſon* of God," * or an extraordinary perſon, and ſuperior to a mere man: a remark, which even heathens, though ignorant of our Saviour's hiſtory, might reaſonably make, on ſeeing the prodigies of earthquake and darkneſs that accompanied his laſt ſuffering.

Sometimes, however, our two articles do not differ ſo widely in ſignification. Thus, we may ſay, "It is true as *the* proverb "declares;" or, "it is true as *a* proverb, or as *a certain* proverb "declares, that," &c: and the change of the article does not make any material change in the ſenſe. In like manner we ſay, "That "heaven ſmiles at the perjury of lovers, is a pernicious maxim of "*the poet*;" where the two laſt words allude, not to Homer, or Virgil, or any other poet of the firſt rank, but to Ovid, who was of an inferiour order. And this ſentence would loſe nothing of its ſignification, if we were to ſubſtitute the other article, and ſay, "*A poet* has delivered a pernicious maxim, when he affirms, that "heaven ſmiles at the perjury of lovers."—A ſimilar idiom may be found in Greek. Thus Ariſtotle: "Change is the ſweeteſt of all

* Or rather, *a ſon of a God*; or, which is the ſame thing here, *the ſon of a God*, as Dr. Campbell renders it, in the work which he is now preparing for the preſs. See above, Chap. II; concluſion of Sect. i. The expreſſion in Greek is θεȣ υἱος, without any article; ſo that both words are equally indefinite. The phraſe υἱος τȣ θεȣ, which occurs ſometimes, is properly *a ſon of God*. But the title which our Saviour takes to himſelf, and which is given him by his Apoſtles, is always in the Goſpel ὁ υἱος τȣ θεȣ, *the Son of the* (true) *God*.

" things, according to *the poet* *;" where *the poet* ſignifies, not Homer, but Euripides; an author of great merit, but by no means equal to Homer, even in Ariſtotle's judgment. Now if the Greek article had been omitted, " Change is the ſweeteſt of all things, as " *a poet* ſays," it is plain, that the ſentence would have had the ſame meaning.

In ſome caſes, the definite article conveys a peculiar ſenſe. *A ſpeaker* is any man who ſpeaks; but *the Speaker* is the perſon who preſides in the Houſe of Commons. *An advocate*, in Scotland, is any one who is entitled to plead in the higher courts of juſtice; but *the advocate* is he, whoſe office correſponds to that which in England is held by the King's Attorney General. *A council* is any aſſembly of men met in conſultation; but *the council* is, according to the Engliſh idiom, the King's Privy Council. So, in Greek, † *anthrôpos* is *a man*, but *ho anthrôpos* is the publick executioner; ‡ *ploion* is *a ſhip*, but *to ploion* is that particular ſhip, which the Athenians ſent every year, on a religious embaſſy, to Delos.

Words, that are ſufficiently definite in themſelves, ſtand in no need of the article to make them more ſo. Such are the pronouns, *I*, *thou*, *he*, *ſhe*, and *it*; to which, accordingly, the article is never prefixed, either in Greek, or in Engliſh ‖. And ſuch, one would think, muſt thoſe proper names be, which diſtinguiſh one individual from all others. And it is true, that, in many languages, the proper names of men and women appear without any article.

* Μεταβολη δε παντων γλυκυτατον, κατα τον ποιητην. Ethic. ad Nicom. lib. 7.

† ἀνθρωπος, ὁ ἀνθρωπος. ‡ πλοιον, το πλοιον.

‖ In paſſages, like the following from Shakſpeare,

Lady, you are *the* cruelleſt *ſhe* alive——
The fair, *the* chaſte, *the* unexpreſſive *ſhe*——
The ſhees of Italy will not betray——

the word *She* is not pronominal, but a noun of the ſame import with *woman*, or *lady*.

But in Greek it is not always ſo: Socrates is ſometimes called * *ho Sôkratês*; and his wife, *hê Xanthippê*. Moſt grammarians conſider this as a redundancy in the Greek; or, at beſt, as an expedient to mark the gender.

The Author of an Eſſay *On the origin and progreſs of language* affirms, that the Greeks prefixed the article to the proper names, either of perſons who were eminent; or of ſuch perſons, whether eminent or not, whoſe names had been formerly mentioned in the diſcourſe: and that, therefore, *ho Sôkratês* ſignifies, either *the famous Socrates*, or *the abovementioned Socrates*. This once appeared to me ſo plauſible, that I adopted it; confiding in the accuracy and erudition of the Author; both which I know to be very great. But ſome Greek paſſages occurring to my memory firſt made me doubtful: and, on looking a little into books with this particular view, I was ſatisfied, that the learned writer is miſtaken. See the introductory paragraph of the Anabaſis of Xenophon; in which, without the article, Darius is named three ſeveral times, Paryſatis twice or thrice, and Artaxerxes as often. See alſo the beginning of Xenophon's Memorabilia; where Socrates himſelf is mentioned by name twelve times (if I miſtake not) without the article, before he is once mentioned with it. I am now, therefore, convinced, that thoſe Grammarians are in the right, who conſider the Greek article, when prefixed to proper names of men and women, as a pleonaſm, or as an expedient, in certain caſes, to clear the ſenſe, aſcertain the gender, or improve the harmony.

The Italians prefix the definite article to ſome of their moſt celebrated names; as *Il Dante*, *Il Petrarca*, *Il Taſſo*; and even to famous ſingers and fiddlers, as *La Fraſi*, *Il Seneſino*, *Il Tartini*: in which they have of late been imitated by ſome of the people of London, who, ſpeaking of favourite muſicians, ſay, *The* Min-

* ὁ σωκρατης, ἡ ξανθιππη.

gotti,

gotti, *the* Gabrielli, &c; but this is affectation, and ſuits not the idiom of the Engliſh tongue.—Another faſhion, not unlike this, has been lately introduced, which, though alſo contrary to idiom, will probably eſtabliſh itſelf in the language, as it is now generally adopted: "I was laſt night in company with *a* Mr. Such-a-one, "who told us ſome good ſtories." The indefinite article is here put for the word *one*; and the meaning is, that the perſon is not known, or very little known, to thoſe who ſpeak of him in this manner.

To the proper names of ſome great natural objects, as mountains and rivers, we prefix the definite article in Engliſh, as they alſo do in French; and ſay, the Alps, the Grampians, the Andes, the Thames, the Tiber, the Dee: but to ſingle mountains however large we do not prefix it; we ſay, Etna, Atlas, Lebanon, Olympus, Morven, not the Etna, the Atlas, &c.—In France, they diſtinguiſh the names of certain countries by the definite article; as *la France*, *l'Angleterre*, *l'Eſpagne*; but this is not done in Engliſh. Indeed our way of applying the article differs in many reſpects from theirs: but I cannot enter into particulars, without quitting the tract of Univerſal Grammar.

When a proper name belongs to ſeveral perſons, it may become a ſort of common appellative, and take the article; as the Ceſars, the Gordons, the Howards. And the article may alſo be applied to diſtinguiſh one perſon from another of the ſame name; as "*The* "Pliny, who wrote the Natural Hiſtory, is not *the* Pliny who "compoſed the panegyrick on Trajan." In this uſe, the definite article coincides nearly in ſenſe with the pronominal article *that*. And this ſame pronoun *that* we ſometimes uſe for the definite article.

Thus I preſume it is uſed in a very ſolemn paſſage of Scripture; where Jehovah, appearing in the burning buſh to Moſes, declares his name in theſe words, "I am *that* I AM;" that is, "I am *the* "I AM;"

"I AM;" or "I am *the great* I AM:" I am he, who alone poſſeſſes perfect and independent exiſtence. This example I the rather take notice of, becauſe a learned author inſinuates, that there is no ſenſe in it, as it ſtands in the Engliſh Bible; and contends, that it ſhould have been rendered, as in the Greek of the Septuagint, "I am the being," or rather, "I am he who is."* But it ſeems to me, that in our verſion the paſſage is not leſs ſignificant. Indeed, if we pronounce it, as is commonly done, "I *am* that I *am*," laying the emphaſis on the two verbs, and without any emphaſis on the pronominal article *that*, it will not appear to have any grammatical propriety. But let an emphaſis be laid on *that*, which is here a moſt emphatical word; and another emphaſis on the concluding words I AM, which are ſtill more emphatical, becauſe they are the name by which the Deity is here pleaſed to make himſelf known; and the paſſage will be found to be both intelligible and ſublime.—The ſame emphatical uſe of the pronoun *that* occurs in other parts of the Engliſh Bible. "Art thou *that* my Lord Elijah?" ſays Ahab's meſſenger to the Prophet: that is, Art thou the *great* or the *celebrated* Lord Elijah? "This is *that* king Ahaz," ſays the hiſtorian, after ſpecifying ſome of his wicked actions: This is the king Ahaz ſo *notorious* for his impiety.†

Articles being ſo important, it may be doubted whether I expreſs myſelf properly, when I affirm, that they are uſeful in language, but not neceſſary; and whether the Latin tongue, which is ſuppoſed to have no article, muſt not, on that account, be very deficient in both perſpicuity and energy. This matter deſerves to be conſidered.

It is true, that many learned men have thought, that the want of an article is a great deficiency in the Latin tongue: and ſome modern authors have gone ſo far as to ſay, that this alone makes it improper for philoſophy. Yet Quintilian, who underſtood Greek

* Ἐγω εἰμι ὁ ὤν. † 1 Kings xviii. 7. 2 Chron. xxviii. 22.

and Latin better, as I ſuppoſe, than any modern can pretend to do, and who alſo appears to have been a proficient in philoſophy, declares, that the Latin tongue has no need of articles; and Scaliger, one of the moſt learned men and ableſt grammarians of latter times, is of the ſame opinion: for that, by means of *ipſe* and *ille*, and ſome other pronouns, every thing of real importance, which the Greek article can expreſs, may be ſignified in Latin. And I think they are right. If, for example, I am deſired to tranſlate thoſe words of Scripture, in which the article is indeed moſt emphatical, "And Nathan ſaid unto David, Thou art *the* "man:" what is eaſier than to ſay, *Et dixit Nathan Davidi, Tu es ille homo*; or, more ſimply, *Tu es ille*; or, more ſimply ſtill, for the context would bear it, *Tu es?*—"I am *that* I AM," may be rendered as emphatically in Latin, as in Engliſh or Greek, Ego ſum *ille* EGO SUM; or, Ego ſum ille cui nomen EGO SUM.

The firſt verſe of St. John's Goſpel, in which the articles are very ſignificant, and which we tranſlate exactly and literally from the Greek, "In the beginning was *the* Word, and *the* Word was "with God, and *the* Word was God," *may* no doubt be rendered ambiguouſly in Latin thus, *In principio fuit Verbum, et Verbum fuit apud Deum, et Verbum fuit Deus* *. For this *might* be ſo turned into Engliſh, as to produce nonſenſe and blaſphemy. But that would be the fault, not of the language, but of the tranſlator. For one, who underſtands Greek and Latin, and is attentive to the meaning, and anxious to preſerve it, would render the verſe, as in the Port Royal Greek Grammar it is rendered, In principio erat Verbum *illud*, et Verbum *illud* erat apud Deum, et *illud* Verbum erat Deus:—which is as expreſſive, as either the Engliſh, or the Greek. If it be ſaid, that this Latin is not elegant, on account of the repetition of the pronoun; I anſwer, firſt, that elegance is not to be expected in a tranſlation ſo exactly literal; and, ſecondly,

* Caſtalio's tranſlation of this verſe is not much better.

that

that in a ſentiment of ſuch importance, and which human wiſdom could never have diſcovered, accuracy of expreſſion is more requiſite, than Claſſical purity. Had St. John written in Latin, he would have delivered this doctrine with equal energy, and probably with more elegance: which every perſon, who is acquainted with that language, knows might eaſily be done, if one is not limited to any particular phraſeology.

When words are *materially* taken; that is, when they appear in a diſcourſe as words only, and not as ſignificant of any idea; as when we ſay, "The word *Boiſterous* has a harſh ſound;"—the article is uſeful in Greek, to indicate their nature. And I obſerve, that verbal criticks often introduce the Greek article in their Latin annotations, in order to point out ſuch words when they occur: as, "Deeſt τὸ *eſt* in manuſcriptis quibuſdam, THE *eſt* is wanting "in ſome manuſcripts." But this is an affectation, for which there is not the leaſt neceſſity. "In Manuſcriptis quibuſdam deeſt "ILLUD *eſt*," is good Latin, and perfectly intelligible. Tully himſelf has ſaid, "Quid enim eſt hoc ipſum *diu?*"

I deny not, that, in ſuch Greek books as the Analyticks and Metaphyſicks of Ariſtotle, there may be points of doctrine, which the Roman language, from its want of an article, cannot expreſs, without either adopting ſome of the Greek terms, or giving a licence to barbarous latinity. But this is no material grievance. Many things are delivered in thoſe books, as maxims of univerſal ſcience, which are only grammatical obſervations on particular Greek words; and which, therefore, cannot be tranſplanted into a foreign tongue, unleſs thoſe Greek words are tranſplanted along with them: even as, in an Engliſh grammar of the Latin language, you cannot ſpeak ſo as to be underſtood, unleſs you illuſtrate what you ſay by Latin examples.—Beſides, when we borrow arts or ſciences from another nation, we muſt always borrow ſomething of their native phraſeology. Thus, in fortification, we uſe many French, in

muſick many Italian, and in rhetorick and medicine many Greek, words. And thus, if we were to write the Hiſtory of England in Latin, we ſhould be obliged to coin many words that were never known in antient Rome; in order to expreſs thoſe peculiarities of Government and manners, of which the Romans could not ſpeak, becauſe they had no idea; as parliament, chancery, peers, commons, guns, bayonets, cannon, &c.—In fact, Ariſtotle's metaphyſical writings ſeem never to have been in any repute among the Romans of the Claſſick ages. That intelligent people adopted what was valuable in the Greek philoſophy: but thoſe verbal ſubtleties and ſpeculations, that had nothing to do with buſineſs, or the conduct of life, they neglected; and I think with good reaſon.

That articles are not of neceſſary uſe, even in Greek, may appear from this, that the Grecian poets, eſpecially Homer, frequently omit them: though I know not, whether there be extant an author more perſpicuous than Homer, notwithſtanding his great antiquity. To which I may add, that, in the Attick dialect, articles are either uſed or omitted, according as they are thought to be more or leſs ornamental in diſcourſe.—In Engliſh, the definite article may often be dropped, without any ambiguity; as, "Horſe "and man fell to the ground," for *the* horſe, and *the* man. This omiſſion is common in our burleſque poems; as, "And pulpit, "drum eccleſiaſtick, Was beat with fiſt inſtead of a ſtick:" that is, *the* pulpit was beat with *the* fiſt. And of ſo little account is our indefinite article, that it is never prefixed to nouns of the plural number: we ſay, "*A* man is coming," if there be but one; but, if more than one, we ſay, "*Men* are coming." The French, indeed, give a plural to their indefinite article; *un homme*, a man, *des hommes*, men, or ſome men: but ſurely, this plural cannot in that, or in any, language be neceſſary, when in our own we hardly perceive that it is wanting.

Yet, that there are in Latin no ambiguities ariſing from the want of an article, I will not affirm. In the beginning of the Eneid, Juno, calling to mind thoſe manifold grievances, which made her reſolve upon the deſtruction of the Trojan fleet, exclaims,

Pallaſne exurere claſſem
Argivum, atque ipſos potuit ſubmergere ponto!

Theſe words may bear two interpretations: Could Pallas burn *the* Grecian fleet! or, Could Pallas burn *a* Grecian fleet! The laſt is the true one; for the whole Grecian fleet was not burned by Pallas, but that ſquadron only, which belonged to Ajax the ſon of Oileus. Now here is an ambiguity, which Virgil might eaſily have avoided, if he had written in a language that either had an indefinite article, like the Engliſh, or, like the Greek, could have conveyed an indefinite ſenſe by omitting the article. But of ſo little importance is this ambiguity, that I doubt whether the poet would have thought it worth his while to guard againſt it; as no perſon, who knows any thing of the poetical hiſtory, could be at a loſs to diſcover the meaning. Many things occur both in ſpeech and in writing, which they only can underſtand, who attend to what goes before, and to what comes after. And if we be not in ſome meaſure prepared for the ſtudy of an author, by a little previous acquaintance with his ſubject, we muſt in the cleareſt language find obſcurity, eſpecially in the beginning of a work. As to the obſcurity in queſtion, it is certain, that, without the help of any article, and by the native powers of the Latin tongue, Virgil could have avoided it; as it is probable he would, if he had thought it a blemiſh.

I would not inſinuate, that the Latin is as comprehenſive a language as the Greek. Both Lucretius and Cicero complain, that on the ſubject of philoſophy it is deficient. But this, I preſume, is not owing to the want of an article; nor do they ſay, that it is: but to ſome other circumſtances; whereof I need only mention this one; that the Latin tongue was completely formed and poliſhed,

before any attempt was made to write philoſophy in it. So that, when Cicero introduced the Greek learning, he was obliged to coin ſeveral words, which, notwithſtanding his authority, never became current; and often to expreſs the Greek idea by a Greek word, becauſe he could not find a Latin one of the ſame ſignification.

But, whatever we determine in regard to the preſent queſtion, this at leaſt muſt be granted; that if, from its want of articles, the Latin tongue be leſs ſimple, and ſometimes leſs perſpicuous, than the Greek or Engliſh, it is in general more conciſe than either. By the abſence of theſe little words, the more important parts of the expreſſion are permitted to have a cloſer coherence. And therefore, though the Latin may be leſs adapted to the abſtruſer philoſophy, it is, however, as ſuſceptible, as even the Greek itſelf, of all the charms of poetical, hiſtorical, and oratorical compoſition.

The great excellence of the Greek is ſimplicity; and that power, which it poſſeſſes unrivalled, of adapting itſelf ſo eaſily to every ſubject, and every ſcience. In Homer and Iſocrates, it may be thought more *harmonious*, than any other language: but I can hardly admit, that in this reſpect the Latin is inferiour, when modulated by Cicero and Virgil. Its dual number, optative mood, middle verb, ſecond aoriſt, and ſecond future, from which ſome would fain perſuade themſelves that it derives part of its pre-eminence, I muſt, till I ſee them better explained than they have hitherto been, conſider as ſuperfluities: which make it more difficult, indeed, in the acquiſition, and ſomewhat more various in the ſound, but contribute nothing to its ſignificancy. Its preterperfect, aoriſt, and article, give it ſome advantage over the Latin; but the Engliſh, and other modern languages, have alſo an article, aoriſt, and preterperfect. In fact, Grammarians ſeem to me to ſpeak raſhly, when they call every tongue barbarous, except the Greek and Roman. The language of ſuch men as Milton, Addiſon, Boileau, Taſſo, and Metaſtaſio, cannot be barbarous. Elſe how comes it, that the greateſt maſters of Claſſick learning find it ſo

difficult to do juſtice to thoſe authors by tranſlation. If Dobſon's *Paradiſus Amiſſus*, the exacteſt poetical verſion, perhaps, that ever was written *, does not deſerve to be called barbarous, I ſhould be glad to know, in what ſenſe of the word, or with what propriety, the original *Paradiſe Loſt* can be ſo called. — But Engliſh is not ſo elegant as Latin and Greek. Be it ſo. Yet, would it not be hard to call one a barbarian, merely becauſe one has not reached the ſummit of politeneſs? The leſs elegant a language is in its ſtructure, the more merit have they who write elegantly in it. If St. Paul's Cathedral were of Parian marble, inſtead of Portland ſtone, its appearance might be more ſplendid; but the ſublime imagination of Sir Chriſtopher Wren would not be more conſpicuous.

It was ſaid, that in Engliſh the indefinite article is not prefixed to nouns of the plural. It ſhould have been added, that when an Engliſh plural noun is a *Collective*, that is, when by referring many, or more than one, to a claſs, it beſtows unity upon them, it may then aſſume the indefinite article. Thus we ſay, not only *a dozen*, *a ſcore*, *a hundred*, but alſo *a few*, and *a great many*; *a many* is found in Shakſpeare. *An eight days* is old Engliſh; for it occurs in the Bible, and is ſtill a vulgar idiom in Scotland. It was once, no doubt, conſidered as a collective; like the word *fortnight* or *fourteen-night*. But this remark, like many others in the diſcourſe, belongs not to Univerſal Grammar.

And now, to conclude. It appears, that, to conſtitute a language as perfect as the Latin, NINE ſorts of words, or parts of ſpeech, are neceſſary: the Noun, Pronoun, Adjective, Participle, Verb, Adverb, Interjection, Prepoſition, and Conjunction. The Latin Grammarians, indeed, enumerate only eight; becauſe they improperly refer Nouns and Adjectives to the ſame claſs. In

* I once thought (ſee the Concluſion of an Eſſay *on the Uſefulneſs of Claſſical Learning*) that Homer was of all poets the moſt fortunate in a Tranſlator. I had not then ſeen Dobſon's incomparable performance: and the Engliſh *Eſchylus*, by my very learned, ingenious, and worthy Friend, the Rev. Mr. Potter, was not then publiſhed.

Greek,

Greek, Engliſh, Italian, French, Hebrew, and many other languages, there are TEN parts of ſpeech: the Noun, Pronoun, Adjective, Participle, Verb, Adverb, Interjection, Prepoſition, Conjunction, and Article.

According to Ariſtotle, the parts of ſpeech are four: the Article, Name, Verb, and Connective. This is not ſo inaccurate, as at firſt ſight it may ſeem to be: for we may ſuppoſe, that to the Name he refers both the Noun, and its repreſentative the Pronoun; to the Verb, (or Attributive), the Adjective, Participle, Verb (ſtrictly ſo called) and Adverb, and conſequently the Interjection; and, to the Connective, both the Conjunction and the Prepoſition. Yet I do not think this diviſion accurate. For there are many Adverbs, thoſe of time and place, for example, which cannot by any juſt reaſoning be proved to belong to the claſs of Attributives; and the ſame thing is true of the Interjections.

Plato reduces all the parts of ſpeech to two, the Noun and the Verb: which his followers endeavour to vindicate, by urging, that every word muſt denote, either a Subſtance, or the Attribute of a Subſtance; that by the Noun, and Pronoun, Subſtances are ſignified, as Attributes are by the Attributive; and that Attributives are ſpoken of, by the antient Grammarians, under the general denomination of Verb. But neither is this ſatisfactory. For there are many words in language, as articles and connectives, which in themſelves cannot be ſaid to ſignify either Subſtance or Attribute; becauſe, when taken ſeparately, they ſignify nothing at all.

If it be aſked, What ſorts of words are moſt, and what leaſt, neceſſary; the following anſwer may be collected from what has been evinced in the courſe of this long inveſtigation. The Noun, Pronoun, Verb, Participle, Adjective, Prepoſition, and Conjunction, ſeem to be eſſential to language: the Article, Interjection, and moſt of the Adverbs, are rather to be called uſeful, than neceſſary, Parts of Speech.

On Fable and Romance.

General remarks on Antient and Oriental Proſe Fable. — *Modern Proſe Fable, divided into,* I. *The* HISTORICAL ALLEGORY. *Argenis. John Bull.* II. *The* RELIGIOUS AND MORAL ALLEGORY. *Pilgrim's Progreſs. Gulliver's Travels. Tale of a Tub.* III. *The* POETICAL PROSE FABLE, *or* ROMANCE. — *Character of the nations, who introduced the Feudal Government and Manners.* — *Cruſades.* — *Chivalry.* — *Alterations in the Feudal Syſtem.* — *Riſe of Modern Literature.* — *Knight-Errantry proſcribed by law; and finally extirpated by the publication of Don Quixote.* — *Importance of that work.* — *Death and character of the* OLD ROMANCE. — *The* NEW ROMANCE. — 1. Serious, *and* Hiſtorically arranged. *Robinſon Cruſoe.* 2. Serious, *and* Poetically arranged. *Sir Charles Grandiſon. Clariſſa.* 3. Comick, *and* Hiſtorically arranged. *Gil Blas. Roderick Random, &c.* 4. Comick, *and* Poetically arranged. *Joſeph Andrews. Tom Jones. Amelia.* — *Concluſion.*

On Fable and Romance.

THE love of Truth is natural to man; and adherence to it, his indiſpenſable duty. But to frame a fabulous narrative, for the purpoſe of inſtruction or of harmleſs amuſement, is no breach of veracity, unleſs one were to obtrude it on the world for truth. The fabuliſt and the novel-writer deceive nobody; becauſe, though they ſtudy to make their inventions probable, they do not even pretend that they are true: at leaſt, what they may pretend in this way is conſidered only as words of courſe, to which nobody pays any regard. Fabulous narrative has accordingly been common in all ages of the world, and practiſed by teachers of the moſt reſpectable character.

It is owing, no doubt, to the weakneſs of human nature, that fable ſhould ever have been found a neceſſary, or a convenient, vehicle for truth. But we muſt take human nature as it is: and, if a rude multitude cannot readily comprehend a moral or political doctrine, which they need to be inſtructed in, it may be as allowable, to illuſtrate that doctrine by a fable, in order to make them attend, and underſtand it, as it is for a phyſician to ſtrengthen a weak ſtomach with cordials, in order to prepare it for the buſineſs of digeſtion. Such was the deſign of Jotham's parable of the trees chuſing a king, in the ninth chapter of the book of Judges: and ſuch that famous apologue, of a contention between the parts of the human body, by which Menenius Agrippa ſatisfied the people of Rome, that the welfare of the ſtate depended on the union and good agreement of the ſeveral members of it. In fact, the common people are not well qualified for argument. A ſhort and pithy proverb, which is eaſily remembered; or little tales, that

appeal as it were to their ſenſes, weigh more with them than demonſtration.

We need not wonder, then, to find, that, in antient times, moral precepts were often delivered in the way of proverb or aphoriſm, and enforced and exemplified by fictitious narrative. Of thoſe fables that are aſcribed to Eſop, ſome are no doubt modern, but others bear the ſtamp of antiquity. And nothing can be better contrived, than many of them are, for the purpoſe of impreſſing moral truth upon the memory, as well as the underſtanding. The diſappointment, that frequently attends an exceſſive deſire of accumulation, is finely exemplified in the fable of the dog and his ſhadow; and the ruinous and ridiculous nature of ambition is with equal energy illuſtrated in that of the frog and the ox. Theſe little allegories we are apt to undervalue, becauſe we learned them at ſchool; but they are not for that reaſon the leſs valuable. We ought to prize them as monuments of antient wiſdom, which have long contributed to the amuſement and inſtruction of mankind, and are entitled to applauſe, on account of the propriety of the invention.

The Greek apologues aſcribed to Eſop, and the Latin ones of Phedrus, are maſterpieces in this way of writing; and have hardly been equalled by the beſt of our modern fabuliſts. They are (at leaſt many of them are, for ſome are trifling) remarkable for the ſimplicity of the ſtyle; and for the attention, which their authors have generally given, to the nature of the animals, and other things, that are introduced as agents and ſpeakers. For in moſt of the modern fables, invented by Gay, La Fontaine, L'Eſtrange, Poggio, and others, the contrivance is leſs natural; and the language, though ſimple, is quaint, and full of witticiſm. That a dog ſhould ſnap at the ſhadow of a dog, and by ſo doing loſe the piece of fleſh that was in his own mouth, is ſuitable to the character of the animal, and is indeed a very probable ſtory: but that an

elephant ſhould converſe with a bookſeller about Greek authors, or a hare intreat a calf to carry her off on his back, and ſave her from the hounds, is a fiction wherein no regard is had to the nature of things. In this, as in the higher, ſorts of fable, it is right to adhere, as much as may be, to probability. Brute animals, and vegetables too, may be allowed to ſpeak and think: this indulgence is granted, from the neceſſity of the caſe; for, without it, their adventures could neither improve nor entertain us: but, with this exception, nature ſhould not be violated; nor the properties of one animal or vegetable aſcribed to a different one. Frogs have been ſeen inflated with air, at leaſt, if not with pride; dogs may ſwim rivers; a man might take a frozen viper into his boſom, and be bit to death for his imprudence; a fox might play with a tragedian's headpiece; a lamb and a wolf might drink of the ſame brook, and the former loſe his life on the occaſion: but who ever heard of an elephant reading Greek, or a hare riding on the back of a calf?

The wiſdom of antiquity was not ſatisfied with conveying ſhort leſſons of morality in theſe apologues, or little tales. The poets entered upon a more extenſive field of fable; in order to convey a more refined ſpecies of inſtruction, and to pleaſe by a more exquiſite invention, and a higher probability. But I confine myſelf at preſent to proſe fable.

One of the firſt ſpecimens of Fabulous Hiſtory, that appeared in theſe weſtern parts of the world, is the *Cyropedia* of Xenophon. This work, however, we are not to conſider as of the nature of Romance; for the outlines of the ſtory are true. But the author takes the liberty to feign many incidents; that he may ſet in a variety of lights the character of Cyrus, whom he meant to exhibit as the model of a great and good prince. The work is very elegant and entertaining, and abounds in moral, political, and military knowlege. It is, nevertheleſs, to be regretted, that we have no certain rule for diſtinguiſhing what is hiſtorical in it, from what

is fabulous. The hiſtory of Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Perſian empire, who has the honour to be mentioned by name in the Old Teſtament, is ſurely worth knowing. Yet we are much in the dark in regard to it. The account given of him by Herodotus differs greatly from Xenophon's; and in many inſtances we know not which to prefer. It is obſervable however, that Xenophon's deſcription of the manner in which Cyrus took Babylon, by turning aſide the courſe of the Euphrates, and entering, through the empty channel, under the walls of the city, agrees very well with ſeveral intimations of that event, which we find in the prophecies of Iſaiah, Jeremiah, and Daniel.

Allegorical Fables were not unknown in the days of Xenophon. The Table, or Picture, of Cebes the Theban was written about this time; as well as the Story of Hercules converſing with Virtue and Vice, and preferring the honours promiſed by the former to the pleaſures offered by the latter. Cebes's Picture of human life excels in accuracy of deſcription, juſtneſs of allegory, and a ſweet ſimplicity of ſtyle. The fable of Hercules, as originally written by Prodicus, is loſt, and ſeems not to have been extant in the time of Cicero*; but Xenophon gives a full and elegant abſtract of it, in the beginning of his ſecond book of *Memorabilia*.

Excepting ſome Allegorical fables ſcattered up and down in Plato, I do not recollect, among the Claſſick productions of Greece and Rome, any other remarkable ſpecimen of proſe fable: for the heathen mythology, though full of allegories, I am not to touch upon in this place, on account of its connection with poetry; and becauſe my chief purpoſe is, to inquire into the origin and nature of the Modern Romance.

But, firſt, it may be proper to obſerve, that the Oriental nations have long been famous for fabulous narrative. The indolence peculiar to the genial climates of Aſia, and the luxurious life which

* Cicero de Officiis. Lib. i. cap. 32.

the

the kings and other great men, of thoſe countries, lead in their ſeraglios, have made them ſeek for this ſort of amuſement, and ſet a high value upon it. When an Eaſtern prince happens to be idle, as he commonly is, and at a loſs for expedients to kill the time, he commands his Grand Vifir, or his favourite, to tell him ſtories. Being ignorant, and conſequently credulous; having no paſſion for moral improvement, and little knowlege of nature; he does not deſire, that they ſhould be probable, or of an inſtructive tendency: it is enough if they be aſtoniſhing. And hence it is, no doubt, that thoſe oriental tales are ſo extravagant. Every thing is carried on by inchantment and prodigy; by fairies, genii, and demons, and wooden horſes, which, on turning a peg, fly through the air with inconceivable ſwiftneſs.

Another thing remarkable in theſe eaſtern tales, is, that their authors expatiate, with peculiar delight, in the deſcription of magnificence; rich robes, gaudy furniture, ſumptuous entertainments, and palaces ſhining in gold, or ſparkling with diamonds. This too is conformable to the character and circumſtances of the people. Their great men, whoſe taſte has never been improved by ſtudying the *ſimplicity* of nature and art, pique themſelves chiefly on the *ſplendour* of their equipage, and the vaſt quantities of gold, jewels, and curious things, which they can heap together in their repoſitories.

The greateſt, indeed the only, collection, that I am acquainted with, of Oriental fables, is the *Thouſand and one tales*, commonly called *The Arabian Nights Entertainment*. This book, as we have it, is the work of Monſ. Galland of the French Academy, who is ſaid to have tranſlated it from the Arabick original. But whether the tales be really Arabick, or invented by Monſ. Galland, I have never been able to learn with certainty. If they be Oriental, they are tranſlated with unwarrantable latitude; for the whole tenor of the ſtyle is in the French mode: and the Caliph of Bagdat, and

the Emperor of China, are addreſſed in the ſame terms of ceremony, which are uſual at the court of France. But this, though in my opinion it takes away from the value of the book, becauſe I wiſh to ſee Eaſtern manners in an Eaſtern tale, is no proof, that the whole work is by M. Galland: for the French are ſo devoted to their own ceremonies, that they cannot endure any other; and ſeldom fail to ſeaſon their tranſlations, even of the graveſt and moſt antient authors, with the faſhionable forms of Pariſian civility.

As the Arabian Nights Entertainment is a book which moſt young people in this country are acquainted with, I need not draw any character of it, or remark that it exactly anſwers the account already given of Oriental fable. There is in it great luxury of deſcription, without any elegance; and great variety of invention, but nothing that elevates the mind, or touches the heart. 'All is wonderful and incredible; and the aſtoniſhment of the reader is more aimed at, than his improvement either in morality, or in the knowlege of nature. Two things, however, there are, which deſerve commendation, and may entitle it to one peruſal. It conveys a pretty juſt idea of the government, and of ſome of the cuſtoms, of thoſe eaſtern nations; and there is ſomewhere in it a ſtory of a barber and his ſix brothers, that contains many good ſtrokes of ſatire and comick deſcription. I may add, that the character of the Caliph Haroun Alraſchid is well drawn; and that the ſtory of forty thieves deſtroyed by a ſlave is intereſting, and artfully conducted. The voyages of Sindbad claim attention: they were certainly attended to, by the author of Gulliver's Travels.

Tales in imitation of the Oriental have oft been attempted by Engliſh, and other European, authors: who, together with the figurative ſtyle, and wild invention of the Aſiaticks, (which, being extravagant, are eaſily imitated) endeavour alſo to paint the cuſtoms and manners of that people. They give us good ſtore of gold and jewels; and eunuchs, ſlaves, and necromancers in abundance: their

perſonages

perſonages are all Mahometan, or Pagan, and ſubject to the deſpotick government of Caliphs, Viſirs, Baſhaws, and Emperors; they drink ſherbet, reſt on ſophas, and ride on dromedaries. We have Chineſe Tales, Tartarian Tales, Perſian Tales, and Mogul Tales; not to mention the Tales of the Fairies and Genii; ſome of which I read in my younger days: but, as they have left no trace in the memory, I cannot now give any account of them.

In the *Spectator*, *Rambler*, and *Adventurer*, there are many fables in the eaſtern manner; moſt of them very pleaſing, and of a moral tendency. *Raſſelas*, by Johnſon, and *Almoran and Hamet*, by Hawkeſworth, are celebrated performances in this way. The former is admirable in deſcription, and in that exquiſite ſtrain of ſublime morality by which the writings of this great and good man are ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed:—of the latter, the ſtyle is rhetorical and ſolemn, and the ſentiments are in general good; but the plan is obſcure, and ſo contrived as to infuſe perplexing notions of the Divine Providence; a ſubject, which the elegant writer ſeems to have conſidered very ſuperficially, and very confuſedly *.—Addiſon excels in this ſort of fable. His viſion of Mirzah, in the ſecond volume of the Spectator, is the fineſt piece of the kind I have ever ſeen; uniting the utmoſt propriety of invention with a ſimplicity and melody of language, that melts the heart, while it charms and ſoothes the imagination.

Modern Proſe Fable (if we omit thoſe ſorts of it that have been already hinted at) may be divided into two kinds; which, for the ſake of diſtinction, I ſhall call the ALLEGORICAL and the POETICAL. The Allegorical part of modern proſe fable may be ſubdivided into two ſpecies, the *Hiſtorical*, and the *Moral*; and the Poetical part I ſhall alſo ſubdivide into two ſorts, the *Serious*, and the *Comick*. Thus the Proſe Fable of the moderns may be diſtributed into four ſpecies; whereof I ſhall ſpeak in their order:

* See the Preface to his Voyages.

1. The

1. The Hiſtorical Allegory; 2. The Moral Allegory: 3. The Poetical and Serious Fable; 4. The Poetical and Comick Fable. Theſe two laſt I comprehend under the general term ROMANCE.

I. The FABULOUS HISTORICAL ALLEGORY exhibits real hiſtory diſguiſed by feigned names, and embelliſhed with fictitious adventures. This ſort of fable may alſo be ſubdivided into the *Serious* and the *Comick*.

1. Of the former, the beſt ſpecimen I know is the *Argenis*; written in Latin, about the beginning of the laſt century, by John Barclay a Scotchman: and ſuppoſed to contain an allegorical account of the Civil wars of France during the reign of Henry the third. I have read only part of the work: and what I read I never took the trouble to decypher, by means of the key which in ſome editions is ſubjoined to it, or to compare the fictitious adventures of Meleander and Lycogenes with the real adventures that are alluded to. I therefore am not qualified to criticize the performance: but can freely recommend it, as in ſome places very entertaining, as abounding in lively deſcription, and remarkable for the moſt part, though not uniformly, for the elegance of the language.

2. We have a *Comick* ſpecimen of the Hiſtorical Allegory, in the *Hiſtory of John Bull*; a pamphlet written by the learned and witty Dr. Arbuthnot, and commonly printed among the works of Swift. It was publiſhed in Queen Anne's time; and intended as a ſatire on the Duke of Marlborough, and the reſt of the whig miniſtry, who were averſe to the treaty of peace that was ſoon after concluded at Utrecht. The war, which the Queen carried on againſt the French and Spaniards, is deſcribed under the form of a law-ſuit, that John Bull, or England, is ſaid to have been engaged in with ſome litigious neighbours. A candid account of facts is not to be expected in an allegorical tale, written with the expreſs deſign to make a party ridiculous. The work, however, has been much read,

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and frequently imitated. It is full of low humour, which in this piece the author affected; but which he could have avoided if he had thought proper; as he undoubtedly poſſeſſed more wit and learning, as well as virtue, than any other writer of his time, Addiſon excepted. In John Bull, great things are repreſented as mean; the ſtyle is conſequently burleſque, and the phraſeology, and moſt of the alluſions, are taken from low life. There is a key printed, in the late editions, at the foot of each page, to mark the coincidence of the fable with the hiſtory of that period.

II. The ſecond ſpecies of modern fabulous proſe I diſtinguiſhed by the name of the *Moral Allegory*. Moral and Religious Allegories were frequent in Europe about two hundred and fifty years ago. Almoſt all the Dramatick exhibitions of that time were of this character. In them, not only human virtues and vices perſonified, but alſo angels both good and evil, and beings more exalted than angels, were introduced, acting and ſpeaking, as perſons of the drama. Thoſe plays, however, notwithſtanding their incongruity, were written for the moſt part with the laudable deſign of exemplifying religious or moral truth; and hence were called Moralities. The publick exhibition of them in England ceaſed about the time of Shakſpeare, or in the end of the ſixteenth century: but ſeveral of the Engliſh Moralities are extant, and may be ſeen in ſome late collections of Old Plays. In Spain and Italy they continued longer in faſhion. When Milton was on his travels, he happened to witneſs a repreſentation of this kind, written by one Andrieno, and called *Original Sin*; from which, rude as it was, he is ſaid to have formed the firſt draught of the plan of Paradiſe Loſt.

Thoſe were poetical allegories: but I confine myſelf to ſuch as are in proſe, and aſſume ſomething of the hiſtorical form.—John Bunyan, an unlettered, but ingenious man, of the laſt century, was much given to this way of writing. His chief work is the

Pilgrim's Progreſs; wherein the commencement, procedure, and completion of the Chriſtian life, are repreſented allegorically, under the ſimilitude of a journey. Few books have gone through ſo many editions, in ſo ſhort a time, as the Pilgrim's Progreſs. It has been read by people of all ranks and capacities. The learned have not thought it below their notice: and among the vulgar it is an univerſal favourite. I grant, the ſtyle is rude, and even indelicate ſometimes; that the invention is frequently extravagant; and that in more than one place it tends to convey erroneous notions in theology. But the tale is amuſing, though the dialogue be often low: and ſome of the allegories are well contrived, and prove the author to have poſſeſſed powers of invention, which, if they had been refined by learning, might have produced ſomething very noble. This work has been imitated, but with little ſucceſs. The learned Biſhop Patrick wrote the *Parable of the Pilgrim:* but I am not ſatisfied, that he borrowed the hint, as it is generally thought he did, from John Bunyan. There is no reſemblance in the plan; nor does the Biſhop ſpeak a word of the Pilgrim's Progreſs, which I think he would have done, if he had ſeen it. Beſides, Bunyan's fable is full of incident: Patrick's is dry, didactick, verboſe, and exceedingly barren in the invention *.

Gulliver's Travels are a ſort of allegory; but rather Satirical and Political, than Moral. The work is in every body's hands; and has been criticiſed by many eminent writers. As far as the ſatire is levelled at human pride and folly; at the abuſes of human learning; at the abſurdity of ſpeculative projectors; at thoſe criminal or blundering expedients in policy, which we are apt to overlook, or even to applaud, becauſe cuſtom has made them familiar; ſo far the author deſerves our warmeſt approbation, and his ſatire will

* The *Imprimatur* prefixed to Patrick's Pilgrim is dated April 11, 1665. Bunyan's *Progreſs* was written, while he was in Bedford priſon, where he lay twelve years, from 1660 to 1672; but I cannot find in what year it was firſt printed.

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be allowed to be perfectly juſt, as well as exquiſitely ſevere. His fable is well conducted, and, for the moſt part, conſiſtent with itſelf, and connected with probable circumſtances. He perſonates a ſea-faring man; and with wonderful propriety ſupports the plainneſs and ſimplicity of the character. And this gives to the whole narrative an air of truth; which forms an entertaining contraſte, when we compare it with the wildneſs of the fiction. The ſtyle too deſerves particular notice. It is not free from inaccuracy: but, as a model of eaſy and graceful ſimplicity, it has not been exceeded by any thing in our language; and well deſerves to be ſtudied by every perſon, who wiſhes to write pure Engliſh.—Theſe, I think, are the chief merits of this celebrated work; which has been more read, than any other publication of the preſent century. Gulliver has ſomething in him to hit every taſte. The ſtateſman, the philoſopher, and the critick, will admire his keenneſs of ſatire, energy of deſcription, and vivacity of language: the vulgar, and even children, who cannot enter into theſe refinements, will find their account in the ſtory, and be highly amuſed with it.

But I muſt not be underſtood to praiſe the whole indiſcriminately. The laſt of the four voyages, though the author has exerted himſelf in it to the utmoſt, is an abſurd, and an abominable fiction. It is abſurd: becauſe, in preſenting us with rational beaſts, and irrational men, it proceeds upon a direct contradiction to the moſt obvious laws of nature, without deriving any ſupport from either the dreams of the credulous, or the prejudices of the ignorant. And it is abominable: becauſe it abounds in filthy and indecent images; becauſe the general tenor of the ſatire is exaggerated into abſolute falſehood; and becauſe there muſt be ſomething of an irreligious tendency in a work, which, like this, aſcribes the perfection of reaſon, and of happineſs, to a race of beings, who are ſaid to be deſtitute of every religious idea.—But, what is yet worſe, if any thing can be worſe, this tale repreſents human nature itſelf

as the object of contempt and abhorrence. Let the ridicule of wit be pointed at the follies, and let the ſcourge of ſatire be brandiſhed at the crimes, of mankind: all this is both pardonable, and praiſe-worthy; becauſe it may be done with a good intention, and produce good effects. But when a writer endeavours to make us diſlike and deſpiſe, every one his neighbour, and be diſſatisfied with that Providence, who has made us what we are, and whoſe diſpenſations towards the human race are ſo peculiarly, and ſo divinely beneficent; ſuch a writer, in ſo doing, proves himſelf the enemy, not of man only, but of goodneſs itſelf; and his work can never be allowed to be innocent, till impiety, malevolence, and miſery, ceaſe to be evils.

The Tale of a Tub, at leaſt the narrative part of it, is another Allegorical fable, by the ſame maſterly hand; and, like the former, ſupplies no little matter, both of admiration, and of blame. As a piece of humourous writing, it is unequalled. It was the author's firſt performance, and is, in the opinion of many, his beſt. The ſtyle may be leſs correct, than that of ſome of his latter works; but in no other part of his writings has he diſplayed ſo rich a fund of wit, humour, and ironical ſatire, as in the Tale of a Tub. The ſubject is Religion: but the allegory, under which he typifies the Reformation, is too mean for an argument of ſo great dignity; and tends to produce, in the mind of the reader, ſome very diſagreeable aſſociations, of the moſt ſolemn truths with ludicrous ideas. Profeſſed wits may ſay what they pleaſe; and the faſhion, as well as the laugh, may be for a time on their ſide: but it is a dangerous thing, and the ſign of an intemperate mind, to acquire a habit of making every thing matter of merriment and ſarcaſm. We dare not take ſuch liberty with our neighbour, as to repreſent whatever he does or ſays in a ridiculous light; and yet ſome men (I wiſh I could not ſay, clergymen) think themſelves privileged to take liberties of this ſort with the moſt awful, and moſt benign diſpenſations

tions of Providence. That this author has repeatedly done ſo, in the work before us, and elſewhere, is too plain to require proof *. The compliments he pays the Church of England I allow to be very well founded, as well as part of the ſatire, which he levels at the Church of Rome; though I wiſh he had expreſſed both the one and the other with a little more decency of language. But, as to his abuſe of the Preſbyterians, whom he repreſents as more abſurd and frantick, than perhaps any rational beings ever were ſince the world began, every perſon of ſenſe and candour, whether Preſbyterian or not, will acknowlege it, if he know any thing of their hiſtory, to be founded in groſs miſrepreſentation. There are other faults in this work, beſides thoſe already ſpecified; many vile images,

* I know not whether this author is not the only human being, who ever preſumed to ſpeak in ludicrous terms of the Laſt Judgment. His profane verſes on that tremendous ſubject were not publiſhed, ſo far as I know, till after his death: for Cheſterfield's Letter to Voltaire, in which they are inſerted, and ſpoken of with approbation (which is no more than one would expect from ſuch a critick), and ſaid to be copied from the original in Swift's hand-writing, is dated in the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty-two. But this is no excuſe for the Author. We may gueſs at what was in his mind, when he wrote them; and at what remained in his mind, while he could have deſtroyed them, and would not. Nor is it any excuſe to ſay, that he makes Jupiter the agent: a Chriſtian, granting the utmoſt poſſible favour to Poetick licence, cannot conceive a heathen idol to do that, of which the only information we have is from the word of God, and in regard to which we certainly know, that it will be done by the Deity himſelf. That humourous and inſtructive allegory of Addiſon, (*Spectator*, 558, 559) in which Jupiter is ſuppoſed to put it in every perſon's power to chooſe his own condition, is not only conformable to antient philoſophy, but is actually founded on a paſſage of Horace.

I mean not to inſinuate, that Swift was favourable to infidelity. There is good reaſon to believe he was not; and that, though too many of his levities are inexcuſable, he could occaſionally be both ſerious and pious. In fact, an infidel clergyman would be ſuch a compound of execrable impiety and contemptible meanneſs, that I am unwilling to ſuppoſe there can be ſuch a monſter. The profaneneſs of this author I impute to his paſſion for ridicule, and rage of witticiſm; which, when they ſettle into a habit, and venture on liberties with what is ſacred, never fail to pervert the mind, and harden the heart.

and obſcene alluſions; ſuch as no well-bred man could read, or endure to hear read, in polite company.

III. I come now to the ſecond ſpecies of modern proſe fable, to which I gave the appellation of *Poetical*, to diſtinguiſh it from the former *Allegorical* ſpecies. In reading the *Allegorical Proſe Fable*, we attend not only to the fictitious events that occur in the narrative, but alſo to thoſe real events that are typefied by the allegory: whereas in the *poetical proſe fable* we attend only to the events that are before us. Thus, in the Tale of a Tub, I not only mind what is related of three brothers, Peter, Martin, and Jack, but alſo keep it conſtantly in view, that thoſe three brothers are by the author meant to be the repreſentatives of the Romiſh, Engliſh, and Preſbyterian churches: whereas when I read Robinſon Cruſoe, or Tom Jones, I attend ſingly to the narrative; and no *key* is neceſſary to make me comprehend the author's meaning.

Conſidering this as the chief part of my ſubject, I diſpatched the former parts as briefly as I could, that I might have the more time to employ upon it. The riſe and progreſs of the MODERN ROMANCE, or POETICAL PROSE FABLE, is connected with many topicks of importance, which would throw (if fully illuſtrated) great light upon the hiſtory and politicks, the manners, and the literature, of theſe latter ages.—Obſerve, that I call this ſort of fable *poetical*, from the nature of the invention; and *proſe*, becauſe it is not in verſe. Proſe and Verſe are oppoſite, but Proſe and Poetry may be conſiſtent. *Tom Jones*, and *Telemachus*, are epick, or narrative poems, though written in proſe; the one Comick, the other Serious and Heroick.

The ſubverſion of the Roman Empire, by the Goths, Huns, Vandals, and other northern nations, was followed, or rather accompanied, with an univerſal neglect of learning, which continued for ſome centuries. During this long night of intellectual darkneſs, the claſſick writers of Greece and Rome were quite forgotten in theſe

theſe weſtern parts of Europe; and many antient authors periſhed irrecoverably. To read and write was then a rare accompliſhment. Even the clergy, who performed the ſervice in Latin, according to the uſage of the Church of Rome, ſeldom underſtood the words they pronounced. Nay, it was no uncommon thing for perſons of rank, when they had occaſion to ſign papers of buſineſs, to employ a notary to ſubſcribe for them, becauſe they themſelves had not learned to write. The very phraſe of *ſigning* a paper came from the practice of putting a mark to it, inſtead of a name; and this mark was commonly the ſign of the Croſs. Alfred the Great, king of England, a prince of excellent parts, and who afterwards made conſiderable attainments in learning, was twelve years old, before a maſter could be found to teach him the alphabet.—The very implements of writing were ſo rare in thoſe days, that the monks would often obliterate valuable manuſcripts, by eraſing the letters, that they might have the parchment to write upon. Of this a remarkable evidence appeared a few years ago. A ſcrap of parchment was found, on which part of the book of Tobit had been written, but which, on being narrowly inſpected, ſeemed to have been originally inſcribed with ſomething elſe; and this was at length diſcovered to be a fragment of Livy. The fragment is now publiſhed.

Men are generally credulous, in proportion as they are ignorant. But want of books, and of the knowledge of letters, was not the ſole cauſe of the ignorance that prevailed in the period of which I now ſpeak. There was little, or no commerce in Europe; navigation and induſtry were neglected; and, except on pilgrimage to the ſhrines of ſaints, people ſeldom travelled beyond the bounds of their native country, or native province. The conſequence may eaſily be gueſſed at. Not having the means of knowing what had happened in other ages, and being equally uninformed of what was now happening in other countries, they would without ſcruple give

credit to any fabulous reports that might be told them, concerning what was to be ſeen in foreign parts. Hence aroſe a thouſand wild ideas, of giants, and dwarfs, dragons, and enchantments, of fairies, ghoſts, witches, and hobgoblins. And when once people were ſatisfied, that ſuch things were common in other lands, it was natural for them to believe, that they were not uncommon in their own. And the ſame extravagance of fancy, and love of ſuperſtition, may always be expected in times of ignorance; eſpecially in countries, where traditions remain concerning antient hiſtory and fable; and where the prieſts, deluded themſelves with viſionary legends, not wholly deſtitute of knowledge, and living retired in gloomy and lonely habitations, find it their intereſt to deceive, amuſe, and terrify the vulgar.

The credulity of mankind in thoſe dark ages is now matter of aſtoniſhment. As late as the thirteenth century, when modern literature had made ſome progreſs, Dante, a famous Italian poet, publiſhed a work in verſe, which he called Inferno; wherein he gave a deſcription of the infernal regions, which he ſays, in the poem, that he had paſſed through, in company with Virgil: and this poem the common people of that time took for a real hiſtory, and ſeriouſly believed that Dante went down to hell from time to time. Sir John Mandeville, an Engliſhman of learning, ſet out on his travels in the year one thouſand three hundred and twenty; employed thirty years in viſiting foreign countries; and, at his return to Europe, publiſhed the hiſtory of his adventures in three languages, Latin, Engliſh, and Italian. His book, before publication, was preſented to the Pope, who, after comparing it with the *Mappa Mundi*, was pleaſed to give it the ſanction of his authority: a proof, that it not only was believed by the author, and by His Holineſs, but was alſo thought credible enough according to the notions of thoſe times. Yet this book, though Mandeville ſeems to have been an honeſt, and by no means an ignorant man,

contains

contains the moſt abſurd fables. The author gravely tells us, that he ſaw the rock to which Andromeda was chained, when they delivered her to the ſea-monſter, and adds, that Andromeda lived before the flood. With equal gravity he ſpeaks of a Lady, who had been transformed into a ſerpent, or dragon, by a goddeſs called Diana, and was then confined in a dungeon, in the iſland of Cyprus, if I miſtake not *. He does not ſay, that he ſaw this lady; but he mentions it as a fact, which he had heard; and he ſeems not to diſbelieve it. He ſpeaks too of a nation of men fifty feet high, who inhabited an iſland in the Eaſt Indies, and of another race of mortals, who had their eyes in their ſhoulders: and all this, and much more, of the ſame kind, he appears to have credited, merely becauſe he had been ſo informed.—There is reaſon to think, that Caxton, one of the firſt Engliſh printers, miſtook a French tranſlation of Virgil's Eneid for a true hiſtory;—if he did not uſe the word *hiſtory* in a ſenſe different from what it now bears. Nay, a Swediſh navigator, who lived not two hundred years ago, has affirmed, that, in the iſlands of Nicobar, in the gulph of Bengal, he diſcovered a race of men, with long tails, like thoſe of cats. The iſlands of Nicobar, and their inhabitants, are now well known to Europeans; but the cats tails are no where to be found.

While the ignorance and credulity of this weſtern world were ſo great, we may well ſuppoſe, that, in their hiſtories (if they had any) little regard would be paid to truth; and none at all to probability, or even to poſſibility, in their fables. In fact, the firſt productions in the way of romance, that appeared in Europe, were in the higheſt degree extravagant.

But other cauſes, beſides the credulity and ignorance of the times, conſpired to give a peculiar caſt of wildneſs to thoſe performances, and make them totally unlike every thing of the kind, which had

* I write from memory; not having the book at hand, nor knowing at preſent where to find it.

hitherto occurred to human fancy.—To explain theſe cauſes, it will be proper to give a brief account of that form of policy, which was introduced by the northern nations, who over-ran the Roman empire; and which is commonly called the Feudal Government. It has been deſcribed at large by many eminent writers. I ſhall enter into the ſubject no further, than is neceſſary to connect and illuſtrate my reaſoning. This government it was, that, among many other ſtrange inſtitutions, gave riſe to Chivalry: and it was Chivalry, which gave birth and form to that ſort of fabulous writing, which we term *Romance*.

The word is Spaniſh, and ſignifies the Spaniſh Tongue: and the name is ſuitable enough to the nature of a language, whereof the greater part is derived from the antient Latin or Roman. It ſeems, the firſt Spaniſh books were fabulous: and, being called Romance, on account of the tongue in which they were written, the ſame name was afterwards given, by the other nations of Europe, not to Spaniſh books, which is the proper application of the term, but to a certain claſs of fabulous writings.

Some have thought, that the nations, who deſtroyed the Roman empire, were obliged to leave their own country, and eſtabliſh themſelves by force elſewhere; becauſe at home their numbers were ſo great, that the ſoil was inſufficient to ſupport them. But this, I preſume, is a miſtake. Thoſe northern regions, where the climate is inhoſpitable, may produce a hardy race of men, but cannot be ſuppoſed to produce them in very great numbers. In fact, the population in ſuch countries has generally been found rather deficient, than exceſſive. I therefore think, that they left their native land, becauſe it was uncomfortable; and becauſe they had heard, that the conveniencies of life were more eaſily obtained in the ſouthern parts of the world. Accordingly, there is no evidence, that they ſent out colonies, or that one part of the nation went in queſt of ſettlements, while the other remained at home: it rather

appears, that a whole people emigrated at once, men, women, and children; without any purpoſe to return.

One of their firſt expeditions, that we read of, happened about the ſix hundred and fiftieth year of Rome; when the Cimbri and Teutones (who are ſuppoſed to have come from Denmark, and the northern parts of Germany) invaded the Roman Province with an army of three hundred thouſand men, beſides women and children, and were overthrown by Caius Marius, with prodigious ſlaughter. Their countrymen were more ſucceſsful in the decline of the empire: and at length they wreſted a great part of Europe out of the hands of the Romans; eſtabliſhing themſelves in the conquered provinces; the Franks and Normans in Gaul, the Goths and Vandals in Spain, and the Lombards in Italy.

There are, in the character of this extraordinary people, ſeveral particulars that deſerve attention. We may call them one people, becauſe a great ſimilarity in manners, opinions, and government, prevailed among them; though they occupied many wide regions in the northern part of the continent of Europe.

Firſt: They were a ſtrong, hardy, and active race of men. This character they muſt have derived, in a great meaſure, from their climate and needy circumſtances. Want is the parent of induſtry. To obtain even the neceſſaries of life, where the climate is cold, and the ſoil untractable, requires continual exertion; which at once inures the mind to vigilance, and the body to labour. The Germans, in Ceſar's time, made it their boaſt, that they had not been under a roof for fourteen years *: which conveyed ſuch an idea of their ferocity and ſtrength to the neighbouring Gauls, that they thought them invincible; and even Ceſar found it difficult to perſuade his Romans to march againſt them. Warm and fruitful countries generally produce (unleſs where a ſpirit of commerce and manufacture prevails) effeminacy and indolence: for there, neither

* Ceſar. Bell. Gall. i. 36.

art nor labour is neceſſary to procure what is requiſite to life; and there, of courſe, both the mind and the body are apt to grow languid for want of exerciſe.

Secondly: They were fierce and courageous. This was owing, not only to their activity and neceſſitous life, but alſo, in part, to their religion; which taught them to undervalue life, and to wiſh rather to die in battle, or by violence, than in the common courſe of nature. For they believed, that the ſouls of thoſe who fell in war, or were put to death, had a better right than others to happineſs in a future life; and paſſed immediately into the *hall of Odin* (ſo in latter times they called heaven), where they were to be regaled with feaſting and feſtivity through innumerable ages. Agreeably to which opinion, in ſome of the nations adjoining to Hudſon's bay, who are thought to be of the ſame race, it is ſtill cuſtomary, for the old men, when they become unfit for labour, to deſire to be ſtrangled; a ſervice, which they demand as an act of duty from their children; or, if they have no children, requeſt, as a favour, of their friends. *

A third

* "Are there not places," (ſays Mr. Locke, in the firſt book of his *Eſſay on Human Underſtanding*), "where at a certain age men kill, or expoſe, their parents, without "remorſe?" Taking for granted, that there are; his intention is, from this, and other ſuppoſed facts of a like nature, to draw theſe inferences. Firſt, that there is no inſtinctive affection towards parents in the human conſtitution; that, independently on habits contracted by education, we ſhould be as indifferent to the perſon whom we knew to be our father, or mother, as we are to any other man or woman; and that, if our teachers were to adopt a contrary plan of education, it would be not more difficult to make us hate our parents, becauſe they are our parents, than it is to make us love them on that account. Secondly, and in general, that the ſame thing is true of every firſt principle, both moral and ſpeculative, even of the κοιναι εννοιαι, that is, of the axioms of geometry, for ſo Euclid calls them: in other words, that all our ideas of duty, and of truth, would be juſt the reverſe of what they are, if we were from the firſt told, that compaſſion (for example) and juſtice are criminal, and cruelty and treachery meritorious; that bodies are not as our ſenſes repreſent them; and that things equal to one and the ſame thing are not equal to one another.—If this is not the intention of Locke's firſt book, his words and arguments are without meaning. It is true, he

A third peculiarity in the character of theſe people is, their attention to their women. With us, the two ſexes aſſociate toge-

he is there very full of words; and ſo inaccurate in the uſe of them, as well as ſuperficial in examining the facts brought to confirm his theory, that we can readily believe, what he himſelf inſinuates, that he ſat down to write his book, before he had any diſtinct idea of what was to be in it.

But, paſſing this; let us conſider, how far the fact hinted at in the quotation tends to prove, or to diſprove, his general doctrine.

The fact is thus ſtated by a judicious Traveller, Mr. Ellis, in his *Voyage for the diſcovery of a North-weſt paſſage*. In ſome of the countries adjoining to Hudſon's Bay, "they have one cuſtom, which is very extraordinary: that when their parents grow "ſo old, as to be incapable to ſupport themſelves by their labour, they *require* their "children to ſtrangle them; and this *is eſteemed an act of obedience* in the children to "perform. The manner of diſcharging this *laſt duty* is thus. The grave of the old "perſon being dug, he goes into it; and, after having converſed, and ſmoaked a pipe, "or perhaps drank a dram or two with his children, the old perſon ſignifies he is "ready: upon which, two of the children put a thong about his neck, one ſtanding "on the one ſide, and the other oppoſite, and pull violently, till he is ſtrangled; then "cover him with earth, and over that erect a kind of rough monument of ſtones. As "for ſuch old perſons as have no children, they *requeſt this office from their friends*; "though in this laſt caſe it is not always complied with.—Theſe Indians" (we are told by the ſame author) "believe in a Supreme Being infinitely good, and the author of all "their bleſſings; they believe alſo in an evil being, of whom they are much afraid."

From this account we learn ſeveral things. 1. The parents are ſtrangled by their own command, becauſe they chooſe, it ſeems, to die in this manner: for old perſons, when childleſs, ſolicit from others, as a favour, what they would have exacted from their children, as a duty. 2. Children would be thought undutiful to their parent, if they did not comply with his command in this particular. 3. This *laſt duty* is not performed without reluctance; for they, who do not think themſelves bound by the ties of blood, are unwilling, and ſometimes refuſe, to perform it. 4. The old perſon dies with compoſure, and even with feſtivity, as well as of choice: which is a proof, that by ſuch a death he hopes to eſcape ſome great evil, or ſecure ſome important good. To which I may add, that ſuch a practice could not become general; and continue from age to age, unleſs with the conſent of the perſons who ſuffer. Young people there, as in other countries, have the view of becoming parents, and of growing old, in their turn; and would never ſet the example, if they were under any apprehenſion in regard to its conſequences.

Does this fact, then, prove, that thoſe poor barbarians are deſtitute of filial affection? It proves juſt the contrary. The children comply with the parent's command, becauſe they love him, and think it their duty to obey him: and they do nothing to him, but what, if in his circumſtances, they would wiſh to be done to themſelves.

If

ther, and mutually improve and poliſh one another: but in Rome and Greece they lived ſeparate; and the condition of the female

If a teacher were to ſay, "Ye children, afflict and torment your parents, and, "when they are old, put them to death; for to them ye owe your life, and many "of its moſt important bleſſings:"—he would hardly obtain a ſecond hearing: the abſurdity of the ſpeech would be evident to every rational creature. But if his addreſs were in theſe terms; "Children owe gratitude and obedience to their parents: let "them, therefore, when a parent grows old, wiſhes to be at reſt, and requires them "to put an end to his ſufferings, do as they are commanded; for thus ſhall they re-"commend him to the favour of the good Deity, and ſatiate all the malevolence "of the evil one:"—ſuch an addreſs to credulous and pagan barbarians might not perhaps appear abſurd. And yet their acquieſcence in it would not prove them deſtitute of natural affection, or of moral ſentiment; nay it would prove that they were poſſeſſed of both: for otherwiſe, how could they receive the one doctrine, and reject the other!

This note is already too long: and yet I think I ſhall not be blamed for ſubjoining, in honour of human nature, another extract from Mr. Ellis's book: that ingenious work being now (I know not for what reaſon) very rare.

"The Indians adjoining to Hudſon's Bay, except when intoxicated with brandy, "are very courteous and compaſſionate, even to thoſe who are abſolute ſtrangers, as "well as to their own family: and their affection for their children is ſingularly great. "An extraordinary inſtance of this happened lately at York-Fort. Two ſmall canoes, "paſſing Hayes's river, when they had got to the middle of it, one of them, which "was made of the bark of a birch tree, ſunk, in which was an Indian, his wife, and "child. The other canoe, being ſmall, and incapable of receiving more than one of "the parents and the child, produced an extraordinary conteſt between the man and "his wife: not but that both of them were willing to devote themſelves to ſave the "other; but the difficulty lay in determining which would be the greateſt loſs to the "child. The man uſed arguments to prove it more reaſonable that he ſhould be "drowned, than the woman. But ſhe alledged, that it was more for the child's ad-"vantage, that ſhe ſhould periſh; becauſe he, as a man, was better able to hunt, and "conſequently to provide for it. The little time there was ſtill remaining was ſpent in "mutual expreſſions of tenderneſs; the woman ſtrongly recommending, as for the laſt "time, to her huſband, the care of her child. This being done, they took leave in "the water; the woman, quitting the canoe, was drowned; and the man with the "child got ſafe aſhore; and is now taken much notice of by the people thereabouts. "It appears upon the whole, that the ſingle object in view was the preſervation of the "child."—Parental love and filial regard are not always proportioned to each other: yet, where the former is ſo ſtrong, it cannot be ſuppoſed that the latter will be preternaturally weak.

was

was little better than ſlavery; as it ſtill is, and has been from very early times, in many parts of Aſia, and in European and African Turkey. But the Gothick warriors were in all their expeditions attended by their wives; whom they regarded as friends and faithful counſellors, and frequently as ſacred perſons, by whom the gods were pleaſed to communicate their will to mankind. This in part accounts for the reverence wherewith the female ſex were always treated by thoſe conquerors: and, as Europe ſtill retains many of their cuſtoms, and much of their policy, this may be given as one reaſon of that polite gallantry, which diſtinguiſhes our manners, and has extended itſelf through every part of the world that is ſubject to European government. *

Another thing remarkable in the Gothick nations, was an invincible ſpirit of liberty. Warm and fruitful countries, by promoting indolence and luxury, are favourable to the views of tyrannical princes; and commonly were in antient, as many of them are in modern times, the abode of deſpotiſm. But the natives of the north, more active and valiant, are for the moſt part more jealous of their privileges. Exceptions may be found to all general theories concerning the influence of climate in forming the human character: but this will be allowed to have been true of the antient Germans, and thoſe other nations, whereof I now ſpeak. All the Gothick inſtitutions were, in their pureſt form, favourable to liberty. The kings, or generals, were at firſt choſen by thoſe who were to obey them: and though they acknowleged, and indeed introduced, the diſtinction of ſuperiour and vaſſal, they were careful to ſecure the independence, and reſpective rights of both, as far as the common ſafety would permit. To them there is reaſon to believe that we are indebted for thoſe two great eſtabliſhments, which form the baſis of Britiſh freedom, a parliament for making laws, and juries for trying criminals, and deciding differences.

* See Eſſay on Laughter and Ludicrous Compoſition. Chap. iv.

Theſe

Theſe four peculiarities, in the character of the northern conquerors, it will be proper to keep in mind; that we may the better underſtand ſome things that are to follow. They were bold and hardy: they deſpiſed death, or rather, they thought it honourable and advantageous to fall in battle: they were indulgent and reſpectful to their women: and they were animated with a ſpirit of liberty and independence.

When they left their own country to go in queſt of a better, it is probable they made choice of the general and other officers who were to command them. They were volunteers in the ſervice; and they ſerved without pay, or at leaſt without any pecuniary acknowlegement. All the recompence they looked for, was to have a ſhare in the lands of ſuch countries as they might conquer. No other indeed could have been given them, as their commander had no money to beſtow; nor can we conceive, how he could have forced them into the ſervice, if they had been unwilling.

Suppoſe them now to have conquered a country. To exterminate the natives, ſeems not to have been their intention *: they only

* That no inſtance of extermination took place, during the period of Gothick Conqueſt, cannot be affirmed, if we admit the teſtimony of contemporary hiſtorians. Several inſtances might have happened; and other horrid deeds, whereof there is no record, muſt have been perpetrated, while ſo many violent and extenſive revolutions were going on. In regard to the character of the northern invaders, authors are not agreed: ſome look upon them as barbarians of the worſt kind; many judge more favourably, both of their policy, and of their manners. It was natural enough for the writers of that time to think and ſpeak of them with the utmoſt abhorrence, and rather to magnify the calamities that were before their eyes, than to deſcribe things impartially. Several circumſtances incline me to believe, that the ſufferings of the vanquiſhed, though they muſt have been great, were not ſo dreadful, as ſome learned writers imagine. I confine myſelf to one particular, which is connected with a ſubject that I have elſewhere touched upon.

If *we* were to be exterminated by a race of men, whoſe language was totally different from ours, would not our language be exterminated too? Can it be ſuppoſed, that the ſpeech of our conquerors would undergo any material alteration from the Engliſh, which, without underſtanding it, they might have heard during the war, or which might

only wiſhed to ſettle among them, to introduce their own cuſtoms and form of government, and to have the territory, or as much of it as they might have occaſion for, at their diſpoſal. The land they conſidered as their property; and preſented, as a voluntary gift, to their ſovereign or commander, on condition of his dividing it among

might ſtill be muttered in obſcure corners by a few of our ſurviving countrymen, who had eſcaped from the general maſſacre, and were ſuffered to remain in their own land, becauſe too inconſiderable to provoke expulſion? In ſuch a caſe, it ſeems probable, that the language of the country would be altogether changed, and that in this, as in every thing elſe, the conquerors would give the law. But if Britain were now to be ſubdued by a people of a ſtrange tongue; and if, after the lapſe of a thouſand years, the Britiſh language ſhould bear ſuch a reſemblance to the Engliſh now ſpoken, as the Italian and Spaniſh bear to the Latin; would it not be reaſonable for our ſucceſſors of that remote period to conclude, that the invaders of the eighteenth century muſt have been but few, in proportion to the number of thoſe among whom they eſtabliſhed themſelves; and that, therefore, though they became maſters of the country, they did not extirpate the people?

In Gaul, in Spain, and in Italy, the Roman tongue was generally ſpoken at the time of the Gothick invaſions; not pure, we may well imagine, in the remoter parts eſpecially, but with ſuch debaſements, as it is natural for provinces, at a conſiderable diſtance from the ſeat of empire, to adopt in the courſe of two or three hundred years. And yet, notwithſtanding theſe debaſements, and thoſe additional barbariſms introduced by the Franks, Vandals, Lombards, &c. the languages now ſpoken in France, Spain, and Italy, are ſo like the antient Latin, and one another, that any perſon who underſtands one of them may gueſs at the meaning of hundreds and thouſands of words in each of the reſt. In fact, though many changes have been made with regard to ſyntax, inflection, articles, and other things of leſs moment, theſe languages may all be ſaid to be compoſed of the ſame materials. Of the Italian, in particular, an author, who muſt be allowed to be a competent judge, declares, that, though very many barbarous and northern words have been brought into it, one might form, not a diſcourſe only, but an entire and large volume of good Italian, wherein not a ſingle word or phraſe ſhould be admitted, that did not derive its origin from the Latin writers. Tutto che non ſi poſſa negare, che ſianviſi aggiunte moltiſſime voci barbare, ed oltramontani, io ſono certiſſimo altresì, che ſi potrebbe formare, non dico un diſcorſo, ma un intero e groſſo volume in buon Italiano, ſenza che vi entraſſe pure una ſola parola, o fraſe, di cui non ſi trovaſſe l'origine negli ſcrittori Latini. *Le vicende della Letteratura. Cap.* 4.

among them, on certain terms, and according to a plan, which, though perhaps not well defined in the beginning, came at laſt to be what I am going to deſcribe.

He firſt appropriated a part of the conquered territory to his own uſe; for the maintenance of his houſehold, and the ſupport of his dignity. This was afterwards called the Crown-lands, and the Royal Demeſnes. The reſt he divided among his great officers, alloting to each a part. The officer held this property, on condition of profeſſing loyal attachment to his ſovereign, and ſerving him in war, at his own charges. He who conferred the property was called the Superiour; and, he who received it, the Vaſſal: who, on being inveſted, ſwore fealty or allegiance to his ſuperiour, and on his bended knees did him homage, by declaring himſelf his *man*, *homo*; whence came the barbarous Latin word *homagium*, and the Engliſh term *homage*. If afterwards he proved unfaithful, or abandoned his lord in battle, or refuſed to ſerve him in war when regularly ſummoned, he forfeited his land, and the ſuperiour might either retain it, or give it to another. The land thus granted was called a *fief*, in Latin *beneficium*; and this ſort of tenure was

Next to the Italian, the Spaniſh and Portugueſe bear the greateſt reſemblance to the Latin; although they ſuffered alteration, not only from the northern invaders, but alſo from the Moors, who conquered Spain in the eighth century, and were not finally driven out of it, till the fifteenth. If theſe languages, after all, loſt ſo little of their primitive form, how inconſiderable muſt have been the number of the victorious Goths and Vandals, when compared to that of the people whom they ſubdued, and among whom they ſettled!

The Saxons, who eſtabliſhed themſelves in England, ſeem to have been more intent upon extermination, than any others of thoſe adventurers. The Britiſh language they extirpated from all the provinces that fell into their hands, and planted their own in its ſtead; which they could hardly have done, if they had not deſtroyed the greater part of the people. And to this day, the Engliſh and lowland Scotch dialects are called *Saſſonich* or Saxon, by the highlanders of North Britain, and do indeed partake more of that tongue, than of any other. By the Norman Conqueſt many French words were brought in, but the foundation and fabrick of the language were not materially affected.

termed

termed a *feud*, or *feod*, from two Norſe words, *fee* ſignifying *reward*, and *odh property* * : an appellation, which implied, that the land was indeed the property of the vaſſal, but that he derived it from the ſuperiour, and held it, on condition of rendering perſonal ſervice, by way of reward or recompence. And hence, the form of government introduced by theſe northern nations is called the Feudal government, and the laws peculiar to that form are called the Feudal laws.

Be careful not to confound this with another Engliſh term of the ſame ſound and letters, *Feud*, which denotes contention, or quarrel: the one is a ſimple term of Saxon original; the other is compounded, and derived, as above, from another language.

As the vaſſal's property was *feudal*, that of the Sovereign, who held of no ſuperiour, was called *Allodial*, from *all*, *totum*, and *odh*, *property*; to intimate, that it was wholly his own, and that he owed no reward nor acknowlegement to any perſon for it. A ſovereign might indeed be feudatory to another ſovereign for certain lands or provinces; but, in regard to theſe, the feudatory was a vaſſal, and obliged to do homage to his ſuperiour: as we find that the kings of Scotland often did, for ſome of their ſouthern territories, to the kings of England; and the kings of England to the kings of France for ſome of their foreign dominions.

In conformity to the feudal inſtitutions and language, our law ſtill ſuppoſes every tenure in land, pertaining to a ſubject, to be derived either from another ſubject, or from the ſovereign. But, in this laſt caſe, the tenure is really allodial; for thoſe lands are ſaid to hold of the Crown, which do not hold of any ſubject.

They, who derived their tenures immediately from the ſovereign, came, in proceſs of time, to be the barons, thanes, lords, or nobility, of a feudal kingdom. They had, all of them, caſtles, and

* Blackſtone's Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book ii. c. 4.

kept a court, and a retinue, reſembling that of the monarch: and each of them, within his own territory, had great power, and poſſeſſed many of the privileges of royalty; as the right of conferring certain dignities, of coining money, and of pardoning criminals.

The ſtate of a feudal lord reſembled that of his ſovereign in other reſpects. He retained part of his territory in his own hands, for the ſupport of his dignity and houſehold; and the reſt, with conſent of the king, he divided among his own vaſſals, according to the ſame feudal tenure, by which he himſelf held his lands of the ſovereign. The ſecondary vaſſals were afterwards known, in ſome countries, by the name of Armigeri, or Eſquires; which in the original ſignification denoted Armour-bearers, or Bearers of ſhields. On being inveſted with their reſpective fiefs, they did homage to their immediate ſuperiour, ſwore allegiance to him, and promiſed at their own charges to attend him in war, when ſummoned for that purpoſe. They, like their ſuperiours the Great Barons, had juriſdiction within their own territories; and, in the economy of their houſehold, would no doubt imitate them, as far as they were able.

The Secondary Barons, like the Primary, had their vaſſals, to whom they gave lands on the ſame feudal conditions; and by whom they were ſerved and attended in war, even as they themſelves ſerved and attended the nobility, and the nobility the king. In times of peace, and when military attendance was not required, the loweſt order of vaſſals would ſometimes make a payment of corn, cattle, or money, in return for their lands; and this in time became general, and was the origin of rents.

A feudal kingdom, thus eſtabliſhed, reſembled, as an elegant author obſerves *, the encampment of a great army: and no form of policy could be better contrived, for ſecuring a conqueſt. Mi-

* Robertſon's Hiſtory of Scotland. Book i.

litary

litary ſervice being the chief part of the duty which the vaſſal owed his lord, and being equally the buſineſs of men of all ranks, we may conclude, that the whole nation muſt have been trained to arms: which would thus come to be conſidered as the moſt honourable, and, for a man of any rank, the only honourable profeſſion. If to this we add the natural ferocity of the people, and their high ſpirit of independance, we ſhall be at no loſs to account for that paſſionate love of warlike enterpriſe, which diffuſed itſelf through all the members of the feudal ſyſtem. A people, thus arranged, prepared, and animated, was at all times ready to appear in arms, when ſummoned by the ſovereign; who would inſtantly be attended by the Greater Barons his vaſſals, and they by their vaſſals, and ſo downward.

I hinted, that the whole nation was trained to the uſe of arms. In the beginning it would probably be ſo: but, when the Gothick ſyſtem had been for ſome time eſtabliſhed, this was not the caſe. All the free men, indeed, were warriors; but the loweſt ſort of people, who ſupplied their betters with food, cloaths, armour, and other neceſſaries, had not that honour, and were in fact no better than ſlaves, though all were not equally ſervile.

For a nation, when once conquered, and ſubjected to this form of policy, it was ſcarce poſſible to throw off the yoke, or even attempt to regain their freedom. The truth is, that the vanquiſhed ſoon came to incorporate with the victors; who ſeemed, when they made their firſt appearance in the ſouthern parts of Europe, to found their political ideas on the natural equality of mankind.

What paſſes for the hiſtory of thoſe dark ages is in many particulars little better than conjecture. It is however certain, that the Feudal plan of ſubordination became at length almoſt univerſal in Europe. Thoſe iſlands and provinces, that had not been conquered, or invaded, by the northern warriors, found their account in adopting it: partly, no doubt, from a deſire to imitate the reſt

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of the world; and partly too, that they might, by eſtabliſhing the ſame military arrangements, acquire the ſame military vigour, and be able to maintain independency in the midſt of their warlike neighbours. The feudal ſyſtem, in its full extent, was not brought into England, till the Conqueſt by William Duke of Normandy; who imported it from his own country, where it had been long eſtabliſhed; and introduced it into the ſouthern part of this iſland, with the conſent of the Great Council of the nation. At what time it came into Scotland, is not yet, ſo far as I know, determined among antiquaries. But that it was adopted by the Scots, and maintained its influence longer in North, than in South, Britain, is well known. *

Every human inſtitution is liable to change. And no form of government has hitherto been deviſed, that is not obnoxious to alteration from a thouſand cauſes, which human laws cannot prevent, becauſe human wiſdom cannot foreſee. The Feudal ſyſtem became different from what it had originally been. While people are in needy circumſtances, they have not the ſame views of things, which they afterwards come to have, when ſettled in the ſecure enjoyment of riches and honour. The feudal king or commander was at firſt elective; and the fiefs granted by the ſuperiour to his vaſſal were but for life, or during pleaſure. But both the ſovereign power, and the right of the feudatory, were in time made perpetual in the ſame family, and deſcended from the father to the ſon, or to the neareſt relation. The nobles grew proud and ambitious, in proportion as they became independent. In ſome caſes, their fiefs were ſtill further ſecured by Entails; which put it in the power of their poſterity to enlarge, but not diminiſh the inheritance. Nay, at laſt, the ſon, whether worthy or unworthy, was allowed to poſſeſs thoſe titles of honour, which the merit of his father had obtained from the ſovereign: and thus the dignities, as well as lands,

* See Robertſon's Hiſtory of Scotland. Book i.

of the feudal baron, became hereditary. And, what is ſtill more ſingular, though great abilities are requiſite to qualify one for the great offices of ſtate, and though nothing can be more abſurd, than to beſtow an office of difficulty upon a perſon who is unfit for it; yet many of the feudal nobles, by force of importunity, or as a reward for particular ſervices, obtained the high privilege of having certain great and lucrative poſts annexed to their reſpective families.

Theſe corruptions of the old feudal ſyſtem were gradually introduced, in conſequence of the aſpiring genius of the nobles, and want of power in the kings. The lands of the former were honoured with privileges, that allowed an extenſive, and ſomething even of royal, authority, to the proprietor. Before him, or judges appointed by him, all cauſes, civil or criminal, were tried, which concerned any of his vaſſals: and if the vaſſal of a baron was ſummoned before any of the king's courts, the lord of that vaſſal might refuſe to give him up, reſerving to himſelf the right of trying him; and might even puniſh his vaſſal, if he ſubmitted to any other juriſdiction, than that of his immediate ſuperiour. Thus, it is eaſy to ſee, that the influence of the crown would be very weak, except within the king's own territory: and that conteſts would take place between him and his nobles, wherein the latter might have the advantage. And hence, a wealthy baron, who had a great number of dependants, might vie, in the ſplendour of his economy, even with the ſovereign himſelf, and learn to ſet him, and his power, at defiance: whence would ariſe inſolent demands from the nobles, and mean-ſpirited conceſſions on the part of the king. In fact, the hiſtory of modern Europe contains, for ſeveral ages, little more, than a detail of diſſentions between the kings and their nobility. For, in proceſs of time, the power of the feudal barons, increaſed by legacies, lucrative marriages, and imprudent conceſſions from the crown, became offenſive, and even intolerable, to their

their ſovereigns: who were thus obliged, in ſelf-defence, to deviſe expedients for checking that ambition, which gave them ſo much uneaſineſs. Some think, that the Cruſades took their riſe from this principle.

The Cruſades were military expeditions into Paleſtine, undertaken by the Chriſtian princes of Europe, with a view to exterminate, as they pretended, from the Holy Land, thoſe Turks and Saracens, who were then in poſſeſſion of it. For they gave out, that it was a reproach to Chriſtendom, to permit infidels to live and reign in a country, which in antient times belonged to the poſterity of Abraham, and had been honoured with the preſence of our Saviour, while he ſojourned among men. Theſe warlike enterpriſes, warranted and encouraged by the Pope, were well ſuited to the enthuſiaſtick valour of the feudal times, as well as to the religious opinions that prevailed while popery and ignorance were univerſal in the weſtern world. The nobility and people, therefore, engaged in them with eagerneſs. They believed, that they ſhould perform an acceptable ſervice to God, by deſtroying, or at leaſt by conquering, the enemies of the Chriſtian faith; and that the reward of their labour would be military renown in this life, and a crown of glory in the next. The pope claimed, and was allowed to have, power to remit the ſins of the whole world: and a general remiſſion of ſin, together with many advantages of a ſecular nature *, was offered to all who would enliſt in thoſe armaments.

But whatever the opinions might be of thoſe who were to ſerve in the holy wars, as they were called, we may, without breach of charity, conclude, that the princes, who planned them, were actuated no leſs by political, than by religious motives. They found their nobility turbulent at home; and were happy to engage them in foreign expeditions, from which it was probable, that the greater part would never return.—The expedition was called a cruſade, or

* See Robertſon's Hiſtory of Charles V. vol. i. page 240.

croiſade, from a Latin, or from a French, word ſignifying *a croſs*; which has in every age been an emblem of Chriſtianity, and which theſe adventurers, as the champions of the faith, bore in their ſtandard, and impreſſed upon their armour.

The honours acquired by the heroes of the Cruſade were not inconſiderable; though attended with great expence, both of treaſure, and of blood. They conquered Paleſtine, and drove the Saracens out of it: and Godfrey of Bologne, or Bouillon, was actually crowned king of Jeruſalem, about the year eleven hundred. Thoſe, who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in theſe wars, expreſſed their atchievements by ſome emblematical device, engraven, or painted, on their ſhield: and this is ſaid to have been the origin of Armorial Enſigns; which, though they may now be purchaſed with money, were antiently attainable by valour only. For the defenſive armour then in uſe was of a particular kind, and quite different from that of the Greeks and Romans. The Feudal baron caſed his whole body in ſteel or braſs: and the helmet was ſo contrived, as to cover upon occaſion every part of his face, except the eyes; ſo that in the field he could not be known, but by the figures on his target, or by the make or colour of his arms. And by theſe the warriors of that time were often diſtinguiſhed. Edward the Black Prince, a name famous in the Engliſh hiſtory, was ſo called from the colour of his armour, which is ſtill preſerved in the Tower of London.

I ſaid, that the figures, which the Cruſader diſplayed on his ſhield, were the origin of enſigns armorial. And this is the opinion of many authors: but it can be true of ſuch figures only, as were according to the ſyſtem of modern heraldry. For devices on ſhields are more antient: witneſs the ſhield of Hercules by Heſiod; that of Achilles by Homer; and thoſe of the *ſeven chiefs at Thebes* particularly deſcribed by Eſchylus. Some fancy, that they are of ſtill higher antiquity, and were known to Noah, Abraham, and Jacob;

and that the twelve tribes of Iſrael were diſtinguiſhed by their reſpective enſigns. But this is foreign from the preſent purpoſe.

That ſpirit of valour and religion, and that paſſion for travelling and ſtrange adventures, to which the cruſades were ſo favourable, gave riſe to Chivalry; which now began to appear in the world, and in time produced very important conſequences, in politicks, in manners, and in literature. I am not ignorant, that ſome authors aſſign it an earlier date; and are rather inclined to derive the cruſades from chivalry, than chivalry from the cruſades. The diſpute is not very material. Certain it is, that Chivalry was firſt known about the time of the cruſades; and that the romantick enthuſiaſm, wild fancy, and deſperate valour, which characteriſed the knights who profeſſed it, were much inflamed, and partly produced, by the reports then circulating through a credulous world, concerning the adventures that were believed to have befallen the heroes of the holy war.

The word *chivalry* is derived from the French *chevalier*; which, like the Latin *eques*, properly ſignifies a man who ſerves in war on horſeback. As the poorer ſort ſerved on foot, *Eques* in Latin, and *Chevalier* in French, became titles of honour, correſponding nearly, but not perfectly, with the Engliſh term *knight*.

Chivalry was a military profeſſion. The man, who wiſhed to be diſtinguiſhed in this way, dreſſed himſelf in a ſuit of the armour of that time; and, girding on a ſword, and graſping a ſpear, mounted his horſe, and ſet out on ſome warlike enterpriſe. He could not, however, be conſidered as a complete cavalier, till he had received the honour of knighthood. This none can now confer, but a ſovereign prince; but any man, who was himſelf a knight, could then confer it; and a ſovereign would condeſcend to accept of it from the hands of a ſubject. The perſon, who was inveſted with this honour, received it on his knees; and many ceremonies, both warlike and religious, were performed on the

occaſion. — There are ſeveral things remarkable in the character of the knights of chivalry; which may be partly accounted for, from the preceding obſervations.

1. The firſt is, their Religious character. The authority of the church of Rome was then unbounded and univerſal in Europe; and the wars undertaken to reſcue the holy land infuſed a religious enthuſiaſm into all who took part in thoſe expeditions, that is, into every European, who aſpired to military fame. Hence piety, as well as valour, was conſidered as indiſpenſably requiſite to form a gallant ſoldier. Some parts, too, of Europe, particularly Spain, had ſuffered from the invaſion of Saracens and other infidel nations, who by their cruelty had rendered themſelves, and their religion, objects of horror to all Chriſtendom. When a knight, made captive by thoſe unbelievers, was prevailed on, by threats, puniſhment, or exhortation, to abandon the true faith, he was branded among Chriſtians with the name of a Recreant, that is, of an Apoſtate Knight: a term of the bittereſt reproach. For every knight, at his inſtallation, ſwore to maintain the Catholick faith, in oppoſition to every danger. And therefore this term implied, in the language of Chivalry, nothing leſs, than an impious, perjured, and profligate coward. *

2. The ſecond thing remarkable in the ſons of chivalry, is their valour; and, I may add, their love of fighting. This they might have derived, as we have ſeen, from their Gothick progenitors; and this every feudal inſtitution tended to encourage. This, by their expeditions againſt the infidels, was raiſed to a pitch of extravagance bordering on phrenſy; and was further cheriſhed by thoſe private broils, wherein the feudal nobility were, from the nature of the government, and the ineffectual authority of the law, almoſt continually engaged. The very ſports of thoſe warlike barons were attended with bloodſhed: for then, on ſolemn feſtivals, and when

* Hurd's Letters on Chivalry and Romance.

people met together to be merry, tilts and tournaments, and other forms of ſingle combat, were exhibited, for the entertainment of kings, and lords, and even of ladies.† And theſe encounters were by no means mock-battles. The knights, fixing their lances, with the points advanced, made their horſes run violently together; and both knight and horſe were often overturned by the ſhock, and ſometimes killed. If they ſurvived the firſt aſſault, which was generally the caſe, they attacked each other with their ſwords, till one of them fell, or owned himſelf vanquiſhed, or till they were parted by the officer, who preſided at the ceremony. Audemar de Valentia, earl of Pembroke, was killed in one of thoſe encounters, on the very day of his marriage. The mode of fighting at that time, as well as in antient Greece and Italy, had, no doubt, ſome influence upon the valour of the combatants, or made them at leaſt more eager to diſplay it. With us, by means of fire-arms, the weakeſt man is a match for the ſtrongeſt: and all that our ſoldiers have to do, is to ſhow their contempt of danger, preſence of mind, and regard to diſcipline. But, before the invention of gunpowder, a warrior, who ſlew his enemy, gave proof, not of valour only, but alſo of ſtrength, and of addreſs in the uſe of his weapons.

3. Their paſſion for ſtrange adventures is another trait in the character of the knights of chivalry. The world was then little

† Tilts and tournaments, however, ought not to be looked upon, as unnatural expedients of a barbarous and bloody policy. In their firſt inſtitution, they were not only rational, but wiſe: "becauſe of ſingular uſe to inſtruct the nobility and gentry, "who formed the cavalry of thoſe days, in the dextrous management of their horſes "and arms." So ſays the great hiſtorian, upon the authority of writers who lived in the age of tournaments. And he ſubjoins the following pertinent remark. "Indeed, "all nations, deſirous to excel in war, have endeavoured to render their publick diver-"ſions conducive to that purpoſe," (that is, to military diſcipline); "a policy, which "ſeems to be too much forgotten at this time, in this kingdom." *Lord Lyttelton's Notes on the fifth book of his Hiſtory of the age of Henry the Second.* That ſingle combat was an amuſement of heroes in the days of Homer, we learn from the funeral games in honour of Patroclus.

known,

known, and men (as I obſerved before) were ignorant and credulous. Strange ſights were expected in ſtrange countries; dragons to be deſtroyed, giants to be humbled, and enchanted caſtles to be overthrown. The caverns of the mountain were believed to be inhabited by magicians; and the depth of the foreſt gave ſhelter to the holy hermit, who, as the reward of his piety, was ſuppoſed to have the gift of working miracles. The demon yelled in the ſtorm, the ſpectre walked in darkneſs, and even the ruſhing of water in the night was miſtaken for the voice of a goblin. The caſtles of the greater barons, reared in a rude but grand ſtyle of architecture; full of dark and winding paſſages, of ſecret apartments, of long uninhabited galleries, and of chambers ſuppoſed to be haunted with ſpirits; and undermined by ſubterraneous labyrinths as places of retreat in extreme danger; the howling of winds through the crevices of old walls, and other dreary vacuities; the grating of heavy doors on ruſty hinges of iron; the ſhrieking of bats, and the ſcreaming of owls, and other creatures, that reſort to deſolate or half-inhabited buildings: — theſe, and the like circumſtances, in the domeſtick life of the people I ſpeak of, would multiply their ſuperſtitions, and increaſe their credulity; and, among warriors, who ſet all danger at defiance, would encourage a paſſion for wild adventure, and difficult enterpriſe.

Conſider, too, the political circumſtances of the feudal barons. They lived apart, in their reſpective territories, where their power was like that of petty kings; and in their own fortified caſtles, where they kept a train of valiant friends and followers: and, in the economy and ſplendor of their houſehold, they imitated royal magnificence. An offender, who had made his eſcape, either from the publick juſtice of his country, or from the vengeance of ſome angry chief, was ſure of a place of refuge, if he could find admittance into the caſtle of any other lord. Hence publick juſtice was eluded, and the authority of the law deſpiſed: and a wicked

and powerful baron, ſecure within his own caſtle, would even defy the power of the ſovereign himſelf, or perhaps with hoſtile intention meet him in the field, at the head of an army of determined followers. William earl of Douglas was generally attended, on ſolemn occaſions, by a body of two thouſand horſe. Such a man it might be unſafe, even for a king, to provoke. As late as the reign of Mary queen of Scots, we read of a court of law held near the border of England; and are told, that the inhabitants of eleven counties were ſummoned by royal proclamation, to defend the perſons of the judges, and enforce their decrees. *

Hence a conjecture may be formed of the diſtracted ſtate of thoſe feudal governments, in which the nobility had acquired great power, and high privileges. The moſt daring enormities were daily committed, to gratify the reſentment, or the rapacity, of thoſe chieftains: caſtles were invaded, and plundered, and burned: depredations by the vaſſals of one lord were made upon the grounds and cattle of another; and horrid murders and other cruelties perpetrated. Rich heireſſes, and women of diſtinguiſhed beauty, were often ſeized upon, and compelled to marry the raviſher. Royalty itſelf was not ſecure from theſe outrages. When Eleanor queen of France was divorced from her huſband Louis VII, ſhe was, in her journey to her own hereditary dominions, waylaid by three princes, at three different places, each of whom intended to force her to marry him: but ſhe eſcaped them all; and afterwards gave her hand to Henry the Second, king of England †. Nay, in thoſe days, there were outlaws and robbers, who, poſſeſſing themſelves of mountains and foreſts, got together a little army of followers, and lived by rapine; while the power of the kingdom was employed in vain to diſlodge, and bring them to juſtice. Such, in England, were the famous Adam Bell, and Robin Hood, and others who are ſtill celebrated in ballads: and, even in the memory of perſons now alive,

* Robertſon's Hiſtory of Scotland. † Lord Lyttelton's Age of Henry II.

there

there were ſome of the ſame profeſſion remaining in the highlands of Scotland; but the race at laſt is happily extinct.—In a word, the weſtern world was in thoſe feudal times full of extraordinary events, and ſtrange viciſſitudes of fortune. And therefore we need not wonder, that a paſſion for adventures and warlike enterprize ſhould have been univerſal among the knights of chivalry.

4. They were alſo diſtinguiſhed by a zeal for juſtice: and, as the laws were ſo ineffectual, profeſſed to take up arms in vindication of the rights of mankind; to puniſh the oppreſſor; to ſet at liberty the captive; to ſuccour the diſtreſſed damſel; and to rid the world of thoſe falſe knights, who wandered about in armour, to accompliſh wicked purpoſes. Theſe were noble deſigns; and, while ſociety was ſo inſecure, and the law ſo openly violated, muſt have been attended with good effects.—If you aſk, how this heroick part of their character is to be accounted for; I anſwer, that they ſeem to have derived it, partly from their northern anceſtors, who were lovers of liberty, and generous in their behaviour to the weaker ſex; and partly from their attachment to the Chriſtian religion, whereof they were the declared champions, and which, disfigured as it then was by ſuperſtition, would ſtill be a reſtraint upon the paſſions of thoſe who were willing to attend to its dictates.

Beſides, the diſorders of the time were ſo great, that ſober-minded men, who were at all enlightened by knowledge, or capable of reflexion, would ſee, that ſuch an inſtitution might be beneficial, and was become almoſt neceſſary to the exiſtence of ſociety. At firſt, perhaps, their views might reach no further, than to defend the perſons, and redreſs the grievances of their friends *. But the habit of doing this, and the honour acquired by it, would determine them to enlarge their plan, and form the generous reſolution of patroniſing mankind, by going through the world, to ſignalize their valour, in protecting the weak, and puniſhing the haughty.

* Hurd's Letters on Chivalry and Romance.

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Their courage, their paſſion for adventures, their deſire of ſeeing what was wonderful in foreign parts, and thoſe hopes of future happineſs which religion taught them to entertain, conſpired with their military genius, and with their ſenſe of the evils to which they ſaw their fellow-creatures expoſed, to produce that extraordinary perſonage, a Knight Errant, or wandering knight: a character, which they who have read Don Quixote are apt to ſmile when they hear mentioned; but which, in its origin, was honourable to the warriors who bore it, and of no ſmall advantage to the publick.

5. The fifth and laſt characteriſtick of chivalry, is the Courteſy of the knights who profeſſed it. I remarked, that the founders of the feudal ſyſtem were diſtinguiſhed, among all the nations then known in Europe or Aſia, by the peculiarity of their behaviour to their women; whom they regarded and loved, as their friends, and faithful counſellors, and as inveſted with ſomething of a ſacred character. Accordingly we are told by ſome authors, that in all their conqueſts they were never guilty of violence, where the female ſex was concerned. This delicacy they tranſmitted to their deſcendants; among the greater part of whom, whatever outrages might now and then be committed by individuals, it ſeems to have been a point of honour, to be generous and reſpectful in their attentions to women. This was at leaſt an indiſpenſable part of the duty of a knight errant. By the ſtatutes of Chivalry, the love of God was the firſt virtue, and devotion to the ladies the ſecond *. But that devotion had nothing licentious in it; being delicate to a degree that bordered on extravagance, if not on impiety. For the true knight did not expect condeſcenſion on the part of his miſtreſs, till he had proved himſelf worthy of her, by deeds of arms, and performed many acts of heroiſm as her champion and admirer. And, when he was going to attack his enemy, we are told it was cuſtomary

* Hurd's Letters.

for

for him, firſt, to implore the help of God, and then to invoke, or at leaſt to mention, the name of his miſtreſs.

The gallant behaviour of theſe knights may further be accounted for, from that religious ardour, which prompted them to ſignalize themſelves as the champions of the faith, and to fulfil thoſe duties of benevolence and kindneſs, which are no where ſo earneſtly recommended as in the Goſpel, and which form the moſt ſubſtantial, and indeed the only ſubſtantial, part of true politeneſs.

The domeſtick life of the feudal baron muſt alſo have had conſiderable influence, in refining the manners of men and women in the higher ranks. He lived, as already obſerved, in his caſtle, with a numerous train of friends and vaſſals, who formed a court, ſimilar in its economy to that of the ſovereign. Luxury was little known at that time, even in palaces. The kings of England had their chambers littered with ruſhes; and their beds were laid on ſtraw or hay. Every perſon of faſhion in a great family has now a ſeparate apartment; but then it was not ſo. The hall of the caſtle was a place of conſtant and univerſal reſort *. There appeared the Baron himſelf, with his lady and children, and thoſe noble gueſts who might occaſionally reſide with him; there too were often ſeen his vaſſals, ranked according to their dignity; and there, in a lower ſituation, the chief ſervants of the family would ſometimes aſſemble. Were ſo many perſons of mean and of equal rank to meet together, every man would indulge his own humour, and politeneſs would not be much minded. But the very great diverſity of ranks in a feudal caſtle would introduce courteous behaviour;

* "After having attended your Lady in the morning," ſays the Troubadour Amanieu des Eſcas in his advice to a *Gentlewoman*, "you may walk in the great hall, and "ſalute with civility thoſe who paſs there; anſwering them in a courteous manner, "but without exceeding in talk. Be grave in your ſtep, and modeſt in your look." *Mrs. Dobſon's Hiſtory of the Troubadours*, pag. 444. — In thoſe days, the upper ſervants in great houſes were generally perſons of family. By the common people in Scotland they are ſtill called, *the gentlewoman*, and *the gentleman*.

while the great found it their intereſt, to be affable; and thoſe of the lower ſort, to be reſpectful. Think with what reverence the inferiour vaſſals would look up to the Baron, who had ſo many men, and ſo much wealth, at his command; and who, within his own juriſdiction, could pardon, or put to death, and enjoyed many other privileges of royalty. The ladies of the family, conſcious of their high rank, reſtrained by native modeſty, and intimidated by the preſence of their relations, would, in the midſt of this great domeſtick aſſembly, maintain a reſerve, ſufficient to diſcourage all familiarity on the part of the other ſex. Ladies of lower rank would imitate them: and thus it is reaſonable to think, that there muſt have prevailed, and we have poſitive evidence, that there actually did prevail, among the women of faſhion in thoſe days, a dignity, and even a ſtatelineſs, of manner, tending to inſpire the enamoured beholder with a paſſion compounded of love and veneration. Hence the origin of Romantick Love: which, regarding its object as ſomething more than human, forms extravagant ideas of perfection and happineſs; a paſſion almoſt peculiar to latter times; and which, in antient Greece and Rome, as well as in Aſia, where the ſexes lived ſeparate, and where the condition of the female was little better than ſervitude, could have no place. For, if it be true, that a prudent reſerve commands ſome degree of reverence; and that the beſt of humankind have blemiſhes, which at a diſtance are not ſeen, and which when near cannot be concealed; we need not wonder at the effects, ſaid to have been produced, in courteous knights, by the ſublime prudery of accompliſhed ladies; nor at the oppoſite tendency of thoſe modes of life, by which men are emboldened to conſider women as a ſort of property, and as rather under the ſtandard of human excellence, than above it.

Politeneſs and courteſy take their riſe among thoſe who ſtand in awe of one another. For this reaſon, Monarchy, where different

ranks of men are eſtabliſhed, has always been thought more favourable to elegant manners, than any of the republican forms of government, in which all the citizens are ſuppoſed to be equal, or nearly ſo. In his own court, that is, in his caſtle, the feudal baron was a monarch in miniature; and polite manners, like thoſe that take place where kings have their reſidence, would naturally be diffuſed through his whole houſehold. You eaſily know by one's behaviour, whether one has been much in the company of one's ſuperiours. A man of ſpirit contracts no ſervility from that circumſtance: but he acquires the habit of attending to the wants and wiſhes of thoſe with whom he converſes, of complying with their innocent humours, of adapting himſelf to their views of things, and their peculiar ways of thinking; and he alſo acquires the habits of unaſſuming ſpeech, elegant phraſeology, and eaſy motion.—It has been remarked by ſeveral writers, that the true Scotch highlander is diſtinguiſhed by a gentility of behaviour, which does not generally diſplay itſelf in the lower ranks of mankind. The fact, I believe, is true; and may be accounted for, if not from the feudal, at leaſt from the patriarchal, policy of the people; from the relation of clanſhip ſubſiſting between the lord and his vaſſal, which entitles the latter to the company of the former, and occaſions a more familiar intercourſe, than is elſewhere met with, between the gentry and the commonalty.—And therefore it is not ſurpriſing, that there ſhould have been, notwithſtanding the rudeneſs of the times, ſo much courteſy in the caſtle of a feudal baron; eſpecially among thoſe who appeared there in a military character, and ſtill more eſpecially among the knights of chivalry.

Beſides, the character of a true knight was very delicate: and ſingle combat was a thing ſo familiar to him, and withal accounted ſo honourable, that he never failed to reſent in a hoſtile manner any reproachful word that might be thrown out againſt his virtue, particularly againſt his faith, or his courage. Hence reproachful

words would in general be avoided; which would promote courteſy, by refining converſation. And hence the origin of Duelling: a practice, unknown to Greece and Rome; which took its riſe in the feudal times, and probably among the ſons of chivalry; and which, though in many reſpects abſurd and wicked, is allowed to have promoted politeneſs, by making men cautious of offending one another.

The knight errant was the declared enemy of the oppreſſor, the puniſher of the injurious, and the patron of the weak. And as women were more expoſed to injury, than men; and as ladies of rank and merit were, for reaſons already given, the objects of veneration to all men of breeding; the true knight was ambitious, above all things, to appear the champion of the fair ſex. To qualify himſelf for this honour, he was careful to acquire every accompliſhment that could entitle him to their confidence: he was courteous, gentle, temperate, and chaſte. He bound himſelf, by ſolemn vows, to the performance of thoſe virtues: ſo that, while he acted with honour in his profeſſion, a lady might commit herſelf to his care, without detriment to her character; he being in regard to thoſe virtues as far above ſuſpicion, as a clergyman is now. And, that women of faſhion might confide in him with the more ſecurity, he commonly attached himſelf to ſome one lady, whom he declared to be the ſole miſtreſs of his affections, and to whom he ſwore inviolable conſtancy. Nothing is more ridiculous than Don Quixote's paſſion for Dulcinea del Toboſo, as Cervantes has deſcribed it: and yet, it was in ſome ſort neceſſary for every knight errant to have a nominal miſtreſs: becauſe, if he had not acknowleged any particular attachment, nor made any vows in conſequence of it, his conduct, where women were concerned, might have been ſuſpected; which would alone have diſqualified him for what he juſtly thought the moſt honourable duty annexed to his profeſſion. In a word, the chaſtity of a knight errant was to be no

leſs unimpeachable, than the credit of a merchant now is, or the courage of a ſoldier.

I have endeavoured to trace out the diſtinguiſhing features of that extraordinary character, a Knight Errant; and to account for each of them, from the nature of the inſtitution, and the manners of the times. The true Knight was religious, valiant, paſſionately fond of ſtrange adventures, a lover of juſtice, a protector of the weak, a puniſher of the injurious; temperate, courteous, and chaſte; and zealous, and reſpectful, in his attentions to the fair ſex. And this is the character aſſigned him in all thoſe old romances and poems, that deſcribe the adventures of chivalry.

Knight-errantry, however reſpectable in its firſt inſtitution, ſoon became dangerous. The Gothick armour was a complete covering to the whole perſon: and under that diſguiſe many warriours went through the world as knights errant, who were really nothing better than robbers; and who, inſtead of being patrons of mankind, were peſts of ſociety. The true knight, therefore, thought himſelf bound in honour to inquire into the character of thoſe who might appear in the ſame garb; ſo that two knights, who were ſtrangers to each other, could hardly meet without fighting. And we may warrantably ſuppoſe, that even the better ſort of theſe wanderers would ſometimes attack an innocent man, without neceſſity, in order to ſignalize their valour, and do honour to the lady of their affections. Nay in time it came to be a ſufficient cauſe for combat, if the ſtrange knight refuſed to acknowlege the beauty of his adverſary's miſtreſs ſuperiour to that of his own. The law, therefore, would find it neceſſary to interpoſe; firſt, in ſubjecting chivalry to certain reſtraints, to which a knight would not willingly ſubmit; and, at laſt, in declaring the profeſſion itſelf unlawful. Before the publication of Don Quixote, knight-errantry had been prohibited in ſeveral countries; and was indeed become unneceſſary, from the alterations, that (as will appear in the next paragraph) had

had been gradually introduced into the feudal ſyſtem; as well as inconvenient, from the abſurd conduct of the knights themſelves.

Of all thoſe, who repined at the encroachments of the feudal barons, the kings of Europe were the moſt impatient, and indeed the greateſt, ſufferers. They could ſummon their ſubjects in arms to the field; but, having little to give them, could not eaſily keep them together for more than a few weeks. And, in time of peace, the royal power being almoſt confined to the royal territory, the greater barons were continually oppoſing the views of the ſovereign, deſpiſing his authority, extorting from him new privileges, and counteracting the influence of the law. This was more or leſs the ſtate of every feudal kingdom. The faſhion of cruſading was now over. And a feudal prince, unable to deviſe employment in foreign parts, for his turbulent nobility, was obliged, in ſelf-defence, to exert all his power and policy, in controuling them at home; with a view to reſume, if poſſible, ſome of thoſe privileges that had been wreſted from him. Many years were paſſed in *ſtruggles* of this kind, between the kings and the nobles; to which nothing could put a period, but a change in the form of government. That happened, in ſome countries ſooner, and in others later: but the kings at length prevailed, and the feudal ſyſtem was broken in pieces. Its laws, however, and its manners, are ſtill obſervable, in every European kingdom.

As the power of the nobles was contracted, that of the kings became more extenſive. This might be unfavourable to the independence, or rather to the licentiouſneſs, of the grandees: but it promoted peace, and re-eſtabliſhed the authority of law. Society became more regular, and more ſecure. The knight-errant was no longer of any uſe. He was even found troubleſome; and the law conſidered him as a vagrant.

But the old ſpirit of chivalry was not extinguiſhed: and what remained of it was inflamed by the books called Romances, which were

were now common in Europe; and, being written in the vulgar tongues, and filled with marvellous adventures, could not fail to be eagerly ſought after and read, at a time when books were rare, and men credulous.

To inveſtigate all the cauſes that brought about the revival of letters, is now impoſſible. The ages immediately preceding this great event were profoundly ignorant; and few memorials of them remain. The cruſades, bloody and unnatural as they were, ſeem to have given a new, and a favourable, impulſe to the human ſoul. For the heroes of thoſe wars, who lived to return home, brought along with them marvellous accounts of Aſia, and of the misfortunes, triumphs, and other adventures that had there befallen them. Thus, it may be ſuppoſed, that the imagination of Europeans would be elevated, their memory ſtored with new ideas, and their curioſity awakened. The human mind, thus prepared, naturally betakes itſelf to invention. Or if we believe the dawn of modern literature to have been previous to, or coeval with, the firſt cruſade, it is not abſurd to imagine, that the ſame ſpirit of activity, however raiſed, which made men think of ſignalizing themſelves in feats of arms at home, or in queſt of adventures abroad, might alſo ſtimulate the mental powers, and cauſe genius to exert itſelf in new ways of thinking, as well as of acting. The wars of Thebes and of Troy are undoubtedly to be reckoned among the cauſes that gave riſe to the literature of Greece. *

Be this however as it will, certain it is, that, about the beginning of the twelfth century, or perhaps a little earlier, there appeared,

* The Cruſades were in many other reſpects beneficial to Europe. They enlarged mens ideas of commerce, improved their taſte, and refined their manners; and occaſioned new diſtributions of property; whereby the ſovereigns acquired greater power, the laws became more effectual, the ariſtocracy grew leſs formidable, and the people by degrees emerged into liberty. Theſe cauſes, by a ſlow and almoſt imperceptible energy continued through ſeveral ages, brought on at laſt a total reformation of the Feudal Syſtem.

in the country of Provence, a ſet of men, called TROUBADOURS, who are to be conſidered as the fathers of modern learning. That country, known of old by the name of *the Roman province*, is ſituated in a genial climate: and, from its vicinity to Marſeilles, which was a Greek colony, and from having ſo long enjoyed the benefit of Roman arts and manners, we need not wonder, that, when all the reſt of Europe was in a rude ſtate, it ſhould retain ſome traces of antient diſcipline. An obvious advantage it muſt have had, in this reſpect, over Rome; owing to its diſtance from the ſeat of Papal deſpotiſm: which in thoſe days was friendly to ignorance; though in a later period, under Leo, it favoured the cultivation of arts and ſciences.

The word *Troubadour*, in its etymological ſenſe, differs not much from the Greek word *poet*; the one denoting an *inventor*, and the other a *maker*. In Italian, *trovare* ſignifies *to find*, or *to invent*; *trovatore* is a *finder*, *inventor*, or *compoſer of poetry*: and *trovatore* and *troubadour* are plainly of the ſame origin. The troubadours made verſes in the Provençal tongue; which (as might be conjectured from the ſituation of the country) reſembled partly the Italian, and partly the French, and is ſaid to have had in it many Greek words and idioms, which it owed, no doubt, to the neighbouring city of Marſeilles. It ſeems to have been the firſt modern tongue that was put in writing, or employed in compoſition. And the rank of ſome of thoſe who compoſed in it (for many of the Troubadours were princes*) and the wandering life which others of them led, made it quickly circulate through the weſtern world.

The firſt poets of Greece ſung their own verſes: but the firſt Provenſal bards only compoſed poems; leaving it to an inferiour

* Richard the Firſt, king of England, and count of Poitou, was a generous patron of the Troubadours, and at length came to imitate them with no bad ſucceſs. Two of his poems, with ſome other Provenſal pieces, are very well verſified in a volume intitled RIMES, printed for Mr. Dilly 1781; in which volume there is great ſtore of poetical ideas, expreſſed with ſtrength, elegance, and harmony.

order

order of men, called *Jongleurs*, to ſing them. This at leaſt was the general practice: though occaſionally, no doubt, the former might ſing, and the latter compoſe. Both were inclined to a wandering life; but the ſinger more profeſſedly than the poet; though they ſometimes went in company. The Jongleur ſtudied to recommend himſelf by various arts; by playing on muſical inſtruments, by imitating the ſong of birds, by jumping through hoops, and by all ſorts of legerdemain. Hence, probably, our word *Juggler*.

No poets were ever held in higher eſteem, than the Troubadours. Raimond the fifth, count of Provence, exempted them from taxes. They went through many nations; and, wherever they went, they found patrons and patroneſſes. The Ladies were particularly ambitious of being celebrated by them; and would rather ſubmit to be teized with the importunities of their love, than venture by rejecting them to incur their hatred: for as the troubadour was extravagant in panegyrick, he could be equally ſo in ſatire, when he thought himſelf affronted or deſpiſed.—This paſſion for that ſort of renown, which poets pretend to give, may be accounted for, perhaps, from the ignorance of letters, which then prevailed in all ranks, and eſpecially among the fair ſex. Bernard de Ventadour mentions it as one of the accompliſhments of Queen Eleanor, who was married firſt to Louis the Seventh of France, and afterwards to Henry the Second of England, that ſhe could read. *

Conſidering the gallantry of the times, and the attention paid to theſe poets by the ladies, it is natural to ſuppoſe, that love would be a chief theme in their compoſitions. And ſo in fact it was. But this love, though in ſome inſtances it might be genuine, had ſo much formality in it, that I can hardly believe it to have been any thing elſe, for the moſt part, than a verbal parade of admiration and attachment, in which the heart had little concern, and which aimed at nothing further, than to ſecure the protection of the fair,

* Literary Hiſtory of the Troubadours, page 12.

and the noble. The Provenſal poet went to the court of ſome prince or lord; where he was no ſooner eſtabliſhed, than he began to compoſe ſonnets in praiſe of his patron's wife, and to feign, or to fancy, himſelf in love with her. This happened, not to one only, or to a few, but almoſt to the whole ſpecies of theſe adventurers; ſo that it would ſeem to have been the mode, and a thing of courſe. To unmarried ladies it does not appear, that much devotion was paid: I ſuppoſe, becauſe they had little to beſtow, in the way either of pecuniary, or of honorary, favour.

Petrarch's paſſion for Laura, though diſintereſted, ſeems to have been in ſome degree fictitious, or at leaſt, not quite ſo ſerious a matter as many people imagine. "He was wretched to ſhow he "had wit," as the ſong ſays: he loved after the Provenſal faſhion: he wanted to make paſſionate verſes; and Laura, being a beautiful lady, and a married one too, with a pretty romantick name, ſuited his poetical purpoſes as well, as Dulcinea del Toboſo did the heroick views of Don Quixote. Had his heart been really engaged, he could not have gone on, from day to day, in the ſame ſtrain of elegant and elaborate whining: a ſincere paſſion would have allowed him neither time nor tranquillity for ſuch amuſement.—What is obſerved, in the old aphoriſm, of violent grief, that it is ſilent, and of ſlight ſorrow, that it vents itſelf in words, will be found to hold true of many of our affections. Hammond was not in love, when he wrote his elegies; as I have been informed on good authority: and Young, while compoſing the moſt pathetick parts of the Night-thoughts, was as chearful as at other times. Theſe are not the only inſtances that might be mentioned *.

The

* That Petrarch's paſſion was ſincere, or ſuch at leaſt as gave him uneaſineſs for a conſiderable time, appears from a paſſage in an account of his life and character, written by himſelf in Latin proſe, and prefixed to an edition of his works printed *Baſil. apud Hen. Petri* 1554. But that it was of that permanent and overwhelming nature, which

is

The *Ciciſbeiſm*, as it is called, of modern Italy, (a ſort of romantick attention paid to married women by thoſe who ſhould not pay it) I do not pretend to underſtand: though I believe it to be a diſgrace to the country, not only as it tends to the utter corruption of

is generally ſuppoſed, may juſtly be doubted, upon the ſame authority. He was, he ſays, once violently in love, when a young man; but it was *amor honeſtus*, an honourable, or a virtuous paſſion. Granting, that Laura (or Lauretta) the wife of Hugues de Sade was the object of it; and that the lover called it *honourable*, becauſe it detached him from criminal connections; yet what evidence have we, that it continued with him (as ſome authors are pleaſed to affirm) to the end of his life? There is preſumptive, nay there is poſitive, evidence of the contrary: and that he was leſs ſubject perhaps, than moſt men can pretend to be, to the tyranny of *the winged boy*.

The *preſumptive* evidence is founded on the laborious life which he muſt have led in the purſuits of literature. His youth was employed in ſtudy, at a time when ſtudy was very difficult, from the want of books and of maſters. He became the moſt learned man of his time. To him we are indebted for the preſervation of ſome antient authors, whom he is ſaid to have tranſcribed with his own hand. His works, in my edition of them, fill one thouſand four hundred and fifty folio pages cloſely printed; whereof the Italian Sonnets are not much more than a twentieth part; the reſt being in Latin; and one of his Latin pieces an Epick poem called *Africa*, almoſt as long as the Eneid. Is it credible, that a man of extreme ſenſibility, pining in hopeleſs love for *thirty*, *forty*, or *fifty* years, could be ſo zealous a ſtudent, and ſo voluminous a compoſer? His retirement at Valcluſe was by no means devoted to love and Laura. There, ſays he, almoſt all the works I have publiſhed were completed, or begun, or planned: and ſo many they were, that even at theſe years they employ and fatigue me. Diverticulum aliquod quaſi portum quærens, repperi vallem perexiguam, ſed ſolitariam atque amænam, quæ Clauſa dicitur, quindecim millibus ab Avinione diſtantem, ubi fontium rex omnium Sorga oritur. Captus loci dulcedine, libellos meos, et meipſum illuc tranſtuli. Longa erit hiſtoria, ſi pergam exequi quid ibi multos ac multos egerim per annos. Hæc eſt ſumma, quod quicquid fere opuſculorum mihi excidit ibi vel actum, vel cæptum, vel conceptum eſt: quæ tam multa fuerunt, ut uſque ad hanc ætatem me exerceant ac fatigent. *Fr. Petrarcha*; *de origine ſua, vita, et converſatione.*

The *poſitive* evidence we have in the following quotation from the ſame Treatiſe; in the third ſentence of which quotation, for a reaſon that will occur to the learned reader, I take the liberty to expunge two words, and put one in their place.—Amore acerrimo, ſed unico, et honeſto, *in adoleſcentia* laboravi; et diutius laboraſſem, niſi jam tepeſcentem ignem mors acerba, ſed utilis, *extinxiſſet*. Libidinum me prorſus expertem dicere poſſe optarem quidem, ſed ſi dicam mentiar; hoc ſecure dixerim, me, quanquam

of manners; but alſo becauſe it ſupplies a pretence for idleneſs, effeminacy, ſauntering, goſſiping, and inſignificant prattle. But if this faſhion aroſe from the bewitching influence of Petrarch's poetry, which has been affirmed by ſome writers, and is not improbable, there may be reaſon to think, that at firſt it was rather a fooliſh, or at moſt a ſelfiſh, than a criminal, connection.—Adelaide, viſcounteſs of Baux, was extremely indulgent to the Troubadour Peter Vidal, as long as his paſſion was merely poetical: but when he had the preſumption to kiſs her one day in her ſleep, ſhe drove him from her preſence, and would never after, even at the requeſt of her huſband, be reconciled to him. Peter, finding her inexorable, went and fell in love with another lady, whoſe name happened to be *Wolf*; and, dreſſing himſelf in a ſkin of the animal ſo called, ſubmitted to the danger of being hunted for her ſake. In this garb he was diſcovered by the dogs; who, entering with great alacrity into the frolick, gave chace, purſued him to the mountains, and were actually worrying him, when he was with difficulty reſcued by the ſhepherds.

Vidal, however, though fantaſtick in love, was not in every thing ridiculous. His advice to a Jongleur is curious; and ſhows,

fervore ætatis et complexionis ad id raptum, vilitatem illam tamen ſemper animo execratum. Mox vero *ad quadrageſimum annum adpropinquans*, dum adhuc et caloris ſatis eſſet, et virium, non ſolum AMOREM, ſed ejus memoriam omnem ſic abjeci, quaſi nunquam fœminam aſpexiſſem. Quod inter primas felicitates memoror, Deo gratias agens, qui me adhuc integrum et vigentem, tam vili et mihi ſemper odioſo ſervitio liberavit. Sed ad alia procedo.

Hieronymo Squarzafichi, in a life of Petrarch prefixed to the ſame collection of his writings, informs us, that the Lady's real name was Lauretta, and that the poet made it Laura. Thus altered, it ſupplies him with numberleſs alluſions to the Laurel, and to the ſtory of Apollo and Daphne. Might he not, in many of his Sonnets, have had allegorical references to the Poetical Laurel; which was offered him at one and the ſame time by deputies from France and Italy, and with which he was actually crowned at Rome? In this view, his love of fame and of poetry would happily coincide with his tenderneſs for Laura, and give peculiar warmth and elevation to ſuch of his thoughts as might relate to any one of the three paſſions.

that,

that, though in thoſe days there might be little learning in Europe, the principles of good breeding, and of elegant behaviour, were in ſome parts of it very well underſtood. *

Love was not the only theme of the Provenſal poets. They occaſionally joined their voices to thoſe of the pope, and the monks, and the kings of Europe, to rouſe the ſpirit of cruſading. Satire, religious and political, as well as perſonal, and little tales or novels, with portions of real hiſtory, and even theological controverſy, were alſo interwoven in their compoſitions. But in every form their poetry pleaſed; and, by the induſtry of thoſe who compoſed, and of thoſe who ſung it, obtained a very extenſive circulation.

* I beg leave to ſubjoin the concluding paragraph, as a ſpecimen of this excellent piece. — "Never condemn other jongleurs: thoſe, who are ſevere on perſons of their "own profeſſion, ſhow a baſe and envious mind, and expoſe their own jealouſy much "more than the faults of their brethren. — If you are aſked to relate what you have "ſeen and heard in the world, be not too diffuſive, but proceed by degrees; ſound the "diſpoſition of your hearers, till you obſerve they reliſh your diſcourſe: then ſpeak of "the brave lords you have met with, and of the ladies in the higheſt eſteem; and en- "deavour to inſpire thoſe, who liſten to you, with the love of virtue. If the company "are perſons of high rank, and of elevated minds, diſplay, both in your countenance "and voice, the eloquence which your ſubject inſpires. Be diſtinct and grave in your "manners; let your carriage be firm and graceful; and abſtain from all mean and low "expreſſions. Some jongleurs find fault with every thing, but take care to extol them- "ſelves highly: and ſuch is their vanity and ignorance, that were they in the preſence "of the king himſelf, they would affect the free and familiar tone of men of import- "ance. Do not imitate thoſe; the more they are known, the leſs they are eſteemed. "For your part, whatever is your genius, your knowledge, or your wit, do not make "a boaſt of it: be modeſt, and you will find perſons enough who will ſet forth your "merit and abilities. Avoid all exceſs: flee all bad company; but do not appear to "deſpiſe any one; for the meaneſt and the worſt perſon is moſt able to become your "enemy; and they ſometimes purſue thoſe they hate, with ſuch inveterate malice, as to "injure them in the opinion of the worthy and the judicious. — While you are young "and vigorous, recommend in your writings, and impreſs by your behaviour, the re- "ſpect due to old age: And maintain continually this truth, that thoſe, who frequent "the company of perſons, whoſe lives have been ſpent in virtue, will derive to them- "ſelves a laſting bleſſing and reward." — See Mrs. Dobſon's Literary Hiſtory of the Troubadours, pag. 338 — 349.

A book,

A book, or a poem, in a living language, was at this period an extraordinary appearance. All Europe attended to it. The Provenſal tongue, and mode of writing, became faſhionable: and the neighbouring nations wiſhed to know, whether their languages could not alſo be applied to the ſame, or to ſimilar purpoſes.

This was firſt attempted with ſucceſs in Italy; where ſeveral men of great genius happened about this time to ariſe, whoſe practice and authority fixed the Italian tongue in a ſtate not very different from its preſent. Among theſe were Dante, Petrarch, and Boccacio; who all flouriſhed in the end of the thirteenth century, or in the beginning of the fourteenth. — Dante diſtinguiſhed himſelf in poetry: and wrote his *Inferno*, *Paradiſo*, and *Purgatorio*, in a bold, but extravagant ſtyle of fable: intermixing ſatire with his poetical deſcriptions and allegories; whereof many are highly finiſhed, and in particular paſſages enforced with ſingular energy and ſimplicity of expreſſion. — Petrarch compoſed many poems, letters, eſſays, and dialogues in Latin, which he thought the only durable tongue: for as to his Italian verſes, he did not believe they could laſt, or be intelligible for a century. But in this he was miſtaken greatly: his Latin works being now almoſt forgotten; while his Italian ſonnets are ſtill the admiration of Europe, for delicacy of ſentiment, and elegance of ſtyle. Their merit was indeed thought to be ſo tranſcendent, that he alone was attended to, and his maſters the Troubadours were neglected and forgotten. — Boccacio's chief performance is called the *Decameron*. It is a ſeries of novels; whereof ſome are grave, others comical, and many indecent. He ſuppoſes a number of men and women met together, at the time when a peſtilence was ravaging Florence, and telling thoſe ſtories for their mutual amuſement. His imagination muſt have been unbounded: and ſo highly is his proſe eſteemed in Italy to this day, that a late author of that country * declares it

* Vicende della Litteratura, del C. Denina.

to be impoſſible, for the man who has not read Boccacio, to form an idea of the extent or energy of the Italian tongue.

The fourteenth century produced alſo the illuſtrious Geoffry Chaucer; who, though not the firſt who wrote in Engliſh, is the firſt of our great authors, and may be truly called the father of our language and literature. His writings are chiefly tranſlations, or imitations, of the Provenſal and Italian writers then known. But he has imitated and tranſlated with the greateſt latitude, and added many fine ſtrokes of character, humour, and deſcription: ſo that we ought to conſider him as an original; ſince he does in fact exhibit, eſpecially in his Canterbury Tales, a more natural picture of the Engliſh manners of that age, than is to be met with in any other writer. He did not, however, fix the Engliſh tongue, as his contemporaries Petrarch and Boccacio had fixed the Italian. Many of his words ſoon fell into diſuſe: and his language at preſent is not well underſtood, except by thoſe who have taken ſome pains to ſtudy it. He died in the year fourteen hundred. Some of his poems, particularly his *Knight's Tale*, which is well modernized by Dryden, are written in the taſte of Chivalry; but not in that extravagant mode of invention, which now began to diſplay itſelf in the Spaniſh and French romances; and which was afterwards adopted, and adorned with every grace of language and of harmony, by Arioſto in Italy, and by Spenſer in England.

The origin of the Old Romance, which, after this long hiſtorical deduction, we are now arrived at, has been already accounted for. It was one of the conſequences of chivalry. The firſt writers in this way exhibited a ſpecies of fable, different from all that had hitherto appeared. They undertook to deſcribe the adventures of thoſe heroes who profeſſed knight-errantry. The world was then ignorant and credulous, and paſſionately fond of wonderful adventures, and deeds of valour. They believed in giants, dwarfs, dragons, enchanted caſtles, and every imaginable ſpecies of necro-

mancy. Theſe form the materials of the Old Romance. The knight errant was deſcribed as courteous, religious, valiant, adventurous, and temperate. Some enchanters befriended, and others oppoſed him. To do his miſtreſs honour, and prove himſelf worthy of her, he was made encounter the warrior, hew down the giant, cut the dragon in pieces, break the ſpell of the necromancer, demoliſh the enchanted caſtle, fly through the air on wooden or winged horſes; or, with ſome magician for his guide, to deſcend unhurt through the opening earth, and traverſe the caves in the bottom of the ocean. He detected and puniſhed the falſe knight, overthrew or converted the infidel, reſtored the exiled monarch to his dominions, and the captive damſel to her parents: he fought at the tournament, feaſted in the hall, and bore a part in the warlike proceſſion: or, when the enchanter who befriended his enemy prevailed, he did penance in the deſart, or groaned in the dungeon; or, perhaps, in the ſhape of a horſe or hart, grazed in the valley, till ſome other valiant knight broke the ſpell, and reſtored to him his form, his arms, and his freedom. At laſt, after innumerable toils, diſaſters, and victories, he married his miſtreſs, and became a great lord, a prince, or perhaps an emperor.

It will appear, from this account, that nature, probability, and even poſſibility, were not much attended to, in thoſe compoſitions. Yet with them all Europe was intoxicated: and in every nation, that had pretenſions to a literary character, multitudes of them were written, ſome in verſe, and others in proſe. To give a liſt is unneceſſary, and would be tedious. Amadis de Gaul was one of the firſt; and is, in the opinion of Cervantes, one of the beſt. Several others are mentioned, and characteriſed, by that excellent author, in his account of the purgation of Don Quixote's library.

While the taſte continued for every thing that was incredible and monſtrous, we may ſuppoſe, that true learning, and the natural ſimplicity of the Claſſicks, would not be held in general eſtimation.

Accordingly, though the knowlege of Greek and Latin was now advancing apace in the weſtern world, Homer, Virgil, Cicero, and all the moſt elegant authors, were much neglected. The firſt accounts, that circulated among us concerning the ſiege of Troy, ſeem to have been taken, not from Homer, but from Dares Phrygius and Dictys Cretenſis, two writers in proſe, who have given a fabulous and marvellous hiſtory of it: and, as late as the age of George Buchanan, our modern Latin poets, Vida excepted, were, if I miſtake not, more ambitious to imitate Claudian, than Virgil, in their hexameters. Ovid, too, was a favourite author; partly on account of the aſtoniſhing fables of the *Metamorphoſis*, and partly, no doubt, for the ſake of his love-verſes, ſo well adapted to the gallantry of this period. *

The paſſion for romance was attended with other bad conſequences. Men of warlike genius and warm fancy, charmed to infatuation with the ſuppoſed atchievements of knights errant, were tempted to appear in that character; though the profeſſion was now conſidered as a nuiſance, and proſcribed by law in ſome parts of Europe. This folly ſeems to have been moſt prevalent in Spain: which may be thus accounted for. The firſt Romances were written in the language of that kingdom. The Spaniards were then, as they are now, a valiant and enterpriſing people. And they had long been enſlaved by the Moors from Africa, whom, after a ſeven hundred years war (according to the hiſtorians), and after fighting three thouſand and ſeven hundred battles, they at laſt drove out of Spain. This produced many wonderful adventures; made them fierce, romantick, and haughty; and confirmed their attachment to their own religion, and their abhorrence of that of their enemies.

* "To avoid the raillery of thoſe who mock my uſeleſs conſtancy, a thought "occurs: I may feign, that I am favourably received. I ſhall be believed: for women "are eaſily ſoftened. *So ſays Ovid*, and all the gallant poets." This paſſage is found in Arnaud Daniel, a Troubadour of the twelfth century. *Hiſt. of Troub.* p. 215.

But the final extirpation of chivalry and all its chimeras was now approaching. What laws and force could not accompliſh, was brought about by the humour and ſatire of one writer. This was the illuſtrious Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra. He was born at Madrid in the year one thouſand five hundred and forty-nine. He ſeems to have had every advantage of education, and to have been a maſter in polite learning. But in other reſpects fortune was not very indulgent. He ſerved many years in the armies of Spain, in no higher ſtation, than that of a private ſoldier. In that capacity he fought at the battle of Lepanto, under Don John of Auſtria, and had the misfortune, or, as he rather thought, the honour, to loſe his left hand. Being now diſqualified for military ſervice, he commenced author; and wrote many Dramatick pieces, which were acted with applauſe on the Spaniſh theatre, and acquired him both money and reputation. But want of economy and unbounded generoſity diſſipated the former: and he was actually confined in priſon for debt, when he compoſed the firſt part of *The Hiſtory of Don Quixote*; a work, which every body admires for its humour; but which ought alſo to be conſidered as a moſt uſeful performance, that brought about a great revolution in the manners and literature of Europe, by baniſhing the wild dreams of chivalry, and reviving a taſte for the ſimplicity of nature. In this view, the publication of Don Quixote forms an important era in the hiſtory of mankind.

Don Quixote is repreſented as a man, whom it is impoſſible not to eſteem for his cultivated underſtanding, and the goodneſs of his heart: but who, by poring night and day upon the old romances, had impaired his reaſon to ſuch a degree, as to miſtake them for hiſtory, and form the deſign of going through the world, in the character, and with the accoutrements, of a knight errant. His diſtempered fancy takes the moſt common occurrences for adventures ſimilar to thoſe he had read in his books of chivalry. And thus, the extravagance of thoſe books being placed, as it were, in

the ſame groupe with the appearances of nature and the real buſineſs of life, the hideous diſproportion of the former becomes ſo glaring by the contraſt, that the moſt inattentive obſerver cannot fail to be ſtruck with it. The perſon, the pretenſions, and the exploits, of the errant knight, are held up to view in a thouſand ridiculous attitudes. In a word, the humour and ſatire are irreſiſtable; and their effects were inſtantaneous.

This work no ſooner appeared, than chivalry vaniſhed, as ſnow melts before the ſun. Mankind awoke as from a dream. They laughed at themſelves for having been ſo long impoſed on by abſurdity; and wondered they had not made the diſcovery ſooner. It aſtoniſhed them to find, that nature and good ſenſe could yield a more exquiſite entertainment, than they had ever derived from the moſt ſublime phrenzies of chivalry. For, that this was indeed the caſe: that Don Quixote was more read, and more reliſhed, than any other romance had ever been, we may infer, from the ſudden and powerful effects it produced on the ſentiments of mankind; as well as from the declaration of the author himſelf; who tells us, that upwards of twelve thouſand copies of the firſt part were ſold, before the ſecond could be got ready for the preſs:—an amazing rapidity of ſale, at a time when the readers and purchaſers of books were but an inconſiderable number compared to what they are in our days. "The very children, (ſays he) handle it, boys read "it, men underſtand, and old people applaud, the performance. "It is no ſooner laid down by one, than another takes it up; ſome "ſtruggling, and ſome entreating, for a ſight of it. In fine, "(continues he) this hiſtory is the moſt delightful, and the leaſt "prejudicial, entertainment, that ever was ſeen; for, in the whole "book, there is not the leaſt ſhadow of a diſhonourable word, nor "one thought unworthy of a good catholick." *

* Third volume of Don Quixote, near the beginning.

Don Quixote occaſioned the death of the Old Romance, and gave birth to the New. Fiction henceforth diveſted herſelf of her gigantick ſize, tremendous aſpect, and frantick demeanour; and, deſcending to the level of common life, converſed with man as his equal, and as a polite and chearful companion. Not that every ſubſequent Romance-writer adopted the plan, or the manner, of Cervantes: but it was from him they learned to avoid extravagance, and to imitate nature. And now probability was as much ſtudied, as it had been formerly neglected.

But before I proceed to the New Romance, on which I ſhall be very brief, it is proper juſt to mention a ſpecies of Romantick narrative, which cannot be called either Old or New, but is a ſtrange mixture of both. Of this kind are the *Grand Cyrus*, *Clelia*, and *Cleopatra*; each conſiſting of ten or a dozen large volumes, and pretending to have a foundation in antient hiſtory. In them, all facts and characters, real and fabulous; and all ſyſtems of policy and manners, the Greek, the Roman, the Feudal, and the modern, are jumbled together and confounded: as if a painter ſhould repreſent Julius Ceſar drinking tea with Queen Elizabeth, Jupiter, and Dulcinea del Toboſo, and having on his head the laurel wreathe of antient Rome, a ſuit of Gothick armour on his ſhoulders, laced ruffles at his wriſt, a pipe of tobacco in his mouth, and a piſtol and tomahawk ſtuck in his belt. But I ſhould go beyond my depth, if I were to criticize any of thoſe enormous compoſitions. For, to confeſs the truth, I never had patience to read one half of one of the volumes; nor met with a perſon, who could give me any other account of them, than that they are intolerably tedious, and unſpeakably abſurd.

The New Romance may be divided into the *Serious* and the *Comick*: and each of theſe kinds may be variouſly ſubdivided.

I. 1. Of *Serious* Romances, ſome follow *the hiſtorical arrangement*; and, inſtead of beginning, like Homer and Virgil, in the middle

middle of the ſubject *, give a continued narrative of the life of ſome one perſon, from his birth to his eſtabliſhment in the world, or till his adventures may be ſuppoſed to have come to an end. Of this ſort is *Robinſon Cruſoe*. The account commonly given of that well-known work is as follows.

Alexander Selkirk, a Scotch mariner, happened, by ſome accident which I forget, to be left in the uninhabited iſland of Juan Fernandes in the South Seas. Here he continued four years alone, without any other means of ſupporting life, than by running down goats, and killing ſuch other animals as he could come at. To defend himſelf from danger during the night, he built a houſe of ſtones rudely put together, which a gentleman, who had been in it, (for it was extant when Anſon arrived there) deſcribed to me as ſo very ſmall, that one perſon could with difficulty crawl in, and ſtretch himſelf at length. Selkirk was delivered by an Engliſh veſſel, and returned home. A late French writer ſays, he had become ſo fond of the ſavage ſtate, that he was unwilling to quit it. But that is not true. The French writer either confounds the real ſtory of Selkirk with a fabulous account of one Philip Quarl, written after Robinſon Cruſoe, of which it is a paltry imitation; or wilfully miſrepreſents the fact, in order to juſtify, as far as he is able, an idle conceit, which, ſince the time of Rouſſeau, has been in faſhion amongſt infidel and affected theoriſts on the continent, that ſavage life is moſt natural to us, and that the more a man reſembles a brute in his mind, body, and behaviour, the happier he becomes, and the more perfect. — Selkirk was adviſed to get his ſtory put in writing, and publiſhed. Being illiterate himſelf, he told every thing he could remember to Daniel Defoe, a profeſſed author of conſiderable note; who, inſtead of doing juſtice to the poor man, is ſaid to have applied theſe materials to his own uſe, by making them the groundwork of Robinſon Cruſoe; which he

* Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick. Part i. chap. 5.

ſoon

ſoon after publiſhed, and which, being very popular, brought him a good deal of money.

Some have thought, that a lovetale is neceſſary to make a romance intereſting. But Robinſon Cruſoe, though there is nothing of love in it, is one of the moſt intereſting narratives that ever was written; at leaſt in all that part which relates to the deſert iſland: being founded on a paſſion ſtill more prevalent than love, the deſire of ſelf-preſervation; and therefore likely to engage the curioſity of every claſs of readers, both old and young, both learned and unlearned.

I am willing to believe, that Defoe ſhared the profits of *this* publication with the poor ſeaman: for there is an air of humanity in it, which one would not expect from an author who is an arrant cheat. In the preface to his ſecond volume, he ſpeaks feelingly enough of the harm done him by thoſe who had abridged the firſt, in order to reduce the price. "The injury, ſays he, which theſe "men do to the *proprietors* of works, is a practice all honeſt men "abhor: and they believe they may challenge them to ſhow the "difference between that, and robbing on the highway, or breaking open a houſe. If they cannot ſhow any difference in the "crime, they will find it hard to ſhow, why there ſhould be any "difference in the puniſhment." Is it to be imagined, that any man of common prudence would talk in this way, if he were conſcious, that he himſelf might be proved guilty of that very diſhoneſty which he ſo ſeverely condemns?

Be this however as it may, for I have no authority to *affirm* any thing on either ſide, Robinſon Cruſoe muſt be allowed, by the moſt rigid moraliſt, to be one of thoſe novels, which one may read, not only with pleaſure, but alſo with profit. It breathes throughout a ſpirit of piety and benevolence: it ſets in a very ſtriking light, as I have elſewhere obſerved, the importance of the mechanick arts, which they, who know not what it is to be without

out them, are ſo apt to undervalue: it fixes in the mind a lively idea of the horrors of ſolitude, and, conſequently, of the ſweets of ſocial life, and of the bleſſings we derive from converſation, and mutual aid: and it ſhows, how, by labouring with one's own hands, one may ſecure independence, and open for one's ſelf many ſources of health and amuſement. I agree, therefore, with Rouſſeau, that this is one of the beſt books that can be put in the hands of children. — The ſtyle is plain, but not elegant, nor perfectly grammatical: and the ſecond part of the ſtory is tireſome.

2. A ſecond ſpecies of the Modern Serious Romance is that, which follows *the poetical arrangement*; and, in order to ſhorten the time of the action, begins in the middle of the ſtory. Such, partly, are *Sir Charles Grandiſon*, and *Clariſſa Harlowe*, by Mr. Richardſon. That author has adopted a plan of narrative of a peculiar kind: the perſons, who bear a part in the action, are themſelves the relaters of it. This is done by means of letters, or epiſtles; wherein the ſtory is continued from time to time, and the paſſions freely expreſſed, as they ariſe from every change of fortune, and while the perſons concerned are ſuppoſed to be ignorant of the events that are to follow. And thus, the ſeveral agents are introduced in their turns, ſpeaking, or, which is the ſame thing in this caſe, writing, ſuitably to their reſpective feelings, and characters: ſo that the fable is partly Epick, and partly Dramatick. There are ſome advantages in this form of narrative. It prevents all anticipation of the cataſtrophe; and keeps the reader in the ſame ſuſpenſe, in which the perſons themſelves are ſuppoſed to be: and it pleaſes further, by the varieties of ſtyle, ſuited to the different tempers and ſentiments of thoſe who write the letters. But it has alſo its inconveniencies. For, unleſs the fable be ſhort and ſimple, this mode of narration can hardly fail to run out into an extravagant length, and to be encumbered with repetitions. And indeed, Richardſon himſelf, with all his powers of invention, is apt to be tedious,

tedious, and to fall into a minuteneſs of detail, which is often unneceſſary. His pathetick ſcenes, too, are overcharged, and ſo long continued, as to wear out the ſpirits of the reader. Nor can it be denied, that he has given too much prudery to his favourite women, and ſomething of pedantry or finicalneſs to his favourite men.—Clementina was, no doubt, intended as a pattern of female excellence: but, though ſhe may claim veneration as a ſaint, it is impoſſible to love her as a woman. And Grandiſon, though both a good and a great character, is in every thing ſo perfect, as in many things to diſcourage imitation; and ſo diſtant, and ſo formal, as to forbid all familiarity, and, of courſe, all cordial attachment. Alworthy is as good a man as he: but his virtue is purely human; and, having a little of our own weakneſs in it, and aſſuming no airs of ſuperiority, invites our acquaintance, and engages our love.

For all this, however, Richardſon is an author of uncommon merit. His characters are well drawn, and diſtinctly marked; and he delineates the operation of the paſſions with a pictureſque accuracy, which diſcovers great knowlege of human nature. His moral ſentiments are profound and judicious; in wit and humour he is not wanting; his dialogue is ſometimes formal; but many of his converſation-pieces are executed with elegance and vivacity. For the good tendency of his writings he deſerves ſtill higher praiſe; for he was a man of unaffected piety, and had the improvement of his fellow-creatures very much at heart.

Yet, like moſt other novel-writers, he repreſents ſome of his wicked characters as more agreeable than was neceſſary to his plan; which may make the example dangerous. I do not think, that an author of fable, in either proſe or verſe, ſhould make his bad characters completely bad: for, in the firſt place, that would not be natural, as the worſt of men have generally ſome good in them: and, ſecondly, that would hurt his deſign, by making the tale leſs captivating; as the hiſtory of a perſon, ſo very worthleſs as to have

not one good quality, would give diſguſt or horror, inſtead of pleaſure. But, on the other hand, when a character, like Richardſon's *Lovelace*, whom the reader ought to abominate for his crimes, is adorned with youth, beauty, eloquence, wit, and every other intellectual and bodily accompliſhment, it is to be feared, that thoughtleſs young men may be tempted to imitate, even while they diſapprove, him. Nor is it a ſufficient apology to ſay, that he is puniſhed in the end. The reader knows, that the ſtory is a fiction: but he knows too, that ſuch talents and qualities, if they were to appear in real life, would be irreſiſtably engaging; and he may even fancy, that a character ſo highly ornamented muſt have been a favourite of the author. Is there not, then, reaſon to apprehend, that ſome readers will be more inclined to admire the gay profligate, than to fear his puniſhment?—Achilles in Homer, and Macbeth in Shakeſpeare, are not without great and good qualities, to raiſe our admiration, and make us take concern in what befals them. But no perſon is in any danger of being perverted by their example: their criminal conduct being deſcribed and directed in ſuch a manner, by the art of the poet, as to ſhow, that it is hateful in itſelf, and neceſſarily productive of miſery, both to themſelves, and to mankind.

I may add, that the puniſhment of Lovelace is a death, not of infamy, according to our notions, but rather of honour; which ſurely he did not deſerve: and that the immediate cauſe of it is, not his wickedneſs, but ſome inferiority to his antagoniſt in the uſe of the ſmall ſword. With a little more ſkill in that exerciſe, he might, for any thing that appears in the ſtory, have triumphed over Clariſſa's avenger, as he had done over herſelf, and over the cenſure of the world. Had his crime been repreſented as the neceſſary cauſe of a ſeries of mortifications, leading him gradually down to infamy, ruin, and deſpair, or producing by probable means an exemplary repentance, the fable would have been more uſeful in a moral view, and perhaps more intereſting. And for the execu-

tion of ſuch a plan the genius of Richardſon ſeems to me to have been extremely well formed.—Theſe remarks are offered, with a view rather to explain my own ideas of fable, than to detract from an author, who was an honour to his country, and of whoſe talents and virtues I am a ſincere admirer.

His Epiſtolary manner has been imitated by many novel-writers; particularly by Rouſſeau in his *New Eloiſa*; a work, not more remarkable for its eloquence, which is truly great, than for its glaring and manifold inconſiſtencies. For it is full of nature and extravagance, of ſound philoſophy and wild theory, of uſeful inſtruction and dangerous doctrine.

II. 1. The ſecond kind of the New Romance is the *Comick*; which, like the firſt, may, with reſpect to the arrangement of events, be ſubdivided into the *Hiſtorical* and the *Poetical*.

Of the Hiſtorical form are the novels of Marivaux, and *Gil Blas* by M. le Sage. Theſe authors abound in wit and humour; and give natural deſcriptions of preſent manners, in a ſimple, and very agreeable, ſtyle. And their works may be read without danger; being for the moſt part of a moral tendency. Only Le Sage appears to have had a partiality for cheats and ſharpers: for theſe are people whom he introduces often; nor does he always paint them in the odious colours, that properly belong to all ſuch peſts of ſociety. Even his hero Gil Blas he has made too much a rogue: which, as he is the relater of his own ſtory, has this diſagreeable effect, that it conveys to us, all the while we read him, an idea that we are in bad company, and deriving entertainment from the converſation of a man whom we cannot eſteem.

Smollet follows the ſame hiſtorical arrangement in *Roderick Random* and *Peregrine Pickle*: two performances, of which I am ſorry to ſay, that I can hardly allow them any other praiſe, than that they are humourous and entertaining. He excels, however, in drawing the characters of ſeamen; with whom in his younger days he

he had the beſt opportunities of being acquainted. He ſeems to have collected a vaſt number of merry ſtories; and he tells them with much vivacity and energy of expreſſion. But his ſtyle often approaches to bombaſt; and many of his humourous pictures are exaggerated beyond all bounds of probability. And it does not appear that he knew how to contrive a regular fable, by making his events mutually dependent, and all co-operating to one and the ſame final purpoſe.—On the morality of theſe novels I cannot compliment him at all. He is often inexcuſably licentious. Profligates, bullies, and miſanthropes, are among his favourite characters. A duel he ſeems to have thought one of the higheſt efforts of human virtue; and playing dextrouſly at billiards a very genteel accompliſhment. Two of his pieces, however, deſerve to be mentioned with more reſpect. Count Fathom, though an improbable tale, is pleaſing, and upon the whole not immoral, though in ſome paſſages very indelicate. And Sir Launcelot Greaves, though ſtill more improbable, has great merit; and is truly original in the execution, notwithſtanding that the hint is borrowed from Don Quixote.

2. The ſecond ſpecies of the New Comick Romance is that which, in the arrangement of events, follows the poetical order; and which may properly enough be called the Epick Comedy, or rather the Comick Epick poem: *Epick*, becauſe it is narrative; and *Comick*, becauſe it is employed on the buſineſs of common life, and takes its perſons from the middle and lower ranks of mankind.

This form of the Comick Romance has been brought to perfection in England by Henry Fielding; who ſeems to have poſſeſſed more wit and humour *, and more knowlege of mankind, than any

* The great Lord Lyttelton, after mentioning ſeveral particulars of Pope, Swift, and other wits of that time, when I aſked ſome queſtion relating to the Author of Tom Jones, began his anſwer with theſe words, "Henry Fielding, I aſſure you, had "more wit and more humour than all the perſons we have been ſpeaking of put toge-"ther." This teſtimony of his Lordſhip, who was intimately acquainted with Fielding, ought not to be forgotten.

other perſon of modern times, Shakeſpeare excepted; and whoſe great natural abilities were refined by a claſſical taſte, which he had acquired by ſtudying the beſt authors of antiquity: though it cannot be denied, that he appears on ſome occaſions to have been rather too oſtentatious, both of his learning, and of his wit.

Some have ſaid, that Joſeph Andrews is the beſt performance of Fielding. But its chief merit is parſon Adams; who is indeed a character of maſterly invention, and, next to Don Quixote, the moſt ludicrous perſonage that ever appeared in romance. This work, though full of exquiſite humour, is blameable in many reſpects. Several paſſages offend by their indelicacy. And it is not eaſy to imagine, what could induce the author to add to the other faults of his hero's father Wilſon the infamy of lying and cowardice; and then to diſmiſs him, by very improbable means, to a life of virtuous tranquillity, and endeavour to render him upon the whole a reſpectable character. Some youthful irregularities, rather hinted at than deſcribed, owing more to imprudence and unlucky accident than to confirmed habits of ſenſuality, and followed by inconvenience, perplexity, and remorſe, their natural conſequences, may, in a comick tale, be aſſigned even to a favourite perſonage, and, by proper management, form a very inſtructive part of the narration: but crimes, that bring diſhonour, or that betray a hard heart, or an injurious diſpoſition, ſhould never be fixed on a character who them poet or novel-writer means to recommend to our eſteem. On this principle, Fielding might be vindicated in regard to all the cenſurable conduct of Tom Jones, provided he had been leſs particular in deſcribing it: and, by the ſame rule, Smollet's ſyſtem of youthful profligacy, as exemplified in ſome of his libertines, is altogether without excuſe.

Tom Jones and *Amelia* are Fielding's beſt performances; and the moſt perfect, perhaps, of their kind in the world. The fable of the latter is entirely poetical, and of the true epick ſpecies; beginning

ning in the middle of the action, or rather as near the end as poſſible, and introducing the previous occurrences, in the form of a narrative epiſode. Of the former, the introductory part follows the hiſtorical arrangement; but the fable becomes ſtrictly poetical, as ſoon as the great action of the piece commences, that is, if I miſtake not, immediately after the ſickneſs of Alworthy: for, from that period, the incidents proceed in an uninterrupted ſeries to the final event, which happens about two months after.

Since the days of Homer, the world has not ſeen a more artful Epick fable. The characters and adventures are wonderfully diverſified: yet the circumſtances are all ſo natural, and riſe ſo eaſily from one another, and co-operate with ſo much regularity in bringing on, even while they ſeem to retard, the cataſtrophe, that the curioſity of the reader is kept always awake, and, inſtead of flagging, grows more and more impatient as the ſtory advances, till at laſt it becomes downright anxiety. And when we get to the end, and look back on the whole contrivance, we are amazed to find, that of ſo many incidents there ſhould be ſo few ſuperfluous; that in ſuch variety of fiction there ſhould be ſo great probability; and that ſo complex a tale ſhould be ſo perſpicuouſly conducted, and with perfect unity of deſign.—Theſe remarks may be applied either to *Tom Jones* or to *Amelia:* but they are made with a view to the former chiefly; which might give ſcope to a great deal of criticiſm, if I were not in haſte to conclude the ſubject. Since the time of Fielding, who died in the year one thouſand ſeven hundred and fifty-four, the Comick Romance, as far as I am acquainted with it, ſeems to have been declining apace, from ſimplicity and nature, into improbability and affectation.

Let not the uſefulneſs of Romance-writing be eſtimated by the length of my diſcourſe upon it. Romances are a dangerous recreation. A few, no doubt, of the beſt may be friendly to good taſte and good morals; but far the greater part are unſkilfully written,

and tend to corrupt the heart, and ſtimulate the paſſions. A habit of reading them breeds a diſlike to hiſtory, and all the ſubſtantial parts of knowledge; withdraws the attention from nature, and truth; and fills the mind with extravagant thoughts, and too often with criminal propenſities. I would therefore caution my young reader againſt them: or, if he muſt, for the ſake of amuſement, and that he may have ſomething to ſay on the ſubject, indulge himſelf in this way now and then, let it be ſparingly, and ſeldom.

ON THE

ATTACHMENTS of KINDRED.

MARRIAGE might be proved to be natural from its univerſality: for no nation has yet been diſcovered, where under one form or other it did not take place. Whether this be the effect of a law preſcribed in the beginning by the Creator, and circulated by tradition through all the tribes of mankind: or, which amounts to the ſame thing, whether this be the reſult of natural paſſions co-operating with human reaſon: certain it is, that, even among ſavages, and where there was hardly any trace of government or art, and none at all of literature, men and women have been found, living together in domeſtick union, and providing neceſſaries for their children, and for each other.

In the lower world of animals, the union of ſexes is temporary: the paſſions that prompt to it being periodical, and the young ſoon

* There are modern authors, who, from an exceſſive admiration of the Greek policy, ſeem to have formed erroneous opinions in regard to ſome of the points touched on in this Diſcourſe. With a view to thoſe opinions, the Diſcourſe was written ſeveral years ago. Afterwards, when a book called *Thelyphthora* appeared, I had thoughts of enlarging theſe remarks, ſo as to make them comprehend an examination of it. This the Authors of the *Monthly Review* rendered unneceſſary, by giving a very ingenious, learned, and deciſive confutation of that profligate ſyſtem. I therefore publiſh my Eſſay, as it was at firſt written: ſatisfied, that Mr. Madan's Book, whatever private immoralities it may promote among the licentious and ignorant, will have no weight with the publick; nor deſerve further animadverſion, unleſs he ſhould ſubjoin to it, as an appendix, or premiſe, by way of introduction, (what indeed ſeems wanting to complete his plan), an argument to prove, that the only true religion is the Turkiſh, and that of all forms of policy a free government is the worſt. For, as the world is now conſtituted, the ſcheme of this Reverend Projector (REVEREND!—it is, it ſeems, even ſo!) is not compatible with any other political eſtabliſhment, than that of Mahometan Deſpotiſm.

in a condition to live independent. While this union laſts, the male and female, of certain tribes, are directed, by the inſtinct of their nature, to be mutually aſſiſtant to their young, and to one another. But, when the young are able to take care of themſelves, it happens for the moſt part, that the family breaks up; and parents and offspring know each other no more: and, till the return of the ſeaſon appointed by the Author of nature for its commencement, the paſſion founded on diverſity of ſex is entirely over. Nor, even when that ſeaſon returns, do thoſe that were formerly connected ſeek to renew the connection; and the following attachment is, like the preceding, fortuitous. This, with a few exceptions, appears to be the ordinary courſe of things among thoſe creatures, whoſe union moſt reſembles that which prevails in the human ſpecies. In ſome other tribes, the connection is ſtill more temporary, and the young are left to the care of the mother; the male being equally, and totally, inattentive, both to his mate, and to her offspring.

But with man the caſe is very different. Human infants are of all animals the moſt helpleſs. The tendereſt care is neceſſary to prevent their periſhing; and that muſt be long continued, before they can preſerve themſelves from danger: nay years muſt paſs away, before they have acquired ſuch knowlege, or dexterity, as enables them to provide for themſelves. A ſavage, notwithſtanding his hardy frame, and the fewneſs of his wants, can hardly be ſuppoſed capable of ſupporting himſelf by his own induſtry, for the firſt eight or ten years of his life: and in civil ſociety, the term of education ought to be, and the period of helpleſneſs muſt be, conſiderably longer. And if, before this period is over, children be left deſtitute of thoſe friends, who were connected with them by the ties of blood, they will be indebted for their preſervation to the humanity of the ſtranger.

Now

Now man, being endowed with reflection and foreſight, muſt be ſenſible of all this. Being, moreover, compaſſionate in his nature; and having that affection to offspring, whereof many brutes are not deſtitute, he cannot but conſider himſelf as under an obligation to take care of that helpleſs infant, whom he has been the means of bringing into the world. And this, together with the tenderneſs, wherewith it is natural for him to regard the mother of his child, would incline him, even of his own accord, and previouſly to the reſtraints of human law, to live for ſome time with his child and its mother, and give them that aid, whereof they now ſtand ſo much in need.

We naturally contract a liking to thoſe, who have long been the objects of our beneficence, eſpecially when we conſider them as dependent on us: and it is further natural, for perſons who have lived long together, to be unwilling to part. There is ſomething too, as Lucretius well obſerves *, in the looks and ſmiles of children, that has a peculiar efficacy in ſoftening the heart of man. The father, therefore, even though a ſavage, who had once taken up his abode with his infant and its mother, would probably become more and more attached to both: and the woman and he, being mutually ſerviceable to each other, would contract a mutual liking, more durable than that which ariſes from mere difference of ſex; and look upon themſelves as united by ties of friendſhip and of gratitude. That their connection would continue is, therefore, more probable, than that it would be diſſolved: and, long before the firſt child was in a condition to ſhift for itſelf, a ſecond, and a third, perhaps, would have a claim to their parental care, and give additional weight to every one of thoſe motives, which had hitherto determined them to live together.

* —— Puerique parentum
Blanditiis facile ingenium fregere ſuperbum. Lib. v. verſ. 1016.

From this view of things; and if it be conſidered further, that, the more we advance in years, the more we become inclined to a ſtationary life; it ſeems not unreaſonable to infer, that, even among ſavages, if they were not utterly brutal, the union of the ſexes, however ſlight the cauſe that firſt gave riſe to it, might have a tendency to laſt, not merely for a day, or a year, but for many years, and perhaps till death. And thus the idea of marriage would become prevalent; that is, of an union for life of one man with one woman, for their mutual benefit, and for that of their children. And, as ſoon as government was formed, the ſalutary effects, both publick and private, of ſuch an inſtitution, would be too conſpicuous, not to procure for it the ſanction of poſitive laws.

This deduction, though it may ſeem to be inferred *a priori* from the nature of man, is not wholly conjectural. Many facts might be quoted to confirm it, from the hiſtory of unpoliſhed nations, and from the ſentiments of the vulgar throughout the world. Among the Germans of old, and all thoſe northern tribes who deſtroyed the Roman empire; among the antient Egyptians, Greeks *, and Romans; and among the original natives of America, marriage was eſtabliſhed, polygamy unknown, and adultery conſidered as a crime. The love of children and kindred is every where, among the vulgar, a moſt powerful principle: and in all the nations we have heard of, that were not ſunk in the groſſeſt barbarity, Genealogy is conſidered as a matter of general concern. But a regard to genealogy, the love of kindred, natural affection

* If it be true, that, on certain emergencies, when many of their people had been deſtroyed by war or other calamities, ſome of the Grecian ſtates granted a toleration to the men to marry more than one wife each, it cannot be ſaid, that polygamy was *unknown* to them. But this was never a general practice among that people. Marriage they conſidered as an union of one man with one woman. When Herodotus ſays, that Anaxandridas the Lacedemonian had two wives, he remarks, that it was contrary to the cuſtom of the Lacedemonians. See *Potter's Antiquities of Greece*, book 4. chap. 11.

to

to children, and puniſhments denounced by law on polygamy and adultery, could never take place, except among thoſe, who have both an idea of marriage, and a reſpect for it.

In fact, that perverſion of conduct and principle, which bids defiance to every thing that is ſacred in the matrimonial contract, and hardens the heart againſt the endearments of natural affection, is ſeldom known either in ſavage, or in common life; but is more apt to take its riſe among thoſe of the higher ranks, whom luxury, inattention, and flattery have corrupted. If the example that is ſet by ſuch perſons were to be followed by the body of a people, friendſhip and love would be at an end; ſelf-intereſt and ſenſuality would detach individuals from their country, and from one another; every houſe would be divided againſt itſelf, and every man againſt his neighbour; the very idea of publick good would be loſt, becauſe a man would ſee nothing in the world, but himſelf, that was worth contending for: and all the charities of domeſtick life, the great humanizers of the heart of man, and the pureſt ſources of ſublunary joy, would be deſpiſed and forgotten.

For ſuppoſe marriage aboliſhed: or ſuppoſe, for it is the ſame thing, that its laws are to be univerſally diſregarded: is it not ſelf-evident, that the forming of families, and the attachments of conſanguinity, together with all decency and order, would be aboliſhed, or diſregarded, at the ſame time? Nay, induſtry would be aboliſhed too: for what is a greater, or more honourable, incitement to induſtry, than the deſire of doing good to friends and kindred? But, in the caſe ſuppoſed, there would be no ſuch thing as kindred; and the condition of mankind would reſemble that of wild beaſts: with this difference, however, that our genius for contrivance, our ſenſibility, and our capacity of wickedneſs, would render us a thouſand times more wretched, and more deteſtable.

I have endeavoured to account for the general prevalence of the matrimonial union, by proving it to be the reſult of human paſſions

co-operating with human reaſon. It promotes the happineſs of the individual, by means the moſt friendly to the ſocial and ſympathetick nature of man. It muſt, therefore, promote the publick weal; both becauſe the publick is made up of individuals; and alſo, becauſe, by this inſtitution, the race of men is continued from age to age, in a way, not only conſiſtent with ſocial affection, decency, induſtry, and patriotiſm, but tending in an eminent degree to encourage all theſe virtues. Without it, a few gloomy and beaſtly ſavages might exiſt: but of all government and good order, and of every thing that is elegant, praiſeworthy, or comfortable in life, it is to be conſidered as the foundation.

Will it be objected, that marriage may have been the cauſe of miſery to ſome individuals? Granting that it has; and that, when it was ſo, the perſons concerned were never themſelves to blame, (which is granting more than any rational opponent would require) — this is only one evidence, of what is too plain to need any, that in the preſent world nothing can be completely good which is tainted with human imperfection. Medicine, philoſophy, liberty, and religion, are good things: yet medicine has killed, as well as cured; and by philoſophy men have been led into projects that ended in ruin: free governments have fallen into anarchy, and moderate monarchies into deſpotiſm: religion itſelf may be loſt in ſuperſtition, and uncharitableneſs and cruelty are the conſequence. Nay, to come to more familiar inſtances, the ax may wound the hand of the moſt ſkilful mechanick; ſhips guided by the beſt pilot may be wrecked; bodily exerciſe may produce fever, and bodily reſt may bring on more fatal maladies; tares ſpring up with the corn; and men have been poiſoned, while they thought only of allaying their hunger and thirſt. But does it follow, that eating, and drinking, and agriculture, are pernicious; that bodily exerciſe and bodily reſt are both to be avoided; that art, and ſcience, and government, and religion, are detrimental to human happineſs?

If nothing is valuable, but what has no mixture of evil, then there is nothing in this world of any value; and life itſelf, and all the comforts of life, are inſignificant things.

Nor let it be ſuppoſed, that I mean by theſe reaſonings to inſinuate, that it is every man's duty to enter into this union. By evincing its importance to publick and private good, we do indeed prove, that every man ought to reverence the inſtitution and its laws, and that it is the duty of all perſons in authority to give the greateſt encouragement to it, and to diſallow every practice that tends to bring it into diſrepute. But it cannot be the duty of any perſon to enter into this ſtate, whoſe circumſtances or way of life would render it imprudent to do ſo; or who is diſqualified for it, either by want of inclination, or by ſuch perverſities of mind or infirmities of body, as might make it impoſſible for him to be an agreeable aſſociate. In regard to a connection, whereon the happineſs of life ſo eſſentially depends, we ſhould be permitted to judge for ourſelves, and be determined by our own free-will. We have heard indeed of laws in ſome countries, commanding all the citizens to marry; but it ſeems to have been bad policy: for neither happineſs to the parties, nor good education to their children, could ever be expected from forced alliances. In matters of this kind, it is better to allure, than to compel. And that might be done with good ſucceſs, if licentious behaviour were always the object of legal animadverſion, and always followed by ſenſible inconvenience; and if particular advantages were annexed to the condition of thoſe who had quitted the ſtate of celibacy. In either of theſe reſpects, I cannot pay great compliments to the virtue, or to the wiſdom, of latter times. Indeed, as to the firſt, it may be ſaid, *Quid leges ſine moribus?* What avail good laws, when the manners are evil? And, as to the ſecond, I know not, whether any modern people have ever thought it worth their while to imitate that part of the Roman policy, which allotted certain privileges to the

parent

parent of three children, and determined, not by their age, but by the number of their children, the precedency of conſuls and ſenators; or that ſimilar inſtitution of the Athenian commonwealth, which required, that a citizen ſhould, by being married, be ſuppoſed to have given ſecurity for his good behaviour, before he could be honoured with the command of an army, or any other publick truſt.

While the manners of a people are tolerably pure; while induſtry is encouraged, and no unreaſonable taxes are laid upon the neceſſaries of life, matrimony is generally found to flouriſh, even though no peculiar advantages are annexed to it by the legiſlature. For the motives to this union are both natural, and ſtrong. They may be reduced to the following. 1. That inſtinct, which tends to the continuation of the ſpecies; and which, being common to all animals, has nothing in it characteriſtical of human nature. 2. A preference of one perſon to another, founded on a real or fancied ſuperiority in mind, or body, or both; which, as it implies compariſon, and a taſte for beauty, as well as the admiration of intellectual and moral excellence, muſt be ſuppoſed to be peculiar to rational minds. The paſſion, thus ariſing from the view of agreeable qualities in another, is commonly called Love. To the inſtinct formerly mentioned it imparts a delicacy, whereof inferior natures are not ſuſceptible; and from the ſame inſtinct it derives a vivacity, whereby it is diſtinguiſhed from all the forms and degrees of friendſhip, that may take place between perſons of the ſame ſex. 3. Benevolence, Goodwill, or a deſire to make the beloved perſon happy, is a third motive to this union. This may ſeem to be the ſame with the Love juſt now mentioned: but we muſt diſtinguiſh them in ſcience, becauſe they are not always united in nature. When, for example, the paſſion that ſprings from diverſity of ſex, and is refined and heightened by the admiration of agreeable qualities, aims at its own gratification, although with ruin to the admired object; or when, by ſucceſs, it is transformed into indifference or hatred; ſuch a paſſion,

ſion, though it may be called Love, has ſurely nothing of goodwill in it: for if it partook of this affection, the circumſtance alluded to, by blending it with gratitude, pity, and other tender emotions, would make it more benevolent, and more generous, than it was before. 4. The love of offspring may be conſidered as a fourth motive: and a regard to one's own happineſs as a fifth.—All theſe principles of conduct are natural to man; and, when united, form a paſſion which does him honour, and ſeems to promiſe him happineſs. But if one or more of them be wanting, an alliance founded on the others will be more or leſs unnatural, according as the generous and rational principles are leſs or more predominant.

Now, theſe propenſities being natural to man, and tending to produce the relation we ſpeak of, it follows, that this relation muſt be natural to him; or, in other words, that Providence, in giving him theſe propenſities, intended, that he ſhould form the connection to which they lead. And for this, human beings are ſtill further qualified, by the peculiar characters of the two ſexes. The one being of a more delicate make, and withal particularly inclined and adapted to what may be called the internal adminiſtration of a family; and the other of a hardier frame, and more enterpriſing genius, and fit for defending a family from external injury: their reſpective abilities form, when united, a complete ſyſtem of the powers eſſential to domeſtick policy. There are many houſehold duties, for which nature has not qualified the man: and many offices, both domeſtick and civil, whereof the woman is not capable. In a word, the two ſexes are natural aſſociates; feminine weakneſs being compenſated by maſculine ſtrength, and what is harſh in the male character by the delicacy of the female: and, in general, the peculiar talents of the one ſex being a ſupplement to the peculiar imperfections of the other.—It is true, we ſometimes meet with a womaniſh man, and with a manniſh woman. But both are awkward to a degree that proves them to be unnatural: and the words,

whereby we denote thoſe characters, are terms of ſcorn and diſlike. The name *virago* conveys the idea of a diſagreeable woman; and *effeminate*, applied to one of the other ſex, denotes a contemptible man.—I might add, that the very dreſs of the one does not become the other; and that nature has eſtabliſhed a great difference in their voices, that of a man being eight notes deeper or graver than that of a woman. Cicero diſtinguiſhes feminine from manly beauty, calling the former *venuſtas*, and the latter *dignitas*: and indeed, at Rome, as the men were almoſt continually in the open air, and expoſed, with their heads uncovered, to the ſun of a warm climate, their complexion, and caſt of features, muſt have differed very much from that of the women, who were for the moſt part within doors *. And with us, and in every other civilized country, many of thoſe outward accompliſhments, that become a woman, would not be graceful in a man; and thoſe defects that are pardonable, and ſometimes pleaſing, in the one, would in the other be intolerable. That vivacity, for example, which is not blamed in a man, might be impudence in a woman; and that timidity, which detracts nothing from the female character, would make a man not only ridiculous, but infamous.

I will not enlarge further on this topick. It is ſufficiently manifeſt, that a man and a woman are different characters, and formed for different employments; and are, each of them, when united, more complete animals, (if I may ſo ſpeak) and have the means of happineſs more in their power, than when ſeparate. Nothing more needs be ſaid to prove, that the matrimonial union is natural and beneficial.

By this union, Providence ſeems to have intended the accompliſhment of theſe very important purpoſes. Firſt, the Continuation of the human race in a way conſiſtent with virtue, decency, and good government. Secondly, the Training up of human

* See Eſſay on Imagination. *Chap. II. Sect. iv. § 1.*

creatures

creatures for the ſeveral duties incumbent upon them as rational and moral beings. And thirdly, the happineſs of the perſons who form this connection.

Some queſtions here occur, on which mankind are not unanimous, and which, therefore, it may be proper to examine. I. It may be aſked, Whether it is according to nature, that the married perſons ſhould be only two, one man and one woman: II. Whether the matrimonial union ſhould laſt through the whole of life: III. Whether the rearing and educating of children ſhould be left to the parents, or provided for by the publick.

I. The firſt queſtion may be otherwiſe expreſſed thus: Is Polygamy lawful? We may imagine two ſorts of polygamy: the firſt, when one woman has at one time two or more huſbands; the ſecond, when one man has at one time two or more wives. The former is ſaid to prevail in the kingdom of Thibet, in the Eaſt Indies; but is ſo very uncommon, that we need not take particular notice of it; eſpecially, as to both ſorts the ſame arguments may be applied, which I am now going to apply to the latter. The former is indeed liable to other objections of a peculiar nature: but I do not care to ſpecify them; and beſides, they are obvious.

Is it then right, that one man ſhould at one time have more than one wife? I anſwer, No: and theſe are my reaſons.

1. All men have a right to happineſs; and it has been ſhown, that Providence intended, by the union of the ſexes, to promote the happineſs of mankind, as well as ſome other important purpoſes. Further, thoſe propenſities, that prompt to this union, are common to all men; ſo that nature does not ſeem to have intended it for one man rather than another. All therefore have an equal right to it. Conſequently, it is not lawful to deprive an innocent perſon of this privilege: which, however, would neceſſarily be the caſe, if polygamy were to prevail. For the number of males that are born is found to be ſo nearly equal to that of females, being

as twenty to nineteen according to ſome computations, or as fourteen to thirteen according to others, that, if all men and all women were to be married, there could not be more than one wife to one huſband, and one huſband to one wife.

If it be objected, that, according to theſe computations, one woman in thirteen, or in nineteen, might have two huſbands, the anſwer is, that men are, by their ſtrength and ſpirit of enterpriſe, expoſed to many dangers, in war, for example, and by ſea, to which the other ſex is not liable; and that, therefore, to keep the two ſexes equal in reſpect of number, a ſmall ſurplus of males muſt be neceſſary. This equality is a deciſive intimation, that polygamy is not according to nature. If it were natural, ſome proviſion would have been made for it. But the economy of nature is plainly againſt it. And let me add, that this exact proportion of the ſexes, continued through ſo many ages, and in all countries, (for we have no good reaſon to think, that it was ever otherwiſe in any country) is a ſtriking proof of the care of a wiſe Providence, for the preſervation of the human race; and is, moreover, a perpetual miracle, (if I may ſo ſpeak) to declare, both that the union of the ſexes is natural, and that Polygamy is not.

It is true, that, either from diſinclination, or from unfavourable circumſtances, many men never marry at all. But the ſame thing may be ſaid with equal truth of many women. So that *ſtill*, the balance of the ſexes may be preſumed to be even. And one man cannot marry more than one wife, without contradicting the views of Providence, and violating the rights of his fellow-creatures.

2. Polygamy is inconſiſtent with that affection, which married perſons ought to bear to one another. To love one more than any other, is natural, and poſſible, and common: but to love two or more in preference to all others, and yet to love them equally, is ſo uncommon, that we may venture to call it unnatural, and

impoſſible. Such a paſſion, at leaſt, would not be tolerated in poetry or romance; for every reader would ſay, that it was incredible in fiction, becauſe it never happens in fact. In comedy ſometimes, indeed, we find a profligate man making love to two women, or a lady at a loſs which of two lovers to prefer: but this cannot be without diſhoneſty; for if the paſſion for the one be ſincere, that for the other muſt be hypocritical. Even where polygamy prevails, it is generally found, that, whatever be the number of his wives, the huſband has but one favourite. The conſequence is, that ſhe is hated by all the reſt, and he on her account.

And this leads me to remark, 3. that Polygamy deſtroys the peace of families; and therefore ſtands in direct oppoſition to one of the chief ends of the matrimonial union. The wives hate one another, as rivals, and bear a particular diſlike to her who happens for the time to be moſt in favour with the huſband. The children naturally take part with their reſpective mothers; and, inſtead of fraternal affection, are animated with mutual jealouſy and envy. And thus a family becomes the ſeat of continual ſtrife; and the huſband muſt exerciſe a tyrannical authority over the whole, and make thoſe obey him through fear, who are not attached to him by love. This obſervation is warranted by fact. In countries, where polygamy prevails, the wives are the ſlaves of the huſband, and the enemies of one another; they are confined in a priſon called a ſeraglio; and are attended by eunuchs, who ſerve at once for guards, and for ſpies, and who, it ſeems, form a neceſſary part of this deteſtable ſyſtem of policy; the children are diſſatisfied with the father, on account of his partialities, and with one another, becauſe of their interfering intereſts: and conſpiracies, poiſoning, and aſſaſſination, are frequently the conſequence. Surely, an economy cannot be rational, which for its very being depends upon practices that are a diſgrace to human nature; and, a family thus divided againſt itſelf can never be happy. And in a nation made

up of ſuch families, though there may be that dark and ſilent tranquillity, which proceeds from fear, there cannot be chearfulneſs, induſtry, liberty, or kind affection; there cannot be that politeneſs, and ſenſe of honour, which accompany the free and decent intercourſe of the ſexes; nor can there be that circulation of ſentiments, whereby literature, free inquiry, and the knowledge and the love of truth, are promoted in the more enlightened parts of the world. This too is according to fact. The Turks, who allow polygamy, are the idle, the ignorant, and the devoted ſlaves of a tyrant, and of a moſt abſurd ſuperſtition: within their own families they are tormented with apprehenſion and jealouſy: honour is ſo little known among them, that they are ſaid to have no word in their language to expreſs the idea: and it is the principle of fear alone, that ſupports their government. When a deſpotick prince is no longer feared by his people, he is undone; and when he ceaſes to be afraid of them, his tyranny is intolerable.

4. After what has been ſaid, it is unneceſſary to add, in the fourth place, that Polygamy, being ſubverſive of filial and parental affection, muſt be inconſiſtent with the right education of children, and ſo counteract another chief end of marriage. The father will probably be partial to the children of his favourites. Certain it is, that, if he have many children by ſeveral wives, he cannot love them all equally; nor can his love fail to be alienated by thoſe diſſatisfactions which he ſees prevailing among them, and whereof he knows himſelf to be in a great meaſure the cauſe. Some of his children, therefore, he will look upon in the light of conſpirators; and for his own ſecurity will be glad to form a party among the reſt: which will widen the diſſenſions that divide his houſehold, by giving them the ſanction of his own example. How is it poſſible, that, in ſuch a family, children ſhould be well educated, or that virtue ſhould be a matter of general concern! Even with us, when the huſband and the wife happen to diſagree in regard to the manage-

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ment of their children, education is commonly neglected; the mother has one favourite, and the father another: and the children, following the example of their parents, adopt their humours and prejudices, and become licentious, diſobedient, and regardleſs of inſtruction. Among the Turks, indeed, education cannot be conſidered as a matter of any great importance. In governments ſo tyrannical, the man who diſtinguiſhes himſelf by his genius, by his induſtry, or even by his virtue, becomes the object of jealouſy to ſome perſon in power; ſo that the only way to live unmoleſted is to remain obſcure and contemptible.

Enough has been ſaid to prove, that Polygamy is unnatural, and deſtructive of virtue and happineſs. But that it is in all poſſible caſes criminal, I have no authority to affirm. Among Chriſtians, indeed, it muſt always be ſo, becauſe forbidden by our religion: and in all Chriſtian countries it is puniſhed, and in ſome capitally. But to the antient Jews and Patriarchs it was not forbidden; and ſeems in ſome caſes to have been permitted as a puniſhment for their intemperance in deſiring it. The greateſt calamities that befel David would not have taken place, if he had been contented with one wife; and the ſenſuality of Solomon in this particular has fixed an indelible blemiſh on one of the brighteſt characters that ever appeared among men.

II. The ſecond queſtion to be conſidered is, Whether the matrimonial union ought to laſt through the whole of life.

Marriage is diſſolved in two ways, by Death and by Divorce. Of Divorce there are two ſorts; the one partial, or *a toro et menſa*, as the lawyers ſay, by which the parties are ſeparated, but the marriage is not annulled: and when this happens, the wife, according to the law of England, is in moſt caſes, though not in all, entitled to an *alimony*; that is, to a certain proviſion from the huſband; the amount of which is determined by the eccleſiaſtical court, according to the circumſtances of the caſe, and the quality of the parties.

The other ſort of divorce, which is called *Divortium a vinculo matrimonii*, annuls the marriage altogether, and leaves the parties as free, as if they had never been united.

This final divorce the New Teſtament allows in the caſe of adultery only: but does not ſay, that, upon conviction of that crime, it ought to take place; and therefore, a Chriſtian Legiſlature may warrantably eſtabliſh, in regard to this matter, ſuch limitations, as human wiſdom may think moſt conducive to publick good. For if, on proof of adultery, the marriage were always to be diſſolved, there is too much reaſon to fear, that, when a huſband and wife were diſſatisfied with each other, a deſire of being diſunited might tempt them to the commiſſion of that wickedneſs. But ſo ſacred is the nuptial tie accounted in moſt Chriſtian nations, that, by the Canon Law, and by the Common Law of England, this crime is not a ſufficient ground for a final divorce, but only for a ſeparation *a toro et menſa*: it may only be pleaded by the parties, as a reaſon for their being diſengaged *a vinculo matrimonii*; but the legiſlature may either admit that plea, or reject it *. The only thing which, according to the common law of England, can nullify a marriage, is, its having been from the beginning null, becauſe unlawful; as in the caſe of too near a degree of conſanguinity. However, in England, upon a charge of adultery, marriage is ſometimes annulled; not indeed by an action at common law, but by an act of parliament made for the purpoſe.

I mention theſe particulars, to ſhow the opinion of mankind concerning the diſſolution of the nuptial tie during the life of the parties. For the laws of enlightened nations, eſpecially thoſe laws that are of long ſtanding, are to be conſidered as the reſult of reaſon and experience united: and therefore, in every inquiry that relates to

* In Scotland, the ſentence of the Commiſſaries, proceeding on the charge of adultery, if there be no appeal from it, annuls the marriage totally; ſo that there is no occaſion for recourſe to the legiſlature.

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the expediency of human conduct, deſerve very great attention. It is plainly a doctrine of Chriſtianity, as well as a principle of the Britiſh law, that the matrimonial union ought to be for life. And that the ſame concluſion may be drawn from philoſophical conſiderations, that is, from the nature of man, and the end of the inſtitution, it will not be difficult to prove.

The only ſcheme of temporary marriage, that has any ſhadow of plauſibility, is that of thoſe who contend, for argument's ſake perhaps, that the man and woman ſhould agree to be faithful to each other for a certain time; and then, if they found they were not happy, to ſeparate, and be at liberty either to remain ſingle, or to chooſe other partners. Now I have ſo good an opinion of human nature, as to believe, that, even if laws were made to this purpoſe, many men and women would be averſe to a ſeparation, from a regard to their children, and to one another. But, in framing laws, we are not ſo much to preſume upon the poſſible virtues of individuals, as to guard againſt the probable evils that may be apprehended from the general depravity of the human heart. And it is eaſy to foreſee, that the ſcheme in queſtion would give licence to the profligate, expoſe the ſober to temptation, deſtroy thoſe ſentiments of delicacy and eſteem which the ſexes ought to bear towards each other, poiſon the happineſs of families, introduce diſorder into the ſtate, and prove ruinous to the education of children.

It cannot be denied, that raſh marriages are more likely to prove unhappy, than ſuch as are founded upon deliberate choice. And if this is true, whatever tends to make men and women conſiderate, in chooſing partners for life, muſt tend eventually to the happineſs of families. But if even the alarming thought, that the matrimonial union cannot be diſſolved but by death, does not always prevent a raſh choice; what, may we think, would be the conſequence, if it were in the power of the parties to put an end

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to their union, and engage in a new one, whenever they pleaſed? The conſequence would be, ſuch precipitancy and caprice in forming this relation, as might preclude all hopes of conjugal felicity.

2. It will alſo be allowed, that perſons, who are united by a ſincere friendſhip, have a better chance to be happy, than thoſe who come together without friendſhip. Now it is the nature of true friendſhip, to deſire a *permanent* union: nay, good men hope to enjoy the ſociety of their friends in another world for ever. Men may for a limited time enter into partnerſhip in trade; and ſervants and maſters may mutually become bound to each other for a certain number of months or years: gain, or convenience, are the foundation of ſuch contracts; and, if friendſhip be ſuperadded, that will continue when the contract is diſſolved. But who ever thought of forming temporary friendſhip! Should we chooſe that perſon for our friend, who would tell us, that he was willing to be ſo for a year or two; but that thenceforth he and we were to be mutually indifferent to each other? Would it be poſſible for us to think his affection ſincere, or indeed that he had for us any affection at all?

Beſides, when a man tells a woman, that he wiſhes to employ his life in making her happy, (and this muſt be a ſentiment in every marriage that is founded on eſteem) is it not more likely, that ſhe will love him as a huſband, and as a friend, than if he were to ſay, or to be ſuppoſed to ſay, that he would be glad to live with her two or three years, or perhaps for a longer time, if he found her agreeable, and did not change his mind? To a propoſal of this ſort, every woman who had any pretenſions to delicacy, to ſenſe, or to virtue, would ſurely return a very contemptuous anſwer. Were matters to come to this paſs, all eſteem and confidence between man and woman would be at an end: and both to the one ſex, and to the other, the love of gain, or of convenience, or a more ſhameful principle, would be, or (which is the

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ſame thing in this caſe) would ſeem to be, the ſole motive to ſuch temporary attachment. It follows, that they would be mutually ſuſpicious, and mutually diſguſted; and each inclined to purſue a private and ſeparate intereſt, at the other's expence. Whereas, when a man and a woman are united for life, from a principle of mutual eſteem, (without which no marriage can be lawful) it is hardly poſſible, that they ſhould have ſeparate intereſts; or if, in conſequence of ſome previous bargain on the ſubject of money, either party could become rich at the expence of the other, a regard to their children would, if they were not loſt to all natural affection, inſpire them with more generous ſentiments.

3. It deſerves to be conſidered, whether the ſcheme propoſed would not debaſe thoſe ideas of Delicacy, wherewith the intercourſe of the ſexes ought always to be accompanied. By Delicacy, I here mean, a peculiar warmth and purity of affection, which can only be gratified by a conſciouſneſs of poſſeſſing, without a rival, the entire eſteem of the perſon beloved. The natural effect of it is, a deſire to pleaſe, not merely by a generous and reſpectful behaviour, but alſo by entertaining no thoughts or wiſhes, but ſuch as the object of the paſſion would approve. It is this, that diſtinguiſhes the union of cultivated minds from the brutal inclinations of a ſenſualiſt or ſavage: and, as it promotes modeſty of ſpeech and of manners, and lays a reſtraint on every irregular deſire, it muſt be of importance both to publick order, and to private happineſs. But how is it poſſible, that this delicacy ſhould form any part of the attachment of thoſe, who have no other view than to be together for a ſtipulated time; and who perhaps, during their term of cohabitation, had their thoughts fixed on other partners, and were liſtening to propoſals, or contriving plans, for a new connection! Perſons, thus united, would in theſe reſpects be *ſuſpicious* at leaſt of one another; which would deſtroy all delicacy of affection, and could hardly fail to end in mutual abhorrence.

4. This ſcheme would be fatal to the education of children. By it, they are, or they may be, even in their infancy, abandoned to the care of one of the parents, who, having loſt all eſteem for the other, and being now, probably, engroſſed by a new attachment, cannot be ſuppoſed to retain any warmth of parental affection towards them. The other parent may alſo be engaged in a new alliance; and have little inclination to look back, except with diſguſt, upon the former, or any perſon connected with it. Thus the children are neglected by one parent, or perhaps by both. Or a ſecond, or a third ſucceſſion of brothers and ſiſters may be obtruded upon them; for whom they, detached from the preſent family, and deriving their origin from a family that no longer exiſts, cannot entertain any particular kindneſs. And thus, the ties of blood would be overlooked or forgotten; kindred would become too complex a thing to be comprehended by ordinary underſtandings; the parental, filial, and fraternal charities would of courſe be extinguiſhed, the human heart hardened, and ſociety transformed into a ſcene of confuſion. Nor does it ſeem poſſible for human policy to contrive a cure for theſe evils, without removing their cauſe, by the eſtabliſhment of regular matrimony.

If it were worth while to enlarge on a topick, which is too plain to require further illuſtration, we might conſider, how the particular intereſts of men and of women, the rich and the poor, the young and the old, the ſtrong and the ſickly, would be affected by the ſcheme of temporary marriages. And I think it might be made appear, that to the young, the healthy, and the rich, it would afford the means of unbounded profligacy; while to the poor, the old, and the infirm, it muſt prove injurious and comfortleſs. In a word, marriage muſt be for life. If, at the will of the parties, it might be limited to a ſhorter term, it would give riſe to as many evils as polygamy itſelf; and overturn all delicacy, decency, morality, good order, and kind affection. Grant, that a regular

inſtitution of matrimony may ſometimes be attended with inconvenience, when perſons muſt remain united for life, who yet, while united, cannot be happy. What then? Muſt the beſt rights of ſociety be ſacrificed to the humour of a few individuals, who perhaps, if they had it in their power to break looſe from the preſent engagement, and to form another, would ſtill be as unhappy as before? The evils complained of are to be remedied, not by unhinging ſociety, but by reforming the education, and regulating the paſſions, of young people of both ſexes. When this is done, let mutual affection, deliberately formed, be the motive to the matrimonial union; let the perſons united be careful, from a ſenſe of their own infirmities, to cultivate mutual forbearance; let them repreſs intemperate thoughts, and apply diligently to the duties of their ſtation: and there will be no reaſon to complain, that the ſexes are made unhappy by being united for life.

I know not, whether temporary marriages, depending, for their duration, upon the will of the parties, ever took place in regular ſociety: which may be conſidered as a proof, that they are not conſiſtent with good order, or with the ends of the matrimonial union. It is true, that in ſome countries divorces have been more frequent, and permitted for ſlighter cauſes, than in others. But, for the moſt part, they have been ſubject to the cognizance of law, and not left to the determination of the parties. Among the Jews, indeed, before the promulgation of the goſpel, the huſband might diſmiſs his wife, on giving her, what Scripture calls, a bill of divorcement. But we are told, from the higheſt authority, that in the earlier ages of the world, when mankind were leſs corrupt, it was not ſo; and that Moſes allowed it, not becauſe it was good, but in order to prevent greater evils, which he had reaſon to apprehend, from the known perverſeneſs of the Jewiſh nation.—Romulus, too, permitted huſbands on ſome occaſions to put away their wives; for a Roman father had a ſort of judicial authority over his

houſehold: but, if it be true, that there was no inſtance of a divorce at Rome, till the five hundred and twenty-fifth year of the city, may we not infer, that this law of Romulus was raſhly made, and not conformable to the ſentiments of the people; and that it remained in force, merely becauſe it was overlooked; as many old laws do in all nations? Marriages of certain ſorts were by the laws of Romulus declared perpetual: which Dionyſius the hiſtorian greatly approves of; becauſe he thinks, that it muſt have been, both to the huſband and to the wife, a motive to diſcreet behaviour, and mutual forbearance. "This law, ſays he, engaged the wives, who "had no other reſource, to yield a ready compliance to the temper "of their huſbands; and it obliged the huſbands, on the other "hand, to treat their wives as a neceſſary poſſeſſion, which they "could not on any account relinquiſh." And it cannot be doubted, that, when married perſons know that their union is to be for life, they will be more inclined to adapt themſelves to the tempers of one another, and to reform what is amiſs in their own diſpoſition, than if they had it in their power to be divorced as ſoon as they became mutually diſſatisfied. So that the perpetuity of this contract has a manifeſt tendency to promote the happineſs of the parties, as well as to purify their manners.

III. Whether the rearing and educating of children ſhould be left to the parents, or provided for by the publick, is the third queſtion which I propoſed to examine.

And it is readily allowed, that there muſt be an egregious fault in the policy of a nation, where the law does not provide a remedy, and a puniſhment, for the negligence of parents in this particular. And too many parents there are, who ſeem very inattentive to the right education of their children: nay, it is to be feared, that not a few are chargeable, not with inattention only, but even with the guilt of corrupting the morals and the principles of their children, by indulgence and bad example. Do we not meet with young

creatures, who ſeem to have learned to ſwear, and to lie, as ſoon as to ſpeak? And can we ſuppoſe, that ſuch a thing would have happened under the tuition of a good parent? I grant, that ſome natures may be more untractable than others: but there are certain vices, and ſwearing is one of them, to which there is no temptation in any of our natural appetites, which therefore children can never acquire of themſelves, and which the admonitions of an attentive parent could hardly fail to prevent, or to cure.

But, if the ſtate were to aboliſh the ties of parental duty, by training up the young ones from their birth in ſeminaries, under the eye of teachers appointed by publick authority, it is to be feared, that the teachers might be ſtill more negligent, becauſe leſs affectionate, than parents; and that the influence of bad example would not be leſs fatal in thoſe large ſocieties, than in families. Publick Inſtitutions there are among us, for training up children at a diſtance from their parents: but domeſtick diſcipline is found to be as friendly to virtue, and is certainly more agreeable to nature. Boarding-ſchools for young women have been accounted ſo dangerous to virtue, that intelligent parents, who ſend their infant daughters to thoſe ſeminaries, are generally careful to take them home before they ceaſe to be children.

While, therefore, I regret the inattention of many parents to one of the moſt indiſpenſable of all human duties, I cannot adopt the ſentiments of thoſe, who maintain, that parents in general are not to be intruſted with the care of their young ones *.—For if children and

* Of the proper methods of education, the generality of the common people are more ignorant, than of any other part of duty. They imitate one another in this reſpect; and a perſon, who has had no opportunities of obſerving their conduct, would hardly believe what abſurd practices prevail among them. The books that have been written on education, many of which are very uſeful, come not into their hands, and are not level to their capacity. Indeed they are rather unwilling to receive advice on this head. "I breed my children (ſay they) as I was bred myſelf:" to which ſome complaiſant

and their parents were forced to live ſeparate, the attachments of kindred would be greatly weakened, if not entirely loſt. Now this muſt be unſuitable to the views of Providence; who would not have made the ties of natural affection ſo ſtrong in every animal, and eſpecially in man, if it had been for the advantage of animal life, or of human ſociety, that they ſhould be diſſolved or diſregarded. That nature intended the mother to be the nurſe of her own infant, and that the worſt conſequences are to be apprehended when we wilfully contradict this intention of nature, is too plain to require any proof. And when the mother has, with the father's aid, diſcharged that part of her duty, in which, in ordinary caſes, every mother finds the greateſt delight; and when thus the attachment of both parents to their child is heightened by long acquaintance, and by thoſe thrillings of ineffable ſatisfaction, wherewith

complaiſant neighbour ſubjoins, "And if they do as you have done, they will act "their part very well." While matters go on thus, improvements are not to be looked for, in education, or in any thing elſe.

How is the evil to be remedied? By ſeparating the children from their parents, and committing the former to the care of ſtrangers? No: ſuch a remedy would be worſe than the evil. How then? By inſtructing parents in their duty? Yes; that would be the eaſier, the more natural, and the more effectual way.

I have therefore often wiſhed, that the teachers of religion would, in their publick diſcourſes and private admonitions, not only recommend the right education of children in general terms, which in fact they do, but alſo lay down, and enforce, the method of it, with ſome degree of minuteneſs; expoſing at the ſame time the improprieties of the prevailing practice. The ſubject, it may be ſaid, is too copious to be diſcuſſed in a ſermon, and too familiar to be delivered from the pulpit. I anſwer, that, if expreſſed in proper language, it would derive dignity from its importance; and that its relation to common life would render it intelligible and intereſting. And ſurely, education is not a more copious theme, than many of thoſe are, on which it is the preacher's duty to expatiate. It would not be neceſſary for him to enter into it with the nicety of a Locke, or a Rouſſeau. If he could only reform a few of the groſſer improprieties of domeſtick diſcipline, he would be a bleſſing to his people, and an honour to his profeſſion. Nor would parents only be improved by diſcourſes of this nature. He who inſtructs the teacher may convey uſeful hints to thoſe who are to be taught. By hearing a parent's duty explained a child could hardly fail to learn his own.

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every exerciſe of parental love is accompanied: — when, I ſay, the parental affections are thus wound up to the higheſt pitch, *where* is the child likely to meet with ſo much tenderneſs, and ſo zealous a concern for his temporal and eternal welfare, as in the houſe of thoſe who gave him birth?

An interchange of the parental and filial duties is, moreover, friendly to the happineſs, and to the virtue of all concerned. It gives a peculiar ſenſibility to the heart of man; infuſing a ſpirit of generoſity and a ſenſe of honour, which have a moſt benign influence on publick good, as well as on private manners. When we read, that Epaminondas, after the battle of Leuctra, declared, that one chief cauſe of his joy was the conſideration of the pleaſure which his victory would give his father and mother; is it poſſible for us to think, that this man, the greateſt perhaps and the beſt that Greece ever ſaw *, would have been ſo generous, or ſo amiable, if he had not known who his parents were? In fact, there are not many virtues that reflect greater honour upon our nature, than the parental and the filial. When any uncommon examples of them occur in hiſtory, or in poetry, they make their way to the heart at once, and the reader's melting eye bears teſtimony to their lovelineſs.

Amidſt the triumphs of heroiſm, Hector never appears ſo great, as in a domeſtick ſcene, when he invokes the bleſſing of heaven upon his child: nor does Priam, on any other occaſion, engage our eſteem ſo effectually, or our pity, as when, at the hazard of his life, he goes into the enemies camp, and into the preſence of his fierceſt enemy, to beg the dead body of his Son. Achilles's love to his parents forms a diſtinguiſhing part of his character; and that ſingle circumſtance throws an amiable ſoftneſs into the moſt terrifick human perſonage that ever was deſcribed in poetry. The interview between Ulyſſes and his Father, after an abſence of twenty years,

* Epaminondas princeps, ut opinor, Græciæ. Cicero. Tuſcul.

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it is impoſſible to read without ſuch emotion, as will convince every reader of ſenſibility, that Homer judged well, in making parental and filial virtue the ſubject of his ſong, when he meant to ſhow his power over the tender paſſions.

Virgil was too wiſe, not to imitate his maſter in this particular. He expatiates on the ſame virtue with peculiar complacency; and loves to ſet it off in the moſt charming colours. His hero is an illuſtrious example. When Anchiſes refuſes to leave Troy, and ſignifies his reſolution to periſh in its flames, Eneas, that he may not ſurvive his father, or witneſs the maſſacre of his houſehold, *is* on the point of ruſhing to certain death; and nothing leſs than a miracle prevents him. He then bears on his ſhoulders the infirm old man to a place of ſafety, and ever after behaves towards him as becomes a ſon, and a ſubject *; and ſpeaks of his death in terms of the utmoſt tenderneſs and veneration. As a father he is equally affectionate: and his ſon is not deficient in filial duty.—Turnus, when vanquiſhed, condeſcends to aſk his life, for the ſake of his aged parent, who he knew would be inconſolable for his loſs. The young, the gentle, the beautiful Lauſus dies in defence of his father; and the father provokes his own deſtruction, becauſe he cannot live without his ſon, and wiſhes to be laid with him in the ſame grave. The lamentations of Evander over his Pallas tranſcend all praiſe of criticiſm. And nothing, even in this poem, the moſt pathetick of all human compoſitions, is more moving, than what is related of the gallant youth Euryalus; when, on undertaking that night-adventure which proved fatal to him, he recommends his helpleſs parent to the Trojan prince. "She knows not," ſays he, "of this enterpriſe; and I go without bidding her farewell: for "I call the Gods to witneſs, that I cannot ſupport the ſight of a

* On the death of Priam and his Sons, Anchiſes became king of the Trojans, and accordingly is repreſented by Virgil as Commander in chief in Eneas's expedition. After his death, Eneas is called king by his followers. See Æneid. I. 548, 557.

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"weeping mother."—Let a man read Virgil with attention, and with taſte; and then be a cruel parent, or an undutiful child, if he can. And let him aſk his own heart this queſtion, Whether human nature would not be deprived of many of its beſt affections, and human ſociety of its beſt comforts, if the ideas of thoſe projectors were to be realiſed, who propoſe to improve the political art, by annihilating the attachments of conſanguinity.

Mankind have in all ages paid reſpect to high birth, and entertained a partiality towards thoſe who are deſcended of virtuous anceſtors. And of ſeveral good reaſons, that have been given for it, this is one; that we may have more confidence in the honour of ſuch perſons, than in thoſe who have no illuſtrious, or honeſt, kindred, to diſgrace by their unworthineſs, or to adorn by their virtue. Is not this a proof, that the ties of kindred are underſtood to be friendly to our nature; and, that the policy, which tends to looſen them, by keeping parents and children ſeparate, or mutually unknown to each other, muſt be detrimental to publick good, as well as to private happineſs? Bacon has an excellent remark on this ſubject. "Unmarried men, ſays he, are beſt friends, beſt maſters, "beſt ſervants: but not always beſt ſubjects; for they are light "to run away; and almoſt all fugitives are of that condition.—For "ſoldiers," (continues he, a little after) "I find that the generals "in their hortatives commonly put men in mind of their wives "and children: and I think the deſpiſing of marriage among the "Turks maketh the vulgar ſoldier more baſe. Certainly, wife and "children are a kind of diſcipline of humanity: and ſingle men, "though they be many times more charitable, becauſe their means "are leſs exhauſt, yet, on the other ſide, they are more cruel and "hard-hearted, becauſe their tenderneſs is not ſo oft called upon." *

My principal view in this argument is, to overturn one of Plato's theories. That philoſopher is of opinion, that parents

* Eſſay viii.

ought not to be entruſted with their children, becauſe they are apt to ruin them by immoderate fondneſs. His plan, therefore, is, that infants, as ſoon as born, ſhould be conveyed to places ſet apart for them, and taken care of by nurſes and teachers appointed by the publick: that parents may never know their own offspring; and that from their earlieſt years the riſing generation may be taught to conſider themſelves as the children of the commonwealth. He thinks too, that the father and mother ſhould not live in domeſtick union; nor ever meet, but on certain ſolemn feſtivals; and that even this indulgence ſhould be denied to all, who are not in the prime of life, and of a healthy conſtitution. In a word, his plan tends to aboliſh families, to efface every idea of kindred, and to render the intercourſe of the ſexes in the rational world ſimilar to that of brutes: which would make men worſe than ſavages; deſtroy all the delicacies of modeſty, and conjugal friendſhip; and deprive ſociety of thoſe moſt important means of improvement, which men and women derive from the company and converſation of each other. It would alſo diveſt us of thoſe habits of mutual kindneſs that take their riſe in a family, and are, as we have ſeen, ſo effectual in refining and adorning our nature *; and it would extinguiſh many of the nobleſt incentives to activity and patriotiſm. If we had been ſent into the world for no other purpoſe, but to act a part, like puppets or players, in the farce of democratical government; and had no private intereſt to contend for, while here, and no

* In that magnificent inſtitution of the Empreſs of Ruſſia, for educating her young nobility, the children are viſited from time to time by their parents, and may correſpond with them by letter; and none under the age of five years are ſent to the academies. Thus that great and wiſe princeſs ſecures the continuance of parental and filial love, at the ſame time that ſhe promotes, by the moſt effectual means, the civilization of her em[illegible]. For in this way, her nobles muſt ſoon equal thoſe of the politeſt nations in elegance o manners; and the improvement of the common people will follow as a neceſſary conſequence. Her nobility, indeed, are not in this reſpect her only care. To the in tereſts of education in the middle ranks of life ſhe is not leſs attentive.

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need to prepare our minds, by habits of piety and benevolence, for happineſs hereafter: in a word, if we were creatures quite different from what we are, this plan might be allowed to have ſome meaning. But, taking man as he is, and paying a due regard to his inherent rights, and final deſtination, we cannot heſitate to pronounce it unnatural and abſurd, and alike unfriendly to happineſs and to virtue.

And what, you will aſk, are the advantages ſuppoſed by the fanciful philoſopher to reſult from it? He thinks, it would free the commonwealth from the evils of avarice, the chief motive to which he imagines to be one's attachment to a family. But in this he is widely miſtaken. Attachment to a family gives riſe to induſtry, and prudent economy, which ought always to be encouraged, becauſe productive of private happineſs, as well as of publick good; but has nothing to do with avarice; which is known to be ſubverſive of benevolence, and to prevail more in hearts that are hardened againſt the claims of conſanguinity, and the calls of nature, than among thoſe who love their children and kindred.—He thinks, that in this way the ſtate would be ſupplied with healthy citizens: and in this too he is miſtaken. For the conſtitution of the child may be bad, when that of the parent is good; and weakly parents have often ſtrong children. Nor is bodily ſtrength the only thing deſirable in a good citizen; wiſdom and virtue, which are often united with an infirm body, are much more important: Demoſthenes, Cicero, and in the latter part of his life Julius Ceſar, were valetudinarians; and one of the greateſt men that Sparta ever produced, I mean Ageſilaus, was lame of a leg. And it is found by experience, that, without being ſubjected to the reſtraints propoſed by this unnatural plan of policy, moſt men enjoy as much health, as is requiſite to all the ordinary buſineſs of life.—Plato imagines further, that by his ſcheme rebellion and ſedition would be prevented; which, he ſeems to think, do commonly take their riſe

among perſons united by the ties of blood. But neither is this true. In civil commotions, we often ſee parents and children attach themſelves to oppoſite parties; and one of the moſt ſhocking calamities attending civil war is, that it promotes contention among kindred, and ſets brother againſt brother, and the father againſt the ſon.

As to that indiſcreet fondneſs wherewith ſome parents treat their children; it is an evil no doubt, and tends to produce evil; but it hurts a few individuals only, and its bad conſequences are often ſucceſsfully counteracted by a little knowledge of the world:—whereas the propoſed remedy would affect the whole commonwealth with evils incomparably greater, and withal incurable. Beſides, teachers, as well as parents, have been partial to favourites; but nobody ever thought of aboliſhing education, to get rid of this inconvenience. It would be, like cutting off the legs, in order to keep the gout out of the great toe; or like knocking out all the teeth, for the purpoſe of preventing the tooth-ach. The beſt ſecurity againſt the evils of parental fondneſs, is parental love; and, where parents have good ſenſe, that will always be ſecurity ſufficient.

ILLUSTRATIONS ON SUBLIMITY.

LONGINUS, the Secretary of Zenobia queen of Palmyra, who was conquered by the emperour Aurelian about the middle of the third century, compoſed many books of philoſophy and criticiſm, and among others a diſcourſe on Sublimity, which is the only part of his writings that has been preſerved to our time. He is an author, not more remarkable for accuracy of judgment, than for the energy of his ſtyle, and a peculiar boldneſs and elevation of thought. And men of learning have vied with each other, in celebrating and expounding that work; which is indeed one of the beſt ſpecimens that remain of antient criticiſm, and well deſerves the attention of every ſcholar.

But he has uſed the word * *Hupſos* in a more general ſenſe, than is commonly annexed to the term *Sublimity*; not always diſtinguiſhing what is ſublime from what is elegant or beautiful. The diſtinction, however, ought to be made. Both indeed give delight; but the gratification we derive from the one is different from that which accompanies the other. It is pleaſing to behold a fine face, or an apartment elegantly furniſhed and of exact proportion; it is alſo pleaſing to contemplate a craggy mountain, a vaſt cathedral, or a magnificent palace: but ſurely, the one ſort of pleaſure differs as much from the other, as complacency differs from admiration, or the ſoft melody of a flute from the overpowering tones of a full organ.

* ὕψος.

Grammarians

Grammarians are not agreed about the etymology of the word *Sublime*. The moſt probable opinion is, that it may be derived from *ſupra* and *limus*; and ſo denotes literally the circumſtance of being raiſed *above* the *ſlime*, the *mud*, or the *mould*, of this world. Be that as it may, it uniformly ſignifies in the Latin, whence we have taken it, *elevation*, or *loftineſs*. And, becauſe whatever is much elevated, as a high building, or a high mountain, infuſes into the beholder a ſort of pleaſing aſtoniſhment; hence thoſe things in art or nature, which have the ſame effect on the mind, are, with a view to that effect, called by the ſame name. Great depth, being the correlative of great height, and being indeed implied in it, (for whatever is high from below is deep from above) and becauſe it aſtoniſhes and pleaſes the imagination, is alſo to be conſidered as ſublime. For, if we be ourſelves ſecure, every one muſt have obſerved, that it is agreeable to look down, from a mountain, upon the plain, or from the top of a high building, upon the various objects below. Cotton ſays, with the energy and enthuſiaſm of Dryden:

O my beloved rocks, that riſe
To awe the earth, and brave the ſkies!
From ſome aſpiring mountain's crown,
How dearly do I love,
Giddy with pleaſure, *to look down:*
And from the vales to view the noble heights above! *

"It is pleaſant," ſays Lucretius, "to behold from the land the "labours of the mariner in a tempeſtuous ocean; — but nothing "is more delightful, than from the heights of ſcience to look "down on thoſe who wander in the mazes of error: not (ſays he) "becauſe we are gratified with another's diſtreſs; but becauſe "there is a pleaſure in ſeeing evils from which we ourſelves are

* See Walton's Angler. Part ii.

" free." The fact is partly ſo; but the poet entirely miſtakes the cauſe. It is pleaſant to behold the ſea in a ſtorm, on account of its aſtoniſhing greatneſs and impetuoſity; and it is pleaſant to look down from an elevated ſituation, becauſe here too there is greatneſs and delightful aſtoniſhment. But to ſee others in danger, or unhappy in their ignorance, muſt always give pain to a conſiderate mind, however conſcious it may be of its own ſecurity, and wiſdom. Such a ſentiment we need not wonder to find in an Epicurean poet; as all the views of his maſter terminated in ſelf. But it is ſomewhat ſtrange, that Creech, in a note upon the paſſage, ſhould vindicate his author in theſe terms: Id aſſerit poeta, quod omnes ſentiunt; qui dolore aut morbo laborantem videt, protinus, O me fælicem: " The poet aſſerts nothing, but what is warranted " by univerſal experience; when we ſee a man diſeaſed, or in pain, " we immediately exclaim (or think) How happy are we!" Every generous mind *feels* the falſehood of this doctrine. It was, however, a favourite topick of Swift; as appears from thoſe verſes on his own death, in which he comments upon a ſilly and ambiguous maxim of Rochefoucault *. According to this theory, the moſt deſirable

* The maxim is, *Dans l'adverſité de nos meilleurs amis nous trouvons toujours quelque choſe, qui ne nous deplaiſt pas:* In the adverſity of our beſt friends we find always ſomething that does not diſpleaſe us. This may mean, either, that while our beſt friends are in adverſity we always meet with ſome gratification; or, that the adverſity of our beſt friends is always to us the ſource of ſome gratification. The former remark is true: for, while our friend is, or even while ourſelves are, in trouble, we may no doubt have the comfort, of eating when we are hungry, drinking when thirſty, reſting when weary; to ſay nothing of the higher enjoyments of ſcience, and of virtue. But this is a childiſh obſervation; and has no particular reference to Rochefoucault's ſyſtem. I therefore ſuppoſe the meaning to be, that the calamities which overtake our beſt friends always give us ſome degree of pleaſure: and this, though no childiſh obſervation, every man, who is not corrupted by extreme ſelfiſhneſs, knows to be utterly falſe. It is natural to wiſh for that which we know to bring pleaſure along with it: but what ſort of perſon would he be, who for his own gratification could wiſh his beſt friends to be in adverſity!

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deſirable of all human conditions would be that of the ſuperintendant of an hoſpital, the keeper of Bedlam, or the commander of galley-ſlaves: who would every moment be rejoicing in the thought, that he was free from the miſeries which he beheld around him.

To this notable aphoriſm Swift makes a little addition, by his paraphraſe. "In *all* "*diſtreſſes* of our friends, We *firſt conſult our private ends*," &c. What can this mean? A child who is playing near me gets a dangerous fall: a friend who is riding with me is thrown from his horſe, and has his leg broken. In this caſe, what do I do? I *firſt of all*, ſays Swift, (what! before I either aid, or pity him? Yes; I *firſt*) conſult ſome private end of my own; that is (if it be any thing) I conſider, how I may make this accident turn to my own advantage. What might paſs in the mind of Swift on an occaſion like this, I know not: but in me, and in moſt other beings of human form, I am certain there would be no ſuch idea. Without thinking of ourſelves at all, we ſhould inſtantly give every aſſiſtance in our power: or, if we did not, we ſhould deſerve to be driven out of ſociety. — But perhaps, by the word *firſt* the author here means *chiefly*: "When our friend is in diſtreſs, our chief deſire is, not that he may be relieved, "but that we may from his ſuffering reap ſome benefit." This will not mend the matter. For, at this rate, love is hatred; and *friend* and *enemy* are ſynonimous terms. — The truth may be, that Swift, knowing the couplet would not be compleat without a ſecond line, and a rhime to *friends*, took the liberty, on this one occaſion, — *to make The one verſe for the other's ſake; For one for ſenſe, and one for rhime, He thought ſufficient at this time.* — But he brings examples to confirm his doctrine. He does. In order to *prove*, from *reaſon* and *experience*, that *in all diſtreſſes* of our friends we firſt conſult our private ends, he argues, that, when our friend is NOT IN DISTRESS, but in an advantageous ſituation, we wiſh to be in as good a place as he, or perhaps in a better; that, when Ned is in the gout, we patiently hear him groan, and are glad that we are not in it; that one poet wiſhes all his rival-poets in hell, rather than that they ſhould write better than he: and he urges other conſiderations, humourouſly expreſſed indeed, but not more to the purpoſe. In a word, his arguments amount to this: "Emula- "tion is natural; Some men, particularly poets and wits, are prone to envy; And "we think it a good thing to be in health. *Argal*, There is no ſuch thing in this "world as ſincere friendſhip, or diſintereſted compaſſion." This may be wit; but it is not ſenſe.

Let not this note be deemed a digreſſion. Of the ſublimities of art and nature the human ſoul would be a very incompetent judge, if it were ſo mean, ſo contemptible, and ſo hateful a thing, as ſome writers would have us believe. Our taſte for the ſublime is conſidered by two great authors (who will be quoted in the ſequel) as a proof of the dignity of our nature.

What we admire, or conſider as great, we are apt to ſpeak of in ſuch terms, as if we conceived it to be high in place: and what we look upon as leſs important we expreſs in words that properly denote low ſituation. We go *up* to London; and thence *down* into the country. The Jews ſpoke in the ſame manner of their metropolis, which was to them the object of religious veneration. "Je- "ruſalem, ſays the Pſalmiſt, is a city, to which the tribes go up:" and the parable of the good Samaritan begins thus, "A certain "man went down from Jeruſalem to Jericho." Conformably to the ſame idiom, heaven is ſuppoſed to be above, and hell to be beneath; and we ſay, that generous minds endeavour to reach the *ſummit* of excellence, and think it *beneath* them to do, or deſign, any thing that is baſe. The terms *baſe*, *groveling*, *low*, &c. and thoſe of oppoſite import, *elevated*, *aſpiring*, *lofty*, as applied in a figurative ſenſe to the energies of mind, do all take their riſe from the ſame modes of thinking. The Latins expreſſed admiration by a verb which properly ſignifies *to look up (ſuſpicere)*; and contempt by another *(deſpicere)* whoſe original meaning is *to look down*. A high ſeat is erected for a king, or a chief magiſtrate, and a lofty pedeſtal for the ſtatue of a hero; partly, no doubt, that they may be ſeen at the greater diſtance, and partly alſo, out of reſpect to their dignity.

But mere local elevation is not the only ſource of ſublimity. Things that ſurpaſs in magnitude; as a ſpacious building, a great city, a large river, a vaſt mountain, a wide proſpect, the ocean, the expanſe of heaven, fill the mind of the beholder with the ſame agreeable aſtoniſhment. And obſerve, that it is rather the relative magnitude of things, as compared with others of the ſame kind, that raiſes this emotion, than their abſolute quantity of matter. That may be a ſublime edifice, which in real magnitude falls far ſhort of a ſmall hill that is not ſublime: and a river two furlongs in breadth

is a majeſtick appearance, though in extent of water it is as nothing when compared with the ocean.

Great number, too, when it gives riſe to admiration, may be referred to the ſame claſs of things. Hence an army, or navy, a long ſucceſſion of years, eternity, and the like, are ſublime, becauſe they at once pleaſe and aſtoniſh. In contemplating ſuch ideas or objects, we are conſcious of ſomething like an expanſion of our faculties, as if we were exerting our whole capacity to comprehend the vaſtneſs of that which commands our attention *. This energy of the mind is pleaſing, as all mental energies are when unaccompanied with pain: and the pleaſure is heightened by our admiration of the object itſelf; for admiration is always agreeable.

In many caſes, great number is connected with other grand ideas, which add to its own grandeur. A fleet, or army, makes us think of power, and courage, and danger, and preſents a variety of brilliant images. A long ſucceſſion of years brings to view the viciſſitude of human things, and the uncertainty of life, which ſooner or later muſt yield to death, the irreſiſtable deſtroyer. And eternity reminds us of that awful conſideration, our own immortality; and is connected with an idea ſtill more ſublime, and indeed the moſt ſublime of all, namely, with the idea of HIM, who fills immenſity with his preſence; creates, preſerves, and governs all things; and is from everlaſting to everlaſting.

In general, whatever awakens in us this pleaſurable aſtoniſhment is accounted ſublime, whether it be connected with quantity and number, or not. The harmony of a loud and full organ conveys, no doubt, an idea of expanſion and of power; but, independently on this, it overpowers with ſo ſweet a violence, as charms and aſtoniſhes at the ſame time: and we are generally conſcious of an elevation of mind when we hear it, even though the ear be not ſenſible of

* Spectator, Numb. 412. Gerard on Taſte.

any melody. Thunder and tempeſt are ſtill more elevating, when one hears them without fear; becauſe the ſound is ſtill more ſtupendous; and becauſe they fill the imagination with the magnificent idea of the expanſe of heaven and earth, through which they direct their terrible career, and of that Almighty Being, whoſe will controuls all nature. The roar of cannon, in like manner, when conſidered as harmleſs, gives a dreadful delight; partly by the overwhelming ſenſation wherewith it affects the ear, and partly by the ideas of power and danger, triumph and fortitude, which it conveys to the fancy.

Thoſe paſſions of the ſoul yield a pleaſing aſtoniſhment, which diſcover a high degree of moral excellence, or are in any way connected with great number, or great quantity. Benevolence and piety are ſublime affections; for the object of the one is the Deity himſelf, the greateſt, and the beſt; and that of the other is the whole human race, or the whole ſyſtem of percipient beings. Fortitude and generoſity are ſublime emotions: becauſe they diſcover a degree of virtue, which is not every where to be met with; and exert themſelves in actions, that are at once difficult, and beneficial to mankind *.—Great intellectual abilities, as the genius of Homer, or of Newton, we cannot contemplate without wonder and delight, and muſt therefore refer to that claſs of things whereof I now ſpeak.—Nay great bodily ſtrength is a ſublime object; for we are agreeably aſtoniſhed, when we ſee it exerted, or hear of its effects.—There is even a ſublime beauty, which both aſtoniſhes and charms: but this will be found in thoſe perſons only, or chiefly, who unite fine features with a majeſtick form; ſuch as we may ſuppoſe an antient ſtatuary would have repreſented Juno, or Minerva, Achilles, or Apollo.

* This idea of Fortitude is admitted by the Stoicks, and all the beſt Moraliſts. That courage (ſays Tully) which aims only at ſelf-intereſt, and is not regulated by equity and benevolence, is to be called *audacity* rather than *fortitude*.

When great qualities prevail in any perſon, they form what is called a ſublime character *. Every good man is a perſonage of this order: but a character may be ſublime, which is not compleſely good, nay, which is upon the whole very bad. For, the teſt of ſublimity is not moral approbation, but that pleaſurable aſtoniſhment wherewith certain things ſtrike the beholder. Sarpedon, in the Iliad, is a ſublime character, and at the ſame time a good one; to the valour of the hero he joins the benignity of a gracious prince, and the moderation of a wiſe man. Achilles, though in many reſpects not virtuous, is yet a moſt ſublime character. We hate his cruelty, paſſionate temper, and love of vengeance: but we admire him for his valour, ſtrength, ſwiftneſs, generoſity, beauty, and intellectual accompliſhments, for the warmth of his friendſhip, and for his filial tenderneſs †. In a word, notwithſtanding his violent nature, there is in his general conduct a mixture of goodneſs and of greatneſs, with which we are both pleaſed and aſtoniſhed. Julius Cæſar was never conſidered as a man of ſtrict virtue. But, in reading his *Memoirs*, it is impoſſible not to be ſtruck with the ſublimity of his character: that ſtrength of mind, which nothing can bear down; that ſelf-command, which is never diſcompoſed; that intrepidity in danger; that addreſs in negociation; that coolneſs and recollection in the midſt of perplexity; and that unwearied activity, which crouds together in every one of his campaigns as many great actions as would make a hero. Nay even in Satan, as Milton has repreſented him in Paradiſe Loſt, though there are no qualities that can be called good in a moral view; nay, though every purpoſe of that wicked ſpirit is bent to evil, and to that only; yet there is the grandeur of a ruined archangel: there is force able to contend with the moſt boiſterous elements; and there is boldneſs, which no power but what is Almighty, can intimidate. Theſe qualities are aſtoniſhing: and though we always deteſt his malig-

* Gerard on Taſte. † Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick, Part i. chap. 4.

nity, we are often compelled to admire that very greatneſs by which we are confounded and terrified.

And be not ſurpriſed, that we ſometimes admire what we cannot approve. Theſe two emotions may, and frequently do, coincide: Sarpedon and Hector, Epaminondas and Ariſtides, David and Jonathan, we both approve and admire. But they do not neceſſarily coincide: for goodneſs calls forth the one, and greatneſs the other; and that which is great is not always good, and that may be good which is not great. Troy in flames, Palmyra in ruins, the ocean in a ſtorm, and Etna in thunder and conflagration, are magnificent appearances, but do not immediately impreſs our minds with the idea of good: and a clear fountain is not a grand object, though in many parts of the world it would be valued above all treaſures. So in the qualities of the mind and body: we admire the ſtrong, the brave, the eloquent, the beautiful, the ingenious, the learned; but the virtuous only we approve. There have been authors indeed, one at leaſt there has been, who, by confounding admiration with approbation, laboured to confound intellectual accompliſhments with moral virtues; but it is ſhameful inaccuracy, and vile ſophiſtry: one might as well endeavour to confound crimes with misfortunes, and ſtrength of body with purity of mind; and ſay, that to be a knave and to loſe a leg are equally worthy of puniſhment, and that one man deſerves as much praiſe for being born with a healthy conſtitution, as another does for leading a good life.

But if ſublime ideas are known by their power of inſpiring agreeable aſtoniſhment, and if Satan in Paradiſe Loſt is a ſublime idea, does it not follow, that we muſt be both aſtoniſhed at his character, and pleaſed with it? And is it poſſible to take pleaſure in a being, who is the author of evil, and the adverſary of God and man?

I anſwer; that, though we know there is an evil ſpirit of this name, we know alſo, that Milton's Satan is partly imaginary; and we believe, that thoſe qualities are ſo in particular, which we admire in

in him as great: for we have no reaſon to think, that he has really that boldneſs, irreſiſtable ſtrength, or dignity of form, which the poet aſcribes to him. So far, therefore, as we admire him for ſublimity of character, we conſider him, not as the great enemy of our ſouls, but as a fictitious being, and a mere poetical hero. Now the human imagination can eaſily combine ideas in an aſſemblage, which are not combined in nature; and make the ſame perſon the object of admiration in one reſpect, who in another is deteſtable: and ſuch inventions are in poetry the more probable, becauſe ſuch perſons are to be met with in real life. Achilles and Alexander, for example, we admire for their magnanimity, but abhor for their cruelty. And the poet, whoſe aim is to pleaſe, finds it neceſſary to give ſome good qualities to his bad characters; for, if he did not, the reader would not be intereſted in their fortune, nor, conſequently, pleaſed with the ſtory of it. *

In the *picture* of a burning city, we may admire the ſplendour of the colours, the undulation of the flames, the arrangements of light and ſhade, and the other proofs of the painter's ſkill; and nothing gives a more exquiſite delight of the melancholy kind, than Virgil's account of the burning of Troy. But this does not imply, that we ſhould, like Nero, take any pleaſure in ſuch an event, if it were real and preſent. Indeed, few appearances are more beautiful, or more ſublime, than a maſs of flame, rolling in the wind, and blazing to heaven: whence illuminations, bonfires, and fireworks make part of a modern triumph. Yet deſtruction by fire is of all earthly things the moſt terrible.

An object more aſtoniſhing, both to the eye, and to the ear, there is hardly in nature, than (what is ſometimes to be ſeen in the Weſt Indies) a plantation of ſugar-canes on fire, flaming to a vaſt height, ſweeping the whole country, and every moment ſending forth a thouſand exploſions, like thoſe of artillery. A good de-

* See Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick. Part 1. chap. 3.

ſcription

ſcription of ſuch a ſcene we ſhould admire as ſublime; for a deſcription can neither burn nor deſtroy. But the planter, who ſees it deſolating his fields, and ruining all his hopes, can feel no other emotions than horror and ſorrow.—In a word, the Sublime, in order to give pleaſing aſtoniſhment, muſt be either imaginary, or not immediately pernicious.

There is a kind of horror, which may be infuſed into the mind both by natural appearances, and by verbal deſcription; and which, though it make the blood ſeem to run cold, and produce a momentary fear, is not unpleaſing, but may be even agreeable: and therefore, the objects that produce it are juſtly denominated ſublime. Of natural appearances that affect the mind in this manner, are vaſt caverns, deep and dark woods, overhanging precipices, the agitation of the ſea in a ſtorm: and ſome of the ſounds above-mentioned have the ſame effect, as thoſe of cannon and thunder. Verbal deſcriptions infuſing ſublime horror are ſuch as convey lively ideas, of the objects of ſuperſtition, as ghoſts and enchantments; or of the thoughts that haunt the imaginations of the guilty; or of thoſe external things, which are pleaſingly terrible, as ſtorms, conflagrations, and the like.

It may ſeem ſtrange, that horror of any kind ſhould give pleaſure. But the fact is certain. Why do people run to ſee battles, executions, and ſhipwrecks? Is it, as an Epicurean would ſay, to compare themſelves with others, and exult in their own ſecurity while they ſee the diſtreſs of thoſe who ſuffer? No, ſurely: good minds are ſwayed by different motives. Is it, that they may be at hand, to give every aſſiſtance in their power to their unhappy brethren? This would draw the benevolent, and even the tender-hearted, to a ſhipwreck; but to a battle, or to an execution, could not bring ſpectators, becauſe there the humanity of individuals is of no uſe:— It muſt be, becauſe a ſort of gloomy ſatisfaction, or terrifick pleaſure, accompanies the gratification of that curioſity which events of this nature are apt to raiſe in minds of a certain frame.

No

No parts of Taſſo are read with greater reliſh, than where he deſcribes the darkneſs, ſilence, and other horrors, of the enchanted foreſt: and the poet himſelf is ſo ſenſible of the captivating influence of ſuch ideas over the human imagination, that he makes the cataſtrophe of the poem in ſome meaſure depend upon them. Milton is not leſs enamoured "of foreſts and enchantments drear;" as appears from the uſe to which he applies them in *Comus*: the ſcenery whereof charms us the more, becauſe it affects our minds, as it did the bewildered lady, and cauſes "a thouſand fantaſies"——

——to throng into the memory,
Of calling ſhapes, and beckoning ſhadows dire,
And aery tongues, that ſyllable mens names
On ſands, and ſhores, and deſert wilderneſſes.

Foreſts in every age muſt have had attractive horrors: otherwiſe ſo many nations would not have reſorted thither, to celebrate the rites of ſuperſtition. And the inventors of what is called the Gothick, but perhaps ſhould rather be called the Saracen, architecture, muſt have been enraptured with the ſame imagery, when, in forming and arranging the pillars and aiſles of their churches, they were ſo careful to imitate the rows of lofty trees in a deep grove.

Obſerve a few children aſſembled about a fire, and liſtening to tales of apparitions and witchcraft. You may ſee them grow pale, and croud cloſer and cloſer through fear: while he who is ſnug in the chimney corner, and at the greateſt diſtance from the door, conſiders himſelf as peculiarly fortunate; becauſe he thinks that, if the ghoſt ſhould enter, he has a better chance to eſcape, than if he were in a more expoſed ſituation. And yet, notwithſtanding their preſent, and their apprehenſion of future, fears, you could not perhaps propoſe any amuſement that would at this time be more acceptable. The ſame love of ſuch horrors as are not attended with ſenſible inconvenience continues with us through life:

and

and Ariſtotle has affirmed, that the end of tragedy is to purify the ſoul by the operations of pity and terror.

The mind and body of man are ſo conſtituted, that, without action, neither can the one be healthy, nor the other happy. And as bodily exerciſes, though attended with fatigue, as Dancing, or with ſome degree of danger, as Hunting, are not on that account the leſs agreeable; ſo thoſe things give delight, which rouſe the ſoul, even when they bring along with them horror, anxiety, or ſorrow, provided theſe paſſions be tranſient, and their cauſes rather imaginary than real.

The moſt perfect models of ſublimity are ſeen in the works of nature. Pyramids, palaces, fireworks, temples, artificial lakes and canals, ſhips of war, fortifications, hills levelled and caves hollowed by human induſtry, are mighty efforts, no doubt, and awaken in every beholder a pleaſing admiration; but appear as nothing, when we compare them, in reſpect of magnificence, with mountains, volcanoes, rivers, cataracts, oceans, the expanſe of heaven, clouds and ſtorms, thunder and lightening, the ſun, moon, and ſtars. So that, without the ſtudy of nature, a true taſte in the ſublime is abſolutely unattainable. And we need not wonder at what is related of Thomſon, the author of *the Seaſons*; who, on hearing that a certain learned gentleman of London was writing an Epick poem, exclaimed, "He write an Epick poem! it is impoſſible: he never "ſaw a mountain in his life." This at leaſt is certain, that if we were to ſtrike out of Homer, Virgil, and Milton, thoſe deſcriptions and ſentiments that allude to the grand phenomena of nature, we ſhould deprive theſe poets of the beſt part of their ſublimity.

And yet, the true ſublime may be attained by human art. Muſick is ſublime, when it inſpires devotion, courage, or other elevated affections: or when by its mellow and ſonorous harmonies it overwhelms the mind with ſweet aſtoniſhment: or when it infuſes that pleaſing horror abovementioned; which, when joined

to words deſcriptive of terrible ideas, it ſometimes does very effectually.

Architecture is ſublime, when it is large and durable, and withal ſo ſimple and well-proportioned as that the eye can take in all its greatneſs at once. For when an edifice is loaded with ornaments, our attention to them prevents our attending to the whole; and the mind, though it may be amuſed with the beauty or the variety of the little parts, is not ſtruck with that ſudden aſtoniſhment, which accompanies the contemplation of ſublimity. Hence the Gothick ſtyle of building, where it abounds in minute decorations, and where greater pains are employed on the parts, than in adjuſting the general harmony of the fabrick, is leſs ſublime than the Grecian, in which proportion, ſimplicity, and uſefulneſs, are more ſtudied than ornament. It is true, that Gothick buildings may be very ſublime: witneſs the old cathedral churches. But this is owing, rather to their vaſt magnitude, to the ſtamp of antiquity that is impreſſed on them, and to their having been ſo long appropriated to religious ſervice, than to thoſe peculiarities that diſtinguiſh their architecture from the Grecian.

The Chineſe mode of building has no pretenſions to ſublimity; its decorations being ſtill more trivial than the Gothick; and becauſe it derives no dignity from aſſociated ideas, and has no vaſtneſs of magnitude to raiſe admiration. Yet is it not without its charms. There is an air of neatneſs in it, and of novelty, which to many is pleaſing, and which of late it has been much the faſhion to imitate.

Painting is ſublime, when it diſplays men inveſted with great qualities, as bodily ſtrength, or actuated by ſublime paſſions, as courage, devotion, benevolence. That picture by Guido Rheni, which repreſents Michael triumphing over the evil ſpirit, I have always admired for its ſublimity, though ſome critics are not pleaſed with it. The attitude of the angel, who holds a ſword in his

his right hand in a threatening poſture, conveys to me the idea of dignity and grace, as well as of irreſiſtable ſtrength. Nor is the majeſtick beauty of his perſon leſs admirable: and his countenance, though in a ſlight degree expreſſive of contempt or indignation, retains that ſweet compoſure, which we think eſſential to the angelick character. His limbs and wings are, it is true, contraſted: but the contraſt is ſo far from being finical, that, if we conſider the action, and the ſituation, we muſt allow it to be not only natural, but unavoidable, and ſuch as a winged being might continue in for ſome time without inconvenience.* Guido is not equally fortunate in his delineation of the adverſary; who is too mean, and too ludicrous, a figure, to cope with an archangel, or to require, for his overthrow, the twentieth part of that force which appears to be exerted againſt him.— Painting is alſo ſublime, when it imitates grand natural appearances, as mountains, precipices, ſtorms, huge heaps of rocks and ruins, and the like.

At the time when Raphael began to diſtinguiſh himſelf, two ſtyles of painting were cultivated in Italy. His maſter Pietro Perugino copied nature with an exactneſs bordering upon ſervility: ſo that his figures had leſs dignity and grace than their originals. Michael Angelo ran into the oppoſite extreme; and, with an imagination fraught with great ideas, and continually aſpiring to ſublimity, ſo enlarged the proportions of nature, as to raiſe his men to giants, and ſtretch out every form into an extenſion that might almoſt be called monſtrous. To the penetration of Raphael both ſtyles ſeemed to be faulty, and both in an equal degree. The one appeared inſipid in its accuracy, and the other almoſt ridiculous in its extravagance †. He therefore purſued a middle courſe; tempering

* Eſſay on Imagination. Chap. II. Sect. iv. § 3.

† I find that Sir Joſhua Reynolds, from whoſe judgment there is no appeal, thinks more favourably of the Sublime of Michael Angelo. I therefore retract part of what is ſaid above: but I am ſure my indulgent Friend will not be offended to ſee this remark,

pering the fire of Angelo with the caution of Perugino: and thus exhibited the true ſublime of painting; wherein the graces of nature are heightened, but nothing is gigantick, diſproportioned, or improbable. While we ſtudy his Cartoons, we ſeem to be converſing with a ſpecies of men, like ourſelves indeed, but of heroick dignity and ſize.

This great artiſt is in painting, what Homer is in poetry. Homer magnifies in like manner; and transforms men into heroes and demigods; and, to give the more grandeur to his narrative, ſets it off with marvellous events, which, in his time, though not improbable, were however aſtoniſhing. But Arioſto, and the authors of the *Old Romance*, reſemble *Michael Angelo* in exalting their champions, not into heroes, but into giants and monſters. Achilles, though ſuperiour to all men in valour, would not venture to battle without his arms: but a warriour of romance, whether armed or not, could fell a troop of horſe to the earth at one blow, tear up trees by the root, and now and then throw a piece of a mountain at the enemy. The true ſublime is always natural and credible: but unbounded exaggerations, that ſurpaſs all proportion and all belief, are more apt to provoke laughter than aſtoniſhment.

Poetry becomes ſublime in many ways: and as this is the only fine art, which can at preſent ſupply us with examples, I ſhall from it ſelect a ſpecimen or two of the different ſorts of ſublimity.

1. Poetry is ſublime, when it elevates the mind. This indeed is a general character of greatneſs. But I ſpeak here of ſentiments ſo happily conceived and expreſſed, as to raiſe our affections above the low purſuits of ſenſuality and avarice, and animate us with the love of virtue and of honour. As a ſpecimen, let me recommend

as I had written it before I met with his admirable Diſcourſe delivered in the Royal Academy, in December, one thouſand ſeven hundred and ſeventy-two. The few pieces I have ſeen of Michael Angelo muſt have been in his worſt manner.

6. the

the account, which Virgil gives in his eighth book, of the perſon, family, and kingdom of Evander; an Arcadian prince, who, after being trained up in all the diſcipline of Greece, eſtabliſhed himſelf and his people in that part of Italy, where a few centuries after was built the great metropolis of the Roman empire. In the midſt of poverty, that good old man retains a philoſophical and a royal dignity. "This habitation (ſays he, to Eneas, who had made him "a viſit) has been honoured with the preſence of Hercules him-"ſelf. Dare, my gueſt, to deſpiſe riches; and do thou alſo faſhion "thyſelf into a likeneſs of God:" or, as ſome render it, "do "thou alſo make thyſelf worthy of immortality."

Aude, hoſpes, contemnere opes; et te quoque dignum
Finge Deo.——

There is a ſtrength in the expreſſion, whereof our language is not capable. "I deſpiſe the world (ſays Dryden) when I read it, and "myſelf when I attempt to tranſlate it."

2. Poetry is ſublime, when it conveys a lively idea of any grand appearance in art or nature. A nobler deſcription of this ſort I do not at preſent remember, than that which Virgil gives, in the firſt book of the Georgick, of a dark night, with wind, rain, and lightening: where Jupiter appears, encompaſſed with clouds and ſtorms, darting his thunderbolts, and overturning the mountains, while the ocean is roaring, the earth trembling, the wild beaſts fled away, the rain pouring down in torrents, the woods reſounding to the tempeſt, and all mankind overwhelmed with conſternation. *

Ipſe

* The following is a more literal tranſlation: but I know not how to imitate, in modern language, the awful, (I had almoſt ſaid, the dreadful) ſimplicity of the original.

High in the midnight ſtorm enthroned, Heaven's Sire
Hurls from his blazing arm the bolt of fire.
Earth feels with trembling; every beaſt is fled;
And nations proſtrate fall, o'erwhelm'd with dread.

Athos

Ipſe Pater, media nimborum in nocte, coruſca
Fulmina molitur dextra; quo maxima motu
Terra tremit, fugere feræ, et mortalia corda
Per gentes humilis ſtravit pavor. Ille flagranti
Aut Atho, aut Rhodopen, aut alta Keraunia telo
Dejicit; ingeminant auſtri, et denſiſſimus imber;
Nunc nemora ingenti vento, nunc littora plangunt. *

This deſcription aſtoniſhes, both by the grandeur, and by the horror, of the ſcene, which is either wrapt in total darkneſs, or made viſible by the glare of lightning. And the poet has expreſſed it with the happieſt ſolemnity of ſtyle, and a ſonorous harmony of numbers.—As examples of the ſame ſort of ſublimity, namely of great images with a mixture of horror, I might call the reader's attention to the ſtorm in the beginning of the Eneid, the death of Cacus in the eighth book, to the account of Tartarus in the ſixth, and that of the burning of Troy in the ſecond. But in the ſtyle of dreadful magnificence, nothing is ſuperior, and ſcarce any thing equal, to Milton's repreſentation of hell and chaos, in the firſt and ſecond books of Paradiſe Loſt.

In the concluding paragraph of the ſame work, there is brought together, with uncommon ſtrength of fancy, and rapidity of narrative, a number of circumſtances, wonderfully adapted to the purpoſe of filling the mind with ideas of terrifick grandeur: the deſcent of the cherubim; the flaming ſword; the archangel leading in haſte our firſt parents down from the heights of paradiſe, and then

* Athos rolls headlong, where his lightnings fly,
The rocks of Rhodope in ruin lie,
Or huge Keraunia. With redoubled rage
The torrent rain and bellowing wind engage,
Loud in the woods afar the tempeſts roar,
And mountain billows burſt in thunder on the ſhore.
Georg. I. 328.

diſappearing;

diſappearing; and, above all, the ſcene that preſents itſelf on their looking behind them.

They, looking back, all th' eaſtern cliff beheld
Of Paradiſe, ſo late their happy ſeat,
Waved over by that flaming brand; the gate
With dreadful faces throng'd and fiery arms.

To which the laſt verſes form the moſt ſtriking contraſt that can be imagined.

Some natural tears they drop'd, but wiped them ſoon.
The world was all before them, where to chuſe
Their place of reſt, and Providence their guide.
They, hand in hand, with wandering ſteps, and ſlow,
Through Eden took their ſolitary way.

The final couplet renews our ſorrow; by exhibiting, with picturesque accuracy, the moſt mournful ſcene in nature; which yet is ſo prepared, as to raiſe comfort, and diſpoſe to reſignation. And thus, while we are at once melting in tenderneſs, elevated with pious hope, and overwhelmed with the grandeur of deſcription, the divine poem concludes. What luxury of mental gratification is here! Who would exchange this frame of mind (if nature could ſupport it) for any other! How exquiſitely does the faith of a Chriſtian accord with the nobleſt feelings of humanity!

3. Poetry is ſublime, when, without any great pomp of images or of words, it infuſes horror by a happy choice of circumſtances. When Macbeth (in Shakſpeare) goes to conſult the witches, he finds them performing rites in a cave; and, upon aſking what they were employed about, receives no other anſwer than this ſhort one, "A deed without a name." One's blood runs cold at the thought, that their work was of ſo accurſed a nature, that they themſelves had no name to expreſs it by, or were afraid to ſpeak of it by any name. Here is no ſolemnity of ſtyle, nor any accumulation of

great

great ideas; yet here is the true ſublime; becauſe here is ſomething that aſtoniſhes the mind, and fills it, without producing any real inconvenience.

Among other omens, which preceded the death of Dido, Virgil relates, that, when ſhe was making an oblation of wine, milk and incenſe upon the altar, ſhe obſerved the milk grow black, and found that the wine was changed into blood. This the poet improves into a circumſtance of the utmoſt horror, when he adds, that ſhe never mentioned it to any perſon, not even to her ſiſter, who was her confidante on all other occaſions: inſinuating, that it filled her with ſo dreadful apprehenſion, that ſhe had not courage even to attempt to ſpeak of it.—Perhaps I may be more ſtruck with this, than many others are; as I once knew a young man, who was in the ſame ſtate of mind, after having been frightened in his ſleep, or, as he imagined, by a viſion, which he had ſeen about two years before he told me of it. With much intreaty I prevailed on him to give me ſome account of his dream: but there was one particular, which he ſaid that he would not, nay that he durſt not, mention; and, while he was ſaying ſo, his haggard eyes, pale countenance, quivering lips, and faltering voice, preſented to me ſuch a picture of horror, as I never ſaw before or ſince. I ought to add, that he was, in all other reſpects, in his perfect mind, chearful, and active, and not more than twenty years of age.

Horror has long been a powerful, and a favourite, engine in the hands of the Tragick poet. Eſchylus employed it more than any other antient artiſt. In his play called *the Furies*, he introduced Oreſtes haunted by a company of thoſe frightful beings; intending thereby an allegorical repreſentation of the torment which that hero ſuffered in his mind, in conſequence of having ſlain his mother Clytemneſtra, for the part ſhe had taken in the murder of his father. But to raiſe the greater horror in the ſpectators, the poet was at pains to deſcribe, with amazing force of expreſſion, the appearance

of

of the Furies; and he brought upon the ſtage no fewer than fifty of them; whoſe infernal looks, hideous geſtures, and horrible ſcreams, had ſuch effects on the women and children, that, in the ſubſequent exhibitions of the play, the number of furies was by an expreſs law limited, firſt to fifteen, and afterwards to twelve. There are, no doubt, ſublime ſtrokes in the poet's account of theſe furies; and there is ſomething very great in the idea of a perſon haunted by his own thoughts, in the form of ſuch terrifick beings. Yet horror of this kind I would hardly call ſublime, becauſe it is addreſſed rather to the eyes, than to the mind; and becauſe it is eaſier to disfigure a man ſo, as to make him have the appearance of an ugly woman, than, by a brief deſcription, or well-choſen ſentiment, to alarm and aſtoniſh the fancy. Shakſpeare has, in my opinion, excited horror of more genuine ſublimity, and withal more uſeful in a moral view, when he makes Macbeth, in ſhort and broken ſtarts of exclamation, and without any pomp of images or of words, give an utterance half-ſuppreſſed to thoſe dreadful thoughts that were paſſing in his mind immediately before and after the murder of Duncan, his gueſt, kinſman, ſovereign, and benefactor. The agonies of a guilty conſcience were never more forcibly repreſented, than in this tragedy; which may indeed be ſaid, in the language of Ariſtotle, to purify the mind by the operation of terror and pity; and which abounds more in that ſpecies of the ſublime whereof I now ſpeak, than any other performance in the Engliſh tongue.—See its merits examined and explained, with the utmoſt correctneſs of judgment, beauty of language, and vivacity of imagination, in Mrs. Montagu's *Eſſay on the writings and genius of Shakſpeare.*

4. Poetry is ſublime, when it awakens in the mind any great and good affection, as piety, or patriotiſm. This is one of the nobleſt effects of the art. The Pſalms are remarkable, beyond all other writings, for their power of inſpiring devout emotions. But it is

not in this reſpect only that they are ſublime. Of the divine nature they contain the moſt magnificent deſcriptions that the ſoul of man can comprehend. The hundred and fourth pſalm, in particular, diſplays the power and goodneſs of Providence, in creating and preſerving the world, and the various tribes of animals in it, with ſuch majeſtick brevity and beauty, as it is vain to look for in any human compoſition. The morning ſong of Adam and Eve *, and many other parts of Paradiſe Loſt, are noble effuſions of piety, breathed in the moſt captivating ſtrains: and Thomſon's Hymn on the Seaſons, if we overlook an unguarded word or two, is not inferiour.

Of that ſublimity which reſults from the ſtrong expreſſion of patriotick ſentiments, many examples might be quoted from the Latin poets, particularly Virgil, Horace, and Lucan: but there is a paſſage in Homer that ſuits the preſent purpoſe better than any other that now occurs. While Hector is advancing to attack the Greek intrenchments, an eagle lets fall a wounded ſerpent in the middle of his army. This Polydamas conſiders as a bad omen, and adviſes him to order a retreat. Hector rejects the advice with indignation. "Shall I be deterred from my duty, (ſays he) and from executing "the commands of Jupiter, by the flight of birds? Let them fly on "my right hand or on my left, towards the ſetting or towards the "riſing ſun, I will obey the counſel of Jove, who is the king of "gods and of men." And then he adds that memorable aphoriſm, "To defend our country is the beſt of all auguries †:" or, as Pope has very well expreſſed it,

Without a ſign, his ſword the brave man draws,
And aſks no omen, but his country's cauſe.

If we attend to all the circumſtances, and reflect that both Hector and Homer believed in auguries, we muſt own that the ſentiment is wonderfully great.

* Par. Loſt, book v.

† Εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης. Iliad. xii. 243.

I might

I might alſo quote, from the ſame book of the Iliad, Sarpedon's ſpeech to Glaucus; which contains the nobleſt leſſon of political wiſdom, and the moſt enlivening motives to magnanimity. I ſhall not tranſlate it literally, but confine myſelf to the general ſcope of the argument; and I ſhall give it in proſe, that it may not ſeem to derive any part of its dignity from the charm of poetical numbers. "Why, O Glaucus, do we receive from our people in Lycia the "honours of ſovereignty, and ſo liberal a proviſion? Is it not in the "hope, that we are to diſtinguiſh ourſelves by our virtue, as much "as we are diſtinguiſhed by our rank? Let us act accordingly: "that, when they ſee us encountering the greateſt perils of war, "they may ſay, we deſerve the honours and the dignity which we "poſſeſs. If indeed (continues he) by declining danger we could "ſecure ourſelves againſt old age and the grave, I ſhould neither "fight myſelf in the front of the battle, nor exhort you to do ſo. "But ſince death is unavoidable, and may aſſail us from ſo many "thouſand quarters, let us advance, and either gain renown by "victory, or by our fall give glory to the conquerour." The whole is excellent: but the grandeur and generoſity of the concluſion can never be too highly applauded.

5. Poetry is alſo ſublime, when it deſcribes in a lively manner the viſible effects of any of thoſe paſſions that give elevation to the character. Such is that paſſage, in the concluſion of the ſame twelfth book of the Iliad, which paints the impetuoſity and terrible appearance of Hector, ſtorming the intrenchments, and purſuing the enemy to their ſhips. Extraordinary efforts of magnanimity, valour, or any other virtue, and extraordinary exertions of ſtrength or power, are grand objects, and give ſublimity to thoſe pictures or poems, in which they are well repreſented. All the great poets abound in examples.

Yet in great ſtrength, for example, there may be unwieldineſs, or awkwardneſs, or ſome other contemptible quality, whereby the

ſublime is deſtroyed. Polyphemus is a match for five hundred Greeks; but he is not a grand object. We hate his barbarity, and deſpiſe his folly, too much, to allow him a ſingle grain of admiration. Ulyſſes, who in the hands of Polypheme was nothing, is incomparably more ſublime, when, in walking to his palace, diſguiſed like a beggar, he is inſulted, and even kicked, by one of his own ſlaves, who was in the ſervice of thoſe rebels that were tempting his queen, plundering his houſehold, and alienating the affections of his people. Homer tells us, that the hero ſtood firm, without being moved from his place by the ſtroke; that he deliberated for a moment, whether he ſhould at one blow fell the traitor to the earth; but that patience and prudential thoughts reſtrained him. The brutal force of the Cyclops is not near ſo ſtriking as this picture; which diſplays bodily ſtrength and magnanimity united. For what we deſpiſe we never admire; and therefore deſpicable greatneſs cannot be ſublime.

Homer and Virgil have, each of them, given a deſcription of a horſe, which is very much, and juſtly, celebrated. But they dwell rather upon the ſwiftneſs and beauty of the animal, or on ſuch of his paſſions as have little or no dignity; and therefore their deſcriptions, though moſt elegant and harmonious, cannot properly be termed ſublime. In the book of Job, we have the picture of a war-horſe in the moſt magnificent ſtyle. The inſpired poet expatiates upon the nobler qualities of that animal, his ſtrength, impetuoſity, and contempt of danger: and ſeveral of the words made uſe of, being figurative, and in their proper meaning expreſſive of human emotions, convey uncommon vivacity and elevation to the whole paſſage.

"Haſt thou given the horſe ſtrength? Haſt thou clothed his "neck with thunder?"—alluding, perhaps, either to the noiſe of cavalry advancing; or to their ſpeed, which the poet inſinuates may be compared to that of lightning. "Canſt thou make him afraid

"as

"as a graſhopper? the glory of his noſtrils is terrible:"—that is, the breath coming from his noſtrils, which appear red with diſtenſion, make him look as if fire and ſmoke were iſſuing from them; an idea, which Virgil has finely expreſſed in that line,

Collectumque premens volvit ſub naribus ignem.

"He paweth in the valley, and *rejoiceth* in his ſtrength; he goeth "on to meet the armed men. He *mocketh* at fear, and is not af- "frighted, neither turneth he back from the ſword. The quiver "rattleth againſt him, the glittering ſpear and the ſhield. He "ſwalloweth the ground with fierceneſs and rage;" which probably ſignifies, according to ſome tranſlations, "he looks as if he would "ſwallow the ground *; neither *believeth* he that it is the ſound of "the trumpet. He *ſaith* among the trumpets, *ha, ha*;" deſpiſes their alarm as much as we do that of a threatening which only provokes our laughter: "and he ſmelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the "captains, and the ſhouting."—Beſides the grandeur of the animal, as here painted, the ſublimity of the paſſage is heightened exceedingly by the landſcape; which preſents to our view an army in order of battle, and makes us think we hear the craſhing of armour, and the ſhouts of encountering multitudes.

In deſcribing what is great, poets often employ ſonorous language. This is ſuitable to the nature of human ſpeech: for while we give utterance to that which elevates our imagination, we are apt to ſpeak louder, and with greater ſolemnity, than at other times †. It muſt not however be thought, that high-ſounding words are eſſential to the Sublime. Without a correſpondent dignity of thought, or grandeur of images, a ſonorous ſtyle is ridiculous; and puts one in mind of thoſe perſons, who raiſe great expectation, and aſſume a look of vaſt importance, when they have

* In a very ingenious criticiſm on this paſſage in the *Guardian*, theſe words are differently underſtood.

† Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick: laſt chapter.

either

either nothing at all to ſay, or nothing that is worth notice. That ſtyle is ſublime, which makes us conceive a great object, or a great effort, in a lively manner; and this may be done, when the words are very plain and ſimple. Nay, the plaineſt and ſimpleſt words have ſometimes a happy effect in ſetting off what is intrinſically great; as an act of vaſt bodily ſtrength is the more aſtoniſhing, when performed by a ſlight effort. This ſort of ſublimity we have in perfection in many of thoſe paſſages of Holy Writ, that deſcribe the operation of Omnipotence: as, "God ſaid, Let there be light, "and there was light:—He ſpoke, and it was done; he com-"manded, and it ſtood faſt:—Thou openeſt thy hand, they are "filled with good; thou hideſt thy face, and they are troubled."

It was obſerved, that the deſcription of the horſe in Job derives not a little of its dignity from thoſe words, that properly ſignify human ſentiments, and cannot be applied to an irrational animal, unleſs with a figurative meaning: "he *rejoiceth in his ſtrength*; he *mocketh at* "*fear*; he *believeth not* that it is the ſound of the trumpet; he *ſaith* "among the trumpets, *ha, ha.*" It may now be remarked in general, that the ſublime is often heightened, when, by means of figurative language, the qualities of a ſuperiour nature are judiciouſly applied to what is inferiour. Hence we ſee in poetry, and in more familiar language, the paſſions and feelings of rationality aſcribed to that which is without reaſon, and without life, or even to abſtract ideas.—On Adam's eating the forbidden fruit,

> Earth trembled from her entrails, as again
> In pangs, and Nature gave a ſecond groan;
> Sky lower'd, and, muttering thunder, ſome ſad drops
> Wept, at compleating of the mortal ſin
> Original.

Who is not ſenſible of the greatneſs of the thought conveyed in theſe words; which repreſent the earth and heaven affected with horror at the ſin then committed, and nature, or the univerſe, uttering

tering in low thunder a groan of anguiſh? Had the poet ſimply ſaid, that there was an earthquake, that the ſky grew dark, and that ſome drops of rain fell, the account would no doubt have been ſublime, as he would have given it. But is it not much more ſo, when we are informed, that this convulſion of nature was the effect of a ſort of ſenſation diffuſed at that inſtant through the whole inanimate world? How dreadful muſt be the enormity of that guilt, which could produce an event ſo great, and withal ſo preternatural! Here are two ſources of the ſublime: the prodigy ſtrikes with horror; the vaſtneſs of the idea overwhelms with aſtoniſhment.

In this place an unſkilful poet would probably have brought on ſuch a *ſtorm of thunder and lightning*, and ſo violent an earthquake, as muſt have overturned the mountains, and ſet the woods on fire. But Milton, with better judgment, makes the alarm of that deep and awful kind, which cannot expreſs itſelf in any other way, than by an inward and univerſal trembling: a ſenſation more affecting to the fancy, than thoſe paſſions are, which vent themſelves in outrageous behaviour; even as that ſorrow is the moſt pathetick, which deprives one of the power of lamentation, and diſcovers itſelf only by fainting and groans. Beſides, if this convulſion of the univerſe had been more violent, the unhappy offenders muſt have been confounded and terrified; which would not have ſuited the poet's purpoſe. For he tells us, and indeed the circumſtances that follow in the narrative (which, by the by, are exquiſitely contrived) do all ſuppoſe, that our firſt parents were ſo intent on gratifying their impious appetite, that they took no notice of the prodigies, which accompanied the tranſgreſſion.

Writers of weak judgment, when they attempt the ſublime, are apt to exaggerate deſcription, till they make it ridiculous. And to Milton's prudent reſerve on this occaſion I cannot quote a better contraſt, than that paſſage in Ovid, where the Earth, as a perſon, lifts up her head, and, holding her hand before her face, complains

to Jupiter, in a voice almoſt inarticulate with thirſt, of the torments ſhe was ſuffering from the conflagration brought upon her by the raſhneſs of Phaeton; and, at the end of her ſpeech, half-ſuffocated with fire and ſmoke, draws back her head into the centre of her body. This is mere burleſque. Our fancy cannot be reconciled to ſo extravagant a fiction, nor conceive the earth to be an animal of ſo hideous and ſo ridiculous a form. But no art is neceſſary to reconcile us to the idea of the earth trembling with preternatural horror at ſuch a lamentable cataſtrophe as the fall of Adam and Eve; the firſt crime by which the ſublunary creation was polluted; and a crime, that

Brought death into the world, and all our woe.

In the poetical parts of Scripture, animation and ſentiment are often, with the happieſt effect, applied to things inanimate. "Let "the floods clap their hands, and let the hills rejoice together "before the Lord; for he cometh to judge the earth. — Canſt "thou ſend lightnings, that they may go, and ſay unto thee, "Here we are? — God ſendeth forth light, and it goeth; he "calleth it again, and it obeyeth with fear." — Theſe and the like figures convey a lively and lofty idea of Divine Power, to which the inanimate parts of nature are as obſequious, as if they had intelligence and activity.

A common ſentiment may be made ſublime, when it is illuſtrated by an alluſion to a grand object. "There is not, ſays Addiſon, a "ſight in nature ſo mortifying, as that of a diſtracted perſon, "when his imagination is troubled, and his whole ſoul diſordered "and confuſed." This is true; but there is nothing very ſtriking in it. But when the author adds, "Babylon in ruins is not ſo "melancholy a ſpectacle," he gives great dignity to the thought, by ſetting before us one of the moſt hideous pictures of deſolation that ever was ſeen by mortal eyes; and at the ſame time declaring, what is no more than the truth, that even this is not ſo mournful

a ſight as the other. — "The evils of life ſeem more terrible when "anticipated than they are found to be in reality," is no uncommon obſervation: but the ſame elegant author improves it into a ſublime allegory, when he ſays, "The evils of this life appear, like "rocks and precipices, rugged and barren at a diſtance; but, at "our nearer approach, we find little fruitful ſpots and refreſhing "ſprings mixed with the harſhneſs and deformities of nature." This happy illuſtration pleaſes, not only by giving perſpicuity to the thought, but alſo by ſuggeſting the magnificent idea of a ridge of rocky precipices, as they appear at a diſtance to the traveller, and as he finds them to be on coming up to them. And it pleaſes yet further, when we compare the object alluded to with the idea ſignified, and find ſo perfect a coincidence.

Things, as well as ſentiments, may be made ſublime by the ſame artifice. Bees are animals of wonderful ſagacity, but of too diminutive a form to captivate our imagination. But Virgil deſcribes their economy with ſo many fine alluſions to the more elevated parts of nature, as raiſe our aſtoniſhment, both at the ſkill of the poet, and at the genius of his favourite inſect; whoſe little ſize becomes matter of admiration, when we conſider thoſe noble inſtincts wherewith the Creatour has endowed it.

It may ſeem ſtrange, and yet it is true, that the ſublime is ſometimes attained by a total want of expreſſion: and this may happen, when by ſilence, or by hiding the face, we are made to underſtand, that there is in the mind ſomething too great for utterance. In a picture repreſenting the ſacrifice of Iphigenia, a Grecian painter * diſplayed varieties of ſorrow in the faces of the other perſons preſent; but, deſpairing to give any adequate expreſſion to the countenance of her father Agamemnon, he made him cover it with his hands: an idea much admired by the antient artiſts, and often

* Timanthes. See Plin. Hiſt. Nat. xxxv. 36. Val. Max. viii. 11. Quintil. ii. 14.

imitated by the modern; as what was likely to raiſe in the ſpectator a more exquiſite horror, than any poſitive expreſſion that could have been given to the face of the parent. Indeed, on ſuch an occaſion, it would be natural for a father to hide his face, as unable to endure ſo dreadful a ſight; ſo that this contrivance was not only the moſt affecting to the beholder, but alſo the moſt proper in itſelf.

When Ulyſſes, in Homer, pays his compliments to the Grecian ghoſts whom he had called up by incantation, we are told that, on ſeeing their old acquaintance and fellow-ſoldier, they all converſed with him, Ajax only excepted; who, ſtill reſenting the affront he had received at Troy, when Ulyſſes in oppoſition to his claim obtained the arms of Achilles, ſtood aloof, diſdaining to take notice of his rival, or to return any anſwer to his kind expoſtulations. It is certain, that no leſs a perſon than Virgil admired this incident; for he copies it in his account of the infernal world: where Eneas, meeting Dido, endeavours to excuſe his deſertion of her, urging his unwillingneſs, and the command of Jupiter: but ſhe, ſays the poet, turned her eyes another way, and minded no more what he ſaid, than if ſhe had been flint or marble.

This ſilence of Dido has been blamed by a very learned critick: who ſeems to think, that, though it was becoming in Ajax not to ſpeak, becauſe he was a hero, it would be natural for an injured woman to upbraid a faithleſs lover with the keeneſt reproaches. But I take the remark, rather as a joke upon that volubility of tongue, which ſatiriſts have imputed to the female ſex, than as a ſerious criticiſm. Dido, as deſcribed by Virgil, is a more dignified character, than Homer's Ajax; and therefore, if the ſilence was majeſtick in him, on account of his greatneſs of mind, it muſt be equally ſo in her. If he, as a hero, was ſuperiour to other men, ſhe, as a heroine, was ſuperiour to other women.

Some

Some writers (and the ſame thing is too often attempted in the pulpit) have endeavoured to expreſs, by an elaborate ſoliloquy, what they ſuppoſe might paſs in the mind of Abraham, on being commanded to offer up his Son. This I cannot but think injudicious. It ſeems to detract not a little from the Father of the faithful, to repreſent him as deliberating whether or not he ſhould obey God's command, or conjecturing for what purpoſe ſo hard a taſk had been enjoined him. Let a man of ſenſibility, after hearing one of thoſe rhetorical flouriſhes, read the narrative in the words of Moſes, and he will *feel*, how much more affecting the one is in its ſimple majeſty, than the other in its gaudy ornaments; and what inexpreſſible ſublimity the character of the great Patriarch derives from his emphatick ſilence and prompt obedience. He knew the command was divine, and conſequently good; and that, whatever his paternal emotions might be, his duty was, inſtantly to obey. He therefore "roſe up early in the morning," and began that journey, which he then thought would have ſo melancholy a termination. I may add, that there is ſomething almoſt equally great in the ſilent ſubmiſſion of Iſaac; who, being at this time about thirty years of age, might have attempted reſiſtance or eſcape, if his faith and his piety had not been worthy the Son of ſuch a Father.

Things in themſelves great may become more or leſs ſublime, according to the nature of the alluſions, whereby the deſcription of them is illuſtrated. Longinus, who ſeems to have thought not ſo favourably of the Odyſſey as it deſerves, repreſents the genius of the author as in the decline when he wrote that poem; but characteriſes that decline by two noble ſimilitudes. "In the Odyſſey "(ſays he) Homer may be likened to the ſetting ſun, whoſe gran-"deur ſtill remains, though his beams have loſt their meridian "heat." What a beautiful idea! Does it not even adorn the object which it is intended in ſome degree to depreciate? And

a little after he has this remark. "Like the ocean, whoſe ſhores, "when deſerted by the tide, mark out the extent to which it ſome-"times flows, ſo Homer's genius, when ebbing into the fables of "the Odyſſey, plainly diſcovers, how vaſt it once muſt have been." To be extolled by ordinary writers is not ſo flattering, as to be cenſured by a critick like Longinus, who tempers his blame with ſo much politeneſs and dignity. Indeed, it has been remarked of him, that he exemplifies every kind of good writing; ſo as in grandeur of thought, and beauty of expreſſion, to vie with the author whom he celebrates.

Inſtances of ideas or images intrinſically great, rendered more ſo by the alluſions employed in deſcribing them, are common in Homer, Virgil, Milton, and all the ſublime poets. So many examples crowd on one's memory, that one knows not which to prefer. Achilles in arms is a grand idea: but Homer throws upon it additional ſplendor, when he compares him to the moon, to the blaze of a beacon ſeen at a diſtance in a night of tempeſt, to a ſtar or comet, and to the ſun. Milton magnifies the ſtrength and intrepidity of Satan, when he ſays,

Satan alarm'd,
Collecting all his might, dilated ſtood
Like Teneriff or Atlas, unremoved;
His ſtature reach'd the ſky, and on his creſt
Sat horror.

The fires lighted up in the Grecian camp, and ſcattered over the plains of Troy, would be a beautiful appearance: but Homer makes it riſe upon us in glory, by comparing them to the moon and ſtars illuminating the ſky, when the clouds ſeparate, and the pure ether ſhines forth in all the magnificence of midnight.

But obſerve, that great ideas are not always alluded to, in the deſcription of great objects. For of two things, different in nature,

ture, that which is upon the whole inferiour may poſſeſs a quality or two in a more exquiſite degree, than that which is in all other reſpects more elevated. How ſuperiour is a man, eſpecially a wiſe man, and ſtill more eſpecially, the wiſeſt, and one of the greateſt of men, to a vegetable! And yet we are warranted, on the beſt authority, to ſay, that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of the lilies of the field.

We muſt therefore, in all caſes, attend to that circumſtance of likeneſs, upon which an alluſion is founded. Homer compares Hector to a rock tumbling from the top of a mountain. Were we to hear nothing more of this ſimilitude, it might appear even ridiculous; for one might imagine it was intended to paint the particular manner, in which that hero deſcended from a high to a lower ground: and ſurely, a man rolling headlong, like a ſtone, down a ſteep place, is an image of neither dignity nor elegance; nor can it raiſe any perſon in our eſteem, to ſay of him that he is like a ſtone. But when we learn, that the poet means by this compariſon to inform us, that Hector was irreſiſtable while he advanced, and immoveable when he ſtopt, we are ſtruck with the propriety, and at the ſame time with the greatneſs, of the alluſion; for it heightens what we had before conceived of the warrior's impetuoſity. If a huge fragment of a rock, torn from the top of a mountain by a winter torrent, were rolling and thundering down to the plain, no human power would be able to oppoſe it; and when it ſtopt, very great power would be neceſſary to move it.

" I will make Babylon a poſſeſſion for the bittern, and pools of " water: and I will *ſweep it with the beſom of deſtruction.*" * The inſtrument alluded to is one of the meaneſt; and yet the idea conveyed by the alluſion is exceedingly great. For it is not the manner, but the conſequences, of the deſtruction, that are here painted: it will be ſo complete, that not the leaſt memorial of that city ſhall

* Iſaiah, chap. xiv.

remain:

remain: even as on a floor that is ſwept no trace is to be ſeen of the duſt that was there formerly, or of the figures that might have been drawn in it. The alluſion has alſo this emphatical meaning, that the people of Babylon are a nuiſance, and that the earth will be purified by their being driven away; and it implies further, that all the efforts of human power are but duſt, when the arm of the Almighty is lifted up againſt them.

"Ruin fiercely drives Her plowſhare o'er creation," ſays Young, ſpeaking of the end of the world. The driving of a plow over a field is not a grand object. Yet the figure conveys a ſublime idea to thoſe who know, that ſome antient nations, when they meant to deſtroy a city, not only raſed the buildings, but plowed up the foundation; to intimate, that it was never to be rebuilt any more. The poet's allegory, therefore, typifies a deſtruction that is to be total, and final.—If I were to criticize it further, I would ſay, that it is pity it ſhould be above the apprehenſion of common readers: for the ſublime is generally the worſe for being wrapt up in learning, or in any other diſguiſe. What we do not clearly perceive we cannot rationally admire. It is true, that, where ſublimity with horror is intended, a certain degree of darkneſs may have a good effect; as unknown objects, viewed through miſt or in the twilight, appear of greater ſize than the reality, and of more hideous proportion. But the example before us is rather ambiguous, than obſcure: the learned reader knows that it comprehends a grand alluſion; but to the unlearned it may ſeem inadequate to the ſubject, by reaſon of its meanneſs.

Out of many that occur I quote a few examples, to ſhow, according to what has been already obſerved, that the ſublime is not always accompanied with ſonorous expreſſion, or a pomp of images. Theſe, when too anxiouſly ſought after, or when they are not ſupported with a correſpondent majeſty of thought, are called Bombaſt or Falſe Sublime; an unpardonable impropriety; which

which has in ſerious writing as bad an effect, as ignorance united with impudence, or a ſolemn behaviour with a mean underſtanding, would have in converſation. Moſt people, who are in earneſt in what they ſay, naturally elevate their voice and ſtyle, when they ſpeak of what is great; but, if they be of polite manners, that elevation is tempered with modeſty; and they rather lay reſtraint on their feelings, than expreſs them with the moſt emphatical utterance. Good writers, in like manner, riſe in ſound and ſolemnity of phraſe, when their thoughts aſpire to ſublimity; but their ſtyle is always ſimple, and their ornaments natural: and they often throw out noble ideas in the plaineſt words, and without any ornament.

Yet he, who aims at the ſublime, muſt not truſt ſo implicitly to the grandeur of his thoughts, as to be careleſs about his expreſſion. Well choſen words, and an elegant arrangement of them, are juſtly reckoned by Longinus among the ſources of ſublimity. Even when the thought is both good and great, the greatneſs, or the elegance, may be loſt or leſſened by an unſkilful writer: and that in ſeveral ways.

Firſt, by too minute deſcription, and too many words. For, when we are engroſſed by admiration or aſtoniſhment, it is not natural for us to ſpeak much, or attend to the more diminutive qualities of that which we contemplate. On ſeeing a lofty edifice, if the firſt thing we did were to count the windows, or the panes of glaſs in each, it would be a ſign of bad taſte, and a proof, that we wanted either imagination to comprehend, or ſenſibility to take pleaſure in, the grandeur of the whole. Were a hero to appear in arms before us, we ſhould not think of looking at his teeth, or obſerving whether his beard were cloſe ſhaved, or his nails nicely cut; at firſt, it is likely, that we ſhould take notice of little beſides his general appearance, and more ſtriking features: or, if thoſe other ſmall matters were to engage our whole attention, might it not

juſtly be ſaid, that we had no true ſenſe of the dignity of the perſon, nor any curioſity to know thoſe particulars concerning him, which alone were worthy to be known? Writers, therefore, who deſcribe too nicely the minute parts of a grand object, muſt both have diſengaged their own minds, and muſt alſo withdraw ours, from the admiration of what is ſublime in it. A few examples will make this plain.

Had Homer or had Milton been to deſcribe the chariot of the Sun, he would probably have confined himſelf to its dazzling appearance, or vaſt magnitude, or ſome of thoſe other qualities of it, which at the firſt glance might be ſuppoſed to fill the imagination, and raiſe the aſtoniſhment, of the beholder. But when Ovid tells us, that the axle was of gold, the pole of gold, the outward circumference of the wheels of gold, but that the ſpokes were ſilver *, we are not aſtoniſhed at all; and are apt to think, from the minuteneſs of the account, that the author had examined this chariot, rather with the curioſity of a coachmaker or ſilverſmith, than with the eye of a poet or painter. Such a detail reſembles an inventory more than a deſcription: as if it were material, in order to form a right idea of Phaeton's unlucky expedition, that we ſhould know the *value* of the chariot in which he rode.

We read, in a certain author, of a giant, who in his wrath tore off the top of a promontory, and flung it at the enemy; and ſo huge was the maſs, that you might, ſays he, have ſeen goats browſing on it as it flew through the air. This is unnatural and ridiculous. A ſpectator would have been too much confounded at the force, that could wield it, and at the aſtoniſhing appearance of ſuch a ruin hurled through the ſky, to attend to any circumſtance ſo minute as what is here ſpecified. Beſides, the motion of ſuch a fragment muſt have been too rapid, to allow the goats to keep their ground,

* Aureus axis erat, temo aureus, aurea ſummæ
Curvatura rotæ, radiorum argenteus ordo. Metam. ii.

or to admit the poſſibility of ſeeing them in the act of feeding. So that, whatever this idea may add to the magnitude, it muſt take away from the ſwiftneſs; and make the vaſt body ſeem to our imagination, as if it had loitered, or ſtopt, in its courſe, to give the beholder time to examine its curioſities, and that the poor goats might be in no danger of loſing their hold.

In ſublime deſcription, though the circumſtances that are ſpecified be few, yet, if they be well choſen and great, the reader's fancy will compleat the picture: and often, as already hinted, the image will not be leſs aſtoniſhing, if in its general appearance there be ſomething indefinite. When Hector forces the Greek intrenchments, the poet deſcribes him by ſeveral grand alluſions, and by this in particular,

Now ruſhing in the furious chief appears,
Gloomy as night, and ſhakes two ſhining ſpears.

In what reſpect he reſembled night, Homer leaves to be determined by the reader's fancy. This conveys no poſitive idea; but we are hence led to imagine, that there muſt have been ſomething peculiarly dark and dreadful in his look, as it appeared to the enemy: and thus we make the picture ſtronger perhaps than it would have been, if the author had drawn it more minutely †. A genius like Cowley

* Pope's Homer. Book 12. near the end.

† Speculative men often err, from an immoderate attachment to ſome one principle; of which, becauſe it holds in many caſes, they think it muſt hold in all. Gilbert, in the courſe of his obſervations on the magnet, grew ſo fond of magnetiſm, as to fancy, that the phenomena of the univerſe might be ſolved by it. And electricity ſeems now to have become almoſt as great a favourite of many ingenious philoſophers.

That poetical deſcription ought to be diſtinct and lively, and ſuch as might both aſſiſt the fancy, and direct the hand, of the painter, is an acknowleged truth in criticiſm. The beſt poets are the moſt picturesque. Homer is in this reſpect ſo admirable, that he has been juſtly called the prince of painters, as well as of poets. And one cauſe of the inſipidity of the Henriade is, that its ſcenery and images are deſcribed in too general terms, and want thoſe diſtinguiſhing peculiarities that captivate the fancy, and intereſt the paſſions.

Cowley would have interrupted the narrative, in order to enumerate all thoſe particulars in which Hector reſembled night; comparing his ſhield to the full moon; his eyes to ſtars; the flaſhing of his armour to comets and meteors; the duſt that flew about him,

to

But ſhould every thing in poetry be pictureſque? No. To the right imitation of nature ſhade is neceſſary, as well as light. We may be powerfully affected by that which is not viſible at all; and of viſible things ſome cannot be, and many ought not to be, painted: and the mind is often better pleaſed with images of its own forming, or finiſhing, than with thoſe that are ſet before it complete in all their colours and proportions. From the paſſage referred to in the text, and from many others that might be quoted, it appears that in deſcription Homer himſelf is not always definite; and that he knows how to affect his readers by leaving occaſionally a part of his picture to be ſupplied by their imagination. Of Helen's perſon he gives no minute account: but, when he tells us, that her lovelineſs was ſuch as to extort the admiration of the *oldeſt* Trojan ſenators, who had, and who owned they had, ſo good reaſon to diſlike her, he gives a higher idea of the power of her charms, than could have been conveyed by any deſcription of her eyes, mouth, ſhape, and other diſtinguiſhing beauties.

Algarotti is of opinion, that the poetry of the northern nations is, in general, leſs pictureſque than that of Italy. Virgil, ſays he, gives ſo exact a repreſentation of Dido's dreſs when ſhe goes a hunting, that a painter might follow it in every particular.

Tandem progreditur, magna ſtipante caterva,
Sidoniam picto chlamydem circumdata limbo;
Cui pharetra ex auro, crines nodantur in aurum,
Aurea purpuream ſubnectit fibula veſtem.

Whereas Milton deſcribes the *nuda bellezza* of Eve by general terms and abſtract ideas, that preſent no image to the mind.

Grace was in all her ſteps, *heaven* in her eye,
In every geſture *dignity* and *love*.

Of this criticiſm I would obſerve, that the cenſure here paſſed on the poetry of the north, as compared with that of the *modern* Italians at leaſt, will hardly be admitted by thoſe who underſtand and have read our great poets, Chaucer, Spenſer, Shakeſpeare, and Thomſon; from whom inſtances without number might be brought of imagery as vivid and particular, as it is in the power of language to convey. Milton, where his ſubject requires that he ſhould be *exactly deſcriptive*, as in his fourth, ſeventh, ninth, and eleventh books, is in this reſpect not inferiour to Homer himſelf. Indeed, when his ſcene of action lies *Beyond the viſible diurnal ſphere*; when, with a view to raiſe aſtoniſhment or horror, he paints what was never ſeen by mortal eye, it is impoſſible for him to be ſtrictly pictureſque. Figures ſo deeply ſhaded cannot preſent a definite outline; forms of ſuch terrifick grandeur muſt be to a certain degree inveſted with darkneſs.

As

to clouds and darkneſs; the clangour of his weapons to the ſcream of the owl; the terror he ſtruck into the enemy, to the fear occaſioned by apparitions; with perhaps a great deal more to the ſame purpoſe: which would have taken off our attention from the hero, and ſet us a wondering at the ſingularity of the author's wit. It ought to be conſidered, that the rapidity of Hector's motion requires a correſpondent rapidity in the narrative, and leaves no time for long deſcription; and it may be ſuppoſed, that the perſons who ſaw him would not ſtand gazing, and making ſimilies, but would fly before him if they were Greeks, or ruſh on along with him if they were his own people.

When an author, in exhibiting what he thinks great, ſays every thing that can be ſaid, he confounds his readers with the multitude of circumſtances; and, inſtead of rouſing their imagination, leaves it

As to the deſcription objected to by the critick:—I think it would *not* have been improved by being made more particular. Nor is the example at all parallel to that of Dido. The varieties of *dreſs* are innumerable: and if the poet meant that we ſhould have a diſtinct idea of Dido's attire, it was neceſſary for him to deſcribe it as minutely as he has done. But no minute deſcription is neceſſary to preſent the nuda bellezza of Eve to our imagination, or to improve the idea which in a caſe of this kind every imagination would form for itſelf.

Algarotti has overlooked a very material circumſtance; namely, that this account of Adam's firſt interview with Eve is given by Adam himſelf to an angel; who needed no information on the ſubject of her beauty, becauſe he had ſeen her; and to whom it would have been highly indecent to particularize her bodily perfections. Adam, therefore, is brief in this part of the narrative; and inſinuates, that, at her firſt appearance, his attention was chiefly engaged by the *delicacy* and the *dignity* of her *mind*, as they diſplayed themſelves externally in her looks and demeanour. In a word, the ſanctity of the ſtate of innocence, the purity of the loves of Paradiſe, the ſublime character of the ſpeaker, the veneration due to the hearer, and that majeſty of thought and of ſtyle which ſo peculiarly characteriſes the divine poem, would all have been violated, if the poet's ideas had in this place been conformable to thoſe of the Critick. Algarotti was probably thinking of the luſcious pictures of Taſſo, and the ſenſualities of Rinaldo and Armida: but Milton was converſing with Gods, breathing "empyreal air," and deſcribing "*immortal* fruits of joy and love." I know not whether any part of the poem does more honour to his judgment.

in a ſtate of indolence, by giving it nothing to do; making them at the ſame time ſuſpect, that, as he has but few great ideas to offer, he is determined to make the moſt of what he has. Beſides, long details encumber the narrative, and lengthen the poem without neceſſity. Brief deſcription, therefore, and conciſe expreſſion, may be conſidered as eſſential to the ſublime.

And no where do they promote it ſo effectually, as in the poetical and hiſtorical parts of Scripture; which, however, more than any other compoſitions, have had their grandeur impaired by the verboſity of paraphraſe. Caſtalio, in his *Sacred Dialogues*, is ſo imprudent in this reſpect, that, if his character as a man of learning and piety were not thoroughly eſtabliſhed, we ſhould be tempted to think he had meant to burleſque ſome paſſages of the Old Teſtament. He makes Abraham (for example), while preparing entertainment for the angels, buſtle about with the officiouſneſs and prattle of one of Fielding's landladies. Indeed theſe Dialogues are ſo frequently farcical, not to ſay indecent, that I wonder the reading of them is not diſcontinued in our ſchools.—I know it has been ſaid, in their behalf, that the language is good, being formed on the model of Terence. But what idea of propriety in writing can he have, who applies the ſtyle of comedy to the illuſtration of Sacred Hiſtory? What would be thought of an Engliſh divine, who ſhould in his ſermons imitate the phraſeology of Mercutio, Benedick, or Will Honeycomb? Nor is Caſtalio correct, even in this ſenſe of the word. He is often harſh: he admits modes of expreſſion, that are not in Terence, or in any good writer: and his deſire of diffuſing a claſſical air through his work makes him give a new and ambiguous meaning to Roman words *, where, if he had adopted the common, and what may be called the technical, terms of Theology, he would have expreſſed himſelf more clearly, and without any real impropriety.

* As when he uſes *adventitius* for *proſelyte*, *genius* for *angel*, *Vejupiter* for *diabolus*, &c.

Our poetical paraphraſes of the Pſalms are not leſs injurious to the original. Sternhold and Hopkins are confeſſedly beneath criticiſm; yet to thoſe, who would rather ſee in the pulpit a threadbare coat than a laced one, are not in their ruſtick guiſe more offenſive, than Brady and Tate in their finical ornaments. If we look into Buchanan, what can we ſay, but that the learned author, with great command of Latin expreſſion, had no true reliſh for the emphatick conciſeneſs, and unadorned ſimplicity, of the inſpired poets? Arthur Johnſton is not ſo verboſe, and has of courſe more vigour: but his choice of a couplet, which keeps the reader always in mind of the puerile epiſtles of Ovid, was ſingularly injudicious.—As pſalms may, in proſe, as eaſily, as in verſe, be adapted to muſick, why ſhould we ſeek to force thoſe divine ſtrains into the meaſures of Roman, or of modern, ſong? He who transformed Livy into Iambicks, and Virgil into monkiſh rhime, did not in my opinion act more abſurdly. In fact, ſentiments of devotion are rather depreſſed than elevated by the arts of the European verſifier.

Secondly: Though an author's ideas be great, they may yet fall ſhort of ſublimity by exceſſive amplification. Hyperbolical phraſes, for reaſons aſſigned in another place *, are often natural, and may therefore promote the ſublime; but if they are not uſed with diſcretion and a due regard to the proportions of nature, they become ridiculous.

A tranſlator of Virgil concludes that elegant deſcription (in the ſecond Eneid) of the felling of a mountain-aſh, with this enormous exaggeration. The tree, he ſays,

Headlong with half the ſhatter'd mountain flies,
And ſtretch'd out, huge in length, th' unmeaſured ruin lies.

Before we can admit this hyperbole to be in any degree tolerable, we muſt ſuppoſe, either that the mountain was a hillock, or that the tree muſt have been at leaſt a thouſand yards high and fifty in diameter. Virgil only ſays, with his uſual propriety;

* Eſſay on Poetry and Muſick. Part ii. chap. 1. ſect. 3.

——traxitque

—— traxitque jugis avolſa ruinam.
And drags a ruin from the mountain's brow.

When a certain poet ſpeaks of one of his champions deſtroying a troop of horſe with a ſingle blow; and of another, whoſe impetuoſity was ſuch, that he fought for a conſiderable time after his head was cut off; he conveys to us the idea, not of ſtrength or courage in the warriours, but of folly in himſelf. To magnify in this manner is as eaſy, as to multiply by a thouſand; which only requires, that three ciphers be ſubjoined to the ſum. At this rate, every child may be a ſublime writer; the only qualifications neceſſary to contrive ſuch things being, ignorance of nature, and a total diſregard both to probability and to poſſibility. *But nothing is ſublime*, that does not create in the mind a *pleaſing* aſtoniſhment; and nothing can pleaſe a rational being, but what is conſiſtent with itſelf, and regulated by the ſtandard of nature.

When Cowley attempts to be great, he frequently becomes monſtrous *. A true poet exhibits the moſt magnificent ideas without any apparent effort; as if they were familiar to him, and ſuch as he can mould and manage at his pleaſure. The one labours ineffectually, and awkwardly, to do what is above his ſtrength; and makes himſelf ridiculous, by ſhowing at once his vanity, and his weakneſs: of the other, after he has, with eaſe and with grace, performed the greateſt exertions, we ſay, that "half his ſtrength "he put not forth." The former reminds one of Aſteropeus in the Iliad, ſtraining with all his might, and diſtorting his body in vain, to wrench the ſpear of Achilles from the bank, into which, when flung by the hero's arm, it had penetrated to the middle: the latter may be compared to Achilles himſelf, who laying his hand upon it draws it forth at once. †

* See the Davideis *paſſim*, particularly the account of Goliah.

† Iliad xxi. 170. 200.

Thirdly:

Thirdly: Mean words and mean circumſtances, introduced in the deſcription of what is great or elegant, will deſtroy the ſublimity, and debaſe the beauty. The Duke of Buckingham, in ſome complimental verſes addreſſed to Pope, has this couplet,

And yet ſo wonderful ſublime a thing
As the great Iliad ſcarce could make me ſing.

The paſſage is not much elevated, it is true: yet who does not ſee, that the little dignity it has is debaſed by the word *thing*; which is choſen merely becauſe it happens to make a rhime? "Homer's "Iliad is a ſublime thing"—the phraſe would be deſpicable even in proſe.

Take an example of a mean circumſtance from Blackmore's Paraphraſe of Job: a work in which one may find ſpecimens of every ſort of bad writing.

I ſolemnly pronounce, that I believe:
My bleſt Redeemer does for ever live.
When future ages ſhall their circuit end,
And bankrupt Time ſhall his laſt minute ſpend,
Then he from heaven in triumph ſhall deſcend.

How groveling muſt be the imagination of a writer, who, in meditating on a paſſage ſo ſublime, and a ſubject ſo awful, can bring himſelf to think and ſpeak of bankruptcy! Such an idea, in ſuch a place, is contemptible beyond expreſſion. And its abſurdity is equal to its meanneſs. A bankrupt is a perſon, who is either pitied for having loſt, or blamed for having ſquandered, the money with which he ought to have paid his debts. But who can imagine, that, at the end of the world, Time will be either blamed or pitied, for having ſquandered, or loſt his minutes!

Before I conclude, I muſt be a little more particular in deſcribing the nature of what I call mean expreſſions: for againſt them I am anxious that we be more eſpecially on our guard; firſt,

becauſe they are a grievous blemiſh in every ſort of elegant writing; and, ſecondly, becauſe in the provincial dialects they abound to ſuch a degree, that without great attention, or much good advice, it is not eaſy for us to avoid them.

And firſt; Thoſe words are not mean, which are ſo neceſſary at all times, that it is impoſſible to ſpeak without them on any ſubject. And moſt of the claſſical words in every tongue are of this character. Words are not mean, becauſe they are plain; nor elegant, becauſe none but men of learning underſtand them: on the contrary, every thing in ſtyle is blameable, which is obſcure or ambiguous to an attentive reader. We may have heard ſome perſons celebrated for a *fine* ſtyle, becauſe they were on every occaſion *dragging* in ſtrange words, to ſhow their learning. But this is contrary to every rule of ſound criticiſm, and to the practice of all good writers. "Let "there be light, and there was light," is a much more elegant ſentence than, "Let light irradiate the univerſe, and inſtantly light "flaſhed into exiſtence:" the former conſiſts of words, that no perſon who knows Engliſh can miſunderſtand; the latter has more words than are neceſſary, and thoſe are affected and ill-choſen, and ſuch as he only can underſtand, who knows ſomething of Latin, as well as of Engliſh. It is ſaid of the ſtyle of Demoſthenes, that, though the moſt artful that had ever appeared in Greece, there was not a phraſe in it, which the meaneſt Athenian citizen did not underſtand. And in fact, the moſt elegant authors are in every language the moſt perſpicuous; as Addiſon and Swift, in Engliſh; Ceſar and Cicero, in Latin; Metaſtaſio, Taſſo, and Arioſto, in Italian; and Vertot, Boileau, and the Archbiſhop of Cambray, in French. Uncommon expreſſions are in general to be avoided, where they can be avoided. It is pedantry to affect them. And therefore, we muſt not imagine, that words are mean, or not elegant, merely becauſe they are common.

But

But ſecondly; Many words there are in every tongue, which are not uſed, except by illiterate perſons, or on very familiar occaſions, or in order to expreſs what the decorum of polite ſociety requires that we conceal: and theſe may be called *mean words*; and are never to be introduced in ſublime deſcription, in elegant writing, or on any ſolemn or ſerious topick.

Such, in the firſt place, are vulgar proverbs. Theſe, though they may have a good meaning, are too familiar to find a place in good ſtyle. We have heard common proverbs, particularly thoſe of this country, celebrated for their force and truth: and ſome may perhaps wonder to ſee them proſcribed as inelegant. I allow them to be emphatical, both in this and in other countries; for otherwiſe, nobody would think it worth while to remember them. But ſtill they form a part of the vulgar dialect, and are therefore themſelves vulgar. One of the common people may be a perſon of great worth and ſenſe: but place him in faſhionable company, and both you and he will perceive, that there is ſomething awkward in his appearance; you may eſteem him for his virtue, but cannot reconcile yourſelf to his air and manner; and you muſt be ſenſible that he and his preſent aſſociates are not well ſuited to one another. Sancho Pança is in many things ridiculous, but in nothing more than in his ſtyle, which is almoſt entirely made up of proverbs. In prayers and ſermons, and on every ſolemn occaſion, one muſt feel that theſe aphoriſms would have a bad effect, and give a ludicrous turn both to the ſubject and to the ſpeaker. Even in converſation they are rarely uſed by perſons of polite manners, as they not only ſavour of vulgarity, but alſo breed ſuſpicion of a barren fancy: for he who retails proverbs gives only what he has borrowed; that is, what he has heard from others: and borrowing generally implies poverty.

Common forms of compliment, though innocent in themſelves, and though in ſociety agreeable, becauſe cuſtomary, muſt not ap-

pear in elegant writing: firſt, becauſe they are too familiar to the ear, being uſed on every trivial occaſion; and ſecondly, becauſe they derive their meaning from the manners of particular times and places. How ridiculous would it be, if a tranſlator of Virgil were to make Eneas introduce himſelf to Dido, with theſe words,

Madam, Your Majeſty beholds in me
Your moſt obliged, obedient, humble ſervant,
Eneas, prince of Troy!

A painter, who would repreſent the interview, might with equal propriety dreſs the Trojan in a full-bottomed wig, with a hat and feather under his arm, and make him bend his body to the ground in all the formality of a minuet-bow. There is great *dignity in* the complimental expreſſions of Homer. Priam addreſſes the moſt dreadful of all his enemies, by the appellation of "Godlike "Achilles *." Achilles begins a ſpeech to Ulyſſes with theſe words, "O wiſe Ulyſſes, deſcended from Jove;" and calls Ajax (who, by the by, had ſpoken to him with provoking bitterneſs) "Divine "Ajax, ſon of Telamon, prince of the people."†—Milton is perhaps ſtill more attentive to this decorum; as his perſons are of greater dignity than heroes. Adam addreſſes Eve in theſe exalted terms,

Daughter of God and man, accompliſh'd Eve —
Beſt image of myſelf, and dearer half —
My faireſt, my eſpouſed, my lateſt found,
Heaven's laſt beſt gift, my ever new delight —

and Eve's complaiſance to her huſband is equally ſublime;

Offspring of heaven and earth, and all earth's Lord —
O thou, in whom my thoughts find all repoſe,
My glory, my perfection —

Such compliments are not made vulgar by common uſe; and *have*, beſides,

* Iliad. xxiv. † Iliad. ix.

beſides, a ſignificancy, which all the world would acknowledge to be ſolemn and majeſtick.

A third claſs of expreſſions, that by their meanneſs would debaſe every ſort of good writing, are thoſe idioms, commonly called *cant*; a jargon introduced by ignorant or affected perſons, and which the moſt perfect acquaintance with every good author in a language would not enable one to underſtand. Their nature may be better known from a few examples, than from a general definition. To ſay, of a perſon, whoſe converſation is tedious, that he is *a bore*; of a drunk man, that he is *in liquor*, that he is *diſguiſed*, that he is *half ſeas over*, that he *has his load*, or that he *clips the king's engliſh*; of one who plays with an intention to loſe, that he *plays booty*; of one, who has nothing to reply, that he is *dumbfounded*; of a tranſaction committed to writing, that it is taken down *in black and white*; of a perſon baffled in any enterpriſe, that he is *beat hollow*, that he has received *check-mate*, or that he is *routed horſe foot and dragoons*; of one who arrives on the very point of being too late, that he has *ſaved his diſtance*; of one, who has enriched himſelf by any buſineſs, that he has *feather'd his neſt*: — theſe, and the like idioms, are all cant: they derive no authority from the analogy or grammar of a language; and polite writers and ſpeakers, unleſs when they mean to ſpeak or write ludicrouſly, avoid them as vulgarities of the loweſt order.

There are ſome profeſſions, that have a peculiar dialect; or certain phraſes at leaſt, which are not underſtood by people of other profeſſions. Thus ſeamen make uſe of terms, which none but ſeamen are acquainted with: and the ſame thing is true of architects, painters, muſicians, and many other artiſts. Now in ſublime writings ſuch words are to be avoided; partly becauſe, being technical, they have ſomething of a vulgar appearance; and chiefly, becauſe to the greater part of readers they are unintelligible. That

paſſage of Dryden's Virgil, in which he abſurdly imitates the ſea-dialect, has often been repeated and cenſured:

Tack to the larboard, and ſtand out to ſea,
Veer ſtarboard ſea and land.

and is chargeable with ſomething worſe than affectation; for I am aſſured by an experienced mariner, that it has no meaning.—Milton ſometimes errs in this way; eſpecially when he alludes to architecture and aſtronomy. He ſpeaks of *cornice*, *freeze*, and *architrave*, and of rays *culminating from the equator*; which is very unſuitable to the heroick ſtyle. For, as Addiſon well obſerves, "It is one of the greateſt beauties of poetry to make hard things "intelligible, and to deliver what is abſtruſe of itſelf in ſuch eaſy "language, as may be underſtood by ordinary readers. Beſides "(continues he) the knowledge of a poet ſhould rather ſeem born "with him, or inſpired, than drawn from books and ſyſtems." True poetry is addreſſed to all mankind; and therefore its ideas are general; and its language ought to be ſo plain, as that every perſon acquainted with the poetical dialect may underſtand it.

It is ſcarce neceſſary to add, that all phraſes are mean, which come under the denomination of barbariſm, or provincial idiom; becauſe they ſuggeſt the ideas of vulgar things, and illiterate perſons. Meanneſs blended with dignity is one of thoſe incongruities that provoke laughter. And therefore provincial idioms introduced in a ſolemn ſubject would make it, or the author at leaſt, ridiculous. The ſpeeches, in Ovid, of Ajax and Ulyſſes contending for the armour of Achilles, cannot be called ſublime; but artful they are, and elegant, in a high degree. That of Ajax has been tranſlated with tolerable exactneſs into one of the vulgar dialects of North Britain. When we read the original, we are ſeriouſly affected: but when we look into the Scotch verſion, we immediately fall a laughing. I was ſtruck with this, when a ſchoolboy,

but could not at that time account for it. The thoughts were nearly the ſame in both: what then could make the one ſolemn, and the other ridiculous? It is the mixture of mean words and ſerious ſentiments, and of clowniſh and heroick manners, contraſted with what we remember of the original, that produces a jumble of diſcordant ideas; and ſuch a jumble, as may be found in moſt ludicrous appearances when we analyſe them. *

The laſt thing I ſhall mention upon this head is, that turns of wit have a bad effect in ſublime writing: for one does not naturally think of witticiſm, when one is engroſſed by any of thoſe grand ideas that raiſe pleaſing aſtoniſhment. In fact, ſublime poets are *ſeldom, what we call, men of wit*: Shakeſpeare is an exception; but he is a ſingular one. For wit ariſes from the diſcovery of minute relations and likeneſſes that had eſcaped the notice of others; and therefore a talent for it implies a habit of minute attention to circumſtances and words: whereas a ſublime genius directs his view chiefly to the great and more important phenomena of art and nature. They who excel in epigram have not often produced ſublime verſes: and Lord Cheſterfield, who was a man of wit, and an epigrammatiſt, appears, from his letters, to have had no reliſh for the ſublime poets.

Let it not be thought, becauſe ſublimity is one of the higheſt virtues of fine writing, that therefore no compoſition is excellent but what is ſublime. A book, that partakes not of this quality at all, may pleaſe by its elegance, inſtruct by its doctrines, or amuſe by its wit and humour, and in all, or in any of theſe reſpects, be truly valuable. Rivulets and meadows have their charms, as well as mountains and the ocean. Though Horace had never written any thing but his Epiſtles, in which there is no attempt at ſublimity, he muſt always have been conſidered as an elegant and inſtructive poet.

* See An Eſſay on Laughter and Ludicrous Compoſition, chap. 2.

Nor

Nor think, becauſe moſt of the preceding examples are taken from poetry, that the Sublime is peculiar to that art. In the orations of Cicero and Demoſthenes; in the hiſtories of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Livy; in the moral writings of Addiſon and Johnſon, of Seneca, Plato, and Antoninus; and eſpecially in the doctrinal and hiſtorical parts of Holy Writ, are many inſtances of the true Sublime, both in ſentiment and deſcription. The ſame thing may be ſaid of almoſt every ſerious author, who compoſes with elegance.

Moſt of the writers on this ſubject have conſidered our paſſion for what is great and elevated, as a proof of the dignity of the ſoul, and of the glorious ends for which it was made. The words of Longinus to this purpoſe are well tranſlated by Dr. Akenſide. "God has not intended man for an ignoble being; but, bringing "us into life, and the midſt of this wide univerſe, as before a mul- "titude aſſembled at ſome heroick ſolemnity, that we might be ſpec- "tators of all his magnificence, and candidates high in emulation "for the prize of glory, has therefore implanted in our ſouls an "inextinguiſhable love of every thing great and exalted, of every "thing which appears divine beyond our comprehenſion. Whence "it comes to paſs, that even the whole world is not an object ſuf- "ficient for the depth and rapidity of human imagination, which "often ſallies forth beyond the limits of all that ſurrounds us. Let "any man caſt his eye through the whole circle of our exiſtence, "and conſider how eſpecially it abounds with excellent and grand "objects, and he will ſoon acknowlege for what enjoyments and "purſuits we were deſtined."

Theſe are the ſentiments of a Pagan philoſopher. And how noble, (I had almoſt ſaid, how divine) muſt they appear, when compared with the ſelfiſh, ſenſual, and groveling ideas of the Epicurean, or with the narrow views and brutal inſenſibility of the antient and modern Pyrrhoniſt!—I muſt not omit, that Addiſon has

has adopted the ſame turn of thinking; and, enlightened with the knowledge, and warmed with the piety, of a Chriſtian, has greatly improved it. "The Supreme Being," ſays he, "has ſo "formed the ſoul of man, that nothing but Himſelf can be its laſt, "adequate, and proper happineſs. Becauſe therefore a great part "of our happineſs muſt ariſe from the contemplation of his being, "that he might give our ſouls a juſt reliſh of ſuch a contemplation, "he has made them naturally delight in the apprehenſion of what "is great and unlimited. Our admiration, which is a very "pleaſing emotion of the mind, immediately riſes at the conſi-"deration of any object that takes up a great deal of room in the "fancy; and, by conſequence, will improve into the higheſt pitch "of aſtoniſhment and devotion, when we contemplate his nature, "who is neither circumſcribed by time or place, nor to be com-"prehended by the largeſt capacity of a created being."

I ſhall only add, that our taſte for the Sublime, cheriſhed into a habit, and directed to proper objects, may, by preſerving us from vice, which is the vileſt of all things, and by recommending virtue for its intrinſick dignity, be uſeful in promoting our moral improvement. The ſame taſte will alſo lead to the ſtudy of nature, which every where diſplays the ſublimeſt appearances. And no ſtudy has a better effect upon the heart. For it keeps men at a diſtance from criminal purſuits, yields a variety of inoffenſive and profitable amuſement, and gives full demonſtration of the infinite goodneſs and greatneſs of the adorable Creator.

THE END.

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Digitized with financial assistance from the
Government of Maharashtra
on 15 June, 2016